Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, a jury convicted Etherton of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. After exhausting both direct and collateral appellate review procedures in Michigan, Etherton timely filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied Etherton’s petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and ordered issuance of a writ. Certain claims had been procedurally defaulted: that the anonymous tip presented at trial denied Etherton’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment; that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of a witness during closing argument; and that Etherton’s counsel’s failure to object to the anonymous tip, as well as other alleged shortcomings, amounted to prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel. Etherton is entitled to review based on ineffective appellate counsel. Appellate counsel failed to argue that failing to object to the anonymous tip constituted ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because there was a Confrontation Clause violation that resulted in substantial prejudice, there is a reasonable probability that Michigan appellate courts would have found trial counsel constitutionally ineffective. The failure to include that argument was, therefore, prejudicial, and amounted to deficient performance of appellate counsel. It was an unreasonable application of federal law to hold otherwise. View "Etherton v. Rivard" on Justia Law

An FBI agent downloaded multiple files depicting children engaged in sexually explicit conduct from Cover’s computer. Cover led guilty to distributing child pornography over the Internet, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). The court calculated a sentencing guidelines range of 262 to 327 months, which included: a two-level increase for distributing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor; a two-level increase for distributing material involving a minor under the age of 12; a four-level increase for distributing material that portrays violent or sadistic conduct; and a five-level increase for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. After considering Cover’s situation and the circumstances of the offense, the court sentenced him to 240 months in prison and ordered, as a special condition of supervised release, that Cover could not “own or possess any type of camera, photographic device, and/or . . . video recording equipment without the written approval of [his] probation officer.” The Sixth Circuit remanded with respect to the sadistic-portrayal enhancement, but rejected other challenges to the sentence. View "United States v. Cover" on Justia Law

Ohio state inmate Jackson continually violated the terms of his parole. Facing up to 26 years behind bars, he filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition in 2013. Jackson filed two more habeas petitions in 2015, but the district court classified them as second or successive and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit. Jackson filed unsuccessful “motion[s] for relief from” the judgments asking the district court to reconsider the transfer orders. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss, noting that Jackson appealed the denial of his motion for relief from the transfer order, not the transfer order itself. .When a district court transfers a second-or-successive habeas petition, the case travels from one court to another, so that the transferring court loses jurisdiction and the other court gains The district court lost jurisdiction over Jackson’s habeas petitions when each petition was physically transferred to the Sixth Circuit, so it lacked jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s motions. View "Jackson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

While Holland was in custody for a parole violation, detectives interviewed Holland about criminal sexual assaults that had occurred in the area. Holland asserted his right to an attorney and the interview ceased. Six days after Holland had requested an attorney—and before one had been provided—police again met with Holland, to discuss the 1991 murder of Lisa Shaw. Holland was to serve as the key prosecution witness at that murder trial, which was scheduled to begin in February 2006. After Holland changed his story regarding Shaw’s murder—a shift that effectively placed him at the scene of the crime—police asked a polygraph examiner to interview Holland. The examiner was instructed to ask only about Shaw’s murder, and nothing else, and to focus on obtaining a witness statement. During the interview, however, Holland confessed that he had killed Shaw and committed several additional crimes. Holland’s statements led to six separate state convictions, all of which employed Holland’s confessions as critical state’s evidence. On federal habeas review, the district court ruled that the confessions were admissible because Holland was not in “Miranda custody” during the January 2006 interviews, and that Holland’s statements were made voluntarily. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also agreeing that any violation of Holland’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was harmless. View "Holland v. Rivard" on Justia Law

Hayden acted as a confidential informant in a Martin, Tennessee investigation into felons in possession of firearms. Hayden contacted her acquaintance, Taylor; Hayden testified that he told her that he had stolen pistols and a shotgun. Law enforcement wired Hayden’s car with an audio transmitter and gave her controlled funds. Taylor eventually got into Hayden’s vehicle with a disassembled shotgun. Police stopped Hayden’s vehicle and apprehended Taylor. Officers reported they found the shotgun between the seat and the door where Taylor had been sitting. Taylor appealed his conviction and sentence of 262 months, for possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j), and as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the court erred in giving a jury instruction for constructive possession of the firearm, in addition to an actual possession instruction; there was insufficient evidence to convict of possession of a stolen firearm; and sentencing was procedurally unreasonable because the court did not explicitly discuss whether a shorter sentence was warranted because the age at which Taylor would be released would decrease his danger to the community. The Supreme Court’s 2015 holding that the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague, did not affect Taylor’s ACCA enhancement. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Collins, Wilburn, Brosky, (Defendants) and others, were charged. Several entered plea agreements and agreed to cooperate. Defendants were convicted of conspiring to manufacture a mixture or substance containing detectable methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 1). The jury attributed 500 grams or more of methamphetamine to Collins and Wilburn, and less than 50 grams to Brosky. The jury also found Collins and Wilburn guilty of conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine (Count 2); of possessing equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(6) (Count 5); and of conspiring to distribute a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine to persons under the age of 21, 21 U.S.C 841(a)(1), 846, and 859(a) (Count 14). The district court sentenced Collins to concurrent terms of 324 months of incarceration on Counts 1, 2 and 14, plus a concurrent term of 120 months on Count 5. Wilburn was sentenced to concurrent terms of 360 months on Counts 1, 2, and 14, and to concurrent terms of 240 months on Counts 5 and 7. Brosky was sentenced to 70 months on his sole conviction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence and to the reasonableness of the sentences, constitutional challenges, and claims of prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Brosky" on Justia Law

In 2000, Davis was engaged to Jennifer, who had an eight-month old son, Caine. Davis was not Caine’s father. On January 27, Davis was at Jennifer’s apartment. Caine was fussy. Davis grew frustrated and pushed Caine across the floor. Later, Jennifer left Davis to watch Caine. When she called to ask about Caine, Davis said that something was wrong. Chilton asked a friend to check on Caine. Her friend found Caine limp. His pulse was weak and erratic, his eyes were rolled back and he was not breathing. Caine was airlifted to Vanderbilt Medical Center where doctors found three complex skull fractures, massive internal bleeding, retinal bleeding in both eyes, and a torn membrane between the lip and the gums. Caine died. Davis insisted he had not dropped Caine and claimed to have no idea how he was injured. Outside a neighbor’s apartment, police found a bag containing a wet washcloth and Caine’s shirt. Davis admitted that he had used the rag to wipe blood out of Caine’s mouth. At trial, in contrast to his previous claims, Davis testified that he had dropped Caine accidentally. A medical expert testified that Caine’s injuries were consistent with that testimony; he eventually lost his medical license for misleading testimony in other trials. All of the doctors who had treated Caine testified that his death could not have been an accident. Following a mistrial, Davis was unable to find an expert willing to take the case. The jury convicted him of felony murder and aggravated child abuse. Davis exhausted state remedies The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for federal habeas relief in which he argued ineffective assistance. View "Davis v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Powell pleaded guilty to drug and weapons charges, preserving the right to appeal his sentence. The court classified Powell as a career offender and sentenced him to 155 months’ imprisonment, near the low end of the Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court improperly classified Powell as a career offender, which affected the calculation of his criminal history points. In February 2001, while in court on an unrelated charge, Powell was served with a summons and given notice of an aggravated-assault charge against him. Approximately two months later, Powell was arrested for a second felony—assault on a police officer. He was sentenced for both crimes on the same day. The district court erroneously interpreted U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(2) to conclude that the service of a summons regarding the first offense before commission of the second offense was sufficient to treat the offenses separately. The section states: If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day. If the Sentencing Commission had intended for the words “intervening arrest” to encompass other intervening events such as summonses, it could easily have used a broader term. View "United States v. Powell" on Justia Law

Keys was convicted in 2005 of second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, and assault with the intent to rob while armed. Due in part to his “habitual offender” status, the Michigan state court sentenced Keys to life in prison for the murder and conspiracy charges and to 12 to 25 years of imprisonment for the assault charge (to be served concurrently). Following the exhaustion of his state-court remedies, Keys filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, rejecting arguments that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to support convictions for second-degree murder and assault with the intent to rob while armed; that Keys’ due process rights were violated when the jury panel viewed him in shackles during voir dire; and that Keys’ counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective for failing to fully investigate and raise the shackling claim. View "Keys v.Booker" on Justia Law

In 1993, Muslim inmates seized control of cellblock “L” at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, took guards hostage and locked inmates considered “snitches” into cells in the L–6 section. The Muslim inmates maintained control of unit L–6 while the Aryan Brotherhood and the Black Gangster Disciples controlled other units within L–Block. LaMar an SOCF inmate serving a sentence for a 1989 murder conviction, was not a Muslim, did not plan or participate in the prison takeover and was in the prison recreation yard when the riot began. LaMar and other inmates negotiated with the Muslim inmates and beat to death five inmates, identified as “snitches,” in exchange for access to the yard. Convicted, LaMar received death sentences for four of the killings and a life sentence for the fifth. After exhausting state remedies, LaMar’s federal habeas petition was rejected. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the state withheld favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland; that the state trial court denied LaMar due process by refusing to sever one count from the remaining charges; that there was insufficient evidence for one of the capital sentencing aggravators; and that he was denied due process by prosecutorial misconduct. View "LaMar v. Houk" on Justia Law