Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kelly was convicted, in Ohio state court, of felony murder, felonious assault, and assault for his involvement in a 2009 fight near Kent State University and was sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, he raised a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. Kelly’s counsel on direct appeal included the wife and business partner of his trial counsel. Kelly’s direct appeal and state post-conviction claims were unsuccessful. With new counsel, Kelly brought a federal claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, advancing a theory of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness that had not been fully presented before the Ohio state courts. Kelly also argued that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a claim that had been properly presented before the Ohio state courts, and that his appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness should excuse his procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim under Supreme Court precedent. The district court rejected both arguments, concluding that the actions of Kelly's appellate counsel, even if allegedly ineffective, could not excuse Kelly’s procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, and that his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim could not overcome AEDPA deference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the deference due strategic decisions made by counsel. View "Kelly v. Lazaroff" on Justia Law

The accreditation of White’s travel agency, CTC, was revoked in 2003 after audits conducted by United Airlines uncovered fraudulent ticketing schemes that cost the airline $100,000 in airfares. White continued working as a subcontractor for other travel agencies and continued to obtain fraudulent ticket fares by providing false information about her clients’ ages, possession of discount certificates, and military status. White charged service fees and airfare directly to her clients’ credit cards, sometimes for persons other than those clients, and sometimes without their permission. When travel agencies violate an airline’s fare policy and cause financial loss, the airline issues Agency Debit Memoranda (ADM), requiring payment. A travel agent testified that within two years, his agency received more than $100,000 in ADMs based on airfare that White booked. When White was asked for proof that her customers qualified for military discounts, she created false Armed Forces Identification cards using customers’ real names and dates of birth. The airlines determined that the cards were fraudulent and notified the Secret Service. White was charged with wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The district court permitted White to examine witnesses about actual repayments that were made to victims; White was not permitted to disclose loss-recoupment negotiations that took place long after White was confronted by her victims. White was sentenced to a total of 94 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments the district court read an improper definition of the term “use” into the aggravated identity theft statute; erred in refusing to admit evidence of White’s intention to repay some of the losses; and erred in calculating victims’ losses. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Pouncy, age 18, was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, felony firearm possession, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Michigan state court appointed attorney Breczinski to represent Pouncy. Before trial, Pouncy complained that he had not been able to talk to Breczinski and that Breczinski had not investigated his defenses. Based on an erroneous calculation, the court told Pouncy that he was subject to a guidelines range of 135-337 months in prison; in reality his guidelines range was 225-562 months. Breczinski did not correct the court’s mistake. Pouncy, insisting on his innocence, rejected a plea offer. Breczinski lost pre-trial evidentiary motions. Pouncy requested to give his own opening statement, reiterating that he still had not had any conversations with Breczinski, and that Breczinski had not followed up on his defenses. The court replied: if you make the opening statement, you’ll have to represent yourself through this trial. The court declined to appoint new counsel or to allow Pouncy to attempt to retain private counsel. Breczinski gave an opening statement, after which Pouncy again asked to represent himself. The court agreed. The trial lasted six days. Convicted, Pouncy was sentenced to 586-824 months of imprisonment. A month later, Pouncy represented himself in a bench trial on charges arising out of a third carjacking. He was, again, convicted. His state appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful. A federal district court granted habeas relief, concluding that Pouncy faced a “Hobson’s choice,” so that his waiver of counsel was involuntary. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the highly deferential standards applicable to federal collateral review of state-court convictions. View "Pouncy v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Mirza called Detective Dare, told Dare that Brown was a drug dealer, and agreed to set up controlled purchases. The first controlled buy occurred in September 2005. Brown was arrested in January 2006, waived his Miranda rights, and admitted in writing that he sold cocaine to Mirza four times. Brown was released from custody. Within weeks, the state issued a criminal complaint and secured an arrest warrant. Brown was unaware of these developments until he was arrested in September 2007, pursuant to an unrelated warrant, and was arraigned. Brown was tried in February 2008. Mirza’s defense theory was that he simply permitted Mirza to use his scale to weigh cocaine that Mirza already possessed. Brown was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown sought relief from judgment, arguing that he was denied due process when exculpatory audio recordings were lost during the 20-month delay between his arrest and trial, and speedy trial violations. State courts denied relief, holding that Brown had not demonstrated good cause for failure to raise the issues on direct appeal. A federal district court then rejected Brown’s claims, applying the Barker v. Wingo, factors, to determine that no speedy-trial violation occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that although the delay exceeded a year, the state was at most negligent, Brown failed to assert the right after he became aware of the charges, and, given the overwhelming evidence against him, Brown had not shown prejudice. View "Brown v. Romanowski" on Justia Law

In Wayne County, Michigan, Grundy was Assistant County Executive; Executive Director of HealthChoice, a municipal corporation chartered to promote the health and welfare of area residents; and Division Director of the County’s Patient Care Management System, which administered its programs through ProCare Plus. Grundy’s friend, Griffin, formed businesses to provide advertising and electronic medical records services to HealthChoice and ProCare Plus. Griffin would inflate the price and “kickback” the excess to Grundy. According to the government, the benefit to Grundy totaled $1,381,766. He pleaded guilty to honest services wire fraud arising from one of his three schemes, 18 U.S.C. 1343 & 1346, waiving the right to appeal if “the sentence imposed does not exceed the 210-month maximum allowed by” the agreement, which was the top end of the Guidelines range proposed by the government based on the loss associated with his conduct. Grundy proposed a range of 37-46 months, arguing that the loss amount associated with his offense of conviction was $400,000. The court imposed a 90-month term. The government obtained a restitution order for $1,380,767; Grundy argued that restitution should be capped at the $400,000 associated with the offense of conviction. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that the waiver applied to the restitution order. View "United States v. Michael Grundy" on Justia Law

The Battle Creek Police Department obtained a warrant to search a residence, based on evidence from a trash pull and from a confidential informant. The Emergency Response Team was involved due to the subject’s (Jones) criminal history, gang affiliations, possession of firearms, and possible possession of cocaine and heroin. Jones and Brown were detained outside. Officer Klein testified that, approaching the door, he could see dogs barking aggressively and “jumping.” The dogs, owned by Brown, were pit bulls, weighing about 97 pounds and 53 pounds. Klein testified that he “did not feel [the officers] could safely clear the basement with those dogs down there.” The officers shot and killed the dogs. Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of the dogs, unreasonable forced entry, and that the city was liable under “Monell” because the Department failed to provide training to address the known risk of constitutional violations arising from dog shootings. The court dismissed, finding no genuine issue of material fact on the Fourth Amendment claims or that an inadequate training policy caused the alleged constitutional violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the officers acted reasonably and that there was no history of “needless killing of animals in the course of searches in Battle Creek.” View "Brown v. Battle Creek Police Department" on Justia Law

In April 1987, witnesses saw Middlebrooks and Brewington chase Majors, a 14-year-old black male. The next day, Majors’ body was found near where that incident had occurred. Majors had been tortured. Brewington led police to a bloodstained knife and to Middlebrooks, who resisted arrest. Middlebrooks gave a video-taped statement. He admitted that he stabbed Majors twice, but depicted Brewington as the primary perpetrator. A jury convicted Middlebrooks of felony murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld Middlebrooks’s convictions but vacated the death sentence. Evidence presented on remand indicated that Majors was small for his age, a good student, not violent, and not armed. Middlebrooks was described as a member of the KKK, who “hated niggers.” Middlebrooks’ relatives described his childhood as involving sexual abuse and neglect. There was testimony that Middlebrooks has severe mental illness and organic brain impairment. The jury found the murder “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,’” and that this outweighed any mitigating factors. Middlebrooks was resentenced to death. The sentence was affirmed. His petition for state post-conviction relief was unsuccessful. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Middlebrooks’s federal habeas petition. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated in light its 2012 decision, Martinez v. Ryan. On remand, the district court again denied Middlebrooks’s petition, finding his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims not “substantial” under Martinez and not warranting an evidentiary hearing or habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Middlebrooks’s claims were rejected on the merits in state court. View "Middlebrooks v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Twenty years ago, Charles was convicted of drug and firearm offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and unlawful distribution of crack cocaine, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. 846. The presentence report found that his total offense level was 38 points, due to the quantity of crack cocaine (216 grams), and two-point (each) obstruction of justice and firearm enhancements; added that Charles appeared to be a career offender and an armed career criminal; and listed a sentencing range of 360 months to life. Charles objected to the amount of cocaine and the enhancements, but did not object to classification as a career offender or an armed career criminal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a 420-month sentence. Ten years later, the Sentencing Commission retroactively amended the sentencing guidelines to lessen the disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses, reducing the range otherwise applicable to Charles’ drug crimes. Charles moved for a sentencing reduction, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In 2010, before the court acted on that motion, Congress again retroactively lowered the guidelines for crack cocaine offenses. Charles filed a second motion. In 2014, the court reduced his sentence to 292 months. On the government’s appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. In his direct appeal, the court had affirmed that Charles was a career criminal, so that the amendments did not reduce his guidelines range. View "United States v. Charles" on Justia Law

In 1995, Bryan was convicted of attempted robbery. After being paroled in 1998, Bryan was indicted for theft. Arrest warrants issued. In 2000, when Bryan stopped at a gas station, officer Leon pulled behind him, saw that Bryan’s temporary tag had been altered, and took Bryan’s driver’s license to run a check. When Leon radioed the police station, Bryan shot the officer in the face. Officer Leon died instantly. Bryan fled. Niedhammer, who owned a private security agency, heard the shooting, saw the officer lying on the ground. and saw a white Pontiac Grand Prix “erratically leave the gas station almost running into people.” Niedhammer activated his siren and lights and gave chase. Twice, Bryan stopped his car, got out, and fired at Niedhammer. Both times Niedhammer returned fire. Eventually, Bryan lost control, crashed, fled on foot, and threw his handgun into a dumpster. He was arrested that same day. A jury convicted Bryan of aggravated murder and attempted murder with firearm specifications and death-penalty specifications, plus carrying a concealed weapon, carrying a firearm as a convicted felon, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced Bryan to death and 33½ years. Bryan unsuccessfully sought relief on direct appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings. Bryan timely sought federal habeas relief with 16 claims. The court granted relief on his Batson claim. The Sixth Circuit remanded for dismissal. The district court correctly denied claims concerning: specific jurors, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, lethal injection, and an allegedly unconstitutional death-penalty scheme. The court incorrectly granted relief on the Batson claim, failing to properly defer to the state court’s ruling. View "Bryan v. Bobby" on Justia Law

Defendant, a 32-year-old black man, has prior state court convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon, resisting arrest, and possession of a prohibited weapon. In 2014, Defendant was arrested by Memphis Police for possession of an assault rifle. He was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sixth Circuit vacated, reversing denial of a “Batson” challenge. During voir dire, the government used peremptory strikes on five prospective jurors—all of whom were black. Defendant made a prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. The government justified striking the last of the black prospective jurors, Dandridge, because he had changed jobs four months prior and had eight children; the government was purportedly “concerned about his ability to focus on the case at hand and listen and be attentive in a trial.” The government did not delve deeper into Dandridge’s answers by, for instance, asking about his child care arrangements, or the reasons he changed jobs. A comparative juror analysis shows that the government did not express concerns about the ability of similarly-situated white jurors to focus throughout the trial despite their large number of children and inconsistent work history. View "United States v. Atkins" on Justia Law