Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alsante pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under 42 U.S.C. 16913. At his sentencing hearing, the district court permitted the government to introduce evidence that Alsante had committed other sexual-misconduct crimes with a minor, all of which were the subject of pending Tennessee state court charges. The district court relied on that conduct in imposing a 54-month sentence, an upward variance from his advisory guidelines range of 15-21 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Alsante’s argument that his due process rights or his rights against self-incrimination were violated by permitting the government to introduce evidence related to pending state court charges at his federal sentencing hearing because any attempt to rebut the government’s evidence at the federal sentencing hearing hampered his ability to defend himself in state court. The court noted that Alsante did not seek a continuance and did not suffer “actual or threatened physical harm” for remaining silent, not face “mental coercion overbearing the will.” View "United States v. Alsante" on Justia Law

Bivens, then 33, began a sexual relationship with A.H., then 13 and living with her father near Bivens’ Kentucky home. A.H. moved to Ohio to live with her mother. A.H. took sexually explicit photos of herself at Bivens’ request and sent them to Bivens; around her fourteenth birthday. Bivens drove to Ohio and took A.H. to a hotel, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Bivens created explicit photos, which he took home on his iPhone. Two months later, A.H. ran away from home; Bivens picked her up in Ohio and drove her to Kentucky, where the two again engaged in sex. A.H. hid in a crawl space behind a dresser and was not found until the sixth search of Bivens’ home. Bivens pled guilty to persuading A.H. to create child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); traveling interstate to engage in illicit sexual conduct, section 2423(b); creating child pornography, section 2251(a); transporting child pornography across state lines, section 2252(a)(1); and transporting A.H. between states to engage in illegal sexual activity, section 2423(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 360 months in prison, based on an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life, upholding the court’s decision, over Bivens’ objection, not to combine the counts in determining the guidelines range. View "United States v. Bivens" on Justia Law

Cabrera, indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm after he procured a handgun for a confidential informant, claimed, in pre-trial motions and post-trial submissions, that law-enforcement agents had doctored an audio-tape recording of that transaction. Cabrera did not, however, testify in support of that theory. A jury found him guilty. At sentencing, the district judge announced that he was sentencing Cabrera to 63 months’ imprisonment, the top of his guidelines range, because Cabrera advanced a “fantastic” claim (that the tape was altered); and did not testify in support of that claim. Cabrera’s counsel raised no objection to his sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although the district judge seemed to rely on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), his statements suggest that he misinterpreted the thrust of that statutory sentencing factor; he failed to substantiate his claim that Cabrera disrespected the law within the meaning of that factor so that Cabrera was punished for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to challenge the government’s case. View "United States v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in California. Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan. DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which states that an alien can be removed if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as “sexual abuse of a minor,” An immigration judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California Penal Code section 261.5(c) constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” and ordered him removed to Mexico. The BIA and Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” was permissibly interpreted to include the conviction. The BIA employed a categorical approach and held that the age differential in California’s statute—which requires an age gap of more than three years— was meaningful. View "Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2011, Asakevich pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and attempting to entice a minor via the internet, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The district court sentenced Asakevich to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Asakevich’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 7, 2013, so that Asakevich’s conviction became final. He had one year to file a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(1). Asakevich has not filed a section 2255 motion. On October 6, 2014, Asakevich filed a pro se “Motion for Extension of Time to File 28 U.S.C. 2255 Motion,” seeking pre-approval for a 90-day extension. The district court denied Asakevich’s motion, reasoning that there was no published authority for enlarging the time for filing a section 2255 motion before the statute of limitations expires. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal courts do not lightly grant relief in non-existent cases or offer advisory opinions about what they might do if an action were filed. Asakevich requested an advisory opinion about whether he could obtain an extension for an action not yet in existence and one that may never come into existence. View "United States v. Asakevich" on Justia Law

In 2005, Watkins was sentenced to 185-months’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Watkins had three prior convictions: arson, felony escape, and voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After unsuccessful direct appeals and a post-conviction petition, which was rejected as untimely, Watkins sought authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in Johnson v. United States, that imposition of an increased sentence under the ACCA residual clause violates due process because the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, stating that Johnson announced “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The residual clause defines the term “violent felony” to include a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” View "In re: Watkins" on Justia Law

In 2008, Javidan shadowed Shahab, who was involved with fraudulent home-health agencies. Javidan, Shahab, and two others purchased Acure Home Care. Javidan managed Acure, signing Medicare applications and maintaining payroll. She had sole signature authority on Acure’s bank account and, was solely responsible for Medicare billing. Javidan illegally recruited patients by paying “kickbacks” to corrupt physicians and by using “marketers” to recruit patients by offering cash or prescription medications in exchange for Medicare numbers and signatures on blank Medicare forms. Javidan hired Meda as a physical therapist. Meda signed revisit notes for patients that he did not visit. He told Javidan which patients were not homebound and which demanded money for their Medicare information. The government charged both with health care fraud conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1347) and conspiracy to receive kickbacks (18 U.S.C. 371). At trial, Javidan testified that she did not participate in and was generally unaware of Acure’s fraudulent business practices. Meda called no witnesses. Javidan and Meda were sentenced to terms of 65 and 46 months of imprisonment, respectively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Meda’s claims that his conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and that he was subjected to prosecutorial vindictiveness for refusing to plead guilty and requesting a jury trial in prior case and Javidan’s claims of improper evidentiary rulings and sentence calculation errors. View "United States v. Javidan" on Justia Law

When Michigan police officers arrested Bachynski on suspicion of murder, she invoked her right to remain silent and asked for an attorney. During later interactions between the officers and Bachynski, she changed her mind, eventually pointing to a detective and saying: “I want to talk to you.” She then waived her Miranda rights three times and confessed three times to a slew of crimes, including murder. A jury convicted her, and the state courts upheld the conviction over challenges to her confession. The federal district court granted her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the detectives impermissibly interrogated her without an attorney present. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the state courts reasonably construed the Supreme Court’s holdings in this area. Ample evidence rebutted showed that Bachynski voluntarily and knowingly waived her Miranda rights and there was ample, admissible evidence of her guilt even without the confession. View "Bachynski v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In 2006, Scarber was sentenced to life imprisonment; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. On November 12, 2009, Scarber moved to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction, which the court took as a post-conviction motion for relief and denied, The Court of Appeals affirmed. In March, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In August, 2011, he filed an unsuccessful state habeas petition. The district court dismissed a federal petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act statute of limitations ran during periods when Scarber had the opportunity to, but did not, seek reconsideration. The limitation period began to run on March 20, 2009, after the 90 days when Scarber could have sought review of the merits judgment against him with the U.S. Supreme Court. It was tolled with 128 days remaining from November 12, 2009 (motion to dismiss filed) until March 8, 2011 (Michigan Supreme Court rejected appeal) and resumed running the day after the Michigan Supreme Court upheld denial of Scarber’s request to appeal. If Scarber had sought reconsideration, the limitation period would have been tolled because an application for state review would shave been pending. View "Scarber v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Priddy pled guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). His presentence report recommended that the court adjudge Priddy an armed career criminal (18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1)), identifying two 1991 aggravated burglary convictions, a 1994 robbery conviction, a 1999 aggravated burglary convictions, and two 2005 burglary convictions. Defense counsel explained to Priddy that he qualified for the ACCA sentencing enhancement, but Priddy did not understand. Defense counsel then conceded that Priddy was subject to the ACCA’s enhancement. Priddy was allowed to speak and questioned why his two 1991 convictions, for which he was sentenced concurrently, counted as separate convictions. He denied committing two separate burglaries and stated that he only pled guilty to two charges because he was promised a concurrent sentence. The district court ruled that the ACCA enhancement applied, finding that Priddy’s three aggravated burglary convictions and his robbery conviction were violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. The court did not address the 2005 burglary convictions, and sentenced Priddy to a statutory minimum term of 180 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly found that four prior convictions constituted violent felonies under the ACCA’s enumerated-offense and use-of-force clauses. View "United States v. Priddy" on Justia Law