Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for two counts each of transporting explosives without a permit, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 842(a)(3)(A), and improper storage of explosives, and one count each of possessing explosives while under indictment and making a materially false statement to government officials. On appeal, defendant argued that 27 C.F.R. 555.205 authorized him to move his ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO) and that this regulation contradicts section 842(a)(3)(A). The court rejected defendant's argument, concluding that the statute is not void for vagueness; because the statute is clear, there is no reason to invoke the rule of lenity; and defendant fails to meet the elements of entrapment by estoppel. The court rejected defendant's Commerce Clause challenge, concluding that Congress's comprehensive regulation of explosives is permissible because the misuse of such material, especially when transported on highways, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Further, the court rejected defendant's claims of error to the jury instructions and defendant's remaining claims of error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Lechner" on Justia Law

Around 2000, at age 44, Levenderis used castor beans and acetone to produce enought ricin to kill 250 people. Levenderis stored it in a can in his freezer until an FBI HAZMAT team removed it in 2011. Levenderis, then ill, told a friend (Coffman), who was watching Levendris’s house, that the can contained ricin. Coffman called the fire department. The FBI visited Levenderis at his nursing home. He described the substance as ant poison and stated that he had been joking about it being ricin. Later, Levendris visited the FBI office with his attorney, admitted that the substance was high-grade, weaponized ricin, and stated that he thought about using it in an elaborate suicide plan or to threaten his cousin or kill his step-father. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction for possessing a biological toxin for use as a weapon, 18 U.S.C. 175(a), rejecting an argument that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Bond v. United States, the federal prohibition on biological weapons does not apply to his allegedly “purely local” conduct. The court also affirmed his conviction for willfully and knowingly making a materially false statement to the FBI and upheld denial of his motion to suppress the statements made at the nursing home. View "United States v. Levenderis" on Justia Law

In September, 2010, Board pleaded guilty to drug trafficking with forfeiture specifications, a felony that carried a mandatory prison term of three-10 years under Ohio law. His plea agreement recommended a seven-year sentence. The court sentenced Board to seven years in prison. Board did not timely appeal his sentence. In June, 2011, Board filed a pro se notice of appeal and motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, asserting that both the court and counsel failed to inform him of his appellate rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals summarily denied Board’s motion. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to hear the case in December, 2011. Board sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that he was denied due process and equal protection when the trial court failed to inform him of his appellate rights and his subsequent motion for leave to file a delayed appeal was denied, and ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Board’s Ohio motion was a “properly filed” motion for collateral relief that tolled AEDPA’s statute of limitations from that date until December 21, 2011, when the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Board’s appeal of the denial of his motion. View "Board v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In 1982, Matthews was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence have been affirmed on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, including in federal court. Having exhausted his judicial remedies, Matthews intends to petition the Governor of Kentucky for clemency under section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution, based on mitigating factors related to his neuropsychological health. The district court denied his request for funding under 18 U.S.C. 3599 to pay for a neuropsychological evaluation to support this argument, but apparently relied on an incorrect rule that section 3599 funding is available only for use in federal proceedings and did not otherwise explain its reasons for denying the request. The Sixth CIrcuit vacated and remanded, noting evidence that in the decades since the 1982 evaluation was conducted, the Bender Gestalt Test administered to Matthews has become “very outdated, rarely used today, and [is] not helpful to gain a full and reliable understanding of the extent of Matthews’ neuropsychological deficits and brain damage.” View "Matthews v. White" on Justia Law

Cincinnati officers, assigned to provide security outside the Black Family Reunion at Sawyer Point, were informed that young African American males were throwing guns over the fence to individuals who were inside. After Cyranek and other officers approached, those individuals ran toward downtown. The officers were then told to provide extra security at Government Square and Fountain Square. Cyranek saw 16-year-old Mullins walking from Fountain Square and recognized two individuals with Mullins from Sawyer Point. Cyranek observed Mullins holding and trying to conceal his right side, which led Cyranek to suspect that Mullins possessed a weapon. Cyranek followed him, but did not alert other officers or radio in his concerns. During a confrontation that lasted two minutes, Cyranek held Mullins to the ground, Mullins brandished a gun and gained enough freedom from Cyranek’s grip to throw his weapon 10-15 feet behind Cyranek. As Mullins threw his gun, Cyranek rose from his crouched position and fired twice. Video footage shows that, at most, five seconds elapsed between when Mullins threw his firearm and when Cyranek fired his final shot. Cyranek retrieved Mullins’s gun and placed it near Mullins’s feet. Mullins was pronounced dead at a hospital. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity, calling the shooting a “tragedy,” but finding Cyranek’s split-second decision to use deadly force “not objectively unreasonable.” View "Mullins v. Cyranek" on Justia Law

Butler, age 25, arrived at Hopkins County Detention Center to serve a misdemeanor sentence. A tower operator saw Butler put something in his mouth and swallow, and relayed her observation to deputies, who started booking procedures. Butler vomited twice. Deputies noticed that Butler appeared to be under the influence and was sweating profusely. While answering questions, his demeanor deteriorated and he had difficulty standing. Butler stated that he had an MRSA infection, high blood pressure, rheumatoid arthritis, gout, and osteoporosis. He listed several prescribed medications and denied drug or alcohol addiction. The deputies did not want to admit Butler because of his condition. A licensed practical nurse examined Butler and instructed the deputies to admit Butler. As an LPN, she lacked the credentials to diagnose any illness, but was aware that untreated MRSA infection could lead to sepsis and death. Although staff placed Butler on suicide watch, there is no evidence that Butler was evaluated for suicidal ideation, nor any evidence that Butler received blood pressure medication while confined or that the nurses questioned why his blood pressure fell, absent medication. Butler died three days later from MRSA complications. The court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983b on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting genuine issues of material fact and that the facility's medical contractor is not entitled to governmental immunity on the state-law claim. View "Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty." on Justia Law

In the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, Customs and Border Patrol officers stopped Gyamfi while he was traveling to Detroit from Ghana. They found at least one kilogram of heroin packed in the inner lining of Gyamfi’s suitcase, allegedly without his knowledge. Gyamfi was charged with importing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 952(a), and possession with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At trial, four CBP officers testified that Gyamfi appeared “nervous” while responding to questions about his travel plans and the contents of his suitcase. The jury found Gyamfi guilty, and the district court sentenced Gyamfi to 72 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court improperly admitted conclusory testimony as to Gyamfi’s mental state without laying a proper foundation. The officers merely described their “own sensory and experiential observations,” distinct from any broad conclusions or allegations directed to the merits of the case. View "United States v. Gyamfi" on Justia Law

In 1987, Abdur’Rahman was convicted of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit first-degree murder, and armed robbery. He was sentenced to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. Abdur’Rahman unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and failure to turn over exculpatory evidence. Abdur’Rahman sought 28 U.S.C. 2254 relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated an order of habeas relief, concluding that Abdur’Rahman was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Abdur’Rahman filed a Rule 60(b) motion. The Sixth Circuit held that the prosecution did not violate Brady with respect to the codefendant’s pretrial statements and that trial counsel interviewed the police officer about, and could have obtained a separate report, concerning an incident following arrest. A cumulative error claim was defaulted as not raised in state court. In 2013, Abdur’Rahman sought to reopen claims in light of the Supreme Court holding, Martinez v. Ryan (2012). Abdur’Rahman specified: cumulative error affecting sentencing arising from prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance and an improper jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony and counsel’s failure to challenge the instruction. After the district court denied relief and issued its certificate of applicability, Abdur’Rahman moved for remand in light of intervening Sixth Circuit decisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and denied remand.As a change in decisional law, Marinez did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance meriting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. None of the claims involve substantial claims of ineffective assistance that were procedurally defaulted by inadequate post-conviction counsel. View "Abdur'Rahman v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Seventeen days into his parole for a state drug conviction, James was caught selling drugs while carrying a pistol. Michigan revoked his parole, returning him to prison for five more years. The federal government indicted him for carrying a firearm while drug trafficking, which has a mandatory minimum five-year prison term and potentially a life sentence. Months later, James was transferred to federal custody. A federal court imposed a below-guidelines 15-year sentence, concurrent to James’ pre-existing state sentence; James would serve the beginning of his federal sentence in state prison. The court stated that he would receive “credit” for time “in custody of the federal marshal.” Later, the federal Bureau of Prisons told James that he would not receive credit for presentence time in federal custody because it, not the court, calculates presentence credit, and awarding James such credit would “double credit” him since Michigan had given him state credit for the same time. On James’s motion, the court added to the original judgment that James “shall get credit for time served beginning July 20, 2006, to January 4, 2007.” Worried that the amended judgment failed to “credit” his time in state prison after January 4, 2007, he appealed. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that James had no injury. View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

Moon and a co-conspirator acquired credit card numbers issued to third parties and used the information to create counterfeit credit cards and gift cards, which they used to purchase merchandise. Moon pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 343 and 1349; the government agreed to move for dismissal of access device fraud and aggravated identity theft counts at sentencing. Moon also waived his right to appeal his conviction and a sentence “within the applicable guideline range, along with the manner in which the sentence was determined on the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3742 or any other grounds.” The district court sentenced Moon to 96 months’ imprisonment followed by for years supervised release and ordered restitution of $80,320.61. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence reasonable even if Moon had not waived his right to appeal. The court rejected an argument that the calculation of intended loss by assuming a $500 minimum loss for each stolen number overstated the severity of the offense and that that the district court should have calculated loss by including only actual losses from the usable card numbers. View "United States v. Moon" on Justia Law