Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1995, a Memphis restaurant manager was murdered during a closing-time robbery. Saulsberry worked at the restaurant and helped plan the robbery but was not there during the robbery. In his state trial, the judge forbade the jury from considering the murder counts together. Only if the jury found Saulsberry not guilty of premeditated murder could it “proceed to inquire whether [he is] guilty of [either count of felony murder].” The jury convicted Saulsberry of premeditated murder, robbery, and conspiracy. He received a life sentence. The jury did not return a verdict on the two felony murder counts. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Saulsberry’s robbery and conspiracy convictions but reversed the murder conviction. On remand, Saulsberry moved to dismiss the new prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, but the state courts rejected the argument. In 2010, a new jury convicted him of both counts of felony murder. Saulsberry’s direct appeal and applications for state post-conviction relief failed. In 2007, Saulsberry filed an uncounseled habeas petition while awaiting retrial in Tennessee, arguing double jeopardy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition. Saulsberry’s jury had no chance to render a verdict on the felony murder counts. There was no mistrial here. That jeopardy can end by another means in another setting does not show an implied acquittal here. View "Saulsberry v. Lee" on Justia Law

Clayton was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for sexually exploiting minors. One minor, J.P. texted her father from Clayton’s house, saying she was being held against her will. Her father called Battle Creek Police. Police and J.P.’s father raced to Clayton’s house. Clayton’s roommate stated J.P. had left. J.P.’s father immediately received another text, alerting him that J.P. was in the house. Officers stormed inside. They found Clayton, loaded guns, brass knuckles, cocaine powder, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. J.P. was traumatized and hysterical. Clayton was arrested.Before questioning him, Detective Sutherland read Clayton his Miranda rights from the Department’s standard form: Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions. If you cannot afford to have a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. Do you understand your rights? Clayton: Yes. Sutherland failed to follow “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer” with “and to have him/her with you during questioning.”At his third interview, Clayton stated: “Hell yeah I want to f[***]ing talk,” then made a statement and provided the password to unlock his cellphone. Clayton’s DNA was found on J.P.’s body; officers found 37 videos of Clayton engaging in sex acts with minors; videos of him weighing cocaine and holding a firearm; and text messages discussing sex trafficking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The critical features of Miranda were conveyed to Clayton. Nothing in the words used indicated that counsel’s presence would be restricted during questioning. View "United States v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Shortly before his high school graduation, 18-year-old Kyle apparently experimented with LSD. The after-effects afflicted him for several days, resulting in his having to be removed from class because of behavioral issues. Kyle’s friend, Collin, checked in on him after school, then went to the police and told them that Kyle needed help and that Kyle was armed and upset with his mother. Four officers went to the house, not knowing that the mother was not actually home with Kyle. Without waiting for a warrant, the officers entered Kyle’s home. He appeared at the foot of the basement stairs, wielding a lawnmower blade. When the officers attempted to subdue Kyle with a taser, he came up the basement stairs swinging. The lawnmower blade struck an officer, who fell back, then shot and killed Kyle. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Calling the case “heart-rending, the court stated that given the circumstances and governing case law, the officers’ entry into Kyle’s home was justified under the exigent-circumstances exception and the use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officer had probable cause to believe that Kyle posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury. View "Baker v. City of Trenton" on Justia Law

Knight was charged with two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; assault and robbery of a person having control of mail matter, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a); possession of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2114(b); use of a firearm during assault and robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a); use of a firearm during kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); carjacking 18 U.S.C. 2119; use of a firearm during carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Knight pled guilty to bank fraud; a jury convicted him on all other counts. The district court sentenced Knight to a total term of 955 months of imprisonment. After exhausting his direct appeals, Knight filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), claiming that his convictions under 924(c) are invalid because the residual clause of the crime-of-violence definition in section 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of recent Supreme Court holdings. The government conceded that Knight’s kidnapping conviction was not a crime of violence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the related section 924(c) conviction but upheld Knight’s section 924(c) conviction for using a firearm during assault and robbery, which qualifies under the “elements clause” of the definition of a “crime of violence.” View "Knight v. United States" on Justia Law

Sensabaugh, the former head football coach at David Crockett High School in Washington County, Tennessee, made two Facebook posts expressing his concerns about the conditions and practices of schools within the District. The posts included pictures of students. Sensabaugh refused to comply with requests to remove the posts and became aggressive with his supervisors who noted other alleged misconduct, including his use of profane language with students and his requiring a student to practice while injured. He was fired after a guidance meeting where his conduct caused his supervisor to report her concern “that Sensabaugh posed a threat to the safety of the students and staff.” He sued, raising First Amendment retaliation and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no causal connection between Sensabaugh’s Facebook posts and his termination. A thorough independent investigation preceded Sensabaugh’s termination; that investigation concluded that the misconduct allegations were substantiated in full or in part and that the misconduct supported termination. View "Sensabaugh v. Halliburton" on Justia Law

Doe sued the University for violating his due-process rights during a disciplinary hearing. The Sixth Circuit remanded Doe’s case in light of a related ruling requiring live hearings and cross-examination in such proceedings. Upon remand, the district judge, frustrated with the University’s apparent foot-dragging, scheduled a settlement conference and required the University’s president to attend. The University requested that the president be allowed to attend by telephone but the district judge refused. The University then requested permission to send someone with both more knowledge about the sexual assault policy at issue and full settlement authority. The judge again refused, stating he wanted the president to be there even if someone else with full settlement authority attended, and “even if the parties [we]re able to resolve" the issue. The University planned for the president to attend. Two days before the settlement conference, the district judge decided that the conference (which he had assured the University would be private) should be a public event, stating that “the University’s public filing of a Motion to Dismiss . . . . The filing incited confusion amongst the media.” The Sixth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus, finding that the district judge acted beyond his power and abused his discretion. Neither Congress nor the Constitution granted the judge the power to order a specific state official to attend a public settlement conference. View "In re: University of Michigan" on Justia Law

Police received a report of a drunk driver, with the vehicle’s license plate number. The database reported the vehicle as stolen. The suspect’s name came back: Powell, who was allegedly “armed and dangerous.” Using the caller’s updates on the vehicle’s location, in minutes three deputies found it stopped on a dirt road with the driver standing outside. The deputies told the driver to get on the ground. He dropped to his knees and put his hands in the air. As the deputies approached, Deputy Stetson instructed the driver to lie down on the ground. The driver yelled back that he would not comply and asked what he had done wrong. Stetson and the driver repeated the conversation nine times, with the driver becoming more belligerent. At one point, the driver reached toward his open truck door but then returned his hands to the air. The driver had three warnings that deputies would tase him if he did not obey. Stetson tased the driver. Deputies then handcuffed him. The driver was not Powell but was the vehicle’s owner, Shanaberg. Powell had allegedly stolen the vehicle months before, but the police later recovered it. The vehicle remained in the stolen-vehicle database. Shanaberg sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Stetson, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity on Shanaberg’s excessive-force claim. Given what Stetson knew, it was objectively reasonable to tase Shanaberg after warning him. View "Shanaberg v. Licking County" on Justia Law

In 2015, Davis was the Rowan County, Kentucky County Clerk, responsible for issuing marriage licenses. Same-sex marriage offended her religious beliefs; when the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Davis stopped issuing marriage licenses altogether. When plaintiffs, same-sex couples, sought marriage licenses they could not get them. Plaintiffs sued Davis in her individual capacity and in her official capacity, seeking damages. In a different lawsuit, the district court enjoined Davis from refusing to issue marriage licenses. After the injunction, plaintiffs obtained marriage licenses. Before the Sixth Circuit could rule on the injunction, Kentucky legislators changed the law and Davis began to issue licenses without objection. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Davis's appeal of the injunction. Davis then moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that sovereign immunity shielded her from suit in her official capacity and that qualified immunity shielded her from suit in her individual capacity. The Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity shields Davis as an official because, when refusing to issue marriage licenses, she acted on Kentucky’s behalf, not on Rowan County’s behalf. The doctrine of qualified immunity does not shield Davis as an individual; the plaintiffs adequately alleged she violated plaintiffs’ right to marry, which was clearly established when she acted. View "Yates v. Davis" on Justia Law

The day after a controlled buy, Detroit police officer Benitez obtained a warrant to search 12011 Bramell. His affidavit stated that a reliable confidential informant had been at two Burnette addresses and “12011 BRAMELL (the target location) and that a certain drug dealer had been selling cocaine and heroin out of 9542 Burnette for several months. Burnette Street and Bramell are eight miles apart. Benitez could not have simultaneously observed the locations as stated in the affidavit. Detroit police executed the warrant at Bramell, which is owned by Butler, a retiree with no prior convictions or links to drug operations. Officers asked for Butler's ID, which Butler provided; he stated he had a concealed pistol license and was carrying a weapon. Butler was handcuffed. Sergeant Meadows “slammed” him “against the wall.” Butler had sustained a serious neck injury during military service, resulting in a spinal fusion operation and disability-based retirement. The “slam” reinjured him. From the house, the police recovered $3,702 cash, weapons, a bulletproof vest, and ibuprofen pills. The state did not charge Butler, who filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Meadows on the excessive force claim and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to Benitez on the false affidavit claim. Assaulting an unarmed, compliant individual is a clearly-established violation of the Fourth Amendment. Removing alleged falsehoods, Benitez had not personally seen suspicious activity at Bramell but he corroborated what the informant stated about the Burnette addresses. Officers need not corroborate every detail provided by an informant to show the informant’s reliability. Even without personally observing any drug activity at Bramell, Benitez put enough in the affidavit for a magistrate to conclude that the informant—who was correct about everything else—would be right that Bramell was a “stash house.” View "Butler v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 1995, Pike and Slemmer, students at the Knoxville Job Corps Center, had a strained relationship; Pike told Iloilo, that she intended to kill Slemmer. The next day, Iloilo observed Pike and Slemmer together. That night, Pike told Iloilo that she had just killed Slemmer and showed Iloilo a piece of Slemmers’s skull, describing many details about the murder. Pike made similar statements to another student. After Slemmer’s body was found, police quickly discovered Pike’s connection to the crime. Pike waived her Miranda rights and gave a complete statement. At trial, much of Pike’s defense centered on her mental health. A jury convicted Pike of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. At a sentencing hearing, Pike’s attorney, Talman, originally intended to rely on the testimony of Dr. McCoy, a mitigation expert; shortly before the hearing, Talman switched his plan and called only Pike’s relatives to testify about Pike’s difficult childhood, and her behavioral problems throughout her adolescence.The jury sentenced Pike to death by electrocution. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. State courts also denied postconviction relief, concluding that Pike’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present alternative expert testimony or additional lay testimony on compelling mitigation in her life history. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her federal habeas petition; the state court’s determination that she is unable to establish prejudice on her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Pike v. Gross" on Justia Law