Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Napier was convicted of 12 counts of production, transportation, distribution, and receipt of child pornography, stemming from his sexual molestation of an 11-month-old baby and a 9- year-old girl, which he filmed and then traded on the Internet with others who share child pornography. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Napier’s arguments that the district court erred in: denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, which was based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the form of participation by an assistant U.S. attorney in Napier’s improper transfer out federal custody and into state custody; denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, because the government failed to prove an interstate commerce connection for all 12 counts of conviction; admitting at trial, over Napier’s objections, various electronic devices as exhibits that included markings indicating the devices were manufactured outside of the United States and a document obtained from Time Warner Cable Company; and denying his motion to vacate his conviction on the distribution-of-child-pornography charge, which was allegedly afflicted by a “fatal” variance and violated Napier’s due process rights. View "United States v. Napier" on Justia Law

Barton’s wife, Vicki, was killed in a 1995 burglary. Detectives determined that Barton was elsewhere at the time of her death. In 1998 Henson was arrested in an unrelated burglary, and stated that his half-brother, Phelps had been involved romantically with Vicki, went to her house to steal, panicked, and shot her. Henson believed that Phelps’ subsequent suicide was related. Phelps’ body was exhumed . There was no DNA match. In a 2003 re-examination of the file, it was discovered that in Barton’s 911 call, he referenced needing to call “Phelp man.” Detectives re-interviewed Henson, who later testified that Barton paid Phelps to go to Vicki’s residence to scare her; that Phelps took unidentified accomplice; and that the accomplice shot and sexually assaulted Vicki. Under cross examination, Henson denied originally telling detectives that Phelps shot Vicki. Barton’s federal habeas petition was rejected. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on the withholding of evidence that would have impeached the sole prosecution witness. Henson testified that he had committed staged burglaries for hire. Before trial, the state provided Barton with a police report documenting the 1993 Kelly burglary, which was suspected to have been staged. The state did not inform him that it had re-opened the Kelly investigation after Henson implicated Barton. Questioned before Barton’s trial, Kelly vehemently denied hiring Henson to stage a burglary. Barton did not learn of Kelly’s statements until after his trial, by means of his own investigation View "Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility" on Justia Law

Givens pled guilty to bank fraud and received a sentence of 18 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release. On July 14, 2011, Givens was released and his supervised release began. In November 2013, Givens’s probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervised release. The officer claimed that Givens attempted to drive his car into Queen. During the revocation hearing, Givens sought to impeach Queen by using hearsay evidence. The district court refused to admit that evidence and revoked Givens’s supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, employing the “abuse of discretion” standard and stating that the case does not turn on whether Queen testified accurately that Givens assaulted him. Rather, it turns on whether the court was within its discretion to exclude evidence that might have called Queen’s testimony into question. The court characterized Givens’ proffered “police report, and the follow-up Secret Service [report] of Mr. Queen” as a report that a church pastor had called the police to tell them that one of his members said that Queen had harassed her and “just a bunch of hearsay.” View "United States v. Givens" on Justia Law

U.S. Congresswoman Miller received a letter threatening to kill her family if she did not send money. The letter was in distinctive handwriting, bearing a Pontiac, Michigan return address. FBI Agent Herrera interviewed a woman (Hiller) at the address. She denied writing the letter, which, she believed was sent by her neighbor, Harris. Hiller provided Herrera with letters that Harris had written and hand-delivered to her a year earlier. After Hiller to Harris to stop writing to her, Orsette, the area’s postal carrier, gave Hiller a threatening letter that was addressed to Senator Stabenow and bore Hiller’s return address. Hiller received several letters that she did not write but that listed her return address. The letters had similar distinctive and nearly illegible writing. She also received unsolicited magazine subscriptions. Orsette was familiar with Harris, who often handed Orsette magazine subscription cards bearing another person’s name. Harris denied writing the letters. Herrera obtained a warrant and recovered envelopes, stamps, and a notepad matching those used in the Miller letter. No fingerprints or DNA were found on the Miller letter, but other letters bore salivaand were written in the same handwriting as the Miller letter. A third such letter contained Harris’ fingerprint. Harris was convicted of mailing threatening communications, 18 U.S.C. 876(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to testimony from witnesses that identified Harris as the author of the letter based on familiarity with his handwriting. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Shawn and Denise were walking with their daughter, grandson, and dog. Shawn carried a cell phone, holstered on his hip, next to a semiautomatic handgun. A motorcyclist, Rose, stopped to complain about Shawn’s visible firearm. After a heated exchange, Rose called 911. The dispatcher stated that the weapon was legal with a concealed-carry weapon permit. Rose stated: “I’m not going to call a crew out if it’s legal.” The department nonetheless dispatched Officer Bright, who claims that Shawn pulled out his cell phone, then “moved his hands back toward his weapon.” Bright told Shawn to put his hands over his head. Rather than comply, Shawn asked why Bright was there. Bright took possession of Shawn’s firearm. Shawn claims that Bright walked up, “his hand on his firearm,” announced that if Shawn “go[es] for the weapon, he’s going to shoot,” and refused to answer questions. Bright demanded Shawn’s driver’s license and concealed-carry permit. Shawn gave Bright his license, but Denise told Bright to look up the permit. Bright threatened to arrest Shawn for inducing panic and placed Shawn in handcuffs. Bright discovered that Shawn had a permit and released Shawn with a citation for “failure to disclose personal information,” a charge later dropped. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted Bright partial summary judgment, rejecting First and Second Amendment claims, but permitted Fourth Amendment and state-law claims to go to trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; Bright could not reasonably suspect that Northrup needed to be disarmed. View "Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep't" on Justia Law

The Medocks’ company, MAS, transported patients to kidney dialysis for Medicare reimbursement. Reimbursement of non-emergency ambulance transport is allowed only if medically necessary for bedridden patients; both a driver and an EMT must accompany any such passenger. Certification of medical necessity (CMN) must be signed by a doctor. A “run sheet” is reviewed by a Medicare contractor other than the ambulance company, such as AdvanceMed, to reduce fraud. AdvanceMed identified MAS as a high biller in Tennessee for dialysis ambulance transport and audited MAS. MAS’s records were missing some CMNs. Covert surveillance resulted in videotapes of patients walking, riding in the front seat, being double-loaded, being driven by single-staffed ambulances, or being transported by wheelchair. MAS had billed the transports as single-passenger and “stretcher required.” Executing a search warrant at the Medlocks’ home, agents seized CMNs and run tickets; some had been altered or forged. The Sixth Circuit reversed a conviction for aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A, agreeing that misrepresentations that certain beneficiaries were transported by stretcher did not constitute a “use” of identification, but affirmed health-care fraud convictions, rejecting arguments that the court should have instructed the jury that Medicare, not merely a prudent person, was the relevant decision-maker; that Medicare would have reimbursed MAS without their misrepresentations; and that refusal to sever a defendant was prejudicial. View "United States v. Medlock" on Justia Law

Wade was tried for rape, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and firearm specifications, stemming from his attack on a woman in her apartment. The conviction was overturned. Wade was retried for rape and kidnapping. Over defense objections, the state reintroduced testimony suggesting that Wade possessed a firearm during the attack. The court denied Wade’s request for a limiting instruction. Wade was again convicted of rape and kidnapping. The Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the kidnapping conviction because Wade only requested a limiting instruction regarding the element of force for rape and it could not say that the outcome of Wade’s kidnapping conviction clearly would have been different had there been a limiting instruction. The district court denied a habeas petition, rejecting arguments that Double Jeopardy Clause principles of collateral estoppel barred prosecutors in the second trial from reintroducing the firearm evidence that did not convince the first jury, and that, even if that evidence were otherwise admissible, the absence of a limiting instruction on the kidnapping count resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the firearm evidence was not an issue of ultimate fact in Wade’s second trial such that collateral estoppel required its exclusion. The lack of a limiting instruction did not “so infec[t] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” View "Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper" on Justia Law

The Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee manufactures and tests components for nuclear weapons and stores highly enriched uranium, much of which is eventually “down-blended” for civilian use, at a Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF). It is not used to store or otherwise manufacture nuclear weapons or for military operations. An 82 year-old nun and two Army veterans, ages 57 and 63, cut through four layers of fences and reached the HEUMF, spray-painted antiwar slogans, hung crime tape and banners with biblical phrases, splashed blood, and sang hymns. When a guard arrived, the group offered him bread and read aloud a message about “transform[ing] weapons into real life-giving alternatives to build true peace.” The group surrendered, having caused $8,000 of damage to government property. The government charged them with injuring government property, 18 U.S.C. 1361, and violation of the peacetime provision of the Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. 2155(a), which applies if the defendant acted “with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense,” and authorizes a sentence of up to 20 years. A jury convicted the defendants on both counts. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part; the defendants lacked the intent necessary to violate the Sabotage Act. View "United States v. Walli" on Justia Law

Ushery sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant. When police attempted to arrest Ushery, he escaped in his car, ran red lights, crashed his car, then fled on foot. The pursuing officer retired due to an injury incurred during the chase. Ushery was in possession of small amounts of heroin, crack cocaine, and marijuana. Ushery admitted to swallowing bags of heroin during the pursuit; threatened to kill the arresting officer; and called his girlfriend and asked her to retrieve money from a storage unit. The call was recorded. After obtaining a warrant, the police seized $8,781 in cash, guns, ammunition, and a digital scale. The government filed notice that Ushery had three felony drug convictions. Ushery pleaded not guilty; at rearraignment he again declined to plead guilty, despite his counsel informing the court that Ushery had stated that he would do so. Ushery expressed frustration with his counsel. Instead of adjourning, the court oversaw negotiations. After the government offered to strike the appeal-waiver provision, Ushery pled guilty. The court sentenced him to 252 months, an upward variance of 17 months from the Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments based on FRCP 11(c)(1)’s ban against judicial participation in plea discussions, that Ushery’s exclusion from a pretrial teleconference violated his right to be present at every critical stage of proceedings, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Ushery" on Justia Law

In 2011, Widmer pled guilty to receipt of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1)) for downloading seven still images and 134 videos depicting “identifiable child victims, prepubescent children in sexual contact with adults and other children, and sadistic and masochistic conduct.” The court sentenced Widmer to 97 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. His supervised release included special conditions, including sex offender mental-health treatment, a post-release psychosexual evaluation, probation-officer compliance searches, restrictions on his use of computers, and restrictions on his association with minors. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Widmer’s sentence, and vacated and remanded the special conditions of his supervised release “for a fuller explanation of its reasons for imposing” the special conditions of supervised release. On remand, the district court received additional briefing and Widmer was given an opportunity to allocute. The court imposed most of the same conditions of supervised release. Widmer challenged only the condition limiting his ability to associate with minors, including his daughter. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court adequately explained its reasoning, particularly with respect to Widmer’s daughter. View "United States v. Widmer" on Justia Law