Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pryor was charged with conspiring to distribute heroin. Interested persons would call to speak to “Daffy Duck” and negotiate a purchase. “Daffy” would then give a location for the transaction and inform members of the conspiracy. Deputy Shattuck listened in on four telephone calls between “Daffy” and an informant. Following the informant's drug purchase, police watched the residence where the sale occurred. While a search warrant was being drafted, Pryor entered the house. Police observed Pryor through the window as he picked up money, then returned to his car and left. They followed the car until it was stopped for traffic violations. Pryor had a pistol inside his waistband, which was properly licensed; wads of money in his pockets; and, in his car, had a cell phone that rang when the “Daffy” number was dialed. Pryor made 33 phone calls while in jail, which were recorded. Officer Shattuck concluded that Pryor’s voice matched the “Daffy” voice. After additional controlled buys, Pryor was re-arrested and, at a hearing, was uncooperative and asserted “sovereign citizen” status. Citing Pryor’s “bizarre” behavior, the magistrate ordered a competency evaluation. Pryor objected to appointed counsel (Upshaw), was found competent, refused to answer questions, and objected to Upshaw acting on his behalf. At later appearances, Pryor continued to assert his desire to appear in propria persona and contest the court’s jurisdiction but refused to cooperate. Pryor was convicted and sentenced to 235 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding a finding that Pryor had waived his right of self-representation by his behavior, the admission of voice-identification testimony, and sentencing enhancements imposed for Pryor’s possession of a gun. View "United States v. Pryor" on Justia Law

Officers went to execute a search warrant at Price’s Grand Rapids home. Multiple informants had reported that Price was dealing large quantities of heroin. The officers had a description of Price’s vehicles and knew that he was a six-time narcotics felon. Three officers sat in a police-surveillance van while other officers sat in an unmarked vehicle on streets adjoining the house. Price’s truck drove past the van and stopped in the snowbound street, partially blocking it. Deputy Frederick saw Price exit the truck and walk to an idling vehicle. Price leaned his head, hands, arms, and shoulders into the vehicle—a motion that, in Frederick’s experience, indicated a drug transaction. Price spotted an officer, then fled, using a truck parked in the alley behind his house. Officers stopped Price a block away; they searched his house and found drug-dealing paraphernalia, but no illegal drugs. They found documents showing that Price rented a mailbox and a parking place occupied by a large van from a nearby storage facility. Three hours after his arrest, Price admitted that the van was his and that he kept guns there. Price consented to a search of the van, in which Frederick found an AK-47, three handguns, and 200 grams of cocaine. Convicted, Price was sentenced to 324 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Price’s motion to suppress. Price’s arrest was lawful and did not vitiate his later consent to search his van. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Ohio House Bill No. 663 protects the identity of individuals and entities that participate in the lethal injection process (Participants), not to be disclosed in public records or during judicial proceedings, except in limited circumstances, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(A)(1)(cc), 2949.221(B)–(C). It directs courts to seal records that contain information related to the identity of Participants, allowing disclosure only if, “through clear and convincing evidence presented in the private hearing," the court finds that the Participant appears to have acted unlawfully with respect to the person’s involvement in the administration of a lethal injection.” HB 663 prevents licensing authorities from taking disciplinary action against a Participant and permits a Participant to bring a civil suit against any person who discloses that individual’s identity and participation. Plaintiffs, Ohio prisoners sentenced to death, claimed that HB 663 unconstitutionally burdened speech, created a regime of unconstitutional prior restraint, violated the Plaintiffs’ equal-protection and due-process rights, and their right of access to the courts, and denied the Plaintiffs constitutionally protected access to government proceedings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Licensure-Immunity Provision and the Civil-Action Provision. Plaintiffs suffered only “conjectural or hypothetical injuries” rather than a “requisite distinct and palpable injury.” Plaintiffs had no constitutional right to the information they claimed they were being deprived of. View "Phillips v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Michigan law forbids voters from exposing their marked ballots to others, Mich. Comp. Laws 168.738(2). The penalty for violation is that the ballot will be rejected and the offender not allowed to vote. Crookston sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from enforcing the law in the upcoming election so that he could take a “ballot selfie” with his cell phone and post it on social media. In late October, the district court granted his motion. The Sixth Circuit stayed the order, stating that, just 10 days before the November 2016 election, “we will not accept his invitation to suddenly alter Michigan’s venerable voting protocols, especially when he could have filed this lawsuit long ago.” The court questioned the likelihood of success on the merits, stating that the ban on photography at the polls seems to be a content-neutral regulation that reasonably protects voters’ privacy and honors a long tradition of protecting the secret ballot. It also is not clear whether a ban on ballot selfies “significantly impinges” Crookston’s First Amendment rights. View "Crookston v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A confidential source met Detective Best and stated that two Hispanic men in a silver Lincoln Aviator were moving narcotics from the Chatham Village apartment complex. Best set up surveillance in an unmarked car; within 45 minutes, Best saw a silver SUV exit Chatham Village. Best followed and saw that it was a silver Lincoln Aviator. At a well-lit intersection, Best pulled up and observed what he believed were two Hispanic males in the vehicle. Best called Officer Phalen and relayed to dispatch, to Phalen, and to his partner (Trivette) that he had witnessed the driver fail to properly signal a turn. They followed the Aviator until they saw it swerve across double-yellow lines. Phalen turned on his emergency lights. The Aviator pulled over. Phalen spoke with the driver, Calderon, who had no valid driver’s license. He observed Calderon visibly shaking. Trivette, on the passenger side, noted that Pacheco was not wearing his seatbelt. Trivette asked Pacheco for identification, but Pacheco did not respond, instead rummaging through the glove compartment and glancing around the vehicle. Concerned about a possible weapon, Trivette asked Pacheco to exit the vehicle. During a pat down, Trivette felt “a large chunk of money on his right cargo pocket” and saw the top of a brick-like object, wrapped in brown paper and tape, protruding out of the top of Pacheco’s left cargo pocket. Pacheco had $3,000 in currency and a half-kilogram of brick cocaine in his pockets. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the pat down and that the cocaine and currency were properly seized pursuant to the plain-view and plain-feel doctrines. View "United States v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

Cole, a Memphis police officer, was arrested after leaving a Beale Street nightclub. He filed a class action, alleging that Memphis’s routine practice of sweeping Beale Street at 3 a.m. on weekend nights violated his constitutional right to intrastate travel. The jury found that the city implemented its street-sweeping policy without consideration of whether conditions in the area posed an existing, imminent, or immediate threat to public safety. Based on those findings, the court found the policy unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, entered an injunction, and ordered other equitable relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in subjecting the Sweep to strict scrutiny and in certifying a class when the precise members of the class were not ascertainable. The primary purpose of the Sweep was to impede travel; it resulted in the broad denial of access to a popular, two-block area of a public roadway and sidewalk. The Sweep was more than an incidental inconvenience. Under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, the city bore the burden of justifying the Sweep to its stated goal of public safety. The jury found that the timing and execution of the Sweep was arbitrary. The precise identity of each class member need not be ascertained for Rule 23(b)(2) class certification, in a case seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief. View "Cole v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

In response to a phone tip that Courtright had “come out of his room [at the Traveler’s Inn] with a gun and threatened to shoot” the dog of “another resident” at the hotel, Battle Creek Officers Wolf and Rathjen were dispatched to the Traveler’s Inn. Courtright claims that he “was nowhere near his room when the alleged incident was said to have taken place,” and that he tried to explain that to the officers. Courtright was nonetheless arrested. He claims he told the officers that prior rotator cuff injuries and shoulder surgeries precluded him from placing his hands behind his back and that he repeatedly complained of pain to the officers after he was handcuffed. He claims the officers disregarded his complaints. The officers and the city appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an assertion of qualified immunity. Courtright alleged a plausible claim that the officers violated his clearly established constitutional rights. View "Courtright v. City of Battle Creek" on Justia Law

In 1986, a jury found that Hutton murdered Mitchell and attempted to kill another friend. Hutton was convicted of aggravated murder with two death specifications. Following a remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the death sentence was appropriate. In 1996, Hutton filed a state petition for post-conviction relief; the court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2001, Hutton unsuccessfully filed a second post-conviction petition. The Ohio Supreme Court again declined further review. Hutton unsuccessfully applied to reopen his direct appeal, contending ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In 2005, Hutton filed a federal habeas petition, which he amended in 2011. Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit denied five of his claim, but reversed with respect to whether a state court’s independent review of a death sentence during sentencing can cure any omission in a jury instruction. A fundamental miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to define “aggravating circumstances” in the jury instructions. The jury, without proper instructions, could not have made a finding that aggravating circumstances existed; the harshest sentence Hutton could possibly have received without that instruction was life. View "Hutton v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Franklin lived with his grandparents and uncle to escape his alcoholic mother’s abuse. As a teenager he began manifesting bizarre behavior and using marijuana. In 1997, when Franklin was 19 years old, his relatives told him to move out. After severely beating them, Franklin shot and killed his grandmother; set fire to the house, leaving his grandfather and uncle to die; then fled to Tennessee. He was apprehended and confessed, claiming his uncle had raped him. The trial court found Franklin competent. During trial, Franklin engaged in disruptive and inappropriate behavior. The jury found Franklin guilty and recommended the death penalty. On appeal, Franklin unsuccessfully argued that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to request a new competency hearing during trial and that the court should have ordered a midtrial competency hearing sua sponte because an expert witness testified that Franklin suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2003. Franklin sought state post-conviction relief, asserting new evidence: affidavits indicating that Franklin was not competent. The trial court rejected the claim as barred by res judicata. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on the merits. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of federal habeas relief. Franklin then sought relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b), citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez (2012), and Trevino (2013). The district court denied Franklin’s motion on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Franklin’s Rule 60(b) motion is a “second or successive” habeas application that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider without prior authorization. View "Franklin v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Jones was arrested in 2013, charged with felonious assault. He pled guilty to a reduced charge on February 3, 2015. At his sentencing hearing that day, the judge imposed an 18-month sentence in the Ohio Department of Corrections, with 560-days credit for time served, but stated that Jones “may be supervised . . . if the parole board determines it is necessary.” The board would make that determination “[b]efore [Jones is] released,” and the sheriff’s office was to “process him.” The judge predicted that Jones “will never be transported.” The sheriff did not release Jones on February 3 or February 4. Jones’ counsel attempted to secure his release. Those efforts failed, absent documentation. The court finally filed the judgment on February 5, but the sheriff had processed Jones. He was transported on February 6. The Department applied the credit, gave Jones the official certificate of expiration of sentence, and released him that day. Jones sued the sheriff in his official capacity for damages, alleging violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and false imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Although Ohio generally treats its sheriffs as county policymakers, Ohio law required the sheriff to transport Jones to the Department. The sheriff, as an arm of the state in this respect, enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. View "Jones v. Hamilton Cty. Sheriff" on Justia Law