Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Gatewood was convicted of two counts of kidnapping and one count of robbery affecting interstate commerce. The court determined that Gatewood’s four prior Arkansas robbery convictions qualified as serious violent felonies and imposed a life sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), the federal three-strikes statute.In 2016, Gatewood moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his robbery convictions had been deemed serious violent felonies only under the residual clause. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause had been found unconstitutionally vague in the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” decision. Gatewood filed his motion within a year of Johnson. The government argued that Johnson could not render the motion timely because it applied only to ACCA. The government also argued procedural default. The Supreme Court decided “Davis” in 2019, finding the 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause, which is nearly identical to the three-strikes residual clause, unconstitutionally vague.The district court denied Gatewood’s motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the government concedes that Gatewood’s motion was timely in light of Davis, Gatewood procedurally defaulted the vagueness claim by failing to raise it on direct review. Gatewood cannot establish cause by showing that his claim cut against circuit precedent at the time of his appeal. From Gatewood’s sentencing to the 2002 conclusion of his appeal, the tools to construct his present vagueness claim existed; no Supreme Court precedent foreclosed it. View "Gatewood v. United States" on Justia Law

Fletcher was convicted of importuning a minor under Ohio law. Under the terms of his probation, Fletcher “[a]greed to a search without warrant of [his] person, [his] motor vehicle or [his] place of residence by a Probation Officer at any time.” During a routine visit, his probation officer noticed that Fletcher had two phones. The officer stated that he was going to search the phones and observed that Fletcher responded nervously and began looking through one of them. Fletcher initially resisted but ultimately unlocked the phone. The officer, searching through the phone, saw an image of child pornography. Detective Carter executed a warrant to search the phone, which contained child pornography that had been downloaded from the internet and that had been filmed by the phone itself. Carter forwarded the videos filmed on the phone to federal agents. For the downloaded child pornography, Fletcher pled guilty in state court, to pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor. For the videos filmed on the phone, Fletcher was charged in federal court with conspiracy to produce child pornography and production of child pornography. His motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his cell phone was denied. Fletcher was sentenced to 35 years in prison, to run concurrently with his 10-year state sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The probation officer did not have reasonable suspicion to search Fletcher’s cell phone and Fletcher’s probation agreement did not authorize the search. View "United States v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

SMART manages a public-transportation system for the counties in and around Detroit. For a fee, parties may display advertisements on the inside and outside of SMART’s buses and bus shelters. SMART guidelines prohibit “political” ads; ads that engage in “scorn or ridicule”; advertising promoting the sale of alcohol or tobacco; advertising that is false, misleading, or deceptive; advertising that is clearly defamatory or likely to hold up to scorn or ridicule any person or group of persons; advertising that is obscene or pornographic or advocates imminent lawlessness or unlawful violent action.AFDI sought to run an ad that said: “Fatwa on your head? Is your family or community threatening you? Leaving Islam? Got Questions? RefugefromIslam.com.” SMART rejected this ad as “political” and as holding up a group of people to “scorn or ridicule.”Initially, the Sixth Circuit held that the advertising space on SMART’s buses is a nonpublic forum and that SMART likely could show that its restrictions were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. In light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the Sixth Circuit reversed. SMART’s ban on “political” ads is unreasonable because SMART offers no “sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.”. SMART’s ban on ads that engage in “scorn or ridicule” is not viewpoint-neutral. For any group, “an applicant may [display] a positive or benign [ad] but not a derogatory one.” View "American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation" on Justia Law

Voter-advocacy organizations challenged Michigan statutes regulating absentee ballots and mandating that no one “hire a motor vehicle or other conveyance or cause the same to be done, for conveying voters, other than voters physically unable to walk, to an election." Michigan Attorney General Nessel was the named defendant; permissive intervenor status was granted to both houses of the Michigan Legislature, and the Republican Party. The court rejected challenges to the absentee-ballot statute but preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the voter-transportation law. When the intervenors sought an emergency stay of the injunction pending appeal, Nessel declined to take a position. The district court denied the intervenors’ motion.The Sixth Circuit granted an emergency stay. The legislature has standing to appeal. The state statute is likely not preempted by federal law, the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30143. The balance of equities weighs in favor of staying the order. The harm to the legislature without a stay would be irreparable: election day will only happen once, and the legislature will lose its ability to regulate paid voter transportation for that election. The harm to the voter-advocacy organizations appears modest. There are other ways, without violating Michigan’s statute, to take voters to the polls. With the expansion of mailed ballots in Michigan, there are likely fewer voters who need to be driven to the polls. The public interest lies in elections conducted with a minimum of fraud and in free elections, in which as many eligible voters can vote as desire to. View "Priorities USA v. Nessel" on Justia Law

Keahey and McGill lived with their daughter and two boys, the product of McGill’s prior relationship with Hampton. Hampton came to the house, pulled out a knife, charged Keahey, and stabbed him in the back. Keahey and McGill never identified Hampton as the assailant. McGill and the children moved in with her mother, Joyce. Despite a criminal history that prohibited firearm possession, Keahey got a gun. Weeks later, Keahey and McGill planned to meet at the doctor’s office for their daughter’s appointment. Keahey decided to instead go to Joyce's house. Joyce testified that when Hampton arrived with his boys, Keahey fired at an unarmed Hampton and chased Hampton down the sidewalk. A knife found at the scene was locked and closed. Keahey testified that he shot Hampton in self-defense because Hampton had charged at him with a knife. Keahey claims that, as he retreated, he heard a gunshot and saw Hampton, gun in hand, coming toward him. After shooting Hampton twice, Keahey fled.An Ohio trial judge found Keahey failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense instruction. State courts rejected his arguments on appeal and on collateral review. Keahey filed a federal habeas petition, citing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that the state court’s decision was not contrary to, and did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. View "Keahey v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, prohibited “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including faith-based events.” The order excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. “Life-sustaining” exempt entities include laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except when they provide “food, shelter, and social services.” The order prohibited even drive-in services.Maryville Baptist held an Easter service. Some congregants went into the church. Others parked outside and listened to the service over a loudspeaker. Police issued notices that their attendance, whether in the church or outdoors, amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters requiring self-quarantine for 14 days. Congregants who attended the service sued, claiming that the orders and their enforcement violated their free-exercise and interstate-travel rights.The Sixth Circuit previously granted injunctions pending appeal, reasoning that the treatment of comparable religious and non-religious activities does not suggest the least restrictive way of regulating the churches. The Sixth Circuit later dismissed the appeals. On remand, the district court(s) should consider whether these cases are moot in light of the Governor’s new orders, permitting indoor worship at limited capacity. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

A 1998 Kentucky law requires abortion facilities to obtain transfer agreements with local hospitals and transport agreements with local ambulance services, Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 216B.0435; 2017 regulations imposed stricter conditions on the agreements but also allowed successive, 90-day waivers for facilities unable to comply. EMW, at the time, Kentucky’s only licensed abortion facility, challenged the requirements as imposing an undue burden on abortion access. They argued that it had become impossible for them to obtain the required agreements and that the law’s enforcement would leave Kentucky without a licensed abortion facility. The district court found Kentucky’s requirements were facially invalid and permanently enjoined them.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, vacating the injunction. The district court erred in attempting to weigh the benefits of the Kentucky laws against their burdens; a court need only consider whether the laws are reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and whether they impose a substantial obstacle. The laws are reasonably related to a legitimate government end. The court noted that Planned Parenthood received a provisional license for its Louisville facility in 2020 and currently performs abortions. To establish a substantial burden, the plaintiffs had to establish that both EMW and Planned Parenthood would be unable to operate on the basis of waivers even if they could reasonably expect to renew the waiver every 90 days. They failed to make that showing. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander" on Justia Law

Tennessee voters must apply to vote absentee. The county administrator of elections determines whether the voter has established eligibility to vote absentee, and compares the signature of the voter on the request with the signature on the voter’s registration record. Voters who qualify to vote absentee receive a ballot, an inner envelope and an outer envelope, and instructions. The inner envelope has an affidavit; the voter must verify that he is eligible to vote in the election. The ballot must be received no later than when the polls close. Upon receipt by mail of the absentee ballot, the administrator "shall open only the outer envelope and compare the voter’s signature on the [affidavit] with the voter’s signature" on the registration record. If the administrator determines the signatures do not match, the ballot is rejected; the voter is “immediately” notified in writing. Voters who are concerned that their absentee ballot might be rejected may cast a provisional ballot before being notified of a rejection.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the signature verification procedures. The plaintiffs cannot cite with certainty or specification any past erroneous rejection of an absentee ballot; their speculative allegations of harm are insufficient to establish standing. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that anyone whose ballot may be erroneously rejected will ultimately be unable to vote, either absentee or by provisional ballot; there is no evidence that anyone’s constitutional rights are likely to be infringed. View "Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Hargett" on Justia Law

In 2011, McCormick was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, which carries a 10-year maximum sentence. The district court sentenced McCormick under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum on defendants with three prior violent felony convictions, citing McCormick’s prior convictions for Kentucky third-degree burglary. Those burglaries occurred during a 16-day period, 19 years earlier, just after McCormick turned 18. The court recognized that McCormick’s offenses did not categorically qualify as ACCA predicates. The district court examined more than the Kentucky statute to conclude that McCormick “pled guilty to each of the essential elements of [generic] burglary.” The court sentenced McCormick to the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum, varying downward. McCormick’s conviction and sentence were affirmed.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court incorrectly concluded that McCormick could not bring a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to challenge his illegal sentence based on the Supreme Court's 2016 "Mathis" decision, which explicated the “categorical approach” and requires courts to rely solely on the state statute's text to determine whether past convictions qualify as ACCA predicates where the state statute is divisible and lists alternative factual means by which a defendant can satisfy the listed elements. Based on Mathis, McCormick’s prior convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates. The 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) savings clause authorized him to seek relief from his unlawful sentence through a section 2241 petition. View "McCormick v. Butler" on Justia Law

Bennett worked at the Metro Government Emergency Communications Center (ECC) for 16 years. On November 9, 2016, Bennett, a white woman, responded to someone else's comment on her public-facing Facebook profile, using some of the commenter’s words: “Thank god we have more America loving rednecks. Red spread across all America. Even niggaz and latinos voted for trump too!” Bennett identified herself as an employee of Metro, the police department, and ECC in her Facebook profile. A constituent reposted part of Bennett’s statement and commented: If your skin is too dark your call may have just been placed on the back burner. Several employees and an outsider complained to ECC leadership. Bennett failed to show remorse. ECC officials determined that Bennett violated three Civil Service Rules and, after paid administrative leave and a due process hearing, fired her.Bennett sued Metro for First Amendment retaliation. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment in favor of Bennett, finding that the district court improperly analyzed the “Pickering” factors. The record indicated that the harmony of the office was disrupted; the court erred in discounting the importance of harmonious relationships at ECC. It is possible that inaction on ECC’s part could have been seen as an endorsement of the speech and impaired future discipline of similar derogatory statements. It is also possible that a damaged relationship with her colleagues could affect the quality and quantity of Bennett's work. Bennett’s comment detracted from ECC's mission. View "Bennett v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County" on Justia Law