Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ryan, a tenured professor of journalism at the University of Kentucky, was accused of misusing department resources to make a larger profit off a textbook he had authored. He was asked to resign but refused to do so. Ryan brought suit alleging that the defendants retaliated against him for asserting his due process and First Amendment rights after he refused to resign.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ryan’s claim. Ryan’s due process rights were not violated; a faculty committee conducted an investigation into his conduct and made its recommendation not to terminate Ryan’s employment. A statement to the press by the University’s provost was not sufficiently chilling that it would deter a person of ordinary firmness from refusing to resign, and cannot be considered retaliation. Ryan failed to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation because the facts alleged do not implicate a matter of public concern. Furthermore, because Ryan failed to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, he is not able to overcome qualified immunity. View "Ryan v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

Williamson County District Attorney Helper told other officials that she distrusted Fairview Police officers Stockdale and Dunning and that she would not “take their cases.” Helper wrote to the city manager (Collins): “per our discussion, this Office has concerns about reports initiated/investigated solely by” Dunning or Stockdale and that defense counsel would be entitled to a copy of an earlier investigation report concerning the officers. Helper stated, “[w]ithout independent corroboration from another law enforcement officer and/or independent witness, the[ir] testimony . . . may be impeached.” Collins disputed Helper’s assessment but Helper refused to back down. Collins fired the officers, explaining the email provided the “sole reason.”Stockdale and Dunning sued. They settled their claims against the city, leaving a First Amendment claim and state law claims against Helper. The district court denied Helper’s claim of absolute immunity and her claim for qualified immunity from the federal First Amendment retaliation claim. It also denied her summary judgment with respect to state law claims for official oppression and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Because Helper’s actions were not closely tied to the judicial process, absolute immunity does not apply; because her conduct did not violate any clearly established law, qualified immunity protects her. View "Stockdale v. Helper" on Justia Law

Troutman, a daily user of heroin and methamphetamine, committed suicide in pretrial detention after LMDC jail officials placed him in solitary confinement despite a recent suicide attempt while in LMDC custody. A medical screening had indicated signs of depression; he had attempted suicide three to four times in the past and was “currently thinking about suicide.” Troutman had experienced a traumatic brain injury the prior year which left him in a coma for nine days, He told medical staff “I’m not good at all, I’m dying!”In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Cox, the LMDC classification officer, but affirmed summary judgment in favor of LMDC director Bolton and Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government.Troutman objectively “exhibited suicidal tendencies” and other risk factors. A reasonable jury could find that Cox was subjectively aware of the substantial risk if Troutman was placed in solitary confinement. Cox’s argument that he reasonably relied on the medical judgment that Charles no longer presented a suicide risk does not make summary judgment appropriate. Claims that Bolton inadequately performed his duties are insufficient for section 1983 supervisory liability. It is plausible that the municipality was negligent in enforcing its policies, but deliberate indifference remains distinct from mere negligence. View "Troutman v. Louisville Metropolitan Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 1997, Gatewood was convicted of two counts of kidnapping and one count of robbery affecting interstate commerce. The court determined that Gatewood’s four prior Arkansas robbery convictions qualified as serious violent felonies and imposed a life sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c), the federal three-strikes statute.In 2016, Gatewood moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his robbery convictions had been deemed serious violent felonies only under the residual clause. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause had been found unconstitutionally vague in the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” decision. Gatewood filed his motion within a year of Johnson. The government argued that Johnson could not render the motion timely because it applied only to ACCA. The government also argued procedural default. The Supreme Court decided “Davis” in 2019, finding the 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause, which is nearly identical to the three-strikes residual clause, unconstitutionally vague.The district court denied Gatewood’s motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. While the government concedes that Gatewood’s motion was timely in light of Davis, Gatewood procedurally defaulted the vagueness claim by failing to raise it on direct review. Gatewood cannot establish cause by showing that his claim cut against circuit precedent at the time of his appeal. From Gatewood’s sentencing to the 2002 conclusion of his appeal, the tools to construct his present vagueness claim existed; no Supreme Court precedent foreclosed it. View "Gatewood v. United States" on Justia Law

Fletcher was convicted of importuning a minor under Ohio law. Under the terms of his probation, Fletcher “[a]greed to a search without warrant of [his] person, [his] motor vehicle or [his] place of residence by a Probation Officer at any time.” During a routine visit, his probation officer noticed that Fletcher had two phones. The officer stated that he was going to search the phones and observed that Fletcher responded nervously and began looking through one of them. Fletcher initially resisted but ultimately unlocked the phone. The officer, searching through the phone, saw an image of child pornography. Detective Carter executed a warrant to search the phone, which contained child pornography that had been downloaded from the internet and that had been filmed by the phone itself. Carter forwarded the videos filmed on the phone to federal agents. For the downloaded child pornography, Fletcher pled guilty in state court, to pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor. For the videos filmed on the phone, Fletcher was charged in federal court with conspiracy to produce child pornography and production of child pornography. His motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his cell phone was denied. Fletcher was sentenced to 35 years in prison, to run concurrently with his 10-year state sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The probation officer did not have reasonable suspicion to search Fletcher’s cell phone and Fletcher’s probation agreement did not authorize the search. View "United States v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

SMART manages a public-transportation system for the counties in and around Detroit. For a fee, parties may display advertisements on the inside and outside of SMART’s buses and bus shelters. SMART guidelines prohibit “political” ads; ads that engage in “scorn or ridicule”; advertising promoting the sale of alcohol or tobacco; advertising that is false, misleading, or deceptive; advertising that is clearly defamatory or likely to hold up to scorn or ridicule any person or group of persons; advertising that is obscene or pornographic or advocates imminent lawlessness or unlawful violent action.AFDI sought to run an ad that said: “Fatwa on your head? Is your family or community threatening you? Leaving Islam? Got Questions? RefugefromIslam.com.” SMART rejected this ad as “political” and as holding up a group of people to “scorn or ridicule.”Initially, the Sixth Circuit held that the advertising space on SMART’s buses is a nonpublic forum and that SMART likely could show that its restrictions were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. In light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the Sixth Circuit reversed. SMART’s ban on “political” ads is unreasonable because SMART offers no “sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.”. SMART’s ban on ads that engage in “scorn or ridicule” is not viewpoint-neutral. For any group, “an applicant may [display] a positive or benign [ad] but not a derogatory one.” View "American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation" on Justia Law

Voter-advocacy organizations challenged Michigan statutes regulating absentee ballots and mandating that no one “hire a motor vehicle or other conveyance or cause the same to be done, for conveying voters, other than voters physically unable to walk, to an election." Michigan Attorney General Nessel was the named defendant; permissive intervenor status was granted to both houses of the Michigan Legislature, and the Republican Party. The court rejected challenges to the absentee-ballot statute but preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the voter-transportation law. When the intervenors sought an emergency stay of the injunction pending appeal, Nessel declined to take a position. The district court denied the intervenors’ motion.The Sixth Circuit granted an emergency stay. The legislature has standing to appeal. The state statute is likely not preempted by federal law, the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30143. The balance of equities weighs in favor of staying the order. The harm to the legislature without a stay would be irreparable: election day will only happen once, and the legislature will lose its ability to regulate paid voter transportation for that election. The harm to the voter-advocacy organizations appears modest. There are other ways, without violating Michigan’s statute, to take voters to the polls. With the expansion of mailed ballots in Michigan, there are likely fewer voters who need to be driven to the polls. The public interest lies in elections conducted with a minimum of fraud and in free elections, in which as many eligible voters can vote as desire to. View "Priorities USA v. Nessel" on Justia Law

Keahey and McGill lived with their daughter and two boys, the product of McGill’s prior relationship with Hampton. Hampton came to the house, pulled out a knife, charged Keahey, and stabbed him in the back. Keahey and McGill never identified Hampton as the assailant. McGill and the children moved in with her mother, Joyce. Despite a criminal history that prohibited firearm possession, Keahey got a gun. Weeks later, Keahey and McGill planned to meet at the doctor’s office for their daughter’s appointment. Keahey decided to instead go to Joyce's house. Joyce testified that when Hampton arrived with his boys, Keahey fired at an unarmed Hampton and chased Hampton down the sidewalk. A knife found at the scene was locked and closed. Keahey testified that he shot Hampton in self-defense because Hampton had charged at him with a knife. Keahey claims that, as he retreated, he heard a gunshot and saw Hampton, gun in hand, coming toward him. After shooting Hampton twice, Keahey fled.An Ohio trial judge found Keahey failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense instruction. State courts rejected his arguments on appeal and on collateral review. Keahey filed a federal habeas petition, citing the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that the state court’s decision was not contrary to, and did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. View "Keahey v. Marquis" on Justia Law

Kentucky Governor Beshear, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, prohibited “[a]ll mass gatherings,” including faith-based events.” The order excepts “normal operations at airports, bus and train stations, . . . shopping malls,” and “typical office environments, factories, or retail or grocery stores where large numbers of people are present, but maintain appropriate social distancing.” A subsequent order required organizations that are not “life-sustaining” to close. “Life-sustaining” exempt entities include laundromats, accounting services, law firms, hardware stores, airlines, mining operations, funeral homes, landscaping businesses, and grocery stores. Religious organizations are not “life-sustaining,” except when they provide “food, shelter, and social services.” The order prohibited even drive-in services.Maryville Baptist held an Easter service. Some congregants went into the church. Others parked outside and listened to the service over a loudspeaker. Police issued notices that their attendance, whether in the church or outdoors, amounted to a criminal act, recorded congregants’ license plate numbers, and sent letters requiring self-quarantine for 14 days. Congregants who attended the service sued, claiming that the orders and their enforcement violated their free-exercise and interstate-travel rights.The Sixth Circuit previously granted injunctions pending appeal, reasoning that the treatment of comparable religious and non-religious activities does not suggest the least restrictive way of regulating the churches. The Sixth Circuit later dismissed the appeals. On remand, the district court(s) should consider whether these cases are moot in light of the Governor’s new orders, permitting indoor worship at limited capacity. View "Roberts v. Neace" on Justia Law

A 1998 Kentucky law requires abortion facilities to obtain transfer agreements with local hospitals and transport agreements with local ambulance services, Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 216B.0435; 2017 regulations imposed stricter conditions on the agreements but also allowed successive, 90-day waivers for facilities unable to comply. EMW, at the time, Kentucky’s only licensed abortion facility, challenged the requirements as imposing an undue burden on abortion access. They argued that it had become impossible for them to obtain the required agreements and that the law’s enforcement would leave Kentucky without a licensed abortion facility. The district court found Kentucky’s requirements were facially invalid and permanently enjoined them.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, vacating the injunction. The district court erred in attempting to weigh the benefits of the Kentucky laws against their burdens; a court need only consider whether the laws are reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and whether they impose a substantial obstacle. The laws are reasonably related to a legitimate government end. The court noted that Planned Parenthood received a provisional license for its Louisville facility in 2020 and currently performs abortions. To establish a substantial burden, the plaintiffs had to establish that both EMW and Planned Parenthood would be unable to operate on the basis of waivers even if they could reasonably expect to renew the waiver every 90 days. They failed to make that showing. View "EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C. v. Friedlander" on Justia Law