Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Schumaker pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. Schumaker had 14 prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary, involving separate structures, occurring on 13 different dates. In 2017, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee aggravated burglary was not a violent felony and did not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) predicate offense. The district court sentenced Schumaker to 54 months’ imprisonment in 2020. While the government’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that Tennessee aggravated burglary qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. Schumaker then argued that his prior offenses “did not occur on separate occasions” under ACCA. The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument after considering the charging documents.On remand, Schumaker cited the Supreme Court’s 2022 grant of certiorari in “Wooden” and unsuccessfully argued that, in conducting the occasions-different inquiry, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibited the court from relying on the dates and locations of the aggravated-burglary offenses found in the judgments associated with those convictions because the dates and locations are non-elemental facts that the government had to prove to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The limited remand required the district court to sentence Schumaker under the ACCA. Circuit precedent bars Schumaker’s argument that the non-elemental facts in Shepard documents must be charged in an indictment and found by a jury before a court may rely on those facts in the occasions-different inquiry. View "United States v. Schumaker" on Justia Law

Officers Simpson and Patrick drove to Perez’s house to execute seven felony arrest warrants. Simpson approached Perez behind the house. After a brief exchange, Perez bolted. Perez wove her way through the neighborhood—including across a two-way street—in a chase the length of two football fields. Patrick ordered her to stop. Perez did not comply. Patrick fired his taser but missed. Perez kept fleeing, heading toward another two-lane street, intending to cross. A row of moving cars stood in her way, so she stopped. Perez alleges she raised her hands and stood still, expecting to be handcuffed. Patrick claims she did not raise her hands and instead took off running. Patrick made the split-second decision to fire his taser again. It connected. Perez fell forward and hit her chin on the ground, fracturing her jaw. She later pled guilty to evading police and resisting arrest.Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Patrick’s request for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment, 28 U.S.C. 1291, where the decision depended on issues of fact. View "Perez v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. View "L. C. v. United States" on Justia Law

Bauer worked as a physician for over 50 years, most recently in pain management at ANA. Bauer’s practice, which included regular prescribing controlled substances, became the subject of a DEA investigation. Bauer was indicted for knowingly or intentionally” distributing or dispensing controlled substances “except as authorized,” 21 U.S.C. 841(a), concerning 14 patients. The prosecution’s expert, Dr. King, opined that Bauer did not sufficiently establish a diagnosis and ignored “red flags.” Each patient had a history of at least two mental health conditions; several had histories of illegal drug use. Bauer drastically exceeded recommended thresholds and prescribed opioids together with other controlled substances. One patient died from an accidental overdose. None showed improvement. A drug task force officer alerted Bauer that a patient was selling his pills. Bauer did not terminate the patient but provided additional prescriptions. Several pharmacies would not fill his prescriptions. Dr. King opined that Bauer prescribed opioids “in most cases” to support “addiction and dependency,” “without a legitimate medical purpose.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bauer’s convictions and 60-month sentence (below the Guidelines range). A jury could reasonably find that Bauer knew his prescriptions were without authorization, satisfying the mens rea requirement clarified by the Supreme Court in 2022. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instruction on the good-faith defense. The court rejected Bauer’s challenges to the exclusion of his proffered expert witnesses and his argument that he had a constitutional right to testify as an expert in his own defense. View "United States v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Based on a tip from foreign law enforcement, Kentucky Detective Gatson and federal agents went to Lewis’s home. Lewis invited them inside and signed a form, consenting to “a complete search of the premises, property or vehicle” and electronic devices. A forensic examiner arrived and generated a preview of Lewis’s laptop, which revealed file names indicative of child pornography; on Lewis’s cell phone, he found thumbnail images of Lewis’s cousin’s children bathing naked. Lewis reportedly stated that he did not know that it was illegal to look at child pornography, then invoked his Miranda rights but did not say that he was revoking his consent to search. Gatson obtained a warrant. A forensic search of the seized devices revealed evidence of child pornography on Lewis’s laptop, cell phone, and USB thumb drive.The district court found that the search warrant failed to establish probable cause but that suppression was inappropriate because officers had relied on the warrant in good faith. Lewis conditionally pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The Sixth Circuit vacated. Lewis consented to the initial search of his laptop and cell phone and the officers’ account of that search and the preview generated were validly obtained and are admissible. All other evidence taken from Lewis’s electronic devices was obtained through searches and seizures that were not supported by a valid warrant. The warrant affidavit stated only Gatson’s conclusory belief that a suspect committed a crime and could not establish probable cause, which precludes the application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop of Moore and Saunders, the Ohio State Highway Patrol seized four vacuum-sealed packages, containing 431 grams of heroin. The couriers stated they had planned to deliver their load to Minter in West Virginia. The FBI Drug Task Force learned Minter had paid them in either cash or drugs, or both, to deliver money to Wright in Detroit and return with drugs for distribution by Minter. They had made similar journeys between Wright and Minter in the past. Moore explained that Wright was “in charge.” The FBI executed a search warrant for Minter’s residence and recovered traces of heroin, scales, and $18,000 in cash. A day later, the FBI executed a second warrant, based on information from a confidential informant, to search under the shared porch at Minter’s apartment building,.Officers recovered a charcoal bag containing 529 grams of heroin and 37 grams of crack cocaine. Underneath the steps, about eight feet away, officers recovered a stolen .357 Magnum.Minter pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin; after remands, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor and a two-level firearm-possession enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the enhancements proper. View "United States v. Minter" on Justia Law

A 911 call, reported that “the people that live behind me” were “yelling and what sounds like him hitting something.” Officers Curtis and Gray responded to the address, wearing activated body cameras. Not seeing or hearing anything amiss outside, they knocked. Reed answered the door. Gray asked, “Do you mind stepping out here and talking to me for a second?” Reed asked, “you got a warrant?” Gray replied, “nope,” explaining that “somebody called and said that somebody was fighting.” Reed said, “Wasn’t here.” After additional discussion, Gray stated they needed to talk to other adults in the house; “if not, then we can come in … exigent circumstances.” Reed closed his door. The officers kicked the door down. Curtis stepped inside, drew his firearm, pointed it at Reed’s head. then put the gun away, and pulled Reed outside. Gray pushed Reed against the car and patted him down. Other officers arrived and spoke with Reed’s family. Satisfied that everyone in Reed’s house was safe, the officers documented the damage to Reed’s door and left.The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Campbell County and against the officers in their official capacities; dismissed a Terry claim as “duplicative” of a false arrest claim; dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and declined to award the officers qualified immunity on the individual capacity unlawful-entry, excessive-force, and false-arrest claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that the officers violated clearly established constitutional rights. View "Reed v. Campbell County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

Jones, who was on supervised release, was arrested after he fired shots outside his house and fled inside. He pled guilty to possessing a stolen firearm. The district court imposed the agreed-upon 10-year sentence, which was above the 77-96 month Guidelines range but below the 15-year mandatory minimum that would have applied if he had been classified as an armed career criminal. The court rejected arguments that he should not receive a sentence enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight and challenging the use of his prior controlled substance offense under Michigan state law to increase his base offense level–claiming Michigan’s controlled-substance statute is broader than the federal definition of the relevant substances. Separately, Jones faced resentencing on his supervised release; the firearm offense violated his supervised release conditions. A different district court imposed a 24-month sentence—half to run concurrently with his firearm conviction and half to run consecutively.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district courts properly calculated Jones’s Guidelines range for the firearm offense and imposed a reasonable sentence for the supervised-release violation. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

From 2009-2015, Hofstetter managed pain clinics in Florida and Tennessee. Hofstetter also co-owned and managed an additional clinic in Tennessee. Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. All four defendants were convicted of maintaining drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering. Hofstetter was sentenced to 400 months in prison, Clemons to 42 months, Newman to 40 months, and Womack to 30 months. After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, the Supreme Court decided “Ruan” (2022), clarifying the applicable mens rea for an unlawful distribution charge, and remanded.The Sixth Circuit again affirmed. Under Ruan, it is insufficient for the government to prove that a prescription was “in fact” not authorized; the government must prove the defendant subjectively knew or intended that the prescription was unauthorized. The district court’s instructions were not plainly erroneous regarding the drug-involved-premises and conspiracy-to-distribute-and-dispense charges. Taken as a whole, the jury instructions made clear that the jury had to find that the defendants knowingly opened the clinics for the purpose of illegally distributing Schedule II controlled substances. View "United States v. Hofstetter" on Justia Law