Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Saginaw County has nearly 200,000 residents. A single company, Mobile Medical, has provided the county’s ambulance services since 2009. The county guaranteed Mobile the exclusive right to operate within its borders; Mobile pledged to serve all eight of Saginaw County’s cities and incorporated villages and its 27 rural townships. In 2011, STAT, a competing ambulance company, entered the Saginaw market, providing patient-transport services for an insurer as part of a contract that covered six Michigan counties. A municipality, dissatisfied with Mobile’s response times and fees, hired STAT. When Saginaw County proposed to extend Mobilel’s contract in 2013, STAT objected, arguing that the arrangement violated state law, federal antitrust law, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The county approved Mobile's new contract and enacted an ordinance that codified the exclusivity arrangement but never enforced the ordinance. STAT continued to insist that Michigan law permitted it to offer ambulance services. Saginaw County sought a federal declaratory judgment that Michigan law authorizes the exclusive contract and that it does not violate federal antitrust laws or the U.S. Constitution by prohibiting STAT from operating in the county. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claim for lack of jurisdiction. The county failed to establish an actual or imminent injury. Federal courts have the power to tell parties what the law is, not what it might be in potential enforcement actions. View "Saginaw County. v. STAT Emergency Medical Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, Hueso was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for drug crimes. In 2013, Hueso unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. His second unsuccessful petition, in 2018, argued that his state convictions were not “felony drug offenses” and that his mandatory minimum should have been 10 years. A 2019 Ninth Circuit case subsequently undercut the substantive portion of the district court’s denial of relief. Hueso filed another petition. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 permits a second 2255 motion only if there is new evidence of innocence or a new rule of constitutional law from the Supreme Court. Prisoners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 must show that section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention.” Hueso argued that prisoners barred from filing a second 2255 motion may seek habeas relief under section 2241 based on new circuit court decisions. The Fourth Circuit has accepted that position. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Hueso’s cited circuit court cases do not render a 2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of section 2255(e); the two circuit decisions cannot establish section 2255’s inadequacy and his cited Supreme Court decision issued when his direct appeal was pending, so he could have cited it in the ordinary course. View "Hueso v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Cardin’s fraud conviction and 78-month sentence. Cardin worked with his sister, Natalie, to prepare a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The filing deadline was June 8, 2016. On June 6, Cardin was unexpectedly hospitalized. The following day, Natalie filed the motion, signed “Walter A. Cardin by Natalie J. Cardin,” stating “under penalty of perjury” that she was Walter’s “attorney in fact,” and that Cardin was “otherwise unavailable to sign this motion and submit it in a timely manner.” About two months later, the court sua sponte indicated that it was considering dismissing the motion. Cardin filed a pro se motion for leave to add Cardin's signature to the original motion, with a letter from his prison case manager affirming that Cardin had been hospitalized. Cardin attached a 2015 document, by which he granted Natalie “unlimited” power of attorney to act on his behalf. Twenty-one months later, the court denied both motions.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Natalie satisfied the requirements of a ‘next friend’: an adequate explanation of why the real party in interest could not appear and “truly dedicated to the best interests of the [defendant].” That a putative next friend bears the burden of proving her status does not mean that the prisoner’s views, after the 2255 motion was filed, are irrelevant. Federal courts routinely enter show-cause orders directing parties, after a filing, to provide facts necessary to the court’s jurisdiction. View "Cardin v. United States" on Justia Law

Tarbett, wanted for assaulting an officer, was last known to be staying at Winchester Drive and allegedly had threatened to kill any officer who made contact with him. Burns was patrolling when a radio call described suspicious individuals walking near Winchester Drive. Burns responded and saw two men walking toward him. Burns says one tried to hide his face. Burns exited his car and engaged the men. Edwards identified himself as “Joe Eldridge,” while snickering. Burns patted down Edwards, who “took off” but fell as Burns caught up. The two struggled. Edwards said he was having a seizure. Other officers arrived. Burns eventually handcuffed Edwards. Edwards asked Burns to call 911; Burns threatened him with a taser. Edwards responded, “I feel like I’m going to pass the [expletive] out.” Five people were present when Deputies Burns and Patty escorted Edwards to Patty’s SUV. Edwards got away and began running. Burns grabbed him, his feet lifted off the ground kicking. Edwards kicked Patty near the groin. Burns and Edwards then fell to the ground. Witnesses disagreed on what happened. Sergeant Boyd arrived and saw Edwards lying on the ground, bleeding from his ears.Edwards’s treating physician said that Edwards would not survive because his “skull was fractured in the rear near the spinal cord” and that his injuries were inconsistent with a backward fall unless “he had been on a ladder.” A medical examiner found multiple contusions around Edwards’s head, chest, back, and abdomen, and two “linear, full-thickness fractures” to the occipital bone at the base of the skull and categorized the manner of death as a homicide. Edwards had, earlier that day, jumped across the hood of a running car. In a suit by Edwards’s survivors, the district court denied qualified immunity on an excessive force claim, finding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding reasonableness and violation of Edwards’s clearly established rights. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was premised on factual disputes and not questions of law. View "Adams v. Blount County" on Justia Law

Johnson rented her restaurant to a private party. For unknown reasons, individuals unaffiliated with her or the party emerged from a vehicle that night and shot at the restaurant. Police were called during the shooting but never apprehended the shooters. Less than two days later, Saginaw City Manager Morales issued Johnson a notice ordering the suspension of all business activity related to her restaurant under an ordinance that permits such suspensions “in the interest of the public health, morals, safety, or welfare[.]” There was hearing three days later. More than two months after the hearing, Human Resources Director Jordan upheld the suspension. Johnson filed suit with a motion for a temporary restraining order and, alternatively, a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Morales from sitting on the appeal panel expected to review Jordan’s decision. The district court denied that motion. The appeal panel, which did not include Morales, held a hearing and affirmed Jordan’s decision upholding the suspension. The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of Johnson’s burden-shifting, substantive due process, and equal-protection claims. Johnson adequately alleged selective enforcement and pled that the city lacked a rational basis to suspend her license. Johnson has plausibly alleged that the procedures afforded to Johnson fell short of constitutional requirements. View "Johnson v. Morales" on Justia Law

At 2:30 a.m., Bey and two friends went out to purchase space heaters. Bey had purchased his older minivan days earlier, so it had a temporary registration tag but no license plate. The three went to a Livonia store but came away empty-handed. They drove to a Canton Walmart, where they purchased space heaters. Undercover Livonia police Sergeant McKinley noticed the minivan. Livonia had recently experienced several retail break-ins. McKinley followed the minivan on “a hunch” that criminals often use stolen, older vehicles for retail crimes. The officers noted that the minivan’s passengers were black. McKinley observed the paper temporary registration taped to the window; he later testified that officers ran the registration through the Michigan state database but found no matching records. Another officer recalled that McKinley said over the radio that the problem was that “it was unreadable.” On the freeway, the officers thought the minivan executed an evasive driving tactic. An officer followed the men into the Walmart and watched them pay for their merchandise. At Livonia’s request, the Canton Police Department dispatched uniformed officers, who surrounded Bey’s van and ordered him out of the vehicle. Bey was carrying a concealed weapon; he properly stated that he was armed and produced a concealed weapon license. That license had expired; Bey was arrested him. The state court found the stop unconstitutional; the case was dismissed with prejudice. Bey then sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit: dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, McKinley’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity as to Bey’s equal protection claim; affirmed the denial of as to Bey’s Fourth Amendment claim; and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the other officers. View "Bey v. Falk" on Justia Law

The Playpen website, a message board for advertising and distributing child pornography, is within the “dark-web,” protected by the “Tor hidden service network,” rendering the website relatively inaccessible. A foreign law enforcement agency alerted FBI agents of its suspicions that a U.S.-based IP address was used to house Playpen. Agents identified the server and executed a search warrant, which allowed them to create a duplicate server at a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia. The FBI assumed administrative control of the website, then obtained a search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to employ a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) to unmask anonymous users. The NIT warrant led the District Court of the Southern District of Ohio to issue a search warrant that allowed authorities to search Bateman’s residence and computer where they found over 599 illicit images of children. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress the evidence and for a "Franks" hearing, to question Agent Macfarlane, who submitted the affidavit to obtain the NIT warrant. The search of Bateman’s home was valid under the good-faith exception. Agent Macfarlane’s affidavit provided a detailed and sufficiently specific picture of Playpen and of the NIT program; it accurately described the locations to be searched, which necessarily included locations outside of the Eastern District of Virginia, and accurately described the NIT’s operation as triggered only when an activating computer’s signals entered the Eastern District of Virginia. View "United States v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Giles County contracted with private probation companies to supervise people it convicted of misdemeanors. Probationers sued Giles County, its Sheriff, the probation companies, and some company employees, alleging RICO violations, civil conspiracy, improper debt collection, and constitutional violations. The district court granted a preliminary injunction based on a claim that the county and sheriff violated the probationers' “substantive right against wealth-based detention” by detaining them after arrest until they pay bail because the bail amount is set “without reference to the person’s ability to pay,” outside the person’s presence, and without determining whether the person poses “a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” The injunction permits bail based on evidence of the probationer’s ability to pay, the necessity of detention, and the alternatives to bail. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the probationers should have sued the state judges who determine the bail amounts instead of suing the county and sheriff who enforce them. The plaintiffs can sue the sheriff, regardless of whether he acts for the state or the county while judges have absolute immunity from suits based on their judicial acts, except in matters over which they clearly lack jurisdiction. View "McNeil v. Community Probation Services, LLC" on Justia Law

While traveling to a mental health treatment facility, Blough got out of his fiancée’s (Reich) vehicle holding his knife, walked through traffic, and wandered into a residential neighborhood. Blough was experiencing hallucinations, having quit his schizophrenia medication. When he ignored his fiancée’s repeated pleas to get back in the car, she called 911. Reich told police officers that Blough was paranoid and did not like the police, having been shot by police in the past. After he refused commands to drop the knife, Blough “took a step forward toward them” with his knife raised in his right hand in a stabbing position. The officers fired three shots, killing Blough. His estate sued, claiming that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the claims on summary judgment. The officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; they are shielded by qualified immunity. The totality of the circumstances gave the officers probable cause to believe that Blough posed a threat of serious physical harm to them and others. The court noted Reich’s contradictory testimony. View "Reich v. City of Elizabethtown" on Justia Law

Mason, a Sheriff’s Department investigator, and uniformed officers were tracking Harrelson, a fugitive, whose vehicle was previously seen outside the home of Wooden and Harris. They approached the home. Mason, who was not in uniform, knocked on the door, while the uniformed officers dispersed. Wooden answered. Mason asked to speak with Harris and to step inside, to stay warm. According to Mason, Wooden responded “Yes.” Mason and an officer entered the home. As Wooden walked down the hallway, the officers saw him pick up a rifle. When they told him to put the weapon down, Wooden did so. Mason knew Wooden was a felon. The officers handcuffed and searched Wooden, finding a holstered loaded revolver. Harris gave the officers permission to search the home. The officers did not find Harrelson but found another rifle. After waiving his Miranda rights, Wooden admitted that he possessed all three firearms and ammunition. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Wooden unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The district court Wooden was classified as an armed career criminal based on Georgia convictions: a 1989 aggravated assault, 10 1997 burglaries, and a 2005 burglary. Wooden argued that neither the aggravated-assault nor burglary offenses qualified as violent felonies and that the 1997 burglaries arose out of a single occasion and were a single ACCA predicate. The court rejected those arguments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, seeing no improper deception or “definite and firm” basis for discrediting the district court’s assessment that Wooden consented to Mason entering his home View "United States v. Wooden" on Justia Law