Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
by
Students at several of Detroit’s worst-performing public schools were subject to poor conditions within their classrooms, missing or unqualified teachers, physically dangerous facilities, and inadequate books and materials. In 2016, the plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that these conditions deprive them of a basic minimum education that provides a chance at foundational literacy, in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses. They sought recognition of a fundamental right to a basic education. They argued that the schools they are forced to attend are schools in name only, so the state cannot justify the restriction on their liberty imposed by compulsory attendance. They sued state officials, rather than local entities, based on the state’s general supervision of all public education and the state’s specific interventions in Detroit’s public schools. The state argued that it recently returned control to local officials. The district court found that the state defendants were the proper parties to sue but dismissed the complaint on the merits.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Though the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead their equal protection and compulsory attendance claims, the court reinstated claims that they have been denied a basic minimum education, and have been deprived of access to literacy. Application of the principles in the Supreme Court’s education cases to a substantive due process framework demonstrates that a basic minimum education should be recognized as a fundamental right. View "Gary B. v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

by
Queen, a Bowling Green firefighter, 2011-2016, was subject to harassment because he is an atheist. According to Queen, he was forced to participate in Bible studies; his co-workers and supervisors badgered him regarding his sexuality and regularly disparaged minorities. In 2012, Queen complained to his supervisor, Rockrohr, who “responded in hostility.” Rockrohr later told Queen that he had discussed the matter with the fire chief and they both believed that Queen “needed to get employment somewhere else.” Queen apologized. Queen’s employment conditions did not improve. Queen was intentionally tripped while retrieving his gear and was regularly subject to disparaging remarks. Stress and anxiety caused Queen to take a leave of absence. While on leave, Queen received many phone calls from his supervisors asking why he was absent.Queen resigned and filed suit under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging hostile work environment based on religion and gender, constructive discharge, retaliation, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on hostile work environment based on religion and gender and the FMLA claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to the city on the claims for hostile work environment based on religion and for retaliation and denial of qualified immunity to Rockrohr for the retaliation claim. View "Queen v. City of Bowling Green" on Justia Law

by
The Twenty-first Amendment permits the states to regulate the sales of alcohol within their borders. Michigan is among several states with a three-tier system that forbids alcohol producers (first tier) to sell directly to retailers or consumers. Producers must sell to wholesalers within the state (second tier); those wholesalers sell exclusively to in-state retailers, who sell to consumers. Businesses at each tier must be independently owned; no one may operate more than one tier, Michigan imposes minimum prices and prohibits wholesalers from offering volume discounts or selling on credit. For liquor (not wine and beer), the state is the wholesaler in Michigan.In 2016, Michigan amended its law to allow in-state retailers to deliver directly to consumers using state-licensed “third party facilitators” or common carriers like FedEx or UPS. A wine retailer based in Fort Wayne, Indiana and Michigan wine consumers alleged that the new law violated the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The district court extended delivery rights to out-of-state retailers. Michigan obtained a stay.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Twenty-first Amendment permits Michigan to treat in-state retailers differently from out-of-state retailers. There is no inherent right to sell intoxicating liquors by retail. Some reduction in consumer choice is inevitable in a three-tier system, which is intended to make it harder to sell alcohol. View "Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc., v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

by
A masked gunman attempted to rob a Columbus Ohio restaurant. Employees escaped and flagged down a police officer. A man, matching the robber's description, discarded distinctive clothing items as he ran away. A pocket contained a handgun matching that used in the robbery. Police apprehended Smith nearby. DNA material matching Smith was found on the discarded items. Smith retained attorney Armengau. Detectives connected Smith to earlier restaurant robberies with “a strikingly consistent method of operation.” They requested cell phone records for a phone number that Smith had given to his probation officer; Smith’s phone had been used near and at the approximate time of most of the robberies.Smith was charged with 18 robberies. Smith’s attorney, Armengau, was indicted for sex crimes. The judge handling Smith’s case recused himself. At Smith’s request, Armengau continued to represent Smith; Armengau’s criminal charges were unknown to the jury. Smith received three continuances. During trial, the prosecutors offered a plea deal for 27 years’ imprisonment. Armengau conceded to the court that he did not share the offer because prior discussions with Smith led Armengau to believe that a 27-year sentence would not be accepted. Smith was present and did not object. The prosecutors stated that the offer would remain open. Smith never asked to discuss a plea. The jury convicted Smith for 12 robberies. With prior-offender gun charges, the judge sentenced Smith to 84 years’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, rejecting ineffective assistance and Confrontation Clause claims, based on the Armengau’s stipulation to limit the number of trial witnesses, his failure to communicate the plea offer, and the “conflict” posed by his own criminal charges. View "Smith v. Cook" on Justia Law

by
In a 2006 Ypsilanti drive-by shooting, two teenagers, inside a mobile home, were killed. Four people, including Tackett, were charged. Tacket was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After unsuccessful state-court proceedings, Tackett filed a federal habeas corpus petition.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even assuming that Tackett’s gun misfired, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Tackett was guilty of first-degree murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The facts supported an inference of an intent to kill and there was more than enough time for the shooters to take a “second look.” There was evidence that premeditation and deliberation took place during that time. Tackett provided assistance to the other shooters, knowing all the facts known to the shooters. The court rejected Tackett’s argument that he could have been convicted as a principal, or as an aider and abettor and that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a special instruction that they had to unanimously agree as to which of these theories was the basis for their verdict. There was no constitutional problem in the fact that two other defendants were convicted of second-degree murder while Tackett was convicted of first-degree murder. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims. View "Tackett v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law

by
Grand Rapids police received tips from an organization that receives anonymous information from the public, describing vehicles May-Shaw was using to transport drugs and a specific bag where he kept drugs, money, and a gun. May-Shaw had one felony firearm conviction and two felony drug convictions. The Department began investigating and, for 23 days, watched a parking lot near his apartment building and a covered carport next to that building, where May-Shaw parked his BMW, one of his several vehicles. The surveillance used a camera affixed to a telephone pole on a public street and cameras in a surveillance van parked in the parking lot. After witnessing May-Shaw engage in several suspected drug deals, the police used a drug-detecting dog to sniff the BMW. The dog indicated the presence of narcotics. Officers then obtained a search warrant for May-Shaw’s apartment and all of his vehicles. They found evidence of drug distribution, including cash, wrappers, and cocaine.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his to suppress the evidence from his apartment and vehicles. May-Shaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport such that police surveillance constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nor was the carport within the curtilage of his apartment such that the dog sniff was unconstitutional. View "United States v. May-Shaw" on Justia Law

by
Reiner’s convictions arose from a 2011 Macomb County home invasion. Eisenhardt, age 69, was stabbed in the neck; jewelry was taken from her house, including a ring from Eisenhardt’s finger. Eisenhardt survived but suffered declining health after the stabbing and died months later. Police in New York apprehended Reiner days after the incident, on unrelated suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle. At his Michigan murder trial, the court admitted the statements to the police, in which a pawnbroker identified Reiner as having pawned Eisenhardt’s ring. The pawnbroker died before trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Reiner’s conviction, finding the Sixth Amendment error harmless.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The evidence presented at trial “paints the picture of a circumstantial case lacking physical evidence or eyewitness testimony placing Reiner at the crime scene.” The statements that caused the Sixth Amendment violation were the linchpin of the government’s case, connecting Reiner to the fruits of the crime in a way no other evidence could. Without those statements, the prosecution’s case would have been significantly weaker, such that “grave doubt” exists as to whether their admission had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "Reiner v. Woods" on Justia Law

by
A fifth-grade student, C.T., lit a match during the bus ride home from an Ohio elementary school. The students sat in assigned seats, with the youngest students at the front of the bus. School administrators moved C.T. to the front of the bus, where he sexually assaulted a kindergarten student, Doe, as they rode home from school over several weeks. The bus driver apparently was aware that C.T. had moved across the aisle to sit with Doe but police concluded that the driver was not aware of the assaults. C.T. was expelled. Doe’s parents brought a state-created-danger claim against the School District and five employees.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that no reasonable jury could find that they knowingly exposed Doe to the risk of sexual assault. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating “that the Constitution does not empower federal judges to remedy every situation” that is “heart-wrenching.” Nothing about C.T.’s school record could have put the school employees on notice that C.T. posed a risk of sexually assaulting Doe. The school employees’ responses to the risk also do not show the “callous disregard” or “conscience-shocking” behavior that state-created-danger cases require. Certain employees could have done more in implementing C.T.’s discipline, but their actions did not amount to “callous disregard for the safety” of Doe. View "Doe v. Jackson Local School District Board of Education" on Justia Law

by
State Trooper King saw Lott’s vehicle slow down on I-75 as it came into view; Lott was driving with “arms locked out.” King interpreted that as a sign of nervousness. King followed Lott for three-fourths of a mile in the left lane while vehicles passed on the right, then pulled Lott over. King stated that he was not going to issue a citation but ran Lott’s driver’s license for outstanding warrants and flagged down Trooper Reams, who had a K-9 in tow. Based on Lott’s nervousness and proximity to the roadway, King asked him to step out of the vehicle. King did not check the warrant search. Lott refused King’s request for consent to search his vehicle. King stated that “we’re going to utilize the K-9.” According to King, Lott responded, “I have a little bit of marijuana in the console.” The K-9 alerted after a “free air sniff.” King located marijuana in the console, then searched the vehicle. In the trunk, King found heroin, other drugs, and money. The Troopers estimated that five-10 minutes elapsed between the stop and the K-9 sniff. Lott was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The traffic stop was initiated constitutionally and was not impermissibly extended. Lott did not dispute that he was impeding traffic; the marijuana admission occurred within the temporal scope of the tasks incident to the traffic stop. View "United States v. Lott" on Justia Law

by
Detective Shockley, investigating whether methamphetamine was being sold at Alexander's mother's house, learned that Alexander’s driver’s license was suspended. Shockley saw Alexander drive away, stopped him and saw a bank deposit bag on the passenger seat and a safe in the backseat. Shockley arrested Alexander for driving on a suspended license and conducted a search, finding a baggie with methamphetamine residue, drug paraphernalia, and $11,000 in cash. Shockley found 35 grams of methamphetamine in Alexander’s waistband. The SUV was towed. The next day, Shockley obtained a warrant for the safe and discovered a loaded pistol. Days later, Shockley saw Alexander leave the house in a Lincoln and called another officer, who stopped him. Shockley arrested Alexander. After Alexander said, “I don’t care,” Shockley searched the vehicle, and found 113 grams of methamphetamine.Charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a firearm as a felon, Alexander unsuccessfully moved to suppress both stops. Classified as a career offender, he was sentenced to 216 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. The inventory search exception did not apply absent evidence of standardized procedures but the inevitable-discovery doctrine salvaged the first search. Alexander consented to the second search. The court vacated the sentence; the government conceded that the case should be remanded for resentencing without the career-offender enhancement. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law