Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Christian was part of a truck theft ring, working with Dubose, Davis, and Lanton. The theft ring first struck in May 2011. In August 2011 and June 2012, they stole three semis containing tires. A sting operation caught Davis selling tires. Davis unwittingly led police to a storage unit, rented by Christian’s girlfriend, where police observed the others loading stolen tires into Lanton’s car and arrested them. At the time, Christian had an unrelated state prosecution, on which he was represented by the same attorney who then represented Lanton. Lanton’s girlfriend and the attorney convinced Christian to sign an affidavit affirming that “Lanton had no knowledge about the heist,” a statement Christian knew was not true. Christian pled guilty. Christian’s PSR recommended: a 14-level specific offense characteristic based on the amount of loss ; a two-level upward adjustment for managerial role; and a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. He had a lengthy criminal history, resulting in a guideline range at 63–78 months of imprisonment. After learning of the false affidavit, the government declined to seek a substantial-assistance departure. On Halloween 2013, Christian knowingly drove a stolen truck. After that arrest, Christian’s attorney abandoned objections to the amount-of-loss calculation. The court overruled Christian’s objection to the managerial-role adjustment, sentencing him to 105 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding the adjustment for a managerial role to be in error. View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted of armed robbery, as a felon-in-possession of a firearm, and of possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony and was sentenced to 22-32 years in prison. Coleman filed an unsuccessful pro se motion for a new trial. His direct appeal was unsuccessful. Coleman then moved for relief from judgment, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his appellate attorney failed to argue that he was allowed to proceed without counsel on his motion for a new trial. The state trial judge denied Coleman’s motion, noting that he had warned Coleman against proceeding without counsel, albeit at the end of the hearing rather than the outset. The Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied his federal habeas petition on the merits. The Sixth Circuit granted review, then vacated the COA as improvidently granted, The Supreme Court has never held that a hearing on a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, so there is no “clearly established Federal law” creating a right to counsel at a hearing on a motion for a new trial and no basis on which Coleman’s appellate attorney could have argued before the Michigan Court of Appeals that a violation of the Sixth Amendment had occurred. View "Coleman v. Bergh" on Justia Law

In 2005, Trimble shot and killed his girlfriend and her seven-year-old son with an assault rifle. Later that night, he broke into the apartment of a female college student, held her hostage, and eventually killed her with a handgun. He admitted his guilt to two family members and the police; there was significant forensic evidence tying him to the murders, and eyewitness testimony. A jury convicted him of the three murders and the judge, upon the jury’s recommendation, imposed three death sentences. The district court conditionally granted Trimble habeas relief because it determined that an alternate juror who was later empaneled during the penalty phase of Trimble’s trial could not set aside his personal views on the death penalty and apply the law. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the alternate juror was not an automatic-death-penalty juror, and that Trimble’s other claims of prejudicial admission of weapons and prosecutorial misconduct were without merit. View "Trimble v. Bobby" on Justia Law

Hodge’s 15-year-old stepdaughter found a micro video recording device that had recorded her exiting the shower naked and wrapping a towel around herself. She also saw that Hodge had setting up a camera on one of her bedroom shelves. The girl called her mother, Hodge’s wife, who came home. Hodge told her he had destroyed the recording. Hodge’s wife called the police, who obtained a search warrant. A police forensic investigation of Hodge’s laptop computer uncovered multiple child pornography images. Hodge pleaded guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography. 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court declined to give him a two-point base-offense-level reduction under USSG 2G2.2(b)(1) that applies when “the defendant’s conduct was limited to the receipt or solicitation of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor” with no intent “to traffic in, or distribute, such material.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Hodge was also secretly recording videos of his stepdaughter naked, so his “conduct” was not “limited to” the receipt or solicitation of child pornography. The court rejected Hodge’s argument that his video voyeurism was not conduct that was “relevant” to his “offense conduct” under USSG 1B1.3. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

From 2006 to 2008, Andrews asked friends and colleagues to loan him money, roughly two million dollars in total, explaining that he needed money to purchase property in Indianapolis or to improve property that he owned in the area. Andrews never owned, bought, or improved property in Indianapolis. Andrews mostly used the money to fund a day-trading account with TD Ameritrade. Most of the money vanished. Andrews’s victims lost over 1.4 million dollars. Andrews was convicted of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, sentenced to 87 months in prison and ordered to repay the full amount his victims had lost. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that all of the loans were part of a single “scheme . . . to defraud.” The court noted a common false statement of a need for funds, usually related to nonexistent Indianapolis property; a common group of victims, usually friends or colleagues, who loaned money to Andrews repeatedly; and a common purpose for the funds, usually the need to fund Andrews’s day-trading account. The final loan occurred on September 25, 2008, fewer than five years before the government indicted Andrews, so prosecution of the entire scheme was not time-barred. View "United States v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Twice in 2007, Johnson was charged in Florida with crimes involving robbery with a deadly weapon, and entered no-contest pleas. After his release and while on probation in Florida, Johnson moved, in violation of his probation. Law enforcement learned that Johnson was at the apartment of his girlfriend, Tweedly, in Michigan. Officers went to the apartment, where they found Tweedly but not Johnson. They found a rifle under the bed. Tweedly explained that Johnson had brought the rifle with him when he moved in and that they had another gun, but that, if it was not at the apartment, it was with Johnson, who was at work. Officers went to Johnson’s workplace, where they arrested him and found a handgun partially under the driver’s seat of the car that he had driven to work. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Johnson fired two attorneys and represented himself with standby counsel. The court sentenced him to two concurrent 60-month sentences. The government conceded that the rifle conviction should be vacated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the handgun conviction, rejecting arguments that it too rested on improperly admitted hearsay evidence; the court should not have allowed the jury to see the nature of Johnson’s prior felony; and the court improperly instructed the jury. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Giorgio was the Chief Financial Officer of Suarez, a direct-marketing company. He and his boss asked employees to donate $5,000 each to political candidates, promising that the company would reimburse the donations. When the scheme was disclosed, Giorgio admitted to soliciting money from “straw campaign donors” in violation of campaign-finance laws that then banned all corporate donations to candidates, 2 U.S.C. 441b, and individual donations of more than $5,000 per candidate in an election cycle. Federal law also bans people from “mak[ing] a contribution in the name of another person,” 52 U.S.C. 30122. He signed a plea agreement. After a jury acquitted his co-conspirators, he tried twice to withdraw his plea. The district court declined and sentenced him at the bottom of the (much-lowered) guideline range—to 27 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Giorgio is a sophisticated and well-educated businessman, not apt to misunderstand what he was signing. Giorgio did not show that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty even if he could show conflicted counsel based on the company’s paying for his defense. Giorgio admitted his guilt and insisted on sticking to his plea even when asked, after trial, if he wanted to withdraw it. View "United States v. Giorgio" on Justia Law

Detroit police received complaints about drug activity at a residence and used a confidential informant to make a controlled buy. They observed as the CI went to the front door, but were unable to see the person with whom the CI interacted. The CI returned to the vehicle with marijuana. The CI stated that he purchased the marijuana from a black male, called Ray, and gave a description. Police obtained a search warrant. Upon arrival at the home, officers encountered a boy on the sidewalk, who stated that Ray, his father, was inside the home. No one responded. The officers claim they found the door unlocked. They entered, announced themselves, and found Ray and a woman sleeping in an upstairs bedroom, where they found 31 individual bags of marijuana, shotgun shells, and an unloaded shotgun. A loaded rifle was found in a second bedroom. On the first floor, officers found loose marijuana, 49 small bags of crack cocaine, and a loaded semiautomatic handgun. Before being read his Miranda rights, Ray took responsibility for the illegal items; he claims that he did not want his son to see the child’s mother taken out in handcuffs and thought the conversation was off the record. Ray was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing on whether the court erred in admitting Ray’s alleged confession. View "United States v. Ray" on Justia Law

During a 1994 attack on his neighbors, Morris shot and killed the husband, beat and stabbed a teen-aged cousin and raped the wife, who survived. The gun was found underneath Morris’s dresser drawer. After waiving his constitutional rights, Morris gave a statement that on the day of the offense he had purchased and smoked $250 worth of cocaine, had an argument with the husband, waited with his gun, entered the house, shot husband, stabbed cousin, and raped wife. The defense focused on Morris’s history as a good student and employee and his deterioration due to drug use. The jury imposed a death sentence for the cousin’s murder and a sentence life without parole for the husband’s murder. The court imposed a consecutive 25-year sentence for the aggravated rape conviction. After exhausting state remedies, Morris sought federal habeas relief. The district court granted the petition in part, vacating his death sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Morris’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilt phase, but vacated the grant of relief on Morris’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The conclusion of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals that counsel’s performance was not deficient was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Morris v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Olive founded National Foundation of America (NFOA) in 2006 and applied to the IRS for recognition of its Section 501(c)(3) status. That application was eventually denied He learned the “business model” as a development advisor and executive at National Community Foundation, which offered products similar to those later marketed by NFOA. The scheme involved highly-compensated insurance agents, who sold investment contracts that customers could purchase with cash or by transferring existing annuities, real estate, or securities to NFOA. Olive misrepresented NFOA’s age, assets, and IRS status, and misrepresented the financial consequences. Olive knew that NFOA paid its brokers commissions well above the industry rate, lost a significant portion of the obtained annuities’ value due to their early surrender, and diverted a portion of funds to Olive’s and others’ personal benefit.Olive was convicted of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343 and of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957; was sentenced to 372 months of incarceration; and was ordered to pay restitution of $5,992,181.24. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the indictment; evidentiary decisions, permitting the introduction of cease-and-desist orders issued by several states; and the sentencing calculation, with respect to Olive's role, vulnerable victims, and loss calculation. View "United States v. Olive" on Justia Law