Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ohio law required criminal defendants to submit a DNA sample after a felony conviction, Ohio Rev. Code 2901.07(B); new law, applicable July 1, 2011, requires county sheriffs to collect DNA after a felony arrest. Crabbs was initially arrested before July 1, 2011, but rearrested after that date. Crabbs sued the Franklin County Sheriff under the Fourth Amendment for requiring him to submit to a DNA cheek swab after a jury acquitted him of voluntary manslaughter. The sheriff responded that Ohio’s sovereign immunity insulated him from the lawsuit because state law required him to take the sample. The district court and the Sixth Circuit rejected that argument, finding that the statute does not require a DNA sample for a felony defendant rearrested after the effective date for violating bond and does not require a sample after an acquittal if the sheriff was unable to collect one during the intake process. Sovereign immunity does not bar Crabbs’ civil rights action. View "Crabbs v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2005, Lee, a Sevierville contractor, owed a substantial debt to Whaley, for loans that financed houses being built by Lee. Whaley proposed to recruit straw buyers for sham purchases of the properties. Eight straw buyers were referred to Bevins, a mortgage broker with whom Whaley had previously dealt. Whaley prepared the contracts and set the prices. Bevins prepared loan applications that falsely inflated the buyers’ incomes and assets and stated that they would bring funds to closing. The closings were conducted by Kerley’s title company. Although none of the buyers brought funds to the closings, Kerley signed HUD-1 forms, indicating that they did. The properties later went into foreclosure. The lenders incurred substantial losses. Lee and Bevins pled guilty and agreed to cooperate. The judge denied Kerley’s motion to sever, concluding that proposed redactions to Whaley’s statement remedied potential violation of Kerley’s Confrontation Clause rights and held that Whaley was not entitled to introduce his own hearsay statements. Both were convicted of money laundering, conspiracy to commit wire fraud affecting a financial institution and bank fraud, wire fraud affecting a financial institution, bank fraud, and making a false statement to a financial institution. They were sentenced to 60 months and 48 months imprisonment, respectively, and ordered to pay $1,901,980.31 in restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and Kerley’s sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, evidentiary rulings, and the court’s refusal to sever. View "United States v. Whaley" on Justia Law

Initially charged with eight counts related to excessive force, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice based on his conduct during the 2010 arrest of Stinnett and the subsequent federal investigation, former Barren County Kentucky Sheriff Eaton was convicted of two counts of witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3) for instructing two officers to give false statements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; that the court should read a materiality requirement into 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3) and should conclude that the statements he procured regarding Stinnett having a knife did not “relat[e] to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense” under the statute; that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense that the alleged conduct was otherwise lawful and the defendant’s “sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully” and erred in failing to give a special unanimity instruction; and that the prosecutor made improper remarks in closing argument regarding Defendant’s failure to testify. View "United States v. Eaton" on Justia Law

Stafford was convicted of conspiring with four others to bomb a bridge near Cleveland in connection with their membership in a spinoff of Occupy Wall Street. Stafford had a history of mental illness, but, after a competency hearing, the district court found him competent to stand trial and granted his motion, supported by his appointed counsel, to represent himself at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the district court could likely have exercised its discretion, recognized by the Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, to impose counsel under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of that discretion in this case to grant Stafford’s motion and permit Stafford to defend himself. The court carefully examined Stafford’s ability to represent himself, and standby counsel was provided. The court upheld application of a Guidelines enhancement for crimes of terrorism. View "United States v. Stafford" on Justia Law

In 2009, Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 846, and was sentenced to 10 months of imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release, with conditions prohibiting him from committing another crime and from possessing, using, or distributing any controlled substance. He was required to attend substance abuse treatment and submit to periodic drug and alcohol testing. Within months of being released, Defendant violated those terms. He stopped attending substance abuse treatment, admitted to his probation officer that he used a controlled substance, and was arrested and found guilty of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance. After serving his time in state prison for the trafficking offenses, Defendant admitted, in open court, to the violations of conditions of supervised release. The court imposed an 18-month term of imprisonment plus an additional three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his admission that he violated conditions was involuntary because the magistrate judge did not conduct a complete Rule 11 colloquy, which would have informed Defendant of his full sentencing exposure and that the custodial sentence and additional supervised release are substantively unreasonable as longer than necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. View "United States v. Melton" on Justia Law

An officer stopped a rental car, in which Winters was the passenger, for speeding. The occupants’ nervous behavior, inconsistent, implausible travel plans, and suspicious rental arrangement led the officer to believe that they might be trafficking contraband. After he issued a warning ticket, the officer extended the stop for four minutes to retrieve his drug-detection dog from his cruiser, deploying his dog 24 minutes after the stop was initiated. The dog alerted to narcotics. Searching the vehicle, the officer discovered heroin in Winters’s bag on the seat. Winters was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin. He entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal denial of his suppression motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the officer unreasonably extended the stop and that the 2013 Supreme Court decision, Florida v. Jardines established that a dog sniff must be justified by probable cause, not mere reasonable suspicion. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified extending the stop. The Jardines decision is premised on special protections accorded to the home and does not alter the analysis for traffic stops. The officer was entitled to reasonably rely on binding precedent, that the use of a drug-detection dog during a lawful traffic stop does not require probable cause. View "United States v. Winters" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. in 1992, and, in 1993, married Cruz, a U.S. citizen. Defendant and Cruz have two children, but are divorced. Defendant has been removed three times. He pled guilty to domestic violence on three different occasions. Under Michigan law, his third offense was a felony. His 2001 application to adjust his status on the basis of his marriage was denied. Before his last removal in 2007, Defendant was informed that he was barred from entering the U.S. for 20 years. In 2013, Grand Rapids immigration authorities learned of Defendant’s unlawful presence from a tip line. Defendant was taken into custody and charged under 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(1). He pled guilty. The district court applied a four-level enhancement under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(D) for a prior felony conviction; determined that an upward variance was warranted; and imposed a custodial sentence of 18 months, citing Defendant’s record of domestic violence and illegal reentries. Defense counsel stated that Defendant had no legal objections to the sentence. Defendant appealed, but due to delays resulting from his attorney’s withdrawal, he completed his term of imprisonment and was removed to Mexico in September, 2014. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Solano-Rosales" on Justia Law

The district court revoked Burch’s supervised release on August 21. Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure gives a criminal defendant 14 days to file a notice of appeal and permits a district court to extend the time to file a notice for up to 30 additional days. On September 26, Burch filed notice of appeal. On October 9, the court granted a requested extension, to render the notice of appeal timely. The government moved to dismiss the appeal, but did not file an appeal (or cross-appeal) of the October 9 order. The Sixth Circuit rejected the motion. The government should have appealed from the district court’s order if it thought the court abused its discretion in granting Burch’s motion for an extension of time to file an appeal; the requirement is mandatory and consistently followed. View "United States v. Burch" on Justia Law

Singer, a Muskegon, Michigan landlord who claimed insurance proceeds for nine rental units that were burned, was convicted of 12 counts of mail fraud, use of fire to commit mail fraud, arson, tax fraud, and obstruction of the administration of the internal revenue laws, and was sentenced to a total term of 55 years in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the mail-fraud count of his indictment was duplicitous; the district court should have severed the tax-fraud counts from the other charged offenses; certain counts in the indictment were outside of the relevant statute of limitations or brought within an improper venue; and the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. 844(h). View "United States v. Singer" on Justia Law

Santana, Soto, Espinoza, and Ramirez were indicted for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841; conspiracy to kidnap, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(c); and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The indictment permitted the government to try them as aiders and abettors for the firearm counts. Three were indicted as principals and as aiders and abettors for possession of 500 or more grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute. All were charged with kidnapping as principals and as aiders and abettors,. Soto was charged with obstruction of justice. A jury convicted on all counts, except acquitting Espinoza of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and Ramirez of conspiracy to kidnap. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that counsel was ineffective for failure to move to suppress the evidence; that imposition of the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for a subsequent conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)(I) violatee the Sixth Amendment, because a jury did not find that the counts were subsequent offenses; that the court should have severed the drug-trafficking and kidnapping offenses; that the court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence; and that the government failed to prove that the kidnapping victims were transported forcibly across state lines. View "United States v. Respardo-Ramirez" on Justia Law