Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Detective Allman learned that someone was using a particular Internet Protocol (IP) address to share child pornography. He subpoenaed AT&T for information. AT&T’s records listed James Lowe of Athens, Tennessee, as the account holder. During a search, officers seized a Dell laptop with the username “Stacy” (Lowe’s wife) from the bedroom, an HP laptop with the username “Jamie” from the office, and a desktop from the office. Michael, a minor relative, lived with them during 2011 but moved out before agents searched the home in August. FBI Agent McFall examined the hard drives and discovered that only the HP laptop contained child pornography. He found 639 image files and 176 video files depicting child pornography on the device. Its settings did not require users to enter a password to access the “Jamie” account or any files. The laptop automatically connected to the home’s wifi through a stored wireless password. The Shareaza peer-to-peer file-sharing program was installed in February 2011. The Sixth Circuit reversed Lowe’s conviction for knowingly receiving, distributing, and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a), agreeing that no rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew about the files or procured the. View "United States v. Lowe" on Justia Law

At a bar, Gradisher had three or four beers and a shot of whiskey. Gradisher noticed the outline of a gun in the pocket of a man sitting to his left. Gradisher made a comment, causing a heated exchange. Gradisher went home and drank more beer. Gradisher then called 911 from his cell phone to report the man with the gun. On the first call, he refused to give his name and hung up. The operator called back. Gradisher and the operator got into a heated exchange, causing the operator to hang up, which prompted Gradisher to call 911 twice more, using obscenities. Akron officers went to his residence. Gradisher locked his door. They feared that someone might need help, broke down the door, entered, and found Gradisher under a sheet in his basement. An officer used a taser because Gradisher allegedly resisted arrest. Gradisher was found guilty of improperly using the 911 system. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force, warrantless entry, malicious prosecution, and common-law torts. The district court rejected all claims. Finding genuine disputes of material facts related to excessive force in tasing Gradisher, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment on those and state-law causes of action for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross neglect, but otherwise affirmed. View "Gradisher v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

At a bar, Gradisher had three or four beers and a shot of whiskey. Gradisher noticed the outline of a gun in the pocket of a man sitting to his left. Gradisher made a comment, causing a heated exchange. Gradisher went home and drank more beer. Gradisher then called 911 from his cell phone to report the man with the gun. On the first call, he refused to give his name and hung up. The operator called back. Gradisher and the operator got into a heated exchange, causing the operator to hang up, which prompted Gradisher to call 911 twice more, using obscenities. Akron officers went to his residence. Gradisher locked his door. They feared that someone might need help, broke down the door, entered, and found Gradisher under a sheet in his basement. An officer used a taser because Gradisher allegedly resisted arrest. Gradisher was found guilty of improperly using the 911 system. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force, warrantless entry, malicious prosecution, and common-law torts. The district court rejected all claims. Finding genuine disputes of material facts related to excessive force in tasing Gradisher, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment on those and state-law causes of action for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross neglect, but otherwise affirmed. View "Gradisher v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

Witnesses originally charged as co-conspirators testified that Garcia sold cocaine in Chicago and received deliveries from Santana, who worked for Soto. Ramirez delivered cocaine to Garcia on Soto’s behalf. Garcia and Santana sold Soto’s cocaine to Detroit-based sellers, the Enriquez brothers, who resold it to Freeman. When another middleman, El Cartero, disappeared without paying for a 10-kilogram cocaine delivery to the Enriquez brothers, Soto told Garcia, who had brokered the deal, to find them. Garcia, Santana, Gudino, Ramirez, and Espinoza went to Detroit. Espinoza, Santana, and Ramirez confronted Enriquez and his cousin, forced them into a van at gunpoint and returned to Chicago. After an hour of questioning, the kidnapping participants left; Ramirez stood guard. Gudino, Garcia, Ramirez, Espinoza, Santana, and Enriquez returned to Detroit to lure Freeman by offering to sell three kilos of cocaine. Garcia took Freeman’s money, Santana, Ramirez, and Espinoza tied Freeman in the basement and left him. On the return to Chicago, officers stopped and searched the cars and found the cocaine, currency, and three handguns. The Seventh Circuit affirmed convictions for conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II); conspiracy to kidnap, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(c); possession of a firearm in furtherance of and during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of and during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

Witnesses originally charged as co-conspirators testified that Garcia sold cocaine in Chicago and received deliveries from Santana, who worked for Soto. Ramirez delivered cocaine to Garcia on Soto’s behalf. Garcia and Santana sold Soto’s cocaine to Detroit-based sellers, the Enriquez brothers, who resold it to Freeman. When another middleman, El Cartero, disappeared without paying for a 10-kilogram cocaine delivery to the Enriquez brothers, Soto told Garcia, who had brokered the deal, to find them. Garcia, Santana, Gudino, Ramirez, and Espinoza went to Detroit. Espinoza, Santana, and Ramirez confronted Enriquez and his cousin, forced them into a van at gunpoint and returned to Chicago. After an hour of questioning, the kidnapping participants left; Ramirez stood guard. Gudino, Garcia, Ramirez, Espinoza, Santana, and Enriquez returned to Detroit to lure Freeman by offering to sell three kilos of cocaine. Garcia took Freeman’s money, Santana, Ramirez, and Espinoza tied Freeman in the basement and left him. On the return to Chicago, officers stopped and searched the cars and found the cocaine, currency, and three handguns. The Seventh Circuit affirmed convictions for conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II); conspiracy to kidnap, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(c); possession of a firearm in furtherance of and during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of and during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). View "United States v. Soto" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped while driving because his license plate had been reported stolen. Defendant fled on foot, but eventually surrendered. A search of his vehicle uncovered eight falsified driver’s licenses and many pieces of mail addressed to Michigan businesses. A later search of his home revealed 112 stolen business checks and related items. Defendant pled guilty to state charges of resisting an officer. Defendant later pled guilty to mail theft, 18 U.S.C. 1708. The parties agreed to a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. At the hearing, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to a supervised release violation. Three months later, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, claiming violations the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, the Speedy Trial Act, and the Sixth Amendment. The court denied his attorney’s motion to withdraw, denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and sentenced Defendant to 60 months on the mail theft charge, to run concurrently with any undischarged state sentence. The court imposed a 24-month sentence, at the bottom of the guidelines range, for a Grade A supervised release violation, to be served consecutively. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal of the mail theft conviction and sentence, but vacated the supervised release sentence. The government conceded that the sentence resulted from a mistaken guidelines calculation. View "United States v. Detloff" on Justia Law

Randolph was convicted of conspiracy to violate the drug laws, conspiracy to commit money laundering and related offenses based on his involvement in a family-run drug trafficking operation in Pulaski, Tennessee. Randolph was sentenced to a concurrent term of imprisonment of 70 months on all counts. The convictions were grouped; the money laundering conspiracy conviction drove the ultimate sentence because it resulted in the highest offense level. The Sixth Circuit reversed the drug conspiracy conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. The jury’s special verdict found that the drugs “involved in” the conspiracy were “none.” This unanimous finding negates an essential element of the charged drug conspiracy and is only susceptible to one interpretation: the government failed to prove Randolph guilty of the charged drug conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also vacated the sentence because the district court determined that he laundered in excess of $200,000 during the course of the money laundering conspiracy without making adequate findings of fact on the record. The court affirmed conviction as to the remaining counts.. View "United States v. Randolph" on Justia Law

Morristown Police stopped a rental vehicle driven by Bah for speeding in a construction zone. During the traffic stop, officers placed Bah under arrest for driving on a suspended license and detained passenger Harvey for “investigatory purposes” after discovering approximately 72 credit, debit, and gift cards in the rental car’s glove compartment and trunk. Bah and Harvey filed motions to suppress evidence of the credit, debit, and gift cards and cell phones found in the car, alleging that the officers had violated their Fourth Amendment rights by: unlawfully searching the rental car; scanning the magnetic strips on numerous credit, debit, and gift cards without first obtaining a warrant; performing a warrantless search of a Blackberry cell phone; and unlawfully detaining Harvey following Bah’s arrest. The district court denied their motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Harvey did not have standing to contest the search of Bah’s rental vehicle- Harvey was reasonably detained during the traffic stop, the warrantless search of Bah’s Blackberry did not taint the subsequent cell phone searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; and scanning the magnetic strips of credit and gift cards was not a search. View "United States v. Harvey" on Justia Law

In 1985, a Tennessee state jury convicted Wright of two counts of pre-meditated murder in the first degree. Wright was sentenced to life imprisonment for one and sentenced to death for the other. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed Wright’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Three sets of unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings followed. In 1999, Wright sought federal habeas relief with appointed counsel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial. In 2013, Wright moved from judgment under Rule 60(b), asserting that Martinez, a 2012 Supreme Court decision, changed the law of procedural default such that, if his case were reopened, the court could reach the merits of claims previously dismissed as procedurally defaulted. The court closed the action without prejudice until the Supreme Court’s 2013 issuance of Trevino, and later denied Wright’s renewed Rule motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available only in “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances,” and Wright did not demonstrate such circumstances. Neither Martinez nor Trevino sufficiently changed the balance of the factors for consideration under Rule 60(b)(6) to warrant relief. Those decisions were “not a change in the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, but rather an adjustment of an equitable ruling by the Supreme Court as to when federal statutory relief is available.” View "Wright v. Warden, Riverbend Maximum Sec. Inst." on Justia Law

After being released from a Pennsylvania state correctional institution where he had been imprisoned for aggravated assault with a firearm specification and for a separate weapons offense, Lee was a parolee living in Ohio when his parole officer received a tip about “possible weapons going in and out of [Lee’s] apartment.” The next day, officers searched the apartment without a warrant and discovered a firearm. Charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, Lee moved to suppress the evidence from the search. After the district court denied Lee’s motion, he entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 53 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the officers likely lacked reasonable suspicion, Lee’s co-resident admitted them and Lee verbally consented to the search. His parole conditions stipulated that Lee would be subject to warrantless searches, pursuant to the Ohio Code, which allows officers to “search, with or without a warrant,” a parolee’s person, residence, vehicle, or other property if they have “reasonable grounds to believe” that the parolee is violating the law or otherwise not complying with the conditions of parole. Lee signed a copy of the conditions, indicating that he had read and understood them. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law