Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Volkman, a University of Chicago M.D. and Ph.D. (pharmacology), board-certified in emergency medicine, was in financial distress after lawsuits. Hired by Tri-State, a cash-only clinic, he was paid $5,000 to $5,500 per week. Soon, pharmacies refused to fill his prescriptions, citing improper dosing. Volkman opened a dispensary in the clinic. The Ohio Board of Pharmacy issued a license, although a Glock was found in the drug safe. Follow-up inspections disclosed poorly maintained logs; that no licensed physician or pharmacist oversaw the actual dispensing process; and lax security of the drug safe. Patients returned unmarked and intermixed medication. The dispensary did a heavy business in oxycodone. A federal investigation revealed a chaotic, unclean environment. Tri-State fired Volkman, who opened his own shop; 12 patients died. Volkman and Tri-State’s owners were charged with conspiring to unlawfully distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); unlawful distribution of a controlled substance leading to death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 24(c). The owners accepted plea agreements and testified against Volkman, The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction on most counts, and a sentence of four consecutive life terms. On remand from the Supreme Court, in light of Burrage v. United States (2014), the Sixth Circuit again found the evidence of but-for causation sufficient. View "United States v. Volkman" on Justia Law

Three-month-old Jiyen was killed when 11 shots were fired into his home in a drive-by shooting. Prosecution witnesses testified to overhearing Drummond discussing a retribution for the death of a fellow gang member, seeing Drummond with an assault rifle 15 minutes before the fatal shots were fired, and to hearing Drummond say that “he didn’t meant [sic] to kill the baby.” A search of Drummond’s house yielded ammunition consistent with the shooting and items tying him to the gang. During trial, the court twice closed the courtroom, once stating that witnesses felt threatened by some of the spectators. A jury found Drummond guilty; the trial court sentenced Drummond to death. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed on direct appeal. State courts denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court granted habeas corpus, holding that the court violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed, distinguishing Supreme Court precedent that involved a full courtroom closure, while Drummond had a partial closing. For a partial closing, the court must balance the interests. The Ohio courts applied that principle reasonably, in the capacious sense of “reasonable” as used for purposes of the habeas statute. View "Drummond v. Houk" on Justia Law

The six-month trial of former Detroit mayor Kilpatrick and Detroit contractor Ferguson, included almost 100 government witnesses and over 700 exhibits. The government’s main theory was that Kilpatrick and Ferguson conspired to extort money from other Detroit-area contractors by pressuring them to include Ferguson’s companies in their city contracts—even when Ferguson’s companies were not the most qualified candidates and even when Ferguson’s companies did no work. Kilpatrick was convicted of 24 counts: RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d); four counts of extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; attempted extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1951; bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a); 11 counts of mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343; five counts of subscribing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206(a); and income tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. Ferguson was convicted of nine counts: RICO conspiracy, six counts of extortion, attempted extortion, and bribery. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated a restitution order, rejecting arguments that Kilpatrick was denied conflict-free counsel because his lead attorneys had recently become “of counsel” to a firm that was suing Kilpatrick for alleged conduct related to his criminal charges; extensive testimony by two case agents violated the Rules of Evidence; and the court erred in allowing witnesses to report what other people had told them about Kilpatrick and Ferguson as evidence that witnesses feared the defendants. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Simmons and 20 others were indicted for conspiracy to sell cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. During Simmons’s trial, the government moved to exclude three of Simmons’s co-defendants from the courtroom during the testimony of one of its witnesses, arguing that, due to certain comments made by Simmons and other individuals outside the courtroom, the presence of the three co-defendants might make the witness feel uncomfortable and intimidated even though the government conceded that none of the statements were threatening and that it did not know whether they were made by any of the three co-defendants it sought to exclude. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that it had discretion to bar any individual from the courtroom if there were any possibility that his or her presence might be intimidating The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding the district court violated Simmons’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when it excluded the three co-defendants from the courtroom without making factual findings that adequately support its decision. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

A group of men stole cash and marijuana from the home of an acquaintance whom they knew to be a drug dealer. Friends of the drug dealer, including Defendant, discovered that the first group was responsible and sought revenge by committing a drive-by shooting at a carwash. One man was killed. Defendant admitted his involvement to a friend, who later testified against him, along with two eyewitnesses. Bullet casings were recovered. The court disallowed introduction of a music video, in which Defendant can be seen toting an assault rifle, but permitted the government to introduce photographs that depicted Defendant holding the assault rifle. The government was allowed to introduce testimony from Godwin (one of the eyewitnesses) regarding a threat made by Defendant and a second drive-by shooting that occurred a month after the carwash shooting. The government corroborated Godwin’s story with testimony from a passenger in Godwin’s vehicle during the battery and with photographs, showing the damage to Godwin’s vehicle. Defendant was convicted of two counts of being a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although certain evidence was admitted for an improper purpose under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the error was harmless. View "United States v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

On September 22, 2009, Henry and an unknown accomplice robbed a bank in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Their faces were covered, and they wore gloves. Clutching a BB gun, Henry jumped over the counter and demanded cash while his associate held a real firearm. The two took $4,382 and shed clothing as they escaped. On November 6, Henry and an unknown associate robbed an bank, with covered faces. Henry again jumped over the counter and demanded cash, while his compatriot held a weapon. Again, the two discarded clothing as they fled with $23,179. On October 21, 2010, two masked men robbed the same bank. One jumped the counter, while the other stood back and fired shots into the air. The counter-jumper wore gloves and a distinctive blue ski mask. The robbers shed clothing and the blue ski mask, as they escaped with $11,966. Police identified Henry as one of the robbers. He confessed to the first two robberies but not the third. He was convicted of three robberies and three firearms chargex, 18 U.S.C. 2113; 924(c), and sentenced to more than 60 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that the prosecution failed to prove everything needed to pin the associate’s gun on Henry in the second and third robberies, but otherwise affirmed. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

The American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan sent letters enclosed in sealed envelopes to 25 inmates at the Livingston County Jail that were marked “Legal Mail,” included the name and bar number of a Michigan attorney, and offered legal assistance regarding the Jail’s mail policy. The Jail’s written mail policy requires that all mail except “bona-fide legal mail” must be on 4x6 inch postcards; “legal mail,” on the other hand, may be sent in a sealed envelope and is generally not opened outside the inmate’s presence. The Jail did not deliver the ACLU’s letters to the inmates, nor did the Jail inform the ACLU or the inmates that the mail was not delivered. The ACLU filed suit, arguing that the Jail’s policies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and obtained a preliminary injunction, requiring the Defendants to deliver the letters. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Jail’s argument that legal mail does not include mail from an attorney if the mail neither contains privileged content nor implicates an attorney-client relationship. View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Livingston Cnty." on Justia Law

Ozier pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The district court sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment, finding that he was a “career offender” on account of having at least two prior felony convictions for “crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The PSR identified eight convictions for aggravated burglary under Tenn. Code 39-14-403: three on April 27, 2006, and five on April 19, 2007, and concluded that these convictions constituted “burglar[ies] of a dwelling.” After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the PSR calculated defendant’s total offense level at 29, and his criminal history at level VI, for an advisory Guideline range of 151–188 months. Without the “career offender” enhancement, his Guideline range would be 77–96 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Other than the district court’s decision to consult the transcript of the plea colloquies, Ozier identified no specific error. The plea colloquies make clear that he admitted to and was convicted of burglarizing dwellings: “residences,” “homes,” “houses,” and an “apartment” so that his convictions categorically track the generic definition of “burglary of a dwelling.” View "United States v. Ozier" on Justia Law

Anderson was the girlfriend of Shakir, the violent leader of a Los Angeles drug conspiracy that operated in Tennessee and other states, 1992-1997. Anderson was active in the conspiracy until her 1997 arrest. Anderson was held in pretrial detention and testified at Shakir’s 2007 trial. Shakir was convicted of nine murders and sentenced to life in prison. Anderson was not indicted for murder, but pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The government revoked Anderson’s plea agreement before she was sentenced, claiming that Anderson did not tell the truth about her role in the 1995 Duran murder, and did not seek a downward departure for substantial assistance. The district court applied a “murder cross-reference” guideline enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(d)(1), and a three-level enhancement for her role as a “manager or supervisor” in the conspiracy and, in 2014, sentenced her to 24 years on the drug charge, the midpoint between the two sentencing requests, and 240 months on the money laundering charge, to run concurrently. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding findings that Anderson had “actual knowledge” that Shakir planned to murder Duran and played a management role. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Agent Seig posed as a father of an 11-year old girl, “Katie,” to respond to a Craigslist.org ad: “I want to be your daddy,” with images of male genitalia. Seig told Roman that he was “active” with his daughter. Roman indicated that he was interested. The men conversed, extensively, by text message, about sexual acts Roman wished to perform and about whether Katie would agree. Seig reassured Roman that was not “the law.” They planned to meet. Seig approached Roman’s vehicle and confirmed that Roman expected to engage in sexual acts with an 11-year old girl. Agents arrested him. Roman’s vehicle was searched. Agents seized Butterfinger candy (identified as Katie’s “fav”), a flower, gum, condoms, and personal lubricant. Roman entered a conditional guilty plea to attempting to use a facility of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Lowe’s argument that his conduct was not prohibited because he communicated with an adult intermediary and not a minor. While it is not sufficient to prove that a defendant intended to persuade an adult intermediary to cause a child to engage in sexual activity, the intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor exists where the defendant seeks the minor’s assent. View "United States v. Roman" on Justia Law