Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, Da’Rell Winters, a convicted petitioner, sought to appeal the district court's denial of his habeas relief application. However, due to the delayed receipt of the district court's decision, he did not file his appeal in time. When he finally filed the appeal notice, he explained his delay but did not formally request to reopen the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that his explanation was sufficient for the district court to consider his appeal notice as a motion to reopen, thus deeming his appeal timely.The case's facts reveal that in 2014, Winters was convicted for armed robbery. After exhausting his appeals in Michigan state courts, he applied for habeas relief in a federal court in 2018. He represented himself and raised various claims, including insufficiency of evidence and errors in jury instructions and sentencing.The federal district court denied Winters's habeas application and a certificate of appealability on March 10, 2021. Due to a mailing error, Winters received the court's decision only on May 18, 2021. He filed a notice of appeal on June 1, 2021, which was after the 30-day deadline for filing an appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal as untimely.Winters later moved the district court to reopen the appeal period, which the court granted. It retroactively construed his June 1 notice of appeal as a motion to reopen, making his appeal timely. The Sixth Circuit agreed with this interpretation, concluding that Winters's appeal was timely and directing the Clerk's Office to set a briefing schedule for considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability in this appeal. View "Winters v. Taskila" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which had denied Adam Carson's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Carson had been convicted of robbing a bank and tampering with a witness, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In his motion, Carson argued that his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to initiate plea negotiations and by committing several mistakes during the trial. He also claimed that he did not knowingly waive his right to testify. The Court of Appeals held that Carson's ineffective-assistance claims failed because they lacked grounds for prejudice. The court ruled there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Carson's case would have been different if his attorney had acted differently. The court also held that Carson had not demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to testify, as he did not object on the record to his attorney's statement that he did not want to testify. View "Carson v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a man named James Wilder II who was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon and attempted witness tampering. While on patrol, Officer Meric Whipple observed Wilder walking beside the road with a visible firearm. When Wilder noticed the police car, he ran, dropped the gun, picked it back up, and entered a house. Upon searching the house, the officers found a gun that matched the one Wilder had dropped and arrested him. While in jail, Wilder called a friend and directed her to bribe the residents of the house to falsely claim that they owned the gun. A jury found him guilty of both charges.Wilder appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial testimony regarding the officer's training and experience was unfairly admitted and that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for attempted witness tampering. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officer's training and experience in identifying weapons were relevant to the case, and the testimony did not pose a risk of unfair prejudice. In regards to the second ground, the court found that Wilder's instructions to his friend to bribe the residents of the house to claim the gun was theirs demonstrated a substantial step towards witness tampering and was sufficient evidence for the conviction. View "United States v. Wilder" on Justia Law

In five 2008 transactions, Goodwin distributed a total of 71.9 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential informant. He pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. Goodwin had a prior “felony drug offense,” 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), and faced a statutory minimum 20-year sentence. The district court found that two of his prior offenses made him a “career offender,” calculated his guidelines range as 262-327 months, and imposed a 262-month sentence. After Goodwin’s sentencing, the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to subject Goodwin to his 20-year minimum sentence from 50 to 280 grams; the 2018 First Step Act made that change retroactive. Goodwin moved for a reduced sentence under the Act. In 2020, before that motion was resolved, the Bureau of Prisons allowed Goodwin to serve the remainder of his sentence in home confinement because of the COVID-19 pandemic (CARES Act, 134 Stat. 281, 516).Two years later, the district court denied Goodwin’s motion for a reduced sentence primarily because his guidelines range remained the same even after the statutory changes. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court committed a procedural error by denying relief in a cursory order and committed a substantive error because Goodwin's rehabilitation efforts (combined with other legal changes) required the court to issue a below-guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Zheng and Wu owned and operated the Tokyo Dragon restaurant, where they employed noncitizens who were working in the U.S. illegally. In 2017, Homeland Security received a tip from a nurse who suspected that they were human trafficking. Agents executed a warrant at Tokyo Dragon and discovered that the business had not filed any government paperwork with respect to the noncitizens’ employment. Four Hispanic men lived in the basement of Zheng and Wu’s home. The owners transported the men to and from work every day and to the grocery store weekly, paying them in cash. Other employees were paid by check. A Mexican citizen testified he began working as a Tokyo Dragon cook in 2015, generally working six or seven days a week for 11-12 hours per day; he did not interact with customers. Zheng instructed the noncitizens that they “should not go outside” the house and should not make noise, to avoid being deported.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Zheng and Wu on four counts of harboring illegal noncitizens for commercial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court rejected arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of “harboring” by not including a requirement that the defendants acted intentionally and knowingly in shielding the illegal noncitizens from law enforcement and invaded the province of the jury by giving examples of “harboring.” View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

Brown created a driver’s license with his photo and someone else’s identity and made credit cards using that identity, pulling account numbers from the dark web. Brown used those fraudulent documents to purchase 25 firearms, which he sold. Brown subsequently walked into a gun store, picked out a firearm, and presented a fraudulent license and credit card. The store employee recognized Brown and called the police. As police arrived, Brown drove away in a rented U-Haul. During the ensuing traffic stop, officers found Brown’s fraudulent license and false credit cards in a wallet on the passenger seat; a gun that had been reported stolen was between the front seats. After being arrested, Brown recruited a friend to continue his scheme. The friend used fraudulent cards to purchase 39 firearms. The two fraudulently purchased $56,000 in guns over three months.Brown pled guilty to aggravated identity theft, using a false ID during the purchase of a firearm, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), 1028A(a)(1), 1343, 1349. The court enhanced Brown’s sentencing range based on the stolen firearm in the U-Haul, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), and imposed a 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the enhancement would apply even without the stolen firearm in the U-Haul. Fraudulently purchased firearms are “stolen” for purposes of the enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Tellez agreed to a car search. After the search, the officer asked, “Do you have your wallet?” Tellez handed it over. Inside, the officer discovered three Visa gift cards, each with numbers written on the back, which the officer believed was indicative of fraud. The officer asked whether he could swipe the cards. Tellez agreed but then said, “I don’t give permission.” The officer nevertheless swiped the cards. The numbers did not match the cards, indicating they had been altered. Tellez was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the U.S., bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. He moved to suppress all evidence derived from the wallet search but did not challenge the officer’s decision to swipe the cards.After reviewing a video recording of the traffic stop and the officer’s testimony, the court denied Tellez’s motion, concluding that Tellez’s gesture of handing over his wallet reflected his nonverbal, voluntary consent. Tellez entered a conditional guilty plea. Tellez objected to the intended loss calculations used to derive his Guidelines offense level. The three cards had been used to spend or withdraw an average of $1,400 per card. The probation office calculated the intended loss by multiplying the number of accounts associated with Tellez—303, including 300 other accounts found on a thumb drive in Tellez’s possession—by $1,400. The court agreed with the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and Tellez’s 70-month sentence. View "United States v. Crespo" on Justia Law

Davis and Allen pleaded guilty to using a facility of interstate commerce (their cellphones) in a murder-for-hire scheme, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a).The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government could not constitutionally apply the federal murder-for-hire statute to their conduct. Although the statute rests on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, the defendants never left Michigan or even made calls outside the state when committing the murder. At most, some of their intrastate calls required the telephone company to use out-of-state switches. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may regulate the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” even when used only within a state, and the Sixth Circuit treats an ordinary telephone as one such “instrumentality” within Congress’s control. The court also rejected speedy-trial claims. Before they pleaded guilty, the district court had postponed their trial for nearly four years. But the delay arose in part from their own repeated requests for more time and in part from the COVID-19 pandemic. Both reasons justified the delay. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Reynolds was convicted of selling a fentanyl-heroin mixture that killed two young men, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Investigators connected Reynolds to these fatal drugs in part through cellphone records, including records showing the general locations of several phones; text messages, including messages between a detective pretending to be one of the victims and Reynolds; and a controlled buy arranged by that detective.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and 328-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the government introduced insufficient evidence to convict; that a government expert identified the phones’ general locations using a software program that failed the “Daubert” reliability standards; that the district court violated the Constitution by excluding text messages that allegedly supported his innocence; and that the prosecutor improperly “vouched” for a key government witness during closing arguments. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

In 2017, officers discovered Rogers sitting in a motel room with methamphetamine. Rogers was taken into custody but released. Rogers was indicted in February 2018 for trafficking in two grams or more of methamphetamine. A month later, Rogers was riding in a vehicle that was stopped for a minor traffic violation. Officers realized that Rogers had an active warrant for his arrest for failing to appear following the indictment. A search of the car unearthed a bag of methamphetamine under Rogers’s seat. Rogers pleaded guilty to two state felony drug trafficking offenses (2017 motel incident; 2018 traffic stop) and received concurrent prison terms. He was released in 2020.In 2021, officers again found Rogers in possession of methamphetamine. Rogers pleaded guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). The probation office recommended that Rogers’s 2017 and 2018 offenses triggered the career offender enhancement for certain defendants with “at least two prior felony convictions” of a controlled substance offense, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), resulting in a Guidelines range of 262-327 months. Rogers unsuccessfully argued that the two offenses did not count as distinct prior felony convictions because they were not “separated by an intervening arrest,” as required by the Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 240-month sentence. Rogers was arrested (as the term is used in the Guidelines) after the motel incident but before the traffic stop. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law