Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ataya pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit health care fraud and wire fraud. In his plea agreement, he relinquished any right to appeal his conviction or sentence “on any grounds.” Atatya nonetheless appealed. The Sixth Circuit directed the parties to brief the question of whether Ataya entered into the plea agreement as a whole knowingly and voluntarily. Ataya understood and accepted the appellate waiver’s consequences, but if he misunderstood the conviction’s key consequences, that undermines the knowingness of the appellate waiver. The district court did not inform Ataya, as Rule 11 requires, that the plea agreement required him to pay restitution and a special assessment and to forfeit the proceeds of his fraud; neither the plea agreement nor the district court mentioned that Ataya, who became a naturalized citizen after the alleged frauds, might face denaturalization as a result of his conviction. Invalidation of the agreement will require him to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” View "United States v. Ataya" on Justia Law

Albaadani came to the U.S. via Saudi Arabia at age 17. In 2015, an order of removal was issued against him because his former wife ceased to sponsor his request for citizenship. Albaadani wants to return to his birthplace, but because Yemen was in a state of “war and political conflict,” no travel documents have been issued. Albaadani was detained for six months, after which he was released subject to monitoring with a GPS ankle monitor. The Immigration and Naturalization Service received a tamper alert on Albaadani’s ankle monitor. When an agent called Albaadani, Albaadani refused to go to an enforcement office and became verbally abusive toward the agent. He was sentenced to nine months of imprisonment for tampering with a GPS ankle monitor, 18 U.S.C. 1361. Albaadani argued that his sentence was based on the impermissible factors of gender and national origin. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that some of the district court’s comments, taken out of context, could appear to be influenced by Albaadani’s national origin, but the court’s explicit and complete reliance on serious threats and photographs attributed to Albaadani indicate that the sentence, viewed as a whole, did not create the appearance of having been based on gender or national origin. View "United States v. Albaadani" on Justia Law

Harold Persaud, M.D., a cardiologist in private practice, was charged with one count of health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, 14 counts of making false statements relating to health-care matters, 18 U.S.C. 1035, and one count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The grand jury also returned a forfeiture finding, requiring Persaud to forfeit all property linked to the charges, including $343,634.671 seized from bank accounts associated with Persaud and his wife. At trial, the government presented 34 witnesses, including 11 physicians, eight patients, and four nurses. The defense relied on five witnesses, including an expert cardiologist, two referring physicians, and a coding expert. The jury convicted Persaud on all charges, except for one false-statement count. The jury concluded that the $343,634.67 seized from the Persauds’ bank accounts was forfeitable; the $250,188.42 seized from Persaud’s wife’s account was related to his money-laundering conviction; and Persaud’s scheme generated gross proceeds of $2,100,000. The district court sentenced Persaud to 20 years of imprisonment, a $1,500 special assessment, and restitution of $5,486,857.03, which consists of money damages to be paid to Persaud’s patients, their private insurers, and the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The jury was entitled to accept the view of the government’s experts over those of Persaud’s experts. View "United States v. Persaud" on Justia Law

Schock was charged with four counts of sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251, based on four incidents of Schock taking sexually explicit pictures of a six- to eight-year-old victim. The indictment did not identify the victim or the total number of victims. Schock was also charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, based on sexually explicit pictures of other children. He agreed to plead guilty to a single incident and that the court could consider all uncharged conduct at sentencing. The PSR started from a base offense level of 32 and recommended enhancements that resulted in a Guidelines range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment: four points (2G2.1(b)(1)(A)) because the victim was under age 12; two points (2G2.1(b)(5)) because the victim was a relative; five points because the offense of conviction was a covered sex crime; and, because Shock’s relevant conduct included more than one victim, two points pursuant to 2G2.1(d)(1)’s adoption of the multiple-count enhancement. The district court imposed a 240-month sentence, citing Schock’s age (66), acceptance of responsibility, and low risk of re-offense. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court erred by finding, on this record, that Schock’s exploitation of Victim 1 (pre-charge conduct) constituted relevant conduct and, therefore, erred in applying the 2G2.1 enhancement. The court also requested clarification of the extent of the incarceration costs that the court intended to impose. View "United States v. Schock" on Justia Law

In 2005, Sutton committed four armed bank robberies in quick succession in Kentucky and Ohio. He agreed to plead guilty to the Kentucky charges in the Southern District of Ohio. Sutton never formally entered a guilty plea to the Kentucky charges but was sentenced as if he had. Five years later, Sutton moved to vacate (28 U.S.C. 2255), challenging his conviction on the Kentucky charges. The Southern District of Ohio vacated the conviction and transferred the case to the Eastern District of Kentucky, where Sutton was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea, 11 years after he was indicted. He moved to dismiss, alleging that violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, and the Sixth Amendment. The court denied the motion. Sutton entered a conditional plea and was sentenced to 25 years to run consecutively to the Ohio sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speedy trial analysis is “necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances.” Even if all four “Barker factors” are satisfied, a court is not required to conclude that a defendant’s speedy trial right was violated. The unique facts of this case demonstrate why such flexibility is necessary. Although the Ohio court and the government were at fault, their collective behavior was consistent with Sutton’s intention to plead guilty. View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Eight-year-old KV accused her 17-year-old uncle, JAS, of vaginally raping her on tribal land. The FBI interviewed KV, who described the assault to an interviewer who had conducted more than 5,000 such interviews. JAS was charged with an act of juvenile delinquency: sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that JAS had sexually assaulted KV as charged. Although the Sentencing Guidelines would have recommended a life sentence had JAS been an adult, his maximum sentence as a juvenile was five years of “official detention,” 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(2)(A); the district court sentenced him to three. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting JAS’s arguments that the court improperly admitted the video of the victim’s FBI interview and that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that he sexually assaulted KV. The court cited Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), which allows the admission of prior out-of-court statements of a trial witness (KV) if: the statements are consistent with the witness’s testimony; the statements are offered to rehabilitate the witness after an opposing party has tried to impeach her “on another ground”; and the opposing party is able to cross-examine the witness about the prior statements. View "United States v. J.A.S." on Justia Law

Ohio’s execution protocol allows for lethal injection using a three-drug combination of midazolam; either vecuronium bromide, pancuronium bromide, or rocuronium bromide, which are paralytics; and potassium chloride, which stops the heart. The midazolam is intended to ensure that the person being executed is insensate to the pain that the other drugs cause. If midazolam does not “render the prisoner unconscious,” then “there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation . . . and pain” from the second two drugs. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to allow for further litigation regarding midazolam’s efficacy before Ohio executes three men. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but following rehearing en banc, reversed. The court noted that about two decades have passed since the commission of the crimes, which included the rape-murder of a three-year-old. The court stated that “In a sense the claim is unprecedented: the Supreme Court ‘has never invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.’” The State’s chosen procedure here is the same procedure (so far as the combination of drugs is concerned) that the Supreme Court has upheld. Every other court of appeals to consider that procedure has likewise upheld it. View "In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation" on Justia Law

From 2011-2014, House ran a drug-trafficking operation that specialized in distributing oxycodone pills. The operation obtained the pills from a Michigan pain clinic’s patients and employed runners to transport the oxycodone to House’s network of dealers in Ohio. In 2014, DEA agents penetrated House’s organization and staged a series of controlled deliveries and pick-ups. After obtaining information from members of House’s network, DEA agents arrested House. He pleaded guilty under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), but maintained during the plea colloquy that the conspiracy spanned from November 2013 to September or October 2014, not the entire 2011-to-2014 time period alleged in the indictment. House challenged the PSR finding that he was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants,” U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). The district court denied House’s objection to the leadership enhancement and rejected House’s claim that the PSR should have calculated the quantity of drugs attributable to him using the conspiracy duration he admitted. The court ultimately decreased the quantity of oxycodone attributed to House on other grounds, but did not shorten the conspiracy’s length, and sentenced House to 180 months’ imprisonment—below the Guidelines range of 235 to 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding House’s designation as a career offender. View "United States v. House" on Justia Law

In 2011, Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth while threatening to kill her. When a neighbor called the police, Stitt fled, then surrendered to authorities after a brief foot chase. Detectives recovered the gun lying on the ground within his reach. A jury found Stitt guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Due to his nine prior “violent felony” convictions—including six for Tennessee aggravated burglary—the court sentenced Stitt under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 290 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the government conceded that the 2015 Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. United States, invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior offenses, leaving only his six aggravated-burglary convictions at issue. Bound by its precedent, (United States v. Nance), which held that Tennessee aggravated burglary fit the Supreme Court’s definition of “generic burglary,” the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed his sentence. On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute is broader than the definition of generic burglary. The court applied the categorical analysis; Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute is indivisible, thereby foreclosing application of the modified categorical approach. View "United States v. Stitt" on Justia Law

Two men robbed a store. The security video shows that one pointed a shotgun at the clerk. The gunman wore a black sweatshirt with a white skeleton pattern that zipped to form a skull hood. The gunman’s exposed hands appeared black to the clerk and on the video. The accomplice took cash. The men fled. Weeks later, officers visited Bailey’s mother. She showed the detectives Bailey's bedroom. They saw a skeleton hoodie and prepared an affidavit for a search warrant, noting that they had received an anonymous tip that Bailey, an African-American, had committed the robbery. A judge approved the warrant. Detectives seized the sweatshirt. Officers arrested Bailey after he fled. Bailey was indicted for armed robbery, possession of a short-barreled shotgun, and resisting arrest. The prosecutor dropped two charges; Bailey pleaded guilty to resisting. Bailey sued, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment rights, citing inconsistencies in the description. The district court denied motions to dismiss, based on purported falsehoods in the affidavit. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The warrant did not say whether the description came from the victim or the video and mentioned both sources; it was not deliberately false. There were few disparities between the video and the warrant description. Even if the warrant were stripped of possible falsities, a fair probability remained that the officers would find evidence of the robbery in Bailey’s home; his Fourth Amendment claim and his Monell claim against the city fail as a matter of law. View "Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor" on Justia Law