Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While traveling to a mental health treatment facility, Blough got out of his fiancée’s (Reich) vehicle holding his knife, walked through traffic, and wandered into a residential neighborhood. Blough was experiencing hallucinations, having quit his schizophrenia medication. When he ignored his fiancée’s repeated pleas to get back in the car, she called 911. Reich told police officers that Blough was paranoid and did not like the police, having been shot by police in the past. After he refused commands to drop the knife, Blough “took a step forward toward them” with his knife raised in his right hand in a stabbing position. The officers fired three shots, killing Blough. His estate sued, claiming that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the claims on summary judgment. The officers’ use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; they are shielded by qualified immunity. The totality of the circumstances gave the officers probable cause to believe that Blough posed a threat of serious physical harm to them and others. The court noted Reich’s contradictory testimony. View "Reich v. City of Elizabethtown" on Justia Law

Mason, a Sheriff’s Department investigator, and uniformed officers were tracking Harrelson, a fugitive, whose vehicle was previously seen outside the home of Wooden and Harris. They approached the home. Mason, who was not in uniform, knocked on the door, while the uniformed officers dispersed. Wooden answered. Mason asked to speak with Harris and to step inside, to stay warm. According to Mason, Wooden responded “Yes.” Mason and an officer entered the home. As Wooden walked down the hallway, the officers saw him pick up a rifle. When they told him to put the weapon down, Wooden did so. Mason knew Wooden was a felon. The officers handcuffed and searched Wooden, finding a holstered loaded revolver. Harris gave the officers permission to search the home. The officers did not find Harrelson but found another rifle. After waiving his Miranda rights, Wooden admitted that he possessed all three firearms and ammunition. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Wooden unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The district court Wooden was classified as an armed career criminal based on Georgia convictions: a 1989 aggravated assault, 10 1997 burglaries, and a 2005 burglary. Wooden argued that neither the aggravated-assault nor burglary offenses qualified as violent felonies and that the 1997 burglaries arose out of a single occasion and were a single ACCA predicate. The court rejected those arguments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, seeing no improper deception or “definite and firm” basis for discrediting the district court’s assessment that Wooden consented to Mason entering his home View "United States v. Wooden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, inmates in Michigan prison facilities, were once juveniles housed with adult inmates, a policy that Michigan has since abandoned. They filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims stemming from alleged sexual abuse by adult inmates, which occurred when the policy was in place. Prior suits were dismissed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The inmates had different experiences in filing grievances under a process enacted pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30302. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The parties disputed which administrative process the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust, MDOC’s regular three-step grievance process or PREA but the Defendants unquestionably treated the Plaintiffs’ complaints as PREA grievances. That grievance process was “unavailable” for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The court characterized the PREA grievance process as: “a classic case of Orwellian doublethink” full of contradictions and machinations that render it “incapable of use.” One inmate adequately alleged retaliation that might excuse following the process. View "John Does 8-10 v. Snyder" on Justia Law

A Tennessee jury convicted Atkins of murdering his stepfather in 2000 when he was 16 years old. A state court imposed a life sentence that renders Atkins eligible for release after at least 51 years’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court later held, in “Miller,” that a sentence of “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” a decision that applies retroactively. Atkins argued that the life sentence he received as a 16-year-old also qualified as a “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment. A state appellate court rejected his claim. The district court denied relief in his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) prohibits a federal habeas court from upending a state criminal judgment unless a state court’s rejection of a constitutional claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Reasonable people can debate a sentencing policy that did not give the 16- year-old Atkins any opportunity for release for 51 years but the state appellate court reasonably distinguished Miller. View "Atkins v. Crowell" on Justia Law

Foster was suspected of conspiring to illegally distribute methamphetamine in southeastern Tennessee. In searching garbage Foster had left on the curb, officers discovered materials indicating methamphetamine use and distribution. With Foster’s consent, agents searched Foster’s residence and discovered methamphetamine, materials used for distributing methamphetamine, and $2,000 in cash. Foster admitted his role in the methamphetamine-trafficking conspiracy. Foster was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), & (b)(1)(C) & 846. Foster represented himself, with standby counsel. A prosecution witness, Agent Freeman, repeated informants’ out-of-court statements several times, largely without objection from Foster. After two particularly egregious exchanges, the court intervened. Freeman admitted during a sidebar that he had no personal knowledge of the events he had described. The prosecution argued that the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The district court asked the parties to propose a curative jury instruction. Foster moved for a mistrial, arguing that no jury instruction would cure the error. The prosecutor requested that the trial continue but conceded that if the court believed a Confrontation Clause violation had occurred, a jury instruction likely would not cure the harm. The district court granted a mistrial but denied Foster's motion to dismiss the indictment. Foster pled guilty to count one. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly declared a mistrial but, because the prosecution did not intend to cause the mistrial, it rightly concluded that initiating a second trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four female students each reported sexual assault to the campus police and authorities. The plaintiffs contend that the administration’s response was inadequate, caused them physical and emotional harm, and consequently denied them educational opportunities. They sued, claiming violations of Title IX, Due Process and Equal Protection under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Michigan law. The district court dismissed all but three claims under Title IX and one section 1983 claim. The Sixth Circuit remanded for dismissal of those claims. A victim of “student-on-student sexual harassment” has a private cause of action against the school under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, if the harassment was “pervasive” and the school’s response “caused” the injury. A student-victim must plead, and ultimately prove, that the school had actual knowledge of actionable sexual harassment and that the school’s deliberate indifference to it resulted in further actionable sexual harassment against the student-victim, which caused the Title IX injuries. A student-victim’s subjective dissatisfaction with the school’s response is immaterial to whether the school’s response caused the claimed Title IX violation. Because none of the plaintiffs suffered any actionable sexual harassment after the school’s response, they did not suffer “pervasive” sexual harassment and cannot meet the causation element. The court also held that the individual defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

In 2002, Hudson became a firefighter. He was outspoken about his Christian faith. According to Hudson, other firefighters watched pornography in communal spaces and engaged in extra-marital affairs at the fire station. For five years, he criticized their behavior; they responded with disrespectful comments about his religious practices and sexual orientation. In 2015, Hudson’s supervisors learned that he had claimed extra hours on his timesheet and suspended him without pay. A local union officer attended Hudson’s suspension meeting. The statewide union filed an unsuccessful grievance. During an ensuing meeting, the city added a claim that Hudson had engaged in “double-dipping.” On his union representatives’ advice, Hudson invoked his right not to incriminate himself and was fired him on the spot. The union continued to attempt a resolution. The local firefighters and the statewide union had a falling out. Hudson’s “Step 2” meeting was canceled. Hudson emailed the local union, asking for arbitration. The local officials nonetheless scheduled another “Step 2” meeting. No one notified Hudson about the meeting until the day before. Hudson could not attend; he insisted on arbitration. At the meeting, the local union did not pursue Hudson’s grievance. The district court rejected all his claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to a First Amendment retaliation claim. Hudson complained about poor administration, protected speech, and the department fired him, an adverse employment action. The court affirmed the rejection of his due process and Title VII claims. View "Peter Hudson v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law

Officer Nelson learned from Heard, who was previously unknown to Nelson, that Crawford was dealing cocaine. Heard identified Crawford’s driver’s license photograph and provided Crawford’s telephone number. Nelson contacted the Drug Abuse Reduction Task Force and the Hamilton County Heroin Coalition Task Force; both confirmed Heard’s reliability as an informant. Nelson reviewed Crawford’s drug-trafficking convictions. Heard showed Nelson text messages between Crawford and Heard. Nelson obtained a state court warrant to electronically track Crawford’s cellphone. Heard told Nelson that Crawford drove a silver 2003 BMW X5 and, using the license plate number provided by Heard, Nelson learned that the vehicle was registered to Crawford at a Cincinnati residence. Cellphone data placed Crawford near a Florence, Kentucky apartment, leased to Crawford’s wife. Nelson surveilled the apartment. He saw Crawford exit the apartment and leave in the BMW. A warrant issued, authorizing officers to use GPS tracking on that vehicle. Weeks later, Heard completed a controlled drug buy from Crawford. Another search warrant was issued for Crawford’s apartment, where officers found cocaine and $1,390 in tagged bills used in the controlled buy. Mirandized, Crawford incriminated himself, admitting that he sold the cocaine on consignment and that he had placed cocaine under his sink. Crawford unsuccessfully argued that the warrants should not have issued. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Crawford’s convictions and 216-month sentence, finding the warrants justified. The informant’s reliability was confirmed by law enforcement agencies and through the affiant officer’s own research. Key information disclosed by the informant proved credible. View "United States v. Crawford" on Justia Law

The Ohio Department of Public Safety fired Trooper Johnson after he sexually harassed women while on duty. When the Department learned of the first incident, it let him sign a “Last Chance Agreement,” which said the Department would not fire him if he followed the rules for two years. When the Department learned of another incident, it fired Morris Johnson for violating the Last Chance Agreement. The district court and Sixth Circuit found that the Department did not racially discriminate against Johnson in doing so. Johnson did not show that he was “similarly situated” in all of the relevant respects to an employee of a different race who was treated better. While Johnson and a white trooper both acted inappropriately, their situations were different. The white trooper’s first incident was unverified while the Department verified all of Johnson’s incidents. Johnson propositioned a woman to go out with him; the white trooper did not. Johnson pulled a woman over without probable cause to ask her out; the white trooper did not. Johnson went to a woman’s home; the white trooper did not. The two troopers had different direct supervisors and were subject to different standards because Johnson signed a Last Chance Agreement. View "Johnson v. Ohio Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Benton, a former schoolteacher, was convicted by a jury for having sex with a 12-year-old student. The judge sentenced her to 25-38 years’ imprisonment. With new appellate counsel, Benton raised constitutional and evidentiary arguments. Her conviction was affirmed. Months later, the Supreme Court handed down its “Lafler” decision, holding that defendants could establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by proving that their lawyer’s incompetence caused them to reject a favorable plea offer. Benton sought postconviction relief, alleging that her attorney told her she had 20 minutes to decide whether to accept a plea offer: a year in jail for a guilty plea to a lesser charge. Her lawyer allegedly told Benton she would lose custody of her infant children. She rejected the deal. Benton claims she would have accepted the plea had the attorney conveyed that the termination of her parental rights would not be automatic. Benton’s appellate counsel offered to stipulate to his own ineffectiveness in not raising the argument. Michigan courts and the federal district court rejected her petitions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Benton has no good excuse for not timely raising her claim. Although Lafler was decided in 2012, Benton did not lack the tools to construct her claim in her 2011 appeal. View "Benton v. Brewer" on Justia Law