Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Santana, Soto, Espinoza, and Ramirez were indicted for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841; conspiracy to kidnap, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)(c); and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The indictment permitted the government to try them as aiders and abettors for the firearm counts. Three were indicted as principals and as aiders and abettors for possession of 500 or more grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute. All were charged with kidnapping as principals and as aiders and abettors,. Soto was charged with obstruction of justice. A jury convicted on all counts, except acquitting Espinoza of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and Ramirez of conspiracy to kidnap. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that counsel was ineffective for failure to move to suppress the evidence; that imposition of the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for a subsequent conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)(I) violatee the Sixth Amendment, because a jury did not find that the counts were subsequent offenses; that the court should have severed the drug-trafficking and kidnapping offenses; that the court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence; and that the government failed to prove that the kidnapping victims were transported forcibly across state lines. View "United States v. Respardo-Ramirez" on Justia Law

The Steadmans were cooking methamphetamine when it exploded, spraying window glass outward, and setting a fire. Her husband extinguished wife, but then hid the evidence. Carter, also present, immediately fled. A neighbor saw Carter leave and called the fire department. James admitted to the meth cooking. All three were charged with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possession of the precursors used to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(6), and creation of a substantial risk of harm to human life during the manufacture of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 858. The Steadmans entered into plea agreements testified against Carter. Before trial, the prosecutor filed notice under Federal Rule 404(b), of intent to offer codefendant testimony that Carter had previously distributed controlled substances where Carter was employed, arguing that it was relevant to prove opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident in the charged acts. The district court permitted the testimony. Convicted, Carter was sentenced to 97 months in prison plus restitution for damage to the building. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Carter was not charged with distribution or conspiracy to distribute; but intent to distribute suboxone strips, an entirely different drug, in an unrelated venture is is not probative of a specific intent to join a conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. The acts do not involve a similar modus operandi and are not otherwise sufficiently similar to satisfy Rule 404(b) View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 2009, a rape suspect (Bynum) led Columbus, Ohio police officers on a highway car chase before crossing the median, accelerating the wrong way, and ramming head-on into a semitrailer. Officers surrounded his car and fatally shot Bynum after he reached down into the car, despite police commands to “show his hands,” and then clasped his hands into a shooting posture, pointing them at the officers. The officers fired 80 shots and did not recover a gun from Bynum’s car. Bynum’s mother sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Bynum’s conduct gave the officers probable cause to believe that he had a gun and posed a threat of serious physical harm. The officers knew from police radio that Bynum was wanted on serious charges and was potentially armed; they were told he had a concealed-carry permit. That Bynum was actually unarmed and did not have a permit is irrelevant; what matters is the reasonableness of the officers’ belief as they “did not and could not have known” otherwise. The officers also knew Bynum was determined to avoid arrest, even at the expense of others’ safety and his own life. View "Pollard v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

Based on confusing statements overheard by a 911 operator, officers pulled over Brown, ordered her out of her car at gunpoint, threw her to the ground, handcuffed her, and detained her in handcuffs for approximately 10 minutes. Brown sued three officers who seized her, and others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment for unreasonable seizure and excessive force and under Michigan state law for assault and battery. The district court denied qualified and governmental immunity to the officers, concluding that, while the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown, the stop ripened into an unlawful arrest. The court held that the officers used excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Brown’s testimony reflects a degree of force against a compliant subject that was clearly established as excessive well before the officers seized her. Taking Brown’s version of events as true, the officers threw her onto the ground, despite the fact that she was clearly afraid and cooperating with their orders. A jury could find that this behavior “shows such indifference to whether harm w[ould] result as to be equal to a willingness that harm w[ould] result.” View "Brown v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 1997, Louisville police discovered the bodies of two people in their apartment. The male victim had nine stab wounds. The pregnant female victim died as a result of manual strangulation and was stabbed after she was dead. Wheeler, ultimately convicted of the murders, changed his story several times. He eventually admitted being in the apartment on that night, after the male victim was stabbed, but claimed that the assailant was inside the apartment and that he and that person fought, resulting in his wounds. The Sixth Circuit held that a writ of habeas corpus must issue as to the death sentence because the trial court erroneously struck from the jury Kovatch, an eligible juror who may have been in favor of sparing Wheeler’s life. The court, after examination of Kovatch, found him not to be “problematic” as a juror but one who “could consider the entire range” of penalties. The next day the court excused him because the judge mistakenly remembered him saying he would not consider the death penalty. As a matter of procedural fairness in administering the death penalty, the Supreme Court has observed, the for-cause exclusion of an otherwise-eligible juror unnecessarily narrows the cross-section of venire members required under the Sixth Amendment. View "Wheeler v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Pola, a Canadian citizen born in Iraq, was living in Louisville with his wife and children, all U.S. citizens, as a lawful permanent resident, when he was charged with intentionally possessing with the intent to distribute oxycodone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Pola entered an Alford plea and was sentenced to 46 months’ incarceration. About two months after judgment was entered, Pola filed a notice of appeal pro se. The Sixth Circuit dismissed it as untimely, noting that he could move to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, based upon his allegation that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal upon his request. Pola did so. A magistrate ordered a ordered U.S. Marshals to transport Pola for an October 17, 2012 hearing, but Pola had been released on September 4, and transferred to ICE custody. On September 11, Pola, without counsel, declined a hearing and conceded removability. On September 19, ICE removed Pola. He could not attend the hearing. Pola and the government filed affidavits. The court denied Pola’s request for an evidentiary hearing and his motion, finding the attorney’s performance not deficient. The Sixth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction, that the court should have granted an evidentiary hearing to develop the ineffective-assistance claim, and vacated. View "Pola v. United States" on Justia Law

When police officers executed a search warrant at a Dayton residence, they found Burney, several handguns, and several ounces of crack cocaine inside. Convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute it, Burney challenged the warrant underlying the search as not supported by probable cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The affidavit supporting the warrant provided several strong indications that the residence was used as a stash house by a drug trafficking operation, and that the house had been unoccupied for more than eight months when Burney, a repeat drug convict, moved in a few weeks before officers obtained the warrant. Because the warrant affidavit presented sufficient evidence tying the property, if not Burney himself, to an ongoing drug trafficking and money laundering operation, and because that evidence, taken as a whole, was sufficiently reliable, the district court properly denied Burney’s motion to suppress. View "United States v. Burney" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), without a plea agreement. He did not dispute an adjusted offense level of 28, yielding a guidelines range of 78 to 97 months. Enhancements were applied for material depicting prepubescent juveniles and sadomasochistic or violent content, use of the computer, and possession of more than 600 images. A reduction was applied for acceptance of responsibility. The government noted the serious nature of the crime and that defendant’s purchase of child pornography contributed to expansion of that market. Defense counsel cited the conclusion of its psychologist that defendant was neither dangerous nor a pedophile, his cooperation with investigators, and his attendance at counseling. The district court sentenced defendant to one day of incarceration plus five years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit vacated that sentence as substantively unreasonable. After the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, the court re-imposed the sentence of one day, lengthened supervised release to 10 years, and added conditions of release. The Sixth Circuit again vacated, stating that it was “dismayed” and reassigning the case because the court had expressed that a sentence of confinement would constitute “pandering.” The sentence failed to adequately address factors previously given insufficient weight: seriousness of the particular crime, need for deterrence, and need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Although the court had new evidence regarding mental health and alleged post-sentence rehabilitation, that evidence could not overcome fundamental deficiencies in reasoning. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Pontiac Officer Lasseigne shot and killed Craft, a 14-year-old male after responding to a 911 call, reporting males with guns were walking west on Ypsilanti Avenue. Officers testified that Craft ran from Ypsilanti Avenue, drawing a gun, and that he aimed a gun at the officers. The district court rejected several claims in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit filed by Craft’s estate, but denied Lasseigne’s motion for summary judgment, finding that he was not entitled to qualified immunity or governmental immunity under Michigan law because there was a genuine dispute regarding whether Craft was holding the shotgun when he was shot. The court noted that Craft was shot only once, while officer training protocol would call for multiple shots in the face of imminent danger; that still shots from the police video depict Craft pinned–at least to some extent–to the fence; and that the weapon did not have any blood on it, while both the fence and vehicle were splattered with blood. The Sixth Circuit dismissed appeal of the denial of summary judgment, affirmed denial of governmental immunity, and remanded. View "Harris v. Lasseigne" on Justia Law

Fallins pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He had prior Tennessee convictions for robbery; attempted aggravated arson; and possession of crack cocaine for resale. The presentence report concluded that Fallins qualified for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and calculated a guidelines range of 180 to 210 months. Fallins objected to the enhancement and moved for downward departure or variance. Because “arson” is an “enumerated” ACCA offense and “attempted aggravated arson” is not, Fallins asserted that his conviction was not a qualifying residual clause offense and was not a “violent felony” because it did not present “a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Fallins argued that the court could not rely on the government’s proffered factual basis in the plea transcript for that conviction because Fallins did not assent to it. The court agreed that it could not rely upon those facts, but found that attempted aggravated arson was a residual clause “violent felony” and that crack-cocaine and robbery convictions qualified as predicate offenses, and sentenced him to 195 months of incarceration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Fallins" on Justia Law