Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of a male victim with nine stab wounds and a pregnant female victim, dead as a result of manual strangulation and stabbed after her death. Wheeler, ultimately convicted of the murders and sentenced to death, changed his story several times. The Sixth Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus must issue as to the death sentence because the trial court erroneously struck from the jury Kovatch, an eligible juror who may have been in favor of sparing Wheeler’s life. The court, after examination of Kovatch, found him not to be “problematic” as a juror but one who “could consider the entire range” of penalties. The next day the court excused him because the judge mistakenly remembered him saying he would not consider the death penalty. After the Supreme Court reversed, the Sixth Circuit reinstated the death penalty, rejecting claims: that admission of evidence as to the availability of prison furloughs in the future; concerning penalty-phase jury instructions that, allegedly, improperly instructed jurors that they were required to be unanimous regarding the presence of mitigating factors; concerning prosecutorial misstatements: and that Kentucky’s proportionality review violates the Eighth Amendment View "Wheeler v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Morrison pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), waiving his right to appeal “any sentence . . . within the applicable guideline range, or lower, whatever that guideline range might be.” The prosecutor argued that Morrison’s prior conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary was a “crime of violence,” setting his applicable Guidelines range at 77-96 months’ imprisonment. At the time, the Sentencing Guidelines defined “crime of violence” to include “burglary of a dwelling.” The Sixth Circuit had held that although Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than “generic” burglary under the Guidelines, the statute was “divisible,” permitting courts to review a “limited class of documents . . . to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” The court examined Morrison’s plea colloquy from his earlier conviction, determined that he had burglarized a “dwelling,” and imposed a 96-month sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court clarified what makes a statute divisible, and the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing to decide whether Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute criminalizes more conduct than generic burglary under the Armed Career Criminal Act, and if so, whether it is divisible under Mathis. The Sixth Circuit dismissed Morrison’s appeal, finding that his waiver foreclosed consideration of his request. View "United States v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Two victims were killed in 1999. Phillips was arrested. The primary witness was Phillips’ stepdaughter, a neighbor of the victim. She testified that she heard the confrontation, followed by shooting, and that Phillips was “intoxicated” that night. A jury convicted Phillips of both counts of first-degree murder. Judge Maricle asked whether the parties were prepared to proceed with sentencing. Phillips’s attorney, Charles, replied, “No,” but neglected to request a continuance, stating, "I don’t know anything about death penalty litigation.” Charles did not object to the prosecution's jury instructions, consulted with Phillips for less than an hour, and offered no opening statement nor evidence. The Commonwealth suggested that the aggravating factor prevented the jury from considering sentences with possible parol. Rather than clarifying the sentencing options or advocating for a particular sentence, Charles remarked: I don’t intend to take anymore of your time. The jury recommended life with no possibility of parole for 25 years. The court entered that sentence with minimal explanation. The state supreme court affirmed. Although Phillips's post-conviction attorney dropped a claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing, Maricle felt “compelled” to authorize relief on that basis. Phillips complied with Maricle's request and submitted information about evidence relevant sentencing, but Maricle was indicted and no state judge decided Phillips’s claims, which were pending for over six years. The district court dismissed his federal habeas petition, finding that Phillips had not shown prejudice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the deferential standard is inapplicable because no Kentucky court ever decided Phillips's claims, that Phillips’s counsel was ineffective, that prejudice is presumed, and counsel’s performance actually prejudiced Phillips under Strickland. View "Phillips v. White" on Justia Law

Quarles pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), without a plea agreement. At his original sentencing, the district court held that Quarles’s conviction for third-degree home invasion was a violent felony under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The district court expressly declined to rule whether that offense qualified as generic burglary and sentenced him to 204 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States (2015), and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court found, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that Michigan’s crime of third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” that was the “functional equivalent of generic burglary.” Quarles was again sentenced to 204 months’ incarceration. View "United States v. Quarles" on Justia Law

Simmerman began working at Shoreline Federal Credit Union in 1987 and became manager in 2006. She began embezzling money, by complex manipulation of ledgers, in 1998 and was discovered in 2014. She pled guilty to embezzling $1,528,000, 18 U.S.C. 657, and to structuring the deposits of the money she stole to evade the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5313(a), in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3) and (d)(1). The district court assessed Simmerman’s total offense level at 28, based on a base offense level of seven, a 16-level increase for a loss amount between $1 million and $2.5 million, a two-level increase for sophisticated means, four-level increase for jeopardizing the soundness of a financial institution, a two-level increase for abuse of a position of trust, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a timely plea. With a criminal history category of I, Simmerman’s guideline range was 78-97 months and she was sentenced to 78 months on Count 1 and 60 months on Count 2, to be served concurrently. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the imposition of enhancements for sophisticated means (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(10)(C)); jeopardizing the soundness of a financial institution (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(16)(B)(i)); and abuse of a position of trust (U.S.S.G. 3B1.3). View "United States v. Simmerman" on Justia Law

Between 2012 and 2014, three University of Michigan students (plaintiffs) rented rooms from Alawi, which collected $2550 in security deposits from the three. When they moved out, they received their security deposits back, minus small deductions for minor damages to the properties. Plaintiffs believed that Alawi had not complied with Michigan law, which requires landlords to deposit security deposits in a regulated financial institution and to provide the address of that institution to the tenant. The plaintiffs sued Alawi for $6.6 million on behalf of a putative class of six years’ worth of tenants, alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Michigan law; alleging that Alawi was not entitled to hold security deposits at all (given these alleged breaches of Michigan law), and that knowingly taking security deposits anyway constituted a pattern of federal wire, mail, and bank fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the RICO claim. The complaint failed to articulate any concrete injury; its allegations were too vague to meet the particularity requirement of fraud allegations under Civil Rule 9(b). View "Wall v. Michigan Rental" on Justia Law

Sizemore drove his car through Great Smoky Mountains National Park with three passengers: Mathes, Clapper, and Trent. All four had been drinking alcohol. At 1:35 a.m., Sizemore crashed the vehicle, killing Trent, and seriously injuring Mathes and Clapper. The Tennessee Highway Patrol determined that Sizemore was driving approximately 97 miles per hour two seconds before the crash.The speed limit was 45 miles per hour. Sizemore pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. 1112 and 7(3), agreeing that the court would order restitution for losses to the victims. The probation office assessed restitution under 18 U.S.C. 3663 at $230,839.37: $9,000 for Trent’s funeral expenses; $29,808.27 to Blue Cross Insurance for Clapper; $3,990.74 to Clapper; $11,787.76 to Blue Cross for Mathes; $2,801.17 to Farm Bureau Insurance for Mathes; and $173,451.43 to Trent’s minor child. Sizemore agreed to the full restitution amount as to the minor, but did not agree to any of the other allotments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court in rejecting his objections, ordering restitution in the total amount of $230,839.37, denying Sizemore’s request for credits for payments made by his insurance provider, and in sentencing Sizemore to 36 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. View "United States v. Sizemore" on Justia Law

The Internal Revenue Service classified Ballard, a securities broker, as a non-filer in 2008 and investigated. Ballard lied about his income, hid money in family members’ bank accounts, and filed then dismissed several Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions, attempting to avoid paying $848,798 in taxes arising from his income between 2000 and 2008. He eventually pled guilty to violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which prohibits “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing] . . . administration of [the tax laws].” Ballard urged the court to use the U.S.S.G. for obstruction of justice. The district court rejected Ballard’s argument that he never intended to evade paying his taxes but was merely delaying the payments and used the tax evasion guideline to calculate a higher offense level and an increase in the sentencing range from eight–14 months to 24–30 months. Ballard was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. What matters in the choice between guidelines sections is which section is more precisely tailored to reflect offense characteristics—like tax evasion and tax loss—and which section covers a more closely related group of crimes. What Ballard did, and what the government charged, was a lie to the tax collector about his earnings. View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Defendant was in the getaway car during a store robbery and saw Caldwell give a firearm to Tripp, who robbed the cashier at gunpoint. Weeks later, Caldwell remained in the car while defendant and Williams brandished firearms and robbed a bank. Weeks later, defendant accompanied Caldwell and Williams to another bank, but remained outside while Williams placed the firearm against the manager’s head and pistol-whipped a guard. Defendant was charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit “Hobbs Act robbery” (18 U.S.C. 1951(a), 1951(b)(1), and 2); three counts of using, carrying and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 2); and two counts of armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2). The court initially adjudged defendant incompetent, but he later passed multiple competency evaluations. The others pleaded guilty. At defendant’s request, the court conducted an extended self-representation colloquy and allowed him to self-represent with appointed counsel as standby. Defendant cross-examined some witnesses but did not present an affirmative defense. The jury found defendant guilty. The court sentenced him to 664 months’ incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he aided the store robbery and second bank robbery, and claims that the court erred in allowing him to self-represent and in imposing consecutive sentences on his section 924(c) convictions, and that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. View "United States v. Gooch" on Justia Law

In 1997, a Memphis armored truck driver was shot while working; he died two years later, as a result. The shooter took the cash and left in a getaway car. Authorities identified Thomas as the shooter and Bond as the getaway driver. In a federal trial before Day’s death, Thomas was convicted of interfering with interstate commerce, carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to life in prison. After Day died, Thomas was convicted of felony murder in state court, was sentenced to death, and exhausted state post-conviction remedies. Jackson, Thomas’s girlfriend, was the pivotal witness in both trials, placing Thomas at the scene of the shooting. After the federal trial, but before the state prosecution, the FBI paid Jackson $750 on behalf of the Task Force. Jackson testified that she did not receive any “reward” money and that she testified because it was the “right thing to do.” Thomas was never notified of this payment and discovered it during his federal habeas hearing. State prosecutors were provided with evidence of the payment, but later argued that they lacked “actual” knowledge. The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief in the death penalty case, finding that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose the payment, but affirmed the denial of relief in the federal case. The state court Brady violation, failure to disclose that Jackson had received compensation after her federal testimony, occurred after Thomas’s federal trial. View "Thomas v. United States" on Justia Law