Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the FBI arrested Monea for money laundering, he told his attorney that the undercover agent coerced him into committing the crime. Much of the sting operation had been recorded; the threats Monea claimed were not on the recordings. He then claimed that the government tampered with evidence. After the jury convicted him Monea found a witness (the trustee of the Monea Family Trust) claiming that the undercover FBI agent lied on the stand. He sought habeas relief, claiming his trial counsel ineffectively pursued the evidence-tampering claim by not adequately following up on an assertion that the recordings had been tampered with, or that the government’s star witness perjured himself. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. The district court “thoroughly considered” the affidavits presented by Monea and concluded that they could not overcome the government’s contrary evidence. It is not enough for Monea to argue that a different attorney would have done a better job. Monea provided no new evidence and no new arguments that would have altered the trial court’s denial of his outrageous-conduct defense. Monea bore the burden of proving perjury and “mere inconsistencies” in the agent’s testimony were not enough to sustain the claim. View "Monea v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2000, Ann Arbor passed an ordinance requiring certain homeowners to undergo structural renovations to their homes to alleviate stormwater drainage problems affecting the city and surrounding areas. The city paid or reimbursed the homeowners for the renovations. In 2014, homeowners affected by the ordinance sued in Michigan state courts, alleging that the city’s actions amounted to a taking without just compensation under the Michigan Constitution; they filed an “England Reservation” in an attempt to preserve federal takings claims for subsequent adjudication. The homeowners lost in state court and then filed suit in federal court, citing the Fifth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the Fifth Amendment claim as issue precluded and the section 1983 action as claim precluded. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court did not address whether Michigan law is coextensive with federal law. If the takings jurisprudence of the two constitutions is coextensive, then issue preclusion bars subsequent litigation of the federal takings claims after litigation of the state takings claims. If the takings jurisprudence of the two constitutions is not coextensive, then claim preclusion bars subsequent litigation of the federal takings claim because it should have been brought with the state claim in the first instance in the Michigan court. View "Lumbard v. Ann Arbor" on Justia Law

The FBI accessed Playpen and verified that the website contained child pornography, then executed a search warrant at a North Carolina server hosting company that owned the IP address. The FBI seized a server that contained a copy of Playpen. Because of a server misconfiguration, the government was able to gain administrative control of the website. For two weeks, the FBI operated Playpen from a Virginia government-controlled computer server but was unable to identify the individuals who logged on. The FBI turned to counter-technology called NIT, which downloads on the user’s computer and sends back information. An Eastern District of Virginia magistrate signed a warrant authorizing the government to deploy NIT on “any user or administrator who logs into [Playpen] by entering a username and password.” NIT identified the IP address associated with a Playpen visitor’s username. An administrative subpoena was sent to the Internet Service Provider that operated that address. The response led to Moorehead's Tennessee residence. The government obtained a residential warrant and seized Moorehead’s computer equipment. Moorehead admitted that he used the Internet to view child pornography. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2252(a)(2). He unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the NIT Warrant violated 28 U.S.C. 636(a) because it was executed outside of the magistrate’s territorial jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Moorehead" on Justia Law

As a cost-saving measure, Flint's municipal water supply was switched from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River and was processed by an outdated and previously mothballed water treatment plant, with the approval of Michigan regulators and an engineering firm, and distributed without adding chemicals to counter the river water’s known corrosivity. Within days, residents complained of foul smelling and tasting water. Within weeks, some residents’ hair began to fall out and their skin developed rashes. Within a year, there were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in deaths from Legionnaires’ disease, and reports of dangerously high blood-lead levels in Flint children. The river water was 19 times more corrosive than the Lake Huron water pumped supplied by DWSD; without corrosion-control treatment, lead leached out of the lead-based service lines. The district court dismissed many claims and defendants in a suit by residents. The remaining defendants appealed with respect to the remaining 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim--that defendants violated their right to bodily integrity as guaranteed by the Substantive Due Process Clause. The Sixth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs pled a plausible Due Process violation regarding some defendants, rejecting their qualified immunity claims. The court reversed as to other defendants; plaintiffs alleged mere negligence, not a constitutional violation, against them. The court rejected a claim that the city was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity based on Michigan's takeover of the city under the “Emergency Manager” law. View "Guertin v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency's automated program, MiDAS, accessed claimant records from employers, state agencies, and the federal government. When MiDAS detected unreported income or “flagged” other information, it initiated an automated process to determine whether the individual had engaged in fraud. If an employee reported no income for any week during a quarter in which he earned income, MiDAS automatically found fraud. MiDAS did not inform the claimant about the basis for suspicion and did not allow fact-based adjudication but automatically sent claimants multiple-choice questionnaires. No human being took part in the fraud determination. MiDAS sent the questionnaires to claimants’ online accounts, many of which were dormant, and did not take additional steps (emails, mail, or phone) to notify claimants. When MiDAS determined that a claimant committed fraud, the individual’s right to benefits terminated immediately and severe monetary penalties were automatically assessed, even when claimants did not actually receive benefits. Most claimants did not know about the determination until the time for appeal had expired. The Agency did not answer calls and garnished claimants’ wages and intercepted their federal income tax returns without an opportunity to contest the fraud determinations. The Michigan Auditor General reviewed 22,000 MiDAS fraud determinations; 93% did not actually involve fraud.In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the Individual Defendants qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Defendants violated their right to procedural due process by terminating their eligibility for benefits and seizing their tax refunds without any meaningful pre-deprivation process; the right to a pre-deprivation hearing was clearly established at the time. Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible equal protection claim; they failed to allege Defendants intentionally singled them out for discriminatory treatment. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not clearly established in this context. View "Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant issued a life insurance policy to the Decedent. Plaintiff, Decedent’s former wife, is the primary beneficiary; the contingent beneficiaries are Decedent’s “surviving children equally.” Plaintiff and Decedent divorced. Their Dissolution Agreement required that Plaintiff pay the premium of the Defendant’s policy and required “Husband at his expense [to] maintain" insurance on his life with the parties’ children as irrevocable primary beneficiaries. The couple had minor children at the time of Decedent’s death. When Plaintiff requested payment, Defendant requested that Plaintiff obtain waivers from "other potential parties” and court-appointed guardians for the children or that Plaintiff waive her rights so that Defendant could disburse the proceeds to the minor children. The court dismissed Defendant’s subsequent interpleader complaint and ordered Defendant to disburse to Plaintiff. A jury found that Defendant breached its contract, resulting in actual damages of $350,000; Defendant’s refusal to pay was in bad faith, resulting in additional damages of $87,500; and Defendant’s refusal to pay was either intentional, reckless, malicious, or fraudulent. The jury awarded punitive damages of $3,000,000. A Tennessee statute capped punitive damages at two times the compensatory damages awarded or $500,000, whichever is greater. Plaintiff challenged the cap under the Tennessee Constitution. The Tennessee Supreme Court declined to provide an opinion on certified questions. The district court then rejected Plaintiff’s challenge, reducing Defendant’s punitive damages liability to $700,000. The Sixth Circuit vacated in part, finding that the statutory cap on punitive damages, T.C.A. 29-39-104, violates the individual right to a trial by jury. View "Lindenberg v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners, Iraqi nationals, were ordered removed years ago because of criminal offenses they committed in the U.S. Iraq refused to repatriate them, so Petitioners remained under orders of supervision by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In 2017, Iraq began to cooperate and removal of Iraqi nationals resumed. In April 2017 ICE conducted a removal by charter flight to Iraq, scheduling a second charter for June and arresting more than 200 Iraqi nationals. Iraq declined to issue requisite travel documents and would accept only Iraqi nationals who had unexpired passports and were returning on commercial flights. Petitioners filed a putative class action habeas petition on behalf of all Iraqi nationals with final orders of removal, who have been, or will be, arrested and detained as a result of Iraq’s recent decision,” seeking a TRO or stay of removal, pending arguments on allegedly changed country conditions. Under 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), immigration courts hold exclusive jurisdiction over removal proceedings. The district court stayed the final removal orders and concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear Petitioners’ claims as an as-applied constitutional violation of the Suspension Clause. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court lacked the jurisdiction. Rejecting Petitioners’ argument the petition-for-review process is constitutionally inadequate as an alternative to habeas review, the court noted that Petitioners had years to file motions to reopen and the administrative scheme provides multiple avenues to stay removal while pursuing relief. The court was not merely interpreting a statute: it “created out of thin air a requirement for bond hearings that does not exist in the statute; and adopted new standards that the government must meet.” View "Hamama v. Adducci" on Justia Law

Berry, charged with Conveying False Information Regarding Explosives, 18 U.S.C. 1038(a), allegedly placed a briefcase made to look like a bomb but containing only papers and no explosives, outside a bank. Berry suffers from mental illness. He apparently believes that he is the trustee of a trust which owns all of Bank of America’s assets and that it is his duty to execute the trust and repossess those assets. According to the government, the briefcase incident was not Berry’s first encounter with the bank. Berry is not competent to stand trial absent medication but he does not wish to be medicated. The district court ordered him to be treated with antipsychotic drugs. The Sixth Circuit vacated that order. Even assuming the five-year statutory maximum sentence for the charged crime makes it a serious offense that could qualify for Berry to be forcibly medicated, there are significant mitigating factors that weigh against finding that the government has a sufficient interest for such mandated treatment. Berry has already been confined for the length of time he likely would face as imprisonment if convicted, and his pretrial confinement would likely be credited against his jail term. View "United States v. Berry" on Justia Law

Confidential informants learned that Ardd wanted to buy cocaine and connected him with Memphis officer Tellez, posing as an out-of-state cocaine dealer. Before a scheduled meeting, Tellez obtained a warrant to search Ardd’s home for drug records and drug proceeds “[u]pon Ardd being arrested for attempting to possess th[e] cocaine.” Tellez’s affidavit described his experience in narcotics investigations and stated that a reliable informant told him about Ardd’s drug activities; Ardd contacted Tellez several times during the year about buying distribution quantities of cocaine; Ardd was ready to buy. The affidavit described Ardd’s residence and noted the police had surveilled it. Officers observed the controlled buy and arrested Ardd after he showed Tellez money, climbed into Tellez’s car, and took the bag of cocaine. Police searched Ardd and seized the cocaine, $9,800, and a loaded pistol. In his home, they seized 34 baggies of drugs, digital scales, and a loaded pistol with an obliterated serial number. Police gave Ardd his Miranda warnings and supplied a written copy. Ardd admitted that he came to the parking lot with a loaded gun to obtain cocaine, and that he had been making up to a thousand dollars a week in cocaine sales for years and that he had more drugs and another gun at home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, Ardd’s convictions, and his 270-month sentence. View "United States v. Ardd" on Justia Law

Logan was a drug courier in a cross-country drug ring from 2004-2007. In total, Logan transported over 150 kilograms of cocaine from California to Michigan. Logan received conflicting advice while considering whether to accept a plea offer with a 10-year sentencing cap. His counsel of record told him it was a very good deal that avoided the high risks of proceeding to trial. Logan signed the plea agreement. His second attorney (retained by Logan’s family but not counsel of record) subsequently persuaded Logan to withdraw from the plea agreement. Ultimately, Logan accepted another plea agreement that did not include a sentencing cap and received a much longer sentence than contemplated by the first agreement. Logan claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court and Sixth Circuit rejected his argument. Counsel of record advised Logan about the risks of going to trial; Logan testified that he signed the plea agreement because he was guilty and was worried about facing a sentence of 30 years or more. He was aware of the risks of trial. Whether to accept the plea offer was ultimately Logan’s decision and that the fear of a higher sentence after trial was a valid concern. Logan received all the information needed to make an informed decision. View "Logan v. United States" on Justia Law