Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Richardson planned and served as lookout for armed robberies during business hours, but never entered the stores during the robberies. In separate cases, Richardson was charged with five counts of interference with commerce by robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)), and of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). Richardson was arraigned nine months after his second indictment. The court consolidated the cases. Richardson’s trial began nearly three years after his first indictment. During that time, attorneys assigned to represent Richardson withdrew, and the parties engaged in extensive pleadings, status conferences, and motions.” Convicted on all counts, Richardson was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment for each robbery count and 120 months of imprisonment for being a felon in possession, to be served concurrently. Richardson was also sentenced to 84 months for one section 924(c) count and 300 months of imprisonment for the other four 924(c) counts, to be served consecutively to each other and the other sentences, as mandated by 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Altogether, Richardson was sentenced to 1,494 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the sentence. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Two men died in a 2005 shooting in Oaxaca, Mexico. Petitioner, a legal permanent resident of the U.S., where he had lived for more than 15 years was the shooter. Petitioner frequently traveled to Mexico, where his wife and children lived.The town clerk held a meeting. Petitioner’s family and a victim's family signed an agreement, drafted by the court, identifying Petitioner as the person “who committed the homicide” and providing that his family would pay 50,000 pesos to the victim's family. Petitioner’s wife understood “the agreement resolved the case," because the family of the other victim, “never claimed that Avelino committed any crime.” Unbeknownst to Petitioner, a cousin who was not a party to the agreement reported the homicide to the attorney general. Oaxacan authorities issued a warrant on charges of homicide with “unfair advantage." Meanwhile, Petitioner returned to the U.S., and lived openly under his own name. The Mexican government made no effort to locate him or to obtain extradition. In 2012, Mexico cited the “urgency” clause of the extradition treaty to request his arrest. Petitioner, who had obtained citizenship in 2010, was working to obtain permanent resident status for his family. He made several trips to Mexico to meet consular officials. Neither Mexican nor U.S. authorities detained him or informed him of the warrant. Petitioner was arrested in 2013, and certified as extraditable. He unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus, challenging certification of extraditability. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty incorporates the Speedy Trial Clause. View "Martinez v. United States" on Justia Law

On the first day of Hill’s criminal trial, as potential jurors were on their way to the courtroom, Hill stated that he wanted to represent himself. The judge denied the request. A jury convicted Hill of armed robbery and carjacking. As a third-felony habitual offender, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20-40 years for each conviction. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Hill’s self-representation request was not knowingly and intelligently made. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hill’s right to self-representation was not violated because his request was untimely and disruptive. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The district court denied Hill’s timely habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act to reduce delays and to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendant’s request as “not timely” because “granting the request at that moment would have disrupted, unduly inconvenienced, and burdened the administration of the court’s business.” A judge may fairly infer that a defendant’s last-minute decision to represent himself would cause delay. Under these circumstances, upholding of the trial court’s factual determination was debatable in light of the whole record and not unreasonable. View "Hill v. Curtin" on Justia Law

Houston participated in a shoot-out that caused two deaths. Facing first-degree and felony murder charges, Houston obtained the services of attorney Logan. To secure payment, Houston’s father executed a deed of trust on the family property. The first trial ended in a mistrial, the second in acquittal. Houston did not pay his fees. Logan foreclosed on part of the Houston property. Soon, Houston was back in jail awaiting trial on a firearms offense. Houston heard that Logan had visited the property. As overheard by a Blount County Sheriff’s Office official, Houston went into “a complete rage” and talked about “killing them all.” The next day, Houston placed a phone call to his girlfriend and said: I’ll kill that motherf[***]er [Logan] when I get out. Hey, I ain’t kidding! … The only thing [Logan]’s gonna get from me is a f[***]ing bullet! “At his trial for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 875(c), the judge, applying then-governing precedent, instructed the jury that Houston’s statement was a “true threat” if a “reasonable person hearing the statement would understand it as a serious expression of intent to inflict injury.” Houston was convicted. In 2015, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction under the same statute premised on a nearly identical jury instruction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "United States v. Houston" on Justia Law

In 2000, Atkins, age 16, found his mother crying. Atkins claim his step-father regularly abused him and his mother. Atkins went into the step-father’s bedroom, carrying a baseball bat. The step-father reached for what Atkins believed to be a gun. Atkins swung the bat several times, killing the step-father. Atkins was convicted of first-degree murder. Atkins unsuccessfully appealed without raising ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims. In unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, he alleged IAC. In 2009, Atkins, pro se, sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that juvenile counsel failed to explain his right to testify and that such testimony would not be used against him; refused the state’s motion for a mental evaluation; and failed to raise an insanity defense after Atkins stated he was “hearing voices.” Atkins asserted that trial counsel failed to: move to suppress Atkins’s statement to police; object to the prosecutor’s extracting an improper promise from the jury during voir dire; request a curative instruction concerning improper testimony; object to descriptions of graphic photos after the photos themselves were ruled inadmissible; adequately cross-examine as to how long the step-father may have survived after the attack; call Atkins’s mother as a witness; question whether the step-father’s medical problems could have contributed to his death; call any expert witness; rebut evidence concerning the step-father’s peaceable character; seek “reckless homicide” and “criminally negligent homicide” jury instructions; and raise an insanity defense. The court denied Atkins’s petition finding that all but one claim procedurally defaulted. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding certain claims not defaulted. View "Atkins v. Holloway" on Justia Law

In 1989 Williams was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. After filing direct appeals and seeking post-conviction relief in state and federal courts, Williams filed a post-conviction petition in state court, based on the Supreme Court’s “Atkins” decision, arguing that he is ineligible for the death penalty because he is intellectually disabled. Ohio courts rejected Williams’s petition. The district court denied Williams’s federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for issuance of a conditional writ, finding the state court’s application of law with regard to whether Williams is intellectually disabled under Atkins was contrary to clearly established Federal law. The court noted refusal to consider past evidence of intellectual disability in determining whether Williams has significantly sub-average mental functioning and adaptive skills limitations. There was no basis for the Ohio Court of Appeals to have assumed, as it apparently did, that most low childhood IQ scores are the result of developmental delays. View "Williams v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Deputy Gillispie, on patrol in Wellston, Michigan, saw Carpenter’s truck. Gillispie knew Carpenter from prior encounters involving Carpenter driving with a suspended license. Gillispie knew Carpenter’s history of drunk driving and resisting arrest. Gillispie pulled Carpenter over, calling for backup. Two dash-cam videos recorded as Gillispie approached and informed Carpenter that he was under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Carpenter appeared “highly agitated,” but voluntarily exited the truck. Gillispie instructed Carpenter to put his hands on the truck. Carpenter did not comply. Gillispie grabbed Carpenter’s right arm. Carpenter swung his arm back—admittedly trying to prevent handcuffing. Gillispie attempted to grab Carpenter’s left arm to place it in handcuffs. Carpenter again swung his arm in Gillispie’s direction. Gillispie did not let go. Carpenter did not comply. Gillispie performed a knee strike. Carpenter still did not comply. Bielski yelled “relax, or else you’re gonna get tasered.” Deputy Bielski tased Carpenter. The officers handcuffed him and escorted him to the cruiser. They did not use any force after they subdued Carpenter, who later pled guilty to driving with a suspended license. Carpenter sued, claiming excessive force. The officers unsuccessfully sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. When an arrestee actively resists arrest the police can constitutionally use a taser or a knee strike to subdue him. View "Rudlaff v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Woolbright was convicted of wanton murder, receiving stolen property with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and first degree possession of and trafficking a controlled substance. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed. In 2006, Woolbright filed a pro se motion to vacate. Appointed counsel did not file a supplemental memorandum but requested leave for Woolbright to file one himself. The trial court found that no evidentiary hearing was required and denied the petition. New counsel was appointed on appeal. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. Woolbright filed a pro se federal habeas corpus petition, alleging seven instances of ineffective assistance that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court, including claims not raised in the 2006 petition or appeal: trial counsel’s failure to: interview exculpatory witnesses; object to prosecutorial misconduct during sentencing; investigate the ownership of a second gun found at the scene; and make a double jeopardy objection to charges of both possession and trafficking. Additional claims concerning counsel’s failure to: prepare a defense to receiving stolen property or object to an improper jury instruction on that charge; move for a directed verdict on grounds that the jury verdict was not unanimous; and object to the jury instruction on wanton murder were raised in the 2006 petition but not raised on appeal. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit denied a motion to vacate the certificate of appealability; affirmed denial with respect to claims raised in the 2006 petition; but reversed with respect to the claims not raised. View "Woolbright v. Crews" on Justia Law

In 1986, 23-year-old West and 17-year-old Martin drove to the home of 15-year-old Sheila, who had rebuffed Martin’s advances. They murdered Sheila and her mother. Sheila was raped and suffered 17 stab wounds, including 14 torture-type cuts, inflicted while she was alive. Police arrested the two. West’s parents hired McConnell for $10,000; the court appointed co-counsel. West admitted that he was present during the crime but denied harming either victim. He testified that Martin threatened his life and forced him to rape Sheila. A jury convicted West of first-degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and larceny, and sentenced him to death. The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected his appeal. The state court rejected his petition for post-conviction relief, interpreting his ineffective assistance claims, relating to McConnell’s handling of information that West’s parents abused him, as conflict-of-interest claims. West filed his federal section 2254 petition. The district court dismissed; the Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, West sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The Sixth Circuit dismissed because West had not set forth grounds warranting a successive habeas petition. In 2013, West filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Martinez, the ineffectiveness of his state post-conviction counsel excused the procedural default of that claim. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Martinez, (expanded by Trevino (2013)), applies to Tennessee cases, but did not apply to West’s conflict-of-interest claim, which was defaulted at the state post-conviction appellate proceeding, rather than initial-review proceeding. View "West v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Lee was transferred to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) following his conviction for criminal sexual conduct involving adult male victims. Lee claims that while at MDOC’s Reception Center for intake, correctional officers harassed him about being homosexual and made comments in front of other inmates encouraging sexual advances. Lee alleged that COs failed to act when Lee requested protection from inmates who were pursuing him. Lee claimed that he complained about staff harassment and being pursued for sex to mental health professionals, but was, nonetheless raped in his cell by unidentified inmates. Lee alleged that he went to the officer’s desk after being assaulted, asked to speak with a mental health professional, and that an unknown CO refused to give him a grievance form. Lee alleged that he submitted a “substitute grievance” on prisoner stationery. Defendants had no record of receiving this substitute grievance. Lee’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 action was filed about three years later. After the Sixth Circuit held that, as a private employee under contract, the MDOC psychiatrist was not entitled to qualified immunity, the district court found that Lee had not submitted the substitute grievance in 2007, and rejected his claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Lee v. Willey" on Justia Law