Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An average “dose” of methamphetamine weighs between one-tenth and one-quarter of a gram; there are 28.3 grams to an ounce. Potter confessed to selling 10 pounds. Potter, had been convicted of seven prior drug offenses. His prior statements about his drug sales supported his conviction for a different conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine that used similar methods, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. His prior drug offenses supported his mandatory life sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejecting an argument that the police elicited his statements after he invoked his “Miranda” right to an attorney and violated the Edwards v. Arizona bright-line rule to stop questioning. Potter initially told the agents he did not wish to speak to them. They honored his request; it was Potter who initiated the exchange with them the next day. Before that interrogation, Potter received Miranda warnings and signed a waiver. The court also rejected arguments that the Eighth Amendment prohibited his mandatory term of life because the child-focused logic of Miller v. Alabama should expand to cover adults who commit nonviolent offenses and that the court should have sustained his relevancy and prejudice objections because his statements discussed different actors (not charged in the indictment) and an earlier time, before the indictment’s start date. View "United States v. Potter" on Justia Law

Investigating robberies in Michigan and Ohio in 2010-2012, the government obtained court orders under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) to obtain Carpenter’s cell-site location information. Unlike other provisions of the SCA, the court-ordered production mechanism in section 2703(d) does not require law enforcement to get a warrant before acquiring such records. Carpenter’s wireless carriers were to provide “the locations of cell/site sector (physical addresses) for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination for incoming and outgoing calls.” MetroPCS produced records spanning 127 days. Sprint produced two days of records covering the period when Carpenter’s phone was “roaming” in northeastern Ohio. The government used the records to establish his physical proximity to many of the robberies: Convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and related gun charges, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 1951(a), Carpenter was sentenced to more than 100 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search that requires a warrant supported by probable cause. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed. The unconstitutionality of the government’s search was not clear until after the Supreme Court ruling. The FBI agents who obtained Carpenter’s information acted in good faith, reasonably relying on the SCA. View "United States v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Fazica was arrested for drunk driving and taken to the Bloomfield County Police Department, and then to Oakland County Jail, which was alerted that she was intoxicated, yelling, and spitting. A Cell Extraction Team met Fazica upon her arrival. She alleges that they roughly removed her from the vehicle and immediately applied a spit hood that nearly entirely obscured her vision. The Team handcuffed her in a bent-over position, handled her forcefully, and threatened her with a taser. The entirely male team took Fazica to a room where she was made to lie on her stomach and was strip-searched. Her pants were torn off her; one officer placed his hands on her genitals and another groped her breasts. Fazica was then made to walk to a cell wearing only her bra and the hood. The hood prevented her from attributing certain specific acts to specific officers. Fazica sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that four officers used excessive force. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, arguing only that Fazica cannot show each officer’s personal involvement in the allegedly unconstitutional acts. The district court denied their motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence, that each defendant either committed or observed and failed to stop the allegedly unconstitutional acts. View "Fazica v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services collects blood samples from nearly every newborn baby in Michigan, to test for diseases. After testing, the samples are transferred to the Michigan Neonatal Biobank and stored for future use by the state. Plaintiffs challenged the law, claiming that blood is drawn from newborns and retained without the consent or knowledge of the newborns’ parents. Plaintiffs allege that despite Defendants’ assurances that all blood samples are secure and not identifiable to the individuals from whom they were taken, some samples have been given up under court orders and some are being sold to researchers.The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of their complaint. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue claims for: damages based on alleged violations of the parents’ and the children’s substantive due process rights when the blood samples were collected and screened; damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief, based on alleged violations of the parents’ and children’s substantive due process rights by retention of the samples; damages based on alleged violations of the parents’ and children’s Fourth Amendment rights when the samples were collected and screened; injunctive and declaratory relief, based on alleged violations of the children’s Fourth Amendment rights by’ retention of their samples. Rights related to directing the medical care of children devolve upon their parents or guardians; the children’s rights were not violated when Defendants drew their blood, screened it, and stored it. State sovereign immunity and qualified immunity bar all claims alleging that the parents’ substantive due process rights were violated when Defendants drew their children’s blood and screened it. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ retention of the samples violates the parents’ fundamental rights. The court remanded that issue and Fourth Amendment claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for Defendants’ ongoing storage of the samples. View "Kanuszewski v. Michigan Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

Based on a five-page-long search-warrant affidavit—which included evidence from a confidential informant and other sources, a controlled buy, direct police-officer surveillance, and Christian’s history of drug trafficking arrests—a magistrate determined that there was probable cause to search 618 Grandville Avenue, Christian’s home, for evidence of drug trafficking. That search uncovered a large amount of heroin, some cocaine and marijuana, and two loaded guns. Christian was convicted of various drug and firearm crimes. The Sixth Circuit initially reversed the district court's denial of Christian's motion to suppress evidence. On rehearing, the en banc court affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting Christian's "attempt to isolate and explain away each piece of evidence," and contradict the factual assertions of the officers who watched the house. Viewing the “totality of the circumstances,” through the “lens of common sense,” as the Supreme Court has instructed, the conclusion is inescapable: there was probable cause to believe that a search of 618 Grandville would uncover evidence of drug trafficking. “Most readers of the affidavit would have been surprised if it did not.” View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

An incumbent Kentucky state senator and an unsuccessful state candidate sued, alleging that Kentucky statutes violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. One (now defunct) campaign finance provision restricted the amount a candidate could loan to his campaign. The challenged ethics provisions prohibit a legislator, candidate for the legislature, or his campaign committee from accepting a campaign contribution from a lobbyist; prohibit a legislator, candidate, or his campaign committee from accepting a campaign contribution from an employer of a lobbyist or a political committee (PAC) during a regular session of the General Assembly; prohibit a legislator or his spouse from accepting “anything of value” from a lobbyist or his employer; and prohibit a lobbyist from serving as a campaign treasurer, and directly soliciting, controlling, or delivering a campaign contribution to a legislator or candidate. The district court dismissed the campaign finance claim as moot but found that the ethics laws burdened “core political speech” and curtailed freedom of association, requiring strict scrutiny. The court upheld the regular session contribution ban but found the other challenged ethics provisions unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the “regular session” ban but otherwise vacated and reversed. Kentucky’s legislature acted to protect itself and its citizens from corruption; these laws are closely drawn to further Kentucky’s anti-corruption interest and pass constitutional muster. View "Schickel v. Dilger" on Justia Law

In an intersection, Patterson’s SUV rammed the door of Green’s sedan. According to Green, she was briefly unconscious and, after coming to, was dazed and in intense pain. Southfield Officer Maya arrived and spoke with Patterson, who did not look injured. Maya then went to Green, still on her back on the median. Because Green “didn’t respond too many times,” Maya refrained from asking many questions. Traffic Specialist Birberick arrived while paramedics were looking after Green. Patterson told him that he had entered the intersection with a green light when his car “was struck” by Green’s car. Birberick did not think that the accident was not severe enough to warrant significant investigation. Birberick determined that the physical evidence corroborated Patterson’s account. Birberick did not complete a police incident report but only completed the crash report that Michigan requires for highway-safety planning purposes. In the “Hazardous Action” box, Birberick wrote “none” for Patterson and “disregarded traffic [signal]” for Green. Crash reports cannot be used in court. Green was hospitalized for several days. When she saw the report, she insisted that Patterson ran the light and that she had a witness. Officers followed up but decided against amending the report. Green sued Patterson, then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983; 1985 action against officers and the city, alleging that the investigation violated her equal protection rights (Green is a black woman, Patterson a white man) and her right of access to the courts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the officers were protected by qualified immunity, characterizing the officers’ actions as “mere laxity.” View "Green v. Southfield" on Justia Law

Petitioner robbed a restaurant of approximately $200-300. Attorney Walwyn represented petitioner. Days before trial, the state offered that petitioner plead guilty in exchange for a 20-year sentence. He allegedly rejected that offer. Convicted, he was sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment for aggravated robbery, eight years for one conviction of aggravated assault, 10 years on the other aggravated-assault conviction, and eight years for evading arrest, all to be served consecutively. On appeal, petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and his sentences. Tennessee courts rejected his motion for postconviction relief, in which he raised was a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. At a hearing, he testified that his attorney never advised him of the plea offer until years later. Throughout the post-conviction proceedings, petitioner maintained his innocence and speculated that he may have been misidentified. Walwyn testified that he “did relay the offer” but petitioner told him “he was not taking any time.” The state court also considered a claim that Walwyn conveyed the offer but did not advise petitioner of the much higher sentence he could face. The court reasoned that, despite the disparity between the offer and the possible sentence, petitioner could not show prejudice because he was uninterested in taking any plea offer. The district court dismissed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Tennessee court did not act contrary to federal law and was not unreasonable in determining that petitioner was uninterested in taking any plea. View "Johnson v. Genovese" on Justia Law

DEA agents waited along I-94, for a black Toyota Camry. The previous evening, agents had arranged for a confidential informant to purchase heroin from Soto, who agreed to drive the shipment from Chicago to Detroit. Agents obtained a warrant to track the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents spotted Soto’s Camry, matching it to the location of Soto’s cell phone. Agents noticed a RAV4 behind Soto, driving at approximately the same speed as the Camry and changing lanes at the same time, concluded that the cars were traveling “in tandem” and asked Michigan State Police to pull over both cars. As a trooper pulled up, the RAV4 slowed to 53 miles per hour, under the minimum speed limit. The trooper effectuated a stop. The RAV4’s driver, Belakhdhar, and his passenger provided identification, explaining that they were driving to visit someone in the hospital. Belakhdhar consented to a car search. Failing to find any contraband, the trooper let them go. DEA continued surveilling the vehicle, determined that Belakhdhar lacked legal immigration status, and requested that Border Patrol stop the car. During that second stop, another agent walked a drug dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the back bumper. Opening the trunk, the agents discovered hidden heroin hidden and arrested Belakhdhar. The court suppressed the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed. As a matter of law, the district court erred to the extent it held that tandem driving with a vehicle suspected of drug activity cannot, alone, support reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Belakhdhar" on Justia Law

In 2006, Williams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had prior convictions under Ohio law: attempted felonious assault, domestic violence, and assault on a peace officer, which subjected him to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). Williams twice unsuccessfully filed 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions to vacate his sentence. In 2015, (Johnson) the Supreme Court found the ACCA's residual clause, section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional and subsequently held that Johnson had announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Williams filed a third motion, arguing that his prior convictions no longer counted as ACCA predicate offenses. The Sixth Circuit authorized the district court to consider whether Williams’ felonious assault conviction still qualifies as an ACCA violent felony, noting its 2012 holding (Anderson), that committing felonious assault in Ohio necessarily requires the use of physical force and is an ACCA predicate offense under the elements clause. The district court then held, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that Anderson remained controlling precedent. The Sixth Circuit, en banc, subsequently overruled Anderson and held that a conviction for Ohio felonious assault no longer categorically qualifies as a violent felony predicate under the ACCA’s elements clause. The court then remanded Williams’ case. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law