Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The FBI obtained access to the physical computer running Playpen’s “dark” website, which contained significant child pornography, and kept the website running to catch its patrons. The site required a browser “mask” to conceal users’ IP addresses, so the FBI placed a digital bug in the fabric of the website, to create a digital fingerprint. After collecting identifying data on Playpen’s individual users, the FBI sought separate warrants, explaining how they cross-referenced the user’s digital fingerprint with an IP address, the "Playpen" items the user had viewed, and the physical location of the computer. distinguishing the machine from others at the same address. The warrant affidavit outlined Tagg’s five hours on Playpen but did not state whether Tagg actually viewed or downloaded illegal files. The magistrate approved the warrant, stating that officers had established probable cause that Tagg violated 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5). Searching Tagg’s home, police found 20,000 child pornography files on his personal computers. The Sixth Circuit found the warrant valid. Visiting a website containing child pornography creates a reasonable inference that the user has stored child pornography on a computer; that the website contains both legal and illegal material does not automatically negate probable cause. An officer of reasonable caution would suspect that Tagg had accessed Playpen with “intent to view” child pornography, and that evidence would be found on his home computer. Tagg browsed the site for an extended period, clicking on blatant child pornography advertisements. View "United States v. Tagg" on Justia Law

Porter, the mayor of Paintsville, Kentucky, steered business and contracts to companies owned by his co-defendant, Crace, and ensured payment of a fraudulent invoice to Crace’s company, in return for payments disguised as loans. Porter was charged with theft concerning programs receiving federal funds, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A), and bribery concerning such programs, section 666(a)(1)(B) and was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the conviction under section 666(a)(1)(B) was unsupported by sufficient evidence and that the admission of a witness’s prior statements to investigators and the admission of another witness’s deposition testimony violated his confrontation rights. A conviction under section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require evidence of a quid pro quo “in connection with” any “official act.” It is enough if a defendant corruptly solicits anything of value with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with some transaction involving property or services worth $5000 or more. Testimony concerning prior statements to investigators did not violate Porter’s confrontation rights because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The government sufficiently demonstrated the unavailability of the deposition witness to testify at trial, so no Confrontation Clause violation occurred. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs submitted a ballot initiative petition proposing to amend the Ohio Constitution by imposing term limits on the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court and requiring that all laws “that apply to the people of the State of Ohio . . . apply equally to the members and employees of the General Assembly.” The single-subject rule, Ohio Rev. Code 3503.062(A), allows initiative petitions to contain only “one proposed law or constitutional amendment,” so the Ohio Ballot Board split the initiative into two initiatives, each containing one proposed constitutional amendment. Plaintiffs challenged the process. Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting an argument that the process was a content-based regulation of core political speech. The Supreme Court has not viewed single-subject rules as inconsistent with the First Amendment and the Ohio Supreme Court has rejected an essentially identical challenge. Ohio’s single-subject rule applies to all petitions, regardless of their substantive messages, and may be justified without reference to the content of any initiative petitions. The rule is intended to prevent voter confusion and "logrolling." Whether Plaintiffs violate Ohio’s single-subject rule depends not on what they say, but simply on where they say it; it is a minimally burdensome and nondiscriminatory regulation. View "Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio Supreme Court v. Ohio Ballot Board" on Justia Law

Morris pled guilty to the distribution of cocaine base. The plea agreement specified a Guidelines range of 30-37 months in prison. Because an amendment lowering the applicable drug sentencing guidelines was about to become effective, the government did not oppose a two-level downward variance, resulting in a range of 24-30 months. The agreement stated that Morris could withdraw his plea if the court were to impose a sentence higher than 37 months. Morris had two Michigan felony domestic violence convictions under M.C.L. 750.81(2). Under that statute, the first two domestic assault convictions are misdemeanor offenses, subsequent violations are felonies. The court utilized the “modified categorical approach,” examining the transcripts from Morris’s convictions and finding that both qualified as crimes of violence, so that he was a career offender. Morris withdrew his plea, proceeded to trial, and was convicted. The career offender designation resulted in a guidelines range of 210-262 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. Domestic assault includes a risk of confrontation at least equivalent to that associated with burglary, so the conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause. The conviction does not qualify under the elements clause; Michigan’s definition of battery does not include an element of “physical force” as defined by the Court in Johnson. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

In 1998, Byerley was found beside the road with her throat slashed. Jordan was convicted for the murder. Prosecutors never told him that a knife found near Byerley's body might have implicated someone else. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Jordan sought post-conviction relief under Brady v. Maryland. The same court vacated Jordan’s conviction in 2011. Jordan was retried and acquitted in 2015. Less than a year later, Jordan sued a Blount County prosecutor, detective, and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages for the Brady violation. The statute of limitations for that claim is one year. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of his suit As a general rule, a claim accrues “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” To obtain relief, the plaintiff must be able to prove the elements of his claim. Analogizing to the tort of malicious prosecution, which requires “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused,” the court concluded that Brady claim under section 1983 cannot accrue until the criminal proceeding so terminates. Jordan’s criminal proceeding continued after the vacatur of his conviction, ending only upon his acquittal in 2015. His claim did not accrue until then. View "Jordan v. Blount County" on Justia Law

Counts 1-4 and 6 alleged Bacon sold firearms to prohibited persons, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). Counts 5 and 7 charged Bacon with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k). Bacon entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 5. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Bacon testified that he purchased the Count 1 firearm and sold it from his Grand Rapids home "with reasonable cause to know that [the purchaser was] a felon.” The government proffered that the Count 1 purchaser had been convicted of a felony and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Bacon confirmed that he sold the Count 5 firearm, a semiautomatic pistol with an obliterated serial number, to a prohibited person at the same house, and had removed the serial number. The government proffered that the Count 5 firearm was manufactured in Ohio. Defense counsel stipulated to all facts proffered by the government and confirmed that Bacon was “satisfied” with the record. The court sentenced Bacon to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Bacon’s arguments that the sections under which he was convicted exceeded Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. The interstate commerce element, which Bacon admitted when entering his plea, ensures that the firearms affected interstate commerce and saves the statute from any jurisdictional defects. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

On October 29, 2014, at 4:00 a.m., 13 police officers wearing SWAT gear and face masks blew open the door of the Greers’ West Bloomfield Township home with a shotgun. The officers did not knock or announce their presence. The parents and their daughters were ordered to their knees at gunpoint; officers handcuffed a nephew. The Greers repeatedly asked to see the search warrant, but the officers refused to show it and did not allow the mother to sit with her seven-year-old daughter. Officers stated that they were searching for a “dangerous Russian,” who had evidently resided at the house more than a year before the search. Police found neither the suspect nor any contraband. The Highland Park Police Department, which evidently conducted the search, produced the underlying search warrant in response to the Greers' complaint. The warrant described the Greers’ home and listed controlled substances and items connected to narcotics trafficking as items to be seized. In the Greers’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity. The complaint states a plausible claim that the officers violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by executing a search warrant on their home in an unreasonable manner. View "Greer v. City of Highland Park" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission issues separate classes of licenses to manufacturers and distillers, wholesalers, and liquor retailers, Tenn. Code 57-3-201. To obtain a license, an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made.” The statute imposes a 10-year residency requirement to renew the license. A corporation cannot receive a license “if any officer, director or stockholder owning any capital stock in the corporation, would be ineligible to receive a retailer’s license for any reason specified” and all capital stock must be owned by individuals who meet the same residency requirements. Anticipating litigation, the state sought a declaratory judgment construing the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The district court found the requirements facially discriminatory; held that state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor; concluded that nondiscriminatory alternatives could achieve the durational-residency requirements’ purposes—citizen health and alcohol regulation; and found that the requirements violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and found the unconstitutional provisions severable. View "Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission issues separate classes of licenses to manufacturers and distillers, wholesalers, and liquor retailers, Tenn. Code 57-3-201. To obtain a license, an individual must have “been a bona fide resident of [Tennessee] during the two-year period immediately preceding the date upon which application is made.” The statute imposes a 10-year residency requirement to renew the license. A corporation cannot receive a license “if any officer, director or stockholder owning any capital stock in the corporation, would be ineligible to receive a retailer’s license for any reason specified” and all capital stock must be owned by individuals who meet the same residency requirements. Anticipating litigation, the state sought a declaratory judgment construing the constitutionality of the durational-residency requirements. The district court found the requirements facially discriminatory; held that state regulations of the retailer and wholesaler tiers are not immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny just because they do not discriminate against out-of-state liquor; concluded that nondiscriminatory alternatives could achieve the durational-residency requirements’ purposes—citizen health and alcohol regulation; and found that the requirements violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and found the unconstitutional provisions severable. View "Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association" on Justia Law

The Hagys took a loan to purchase a mobile home and property on which to park it. In 2010, they defaulted. Green Tree initiated foreclosure. Hagy called Green Tree’s law firm, Demers & Adams, wanting to settling the claim. Demers sent a letter containing a Warranty Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure, stating, “In return for [the Hagys] executing the Deed … Green Tree has advised me that it will waive any deficiency balance.” The Hagys executed the Deed. Demers wrote to the Hagys’ attorney, confirming receipt of the executed Deed and reaffirming that “Green Tree will not attempt to collect any deficiency balance.” Green Tree dismissed the foreclosure complaint but began calling the Hagys to collect the debt that they no longer owed. Green Tree realized its mistake and agreed that the Hagys owed nothing. In 2011, the Hagys sued, citing the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. Green Tree resolved the dispute through arbitration. The court granted the Hagys summary judgment, reasoning that Demers’ letter “fail[ed] to disclose” that it was “from a debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11). The court awarded them $1,800 in statutory damages and $74,196 in attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal and the underlying suit. The complaint failed to identify a cognizable injury traceable to Demers; Congress cannot override Article III of the Constitution by labeling the violation of any statutory requirement a cognizable injury. View "Hagy v. Demers & Adams" on Justia Law