Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Federal agents, while investigating a drug conspiracy in 2019, intercepted two parcels containing nearly five kilograms of methamphetamine addressed to the defendant’s residence. An undercover agent delivered these parcels, which the defendant accepted. Postal records indicated she had received seven similar parcels over several months. The defendant was arrested and indicted along with others involved in the conspiracy. Her admitted role was accepting the drug parcels and turning them over to co-conspirators.The defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. At her sentencing in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, the judge considered her difficult background, resilience, and family responsibilities, ultimately imposing a sentence of 12 months, well below the guideline range of 57 to 71 months. The court granted her a delayed prison report date, but she failed to report as ordered. After her failure to surrender, she was charged with criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), pled guilty, and was sentenced to 11 months for contempt, to run consecutively to her prior sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the contempt sentence. The court held that to determine whether contempt is a felony for sentencing purposes, the conduct underlying the contempt must be compared to analogous federal offenses. Here, the defendant’s conduct—failing to surrender for service of sentence—was identical to the felony described in 18 U.S.C. § 3146, and thus, the district court properly applied the felony guideline §2J1.6. The appellate court also found the district court’s analysis of the sentencing factors thorough and appropriate. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Owens" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Gene Roper, a convicted sex offender, was required to register his location under the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act due to a prior conviction for attempted lewdness with a child under 14. After repeated violations of registration requirements and additional criminal conduct, including multiple failures to register, resisting arrest, and battery, Roper moved from Nevada to Tennessee without notifying authorities, resulting in his fourth failure-to-register offense. His history also included significant mental health challenges, homelessness, and substance abuse issues.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee accepted Roper’s guilty plea to the federal failure-to-register charge. At sentencing, the court imposed a 30-month prison term, which Roper did not appeal. However, the court also ordered a 20-year term of supervised release, exceeding the five-year period recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines but remaining under the statutory maximum of life. The district court justified this decision by referencing Roper’s mental health needs, criminal history, repeated noncompliance with prior supervision, and risk to public safety. The court also ordered conditions such as mental health treatment and substance abuse testing.Roper appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred procedurally by relying on his mental illness to lengthen his supervised release, and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit held that it was permissible for the district court to consider mental health issues as one factor among several when determining the length of supervised release. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s justification and affirmed the 20-year term, concluding that it was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate statutory or constitutional limits. View "United States v. Roper" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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An elected county commissioner was arrested during a public board meeting after she repeatedly interrupted the reading of a letter that criticized her prior statements about alleged inmate mistreatment in the county jail. The commissioner, known for her confrontational stance toward her fellow commissioners and county officials, objected to the letter being read without prior notice and continued to speak over the clerk despite warnings and calls to order from her colleagues. Two sheriff’s deputies present as security arrested her for disrupting a lawful meeting under an Ohio statute. She was processed and released the same day, and the criminal complaint was later dismissed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted partial summary judgment in favor of the commissioner on her federal claims for First Amendment retaliation and Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure, and denied qualified immunity and statutory immunity to the defendants on these claims and related state-law claims for false arrest and civil conspiracy. The defendants, including the deputies, fellow commissioners, and sheriff, appealed the denial of immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the deputies had probable cause to arrest the commissioner for disrupting the meeting, and thus all defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. The court also concluded that only the deputies were personally involved in the arrest for purposes of individual First Amendment liability and that the presence of probable cause generally precluded the First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, but remanded for the district court to consider whether exceptions to this rule applied. Regarding the state-law claims, the court affirmed the denial of statutory immunity, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants acted in bad faith by allegedly conspiring to arrest the commissioner in retaliation for her speech. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Frenchko v. Monroe" on Justia Law

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A 20-year-old man with autism developed a sexual relationship with a 12-year-old girl he met online. Although the girl claimed to be thirteen, she was in fact younger. Their conversations became sexual, and at the man’s request, the girl sent him nude and sexually explicit photos and videos. In one video, she, who was pubescent, is depicted inserting a marker into her vagina at his suggestion. Law enforcement intervened after the girl reported him, leading to his arrest when he arrived at a hotel believing he would meet her for sex.A grand jury indicted the defendant on several sex-related offenses. He pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, enticing a minor, and attempting to transfer obscene material to a minor. The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, in calculating the sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines, applied a four-level enhancement for material depicting “sadistic or masochistic conduct,” based on the video of the girl’s self-penetration. The court relied on prior Sixth Circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Preston, to apply this enhancement, treating penetration with a foreign object as per se sadistic. The court sentenced the defendant to 226 months’ imprisonment after some downward variance for his immaturity and autism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the sentence. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying a categorical rule that all foreign-object penetration by a pubescent minor is per se sadistic. The appellate court clarified that for pubescent minors, the sadism enhancement requires an objective finding, based on the content of the material, of visible physical pain, emotional suffering, or humiliation—not simply penetration. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under the correct legal standard. View "United States v. Vowels-Harper" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Two healthcare professionals operated a clinic specializing in pain management in Kentucky. One owned and managed the clinic, while the other served as its medical director. Together, they implemented a scheme to maximize profits by routinely ordering and billing insurers for both basic and more expensive, specialized urine drug tests for patients, regardless of actual medical need. The clinic eventually acquired in-house testing equipment to further increase billing. Staff raised concerns about the medical necessity of the tests and the reliability of the equipment, but the practice continued. The clinic also billed for tests conducted on malfunctioning equipment and for tests whose results could not be used for patient care due to processing delays.A grand jury indicted both individuals for conspiracy to commit health care fraud, substantive health care fraud, and (for one defendant) unlawful distribution of controlled substances. Both defendants went to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The jury convicted one defendant of health care fraud, and the other of both health care fraud and conspiracy to commit health care fraud. After denying post-trial motions for acquittal and new trial, the district court sentenced both to below-Guidelines imprisonment terms, after calculating loss amounts based on insurer payments for unnecessary testing, with a discount for tests likely to have been medically necessary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. The court held there was sufficient evidence to support both defendants’ convictions, upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings (including admission of propensity and patient death evidence with limiting instructions), found no variance between the indictment and proof at trial, and determined that one defendant’s conflict-of-interest waiver was valid. The court also affirmed the district court’s methodology for estimating loss amounts for sentencing and restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed all convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Siefert" on Justia Law

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In this case, the petitioner was convicted by a Michigan state jury of first-degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and felony firearm. The homicide occurred in a Detroit neighborhood known for drug trafficking, where the victim was found with multiple gunshot wounds and no physical evidence tying any individual to the crime. Two witnesses, both local drug dealers, initially denied knowledge of the shooting but later identified the petitioner as the shooter after being arrested on unrelated charges. Their trial testimony was the primary evidence against the petitioner, as there was no physical evidence or eyewitness identification from the scene.Following his conviction, the petitioner pursued direct appeals and post-conviction relief through the Michigan courts, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Those efforts were unsuccessful. He then filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied. Years later, he sought state court relief again, now relying on an affidavit from another individual who claimed to have witnessed the murder and identified a different perpetrator. The state trial court rejected this new evidence as unreliable and insufficient to overcome procedural barriers, and subsequent appeals in the state courts were denied. The petitioner returned to federal court with a second habeas petition, presenting affidavits including recantations and new claims of innocence. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the petition, finding it untimely and failing to meet the stringent requirements for successive habeas petitions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It agreed that the petitioner did not satisfy the gatekeeping requirements for successive petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B), nor did he establish grounds for equitable tolling based on actual innocence. The Sixth Circuit held that the new affidavits presented were unreliable and would not clearly and convincingly prevent any reasonable juror from convicting the petitioner. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the habeas petition. View "Houston v. Tanner" on Justia Law

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Four individuals established two illegal gambling businesses in northern Ohio, operating gaming rooms that paid out winnings in cash. To avoid detection, the true owners concealed their involvement by using nominal owners and destroyed financial records. The businesses operated almost entirely in cash, allowing the owners to hide profits and evade taxes. One of the defendants, an accountant, played a central role in managing finances and preparing false tax returns for the group. The scheme also involved efforts to launder money and shield assets from IRS collection, including the use of shell companies and deceptive real estate transactions.After law enforcement executed multiple search warrants in 2018, a grand jury indicted several participants on conspiracy, illegal gambling, tax evasion, and related charges. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied motions to dismiss and to sever the trials. At trial, a jury convicted two defendants on nearly all counts. At sentencing, the court calculated tax losses exceeding $3.5 million for each defendant, resulting in lengthy prison terms and substantial restitution orders. Both defendants challenged the loss calculations, the denial of severance, jury instructions, and other procedural aspects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, as no compelling prejudice was shown. The court found no error in the denial of the motion to dismiss the tax evasion count, concluding that affirmative acts of evasion within the limitations period were sufficiently alleged. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s tax loss calculations, the application of the sophisticated means enhancement, and the handling of jury instructions. The sentences were affirmed, but the case was remanded for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the judgment regarding restitution interest. View "United States v. DiPietro" on Justia Law

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California Palms Addiction Recovery Campus, Inc., an Ohio rehabilitation center, and its owner, Sebastian Rucci, became the subjects of a federal criminal investigation in 2021. Pursuant to ex parte warrants issued by a magistrate judge, the FBI seized $603,902.89 from their accounts. Shortly thereafter, state agencies revoked the facility’s provider certification and terminated its Medicaid agreement. The plaintiffs filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, seeking the return of the seized funds and disclosure of the affidavits used to obtain the warrants, alleging constitutional defects and asserting a right to inspect the affidavits under the Fourth Amendment.The Government moved to stay the civil action, indicating its intent to pursue a civil forfeiture proceeding regarding the seized funds. After initiating the forfeiture case, the Government moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ civil action, arguing that the statutory forfeiture process provided the appropriate remedy. The district court stayed the civil action pending resolution of the forfeiture case. In September 2024, the Government voluntarily dismissed the forfeiture proceeding and returned the funds with interest to the plaintiffs. The district court then ordered the plaintiffs to show cause why the civil action should not be dismissed as moot. Despite the plaintiffs’ argument that their claim for disclosure of the warrant affidavits remained unresolved, the district court dismissed the entire action as moot, reasoning that the plaintiffs had received the relief sought.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, while the claim for return of funds was moot, the claim for disclosure of the warrant affidavits was not. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the affidavit disclosure claim and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the existence of a live controversy over the disclosure request precluded dismissal for mootness. View "California Palms v. United States" on Justia Law

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After pleading guilty to federal drug-distribution conspiracy charges in 2012, the defendant was sentenced to ten years in prison followed by eight years of supervised release. He began his supervised release in 2019. In 2022, while still under supervision, he shot and killed a man outside a convenience store, an act captured on security video. He subsequently pled guilty to murder in state court. This new criminal conduct constituted a violation of the conditions of his federal supervised release.Following the murder conviction, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan revoked the defendant’s supervised release. At the revocation hearing, the court considered the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, which recommended a range of 51 to 63 months, but imposed the statutory maximum of 60 months’ imprisonment. The court ordered this sentence to run consecutively to the defendant’s state sentence. The defendant objected to both the length of the federal sentence and the decision to run it consecutively, but did not object to the court’s consideration of the seriousness of the supervised-release violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Applying plain-error review to the procedural challenge, the court held that the district court did not treat the seriousness of the supervised-release violation as a mandatory factor, but permissibly considered it as a breach of trust. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, noting that the district court considered multiple relevant factors and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant, a long-time drug trafficker, was convicted for conspiring to distribute oxycodone in rural Appalachian communities. His criminal history included two prior drug distribution convictions, and he was previously sentenced as a career offender, resulting in a lengthy prison term, supervised release, and a fine. After a series of unsuccessful post-trial motions and appeals, a change in Sixth Circuit law regarding the definition of a “career offender” under the Sentencing Guidelines made him eligible for resentencing. At resentencing, the defendant presented evidence of rehabilitation and mitigating personal history, and requested a sentence within the recalculated, lower Guidelines range.Previously, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky had sentenced the defendant above the Guidelines range, citing his recidivism and lack of remorse. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed both the conviction and sentence. However, after the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Havis, which narrowed the definition of a “controlled substance offense,” the defendant successfully moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, leading to resentencing without the career offender enhancement. At resentencing, the district court imposed a sentence at the top of the new Guidelines range, reduced the term of supervised release, and reimposed the fine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, in its consideration of sentencing disparities, or in its treatment of mitigating evidence. The appellate court also found no plain error in the imposition of supervised release conditions. The sentence was affirmed, but the case was remanded to the district court for consideration of a retroactive sentencing amendment (Amendment 821). The request for reassignment to a different judge was denied. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law