Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

On May 8, 2013, a fire broke out in the kitchen of Plaintiffs' restaurant. Firefighters put out the fire, but a firefighter, Woelke, died from smoke inhalation. State Police offered to investigate, but the Wayne-Westland Fire Marshal (Adams) and Fire Chief Reddy declined and investigated. Adams found no evidence of accelerants. Investigators representing Plaintiffs’ landlord and insurer also investigated and found the fire's cause to be “undetermined.” The Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration concluded that Woelke's death resulted, at least in part, from the Fire Department’s violations of health and safety regulations. The Department admitted its violations. Meanwhile, according to Plaintiffs, Adams, Reddy and Reddy’s father, retired Fire Chief Reddy Sr., planned to divert attention away from the Department; they agreed to change the cause of the fire to “incendiary” to trigger an arson and homicide investigation. Despite their ensuing activities, no charges were ever brought.Plaintiffs sued the three under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging civil conspiracy, and sued Lieutenant Sanchez, alleging that he falsified his application for a warrant and illegally searched Plaintiffs' homes without probable cause. The court denied their motions to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Reddy Sr.’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A party who is not a public official may be liable under section 1983 but not entitled to qualified immunity because the reason for affording qualified immunity does not exist. The court affirmed as to the others. Sanchez’s motion to dismiss did not challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Adams and Reddy Jr. engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to fabricate evidence and thereby caused Plaintiffs’ constitutional injury. View "Marvaso v. Adams" on Justia Law

Chase was convicted of kidnapping, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, unlawful imprisonment, and assault with a dangerous weapon. In 2013, the Michigan court imposed two consecutive terms of 25-80 years’ imprisonment on the criminal sexual conduct counts, to be served concurrently with terms for the other counts. Michigan’s sentencing guidelines allowed a sentencing court to depart from the guidelines’ mandatory sentencing ranges upon a showing of “a substantial and compelling reason,” using “prior record variables” and “offense variables.” In Chase’s case, the court increased Chase’s minimum sentencing range based on offense variables that had not been found by the jury, such as serving as a “leader” and causing bodily injury and serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment.Days after Chase’s sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in “Alleyne,” that the Sixth Amendment requires any fact that increases a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence be found by a jury, not a judge. Chase did not raise an “Alleyne” claim on direct appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court did not determine that Alleyne rendered its sentencing scheme unconstitutional until 2015.The Sixth Circuit granted Chase habeas relief, excusing the procedural default. Because there is a reasonable probability that, but for his appellate counsel’s error, Chase would have received relief from the Michigan Supreme Court, he has shown prejudice. A decision upholding the sentencing court’s use of judge-found facts to raise Chase’s mandatory minimum sentence would be contrary to clearly established federal law,. View "Chase v. MaCauley" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Ohio Department of Transportation began a construction project on a portion of Interstate Highway 75 near the Plaintiffs’ Hancock County properties. As a result of this construction, storm and groundwater flooded those properties three times and caused significant damage. The Plaintiffs filed suit, including a claim brought directly under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, seeking a declaratory judgment that the flooding caused a “change in topography [that] constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation,” and compensation for the same, and a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages for the alleged taking. The district court dismissed, finding that Ohio’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. States’ sovereign immunity predates the Constitution; unless the Constitution itself, or Congress acting under a constitutional grant of authority, abrogates that immunity, it remains in place. The Sixth Circuit has previously held that the states’ sovereign immunity protects them from takings claims for damages in federal court and that Ohio’s statutory mechanism for obtaining compensation to remedy a Takings Clause violation does provide reasonable, certain, and adequate procedures. View "Ladd v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

Marquardt, a Cleveland EMS captain, posted on his personal Facebook page, concerning the shooting death of 12-year-old Tamir Rice. The posts did not identify Marquardt as a city employee, nor were they made during work hours. The posts stated: Let me be the first on record to have the balls to say Tamir Rice should have been shot and I am glad he is dead. I wish I was in the park that day as he terrorized innocent patrons by pointing a gun at them walking around acting bad. I am upset I did not get the chance to kill the criminal fucker” and referred to Rice as a “ghetto rat..” Marquardt removed the posts within hours and later claimed an acquaintance with access to his phone made the posts while he slept. A termination letter advised Marquardt that his speech violated city policies.Marquardt's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was rejected on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Marquardt’s posts addressed a matter of public concern. The court did not decide whether the posts amount to protected speech, which will require a determination of whether Marquardt’s free speech interests outweigh the interest of the Cleveland EMS in the efficient administration of its duties. Government, when acting as an employer, may regulate employee speech to a greater extent than it can that of private citizens, including to discipline employees for speech the employer reasonably predicts will be disruptive. View "Marquardt v. Carlton" on Justia Law

Less than an hour after a Brown County, Ohio jail officer was captured on video yelling in Goldson’s ear, “I’d like to break your fucking neck right now,” multiple correctional officers apparently discovered Goldson hanging by his neck from a bedsheet tied to the sprinkler escutcheon in his cell, in what the officers now characterize as a suicide. Goldson’s sister claims that Goldson’s hanging was staged. The district court acknowledged that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Goldson was capable of hanging himself, mainly due to the physical layout of the cell and Goldson’s physical characteristics but nonetheless granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence as to a specific theory of how Goldson died. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, reinstating claims against two correctional officers relating to Goldson’s death. The court affirmed with respect to other defendants and claims. View "Bard v. Brown County" on Justia Law

In 2000, Lisa was found dead in her driveway. Investigators focused on McCary, Halvorson’s former boyfriend. After hearing of a $10,000 reward, Woodfork alleged that McCary had paid him and England to murder Lisa. Woodfork wore a wire, allowing the police to record a conversation between him and England. England complained about McCary’s not having paid him in full and made threats. Police subsequently brought England to the station for questioning, telling him that he had been recorded. England stated, “go on and lock me up then and call my lawyer … I don’t know what you’re talking about.” The interrogation continued. England ultimately admitted that he was present at the murder but claimed only to have punched Lisa, which knocked her down, and that he attempted to talk McCary out of further violence. He claimed that Lisa was alive when they departed the scene. The prosecution’s theory was that the two planned to make it appear that Lisa was accidentally run over by her own truck and that they knocked her to the ground, accelerated the truck backward, and broke her windpipe. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed England’s conviction and life sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting arguments that the trial court erroneously admitted his confession, that improper admission of hearsay statements from the deceased victim was erroneously deemed harmless error, and that the prosecution suppressed evidence in violation of Brady. View "England v. Hart" on Justia Law

In 1978, McKillop was brutally murdered. In 2006, Lolley, McKillop’s former neighbor, told police that Cooper had confessed to killing McKillop. On March 3, 2010, after multiple interviews and while in custody, Cooper admitted that he had witnessed McKillop’s murder and that he knew who had tied him up and shot him, but denied that he had done it., declaring: “I’m not saying no more.” He accused the detectives of having already concluded that he was the murderer and made statements indicative of his desire to be arraigned. The questioning did not stop. Finally, Cooper admitted that he and Bollis forced McKillop to the floor, where McKiddie shot McKillop in the head. Although the trial court declined to suppress the March 3 statements, the prosecutor agreed not to use proof from that interview affirmatively. However, during his questioning of the officer who conducted the interview, defense counsel referenced certain statements made by Cooper at the March 3 interview and moved for the interview’s admission into evidence.Cooper was convicted of first-degree felony murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Michigan court found that Cooper had waived any challenge to the admission of his statements from the March 3 interview under Michigan’s invited-error doctrine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Cooper’s petition for federal habeas relief. The Michigan trial court’s admission of the confession was not an error that rose to the level of actual prejudice. View "Cooper v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Euclid Officers Rhodes and Catalani were dispatched to check on a “suspicious” vehicle in a residential area near a school. Stewart was sleeping in the car. Catalani shined his flashlight through the windows and saw indications of marijuana and alcohol. The officers did not turn on their dashboard camera, belt microphones, nor their vehicle’s overhead lights. Stewart woke up and started the car. Neither officer announced himself as a police officer. The officers attempted to remove Stewart from the car; Rhodes got into the car. Stewart drove away within the speed limit. Rhodes attempted to gain control of the gearshift and the keys while striking Stewart in the head. Rhodes eventually deployed his taser and pulled the trigger six times. The car came to a stop. Rhodes did not try to leave the car. Stewart then continued driving. When the car stopped, Rhodes fired two shots into Stewart’s torso. According to Rhodes, Stewart attempted to “punch” him. Rhodes shot Stewart three additional times. Stewart died from his wounds; 59 seconds elapsed from the time Catalani advised dispatch that Stewart was fleeing to the time he reported shots fired.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as barred by qualified immunity but reversed the dismissal of state law claims. Regardless of whether a constitutional violation occurred, the contours of the right were not clearly established in these circumstances. Few cases have ever considered the danger faced by an officer inside a fleeing suspect’s vehicle and at what point it justifies the use of deadly force. Violation of Stewart's rights cannot be the “known or obvious consequence” disregarded by the city through its training program. Statutory immunity under Ohio law is distinct from federal qualified immunity. View "Stewart v. City of Euclid" on Justia Law

Castro-White, age 23, was found dead in his bedroom with signs of an opiate overdose. The Lorain Police Department retraced Castro-White’s final hours and identified Davis as the dealer who sold the drugs that killed Castro-White. Davis had sold the drug to Castro-White's friends, who had shared the drugs. Davis received a life sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) which imposes a mandatory life sentence if a defendant with a prior felony drug conviction distributes an illegal substance and death results from its use.The Sixth Circuit rejected Davis' argument that the enhancement does not apply because he did not sell drugs directly to Castro-White. The enhancement’s text does not require such a buyer-seller relationship with the victim. The court also rejected Davis’s other evidentiary and instructional claims.The court remanded because the government conceded that the warrant that allowed the police to search Davis’ home and seize his cellphone lacked probable cause. The government claimed that the affiant gave additional unrecorded oral testimony to establish probable cause in front of the state magistrate who issued the warrant. The Fourth Amendment does not mandate recorded testimony, so the court allowed the government to offer evidence of this additional testimony in an evidentiary hearing on remand. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Pirkel committed 17 crimes in 2007. He was suicidal when he was arrested. Pirkel expressed reservations about entering a plea; he was given 90 minutes to read police reports. When the court reconvened, Pirkel pleaded no contest to all of the charges except criminal sexual conduct and accosting a minor, which were dismissed. Pirkel stated that he understood the plea agreement and that no one had threatened him or promised him anything. Before sentencing, Pirkel sent the judge a letter expressing concerns with his representation and his plea. The court would not allow Pirkel to withdraw his plea, refused to appoint new attorneys, and sentenced Pirkel to 20-50 years’ imprisonment for assault with intent to murder,Pirkel's appointed appellate counsel, Ujlaky, advised Pirkel that he “found no issue of even colorable merit to pursue.” The judge who had presided over Pirkel’s plea and sentencing allowed Ujlaky to withdraw and declined to appoint new counsel. Michigan courts declined to hear his delayed pro se appeal. Pirkel filed a federal habeas petition. The district court found that Pirkel failed to exhaust several claims and denied relief on the other claims.The Sixth Circuit appointed counsel and allowed Pirkel to proceed on claims that his plea was rendered involuntary by ineffective assistance of trial counsel; that appellate counsel performed ineffectively; that the court violated Pirkel’s constitutional rights by allowing appellate counsel to withdraw; and that any exhaustion defense was waived. The court then reversed the denial of relief. The Michigan trial court failed to conduct its own review of the merits of Pirkel’s appeal before allowing counsel to withdraw based on a conclusory statement. The Constitution requires more. The Michigan courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Pirkel is entitled to a new first-tier appeal in the Michigan courts View "Pirkel v. Burton" on Justia Law