Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jones was convicted of robbery in Indiana, Kentucky, and federal courts. Jones’s Kentucky plea deal agreed to a commencement date for Jones’s accrual of time-served credits, not when officers actually took Jones into custody, as would ordinarily be the case, but on an earlier date. The sentencing court failed to adopt the plea agreement and ordered the Department of Corrections to calculate Jones’s time-served credit in accordance with “this judgment,” which made no mention of the negotiated agreement, and “the law.” The court did not provide Jones the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Jones did not appeal or seek correction of his sentence. Jones unsuccessfully asked prison administrators to honor the plea agreement’s time-served provision; doing so would have violated the judgment of conviction. Jones asked the sentencing court for clarification. The court ratified the administrators’ calculations. Jones did not appeal. The court subsequently instructed that Jones be given credit in accordance with the agreement. Jones was then released.Jones filed suit, alleging that Kentucky prison administrators violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through their alleged deliberate indifference to the prospect of incarcerating him beyond the length of his sentence. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of the defendants’ qualified immunity motions. The defendants—state corrections officials—neither caused nor contributed to Jones’s over-incarceration nor could they unilaterally remedy the matter, which was dictated by court orders. View "Jones v. Bottom" on Justia Law

During his booking at Kenton County Detention Center, Grote could not complete paperwork while standing nor be photographed due to his agitated state. By the time he was examined by LPN Brand, Grote was constantly shaking and twitching and was covered in sweat. With officers, Grote denied that he had taken any substances but told Brand that he had taken a half gram of methamphetamine. Grote’s oxygen level was 89 percent; he was hyperventilating. Brand was unable to take any other vital signs. Brand does not recall communicating to anyone her assessment that Grote was detoxing. Deputies conducted sporadic checks on Grote in his cell before an inmate reported that Grote was unconscious and foaming at the mouth. Grote suffered multiple cardiac arrests and did not regain neurological function before dying. A doctor testified that Grote’s overdose would have been obvious to a layperson and that the situation required urgent medical care. Grote had a blood methamphetamine concentration 14 times higher than “the lowest reported lethal dose.”The KCDC defendants testified received no training on recognizing signs of an overdose or detox and could not call 911 immediately in the event of an inmate overdose, but instead were to notify shift managers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of a section 1983 suit. A jury could find that the medical provider was deliberately indifferent to Grote’s need for medical attention, but not that the deputies acted unconstitutionally. View "Grote v. Kenton County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

In 2019, Flint, Michigan officers recovered ammunition and three firearms from Jamison’s suspected residence. Jamison was charged as a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government referenced the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA) in the indictment. Jamison pleaded guilty without a plea agreement.At sentencing, the district court found that Jamison had prior convictions that were violent felonies under the ACCA: a 1994 conviction as a juvenile in Michigan for second-degree murder and for felony firearm; a 2011 Michigan conviction for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and for felony firearm; and a 2012 federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 188-month sentence. Michigan’s felony-firearm statute is a “violent felony” under the ACCA when a juvenile is convicted of that offense for possessing a firearm while committing second-degree murder because the second-degree murder element requires a level of culpability almost indistinguishable from purposeful or knowing, and necessarily involves the use of force. View "United States v. Jamison" on Justia Law

After being stopped for a broken headlight, Akima was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated based on his performance on a three-part field sobriety exam and a preliminary breathalyzer test. Arresting Officer Peca determined that he failed the assessments but had both administered the field sobriety tests improperly and misread the breathalyzer. Akima blew a blood alcohol content of 0.02, well below the legal limit of 0.08; Peca read the result as 0.22 and arrested him, causing Akima, a Japanese citizen, to lose his work visa and be deported. A blood test confirmed the Officer’s error. Akima sued, alleging constitutional violations. Peca moved to dismiss, citing qualified immunity.The district court permitted Akima’s constitutional claims to proceed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Officer Peca lacked probable cause to believe Akima’s license was not in his immediate possession or that he was intoxicated. A reasonable jury could find that while driving without any apparent difficulty, Akima was stopped for a broken headlight; perhaps due to evident communication barriers, Akima took the atypical step of exiting his vehicle. Akima acknowledged he had been drinking “just a little bit,” registered 0.02 on a breathalyzer, exhibited a temperate and responsive demeanor, and maintained steady speech and gait. He completed three field sobriety tests. View "Akima v. Peca" on Justia Law

James picked up Herald and Hickerson in a silver car. Driving around, the men got high and plotted to rob the Contreras home. At a gas station, Hickerson picked up black ski masks. Herald went home. Hours later, two armed, masked men invaded the Contreras home and shot Adrian five times, killing him. Adrian’s brothers returned fire, hitting Hickerson. The other intruder escaped in a silver car. Around 4 a.m. that day, James arrived at his friends’ house in a silver car, telling them he had attempted a robbery with Hickerson and that Hickerson had been shot. James later told Herald that he “left Johnny” and had thrown his gun in a lake. Police found a black ski mask two blocks from the Contreras house, with James’s DNA on it.James was convicted of felony murder, home invasion, assault, and firearm offenses. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that Herald’s testimony was supported by “the location of the weapon” and that a “weapon” found near the crime scene had James’s DNA on it. No evidence supported those findings. Police never found the second intruder’s gun and did not find James's DNA on any weapons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of James’s federal habeas petition. Even serious errors do not warrant habeas relief by themselves. Petitioners need to show a violation of the Constitution or federal law. James has not. View "James v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

Taylor pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 400 or more grams of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, section 841(a). The PSR recommended sentencing enhancements for maintaining premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12); being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants, 3B1.1(a); and using fear, impulse, friendship, affection, or some combination thereof to involve another individual in the illegal purchase, sale, transport, or storage of a controlled substance, 2D1.1(b)(16)(A).Over Taylor’s objections and following testimony from several witnesses, the district court applied those enhancements, calculated his Guidelines range to be 324-405 months, and sentenced him to a prison term of 385 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Taylor stipulated to facts concerning his connection to his co-conspirators’ residences that provided a foundation for the application of the drug house enhancement. The court noted testimony about Taylor’s role atop his distribution network and that he “essentially blackmailed” at least one participant. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Zakhari, in a program to become a cardiothoracic surgeon, engaged in online sexually explicit conversations with a profile (boredcrbgirl) created by a detective, claiming to be a 15-year-old girl. He received an image of an officer. Zakhari sent an Uber to take boredcrbgirl to his apartment for sex. The officer arrived at Zakhari’s residence in the Uber. Zakhari was arrested. The detective interrogated him after giving the Miranda warnings. Zakhari said, “I can answer some questions and then maybe call.” After responding to basic questions, he said: My sister’s an attorney. Asked if he wanted to call her, Zakhari said “yeah,” then paused. The detective interjected that such a call would end the questioning. Zakhari continued to answer questions and made incriminating statements.Zakhari was convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), attempting to transmit an obscene image to a minor, section 1470, and attempting to produce child pornography sections 2251(a)(e). Zakhari unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements. The court declined to strike the third charge on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness.The Sixth Circuit vacated the convictions. The suppression motion should have been granted. The factual context shows Zakhari had “lawyerly assistance” in mind in wanting to call his sister and the invocation was not ambiguous. The court abused its discretion in failing to require the government to substantiate its explanations concerning Count 3. Zakhari showed enough to presume vindictiveness. View "United States v. Zakhari" on Justia Law

Castro-White died from a drug overdose. Detective Sivert noticed that Castro-White’s phone had many missed calls from Karaplis, who implicated others but lied to Sivert by denying any involvement. Later, after admitting his involvement, Karaplis described the drug dealer, “Red,” Red’s car, Red’s phone number, and, using Google Maps, the specific home where he bought drugs from Red. Sivert traveled to this home and spotted a nearby car p that fit Karaplis’s description and was registered to “Russell Davis,” called “Big Red.” Karaplis identified Davis’s picture with “100 percent” confidence. Sivert had Karaplis set up a phone call with Davis to discuss Castro-White’s death. Sivert then obtained a warrant to search Davis’s Garden Avenue home. During the search, police found the phone and illegal drugs. Davis unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence and was given a mandatory life sentence.The Sixth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing about what Sivert told the magistrate in person. Although the magistrate described his general practice, he lacked a “specific recollection” of Davis’s case. Sivert was “sure” that he had conveyed the many facts connecting Davis to the home. The court again denied Davis’s motion, despite finding that the affidavit failed to establish a probable-cause nexus between Davis and the home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sivert uncovered overwhelming evidence tying Davis to the home and the magistrate (not Sivert) bore any blame for failing to transcribe the additional oral testimony. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Roberts was convicted for federal crimes relating to the death of Caldwell, who was in a child-custody dispute with his ex-wife (Roberts’ girlfriend). Roberts tried to kill, or at least seriously harm, Caldwell by luring him through false guise to a remote location. Caldwell escaped but was later murdered after a family counseling session.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Roberts’ arguments under the Confrontation Clause, federal evidentiary rules, and the attorney-client privilege, that the district court improperly admitted evidence related to the earlier attack and other incriminating proof and his two constitutional challenges to the interstate stalking statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. 2261A, claiming that it exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that the counts of his conviction are multiplicitous. Testimonial statements are allowed into evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), for “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused . . . the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Caldwell was the declarant of the written-witness statement and an affidavit, which were to be used against Roberts, who intentionally caused Caldwell’s unavailability as a witness. The court also upheld the admission of “excited utterances’ made by Roberts to Caldwell’s attorney. View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Terry pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing a mixture containing fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and was sentenced to 57 months of imprisonment, at the high end of his U.S.S.G. range. He challenged the imposition of the Guidelines’ two-point enhancement for maintaining premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). Without the two-level enhancement, the Guidelines range would have been 37-46 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Terry sold fentanyl from the address and permitted the head of the conspiracy to use his property for drug distribution. The district court adopted the facts in the PSR, stating “the government’s argument as related to the facts which justify the enhancement, are spot on correct.” The PSR listed multiple activities involving Terry’s residence. The conclusion does not change even if no drugs were ever recovered from the house, there is no evidence that Terry cooked, manufactured, or packaged drugs there, no tools of the trade were found at his house, no money was seized from his house, and Terry had other legitimate employment. Distributing drugs “need not be the sole purpose” for the premises; it need only be one of the primary uses for the premises. View "United States v. Terry" on Justia Law