Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tanner was convicted of a 1995 robbery and stabbing murder. The appeals court reversed for failure to provide DNA and serology experts. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed. Tanner’s federal habeas petition was dismissed in 2005. Tanner, who is illiterate, then met with a legal assistant and requested a prison certificate of account, for her motion to file in forma pauperis. The assistant received that document on December 5, while Tanner’s unit was on lockdown. The legal assistant scheduled a “call-out” for December 6, so that Tanner could sign and file within the 30-day appeal period (FRAP 4(a)(1)(A)). Tanner told guards that she needed to pick up legal papers, but they refused. On December 8 Tanner signed the notice and delivered it to the mailroom for expedited handling the following day. Her notice was considered filed on December 9, 31 days after entry of judgment. The district judge granted a certificate of appealability on December 23. Tanner’s habeas appeal was docketed on January 9, beyond the last day on which Tanner could request extension of the 30-day period. On January 20, the Sixth Circuit issued a show-cause order. Tanner explained that guards had prevented timely filing. The Sixth Circuit dismissed. In 2007, Tanner filed a civil rights action against the guards. In 2012, a jury awarded damages. Tanner moved for relief under FRCP 60(b)(6), which permits a district court to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment … for . . . any . . . reason.” The court denied the motion, ruling that Rule 4(a)(1) is jurisdictional. The Sixth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that the court will be granting relief “to revive a lost right of appeal,” not granting an extension under Rule 4(a)(5). View "Tanner v. Yukins" on Justia Law

Sweet and Cook stole 32 firearms from two licensed firearms dealers. Arrested separately, days later, Sweet admitted that he sold two guns to his “dope dealer” for $200 plus three rocks of cocaine base and that he and Cook sold eight firearms for $500 and four grams of heroin. Cook helped authorities retrieve nine firearms that were hidden. Both pled guilty to two counts of theft of firearms from a licensed dealer, 18 U.S.C. 924(m). Presentence Investigation Reports recommended a base offense level of 20 (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)) for each, and enhancements: six levels (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(C)), because the theft involved 32 firearms; two levels (2K2.1(b)(4)(A)), because the firearms were stolen; four levels (2K2.1(b)(5)) because they trafficked firearms; and four levels (2K2.1(b)(6)(B)), because the firearms were used in connection with another felony, distribution of heroin. Both contended that the 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement did not apply because the firearms did not facilitate the drug offense and that application of both 2K2.1(b)(5) and 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) constituted double counting because they were based on the same conduct, firearms trafficking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed application of the enhancements, which address different aspects of the same action: selling firearms and purchasing drugs. Each could have occurred without the other. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

Officers learned that a school-bus driver had reported that a man was approaching young girls. The man was described as black, with medium-toned skin and short hair, driving a black GMC SUV on Euclid Avenue between Rally’s restaurant and Eastham Avenue. Officers arrived within a minute, drove into an area parking lot, and saw a dark grey GMC SUV with Gatson, a black male with short hair and medium-brown skin in the driver’s seat. The officers noticed that Gatson’s speech was slurred and his movements sluggish. He admitted that he had been drinking and talking to young girls. Officers asked for identification, then saw Gatson push something between his seat and center console. With Gatson locked in the police cruiser, they walked around the SUV and saw a pistol handle protruding from between the seat and console. Indicted as a misdemeanant with a domestic-violence conviction and a felon (arson) in possession of a firearm, Gatson moved to suppress evidence of the pistol. The district court denied the motion and determined that Gatson was subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum under the ACCA. Gatson’s Guidelines range was, therefore, 180 to 210 months. Following his guilty plea, the court sentenced Gatson to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to suppress and the sentence View "United States v. Gatson" on Justia Law

Coppenger pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mortgage fraud. Coppenger initiated the scheme and worked with mortgage officers and straw buyers, resulting in a loss of more than $32 milion. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the government agreed not to recommend a sentence in excess of the applicable advisory Guidelines range, which was 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment. Nonetheless, the district court used information in presentence report prepared for Coppenger’s co-conspirators to vary upward and sentenced Coppenger to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that the district court failed to provide him with notice and opportunity to respond to its intent to vary upward based on information contained in co-conspirators’ presentence reports, which was unavailable to his defense. View "United States v. Coppenger" on Justia Law

Federal agents located a computer downloading child pornography videos using peer-to-peer software that enabled the user to access other computers and vice versa. They executed a search warrant on Walters’ neighbors’ house based on the ISP billing address. The neighbor had shared his internet password with Walters. Walters consented to a search, stating that if there was anything on the computer, they could erase it and it would not happen again. The agents recovered multiple pornographic videos. Walters admitted to downloading pornographic images through the network and that he knew others could obtain child pornography from him. Walters estimated that during one year, he had viewed 500 videos depicting girls, aged five to 14, having sex with an adult male. Walters pleaded guilty to knowingly receiving and distributing child pornography and knowingly possessing a computer containing child pornography. At sentencing, Walters objected to enhancements as impermissible double counting: two level s for “distribution”; four levels for “sadistic, masochistic or other violent images”; and two level s for “use of a computer.” The court assigned a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, with a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months, and sentenced Walters to 151 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting due process and double jeopardy arguments. View "United States v. Walters" on Justia Law

In 1983, Clifton was convicted of grand larceny, found to be a habitual criminal, and sentenced to life in prison. In 2010, Clifton was paroled. Tennessee’s Court Cost Center sent Clifton an invoice for $124 in outstanding court costs. Clifton attempted to pay and contacted the Center to establish a payment plan. Months later, the Board of Probation and Parole issued an arrest warrant, alleging that Clifton had engaged in “intimidating and threatening behavior.” After a hearing, the board recommended parole revocation. His appeal was denied. Although his certiorari petition was timely, the court clerk refused it because Clifton had unpaid court costs. A notice of appeal was returned unfiled for the same reason, referring to costs totaling $1,449; the decision complied with a chancery court Standing Order, which refers to Tenn. Code 41-21-812. Clifton filed a pro se habeas corpus petition. The district court acknowledged Clifton’s contention that he was unfairly prevented from filing his state appeal, but concluded that the claims were procedurally defaulted and that Clifton had not established “cause” and “prejudice” to overcome that default. The Eighth Circuit held that Tennessee may not constitutionally require that prior expenses be paid in full before permitting a prisoner to file a habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of probation revocation. View "Clifton v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Based on his sexual relationship with a 16-yar-old boy, which included nude photographs and a trip to Florida, the district court found Wright (then age 60) guilty on five counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), (e), and one count each of transporting images of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1) & (b)(1) (count 6), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A (count 7). He was sentenced to concurrent 15-year terms. Wright stated to the Probation Officer who prepared the PSR that because the age of consent in Michigan is 16, Wright did not believe that photographing the boy in the nude was illegal. Wright told the Probation Officer who prepared the PSR that because the age of consent in Michigan is 16, Wright did not believe that photographing the boy in the nude was illegal. Wright appealed his convictions on counts 1 through 6. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the “use” element of the sexual exploitation statute is satisfied if a minor is photographed in order to create pornography. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

A confidential informant told DHS that Garcia and Villegas were selling crystal meth in Michigan; he arranged a meeting between an undercover officer posing as a meth dealer and Garcia. The officer offered to purchase 20 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, which Garcia promised to provide. After they completed a smaller transaction, Garcia became suspicious, and, via the CI, asked to delay the transaction. The conspirators ultimately called off the deal, packed cash and methamphetamine into the wheel wells of a vehicle that Kellerman drove toward Kansas City. He was pulled over by police, who conducted discovered the meth. Garcia gave his wife $10,000 cash to buy Villegas a car to return to Kansas City. The cash included marked bills from the controlled buy. While looking at a vehicle, Villegas was arrested. The others were arrested and searches of their property revealed crystal meth, assault rifles, ammunition, cash, and other evidence. They pled guilty and testified against Villegas. Villegas received a 325-month sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims based on denial of his motion to compel disclosure of the informant’s name on the record and allow the informant to testify and sentencing enhancements for leadership, firearms possession, and obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Sierra-Villegas" on Justia Law

Gumm is mentally retarded, with an IQ of approximately 70. He was convicted of the kidnapping, attempted rape, and murder of a 10-year-old and was sentenced to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, and his post-conviction petition was found to lack merit by the Ohio state courts. After he sought federal habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) that persons who are mentally retarded cannot be executed. In a post-Atkins petition, Ohio courts adjudicated Gumm mentally retarded and reduced his sentence to 30 years to life in prison, but rejected non-Atkins claims. On federal habeas review, the court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus on claims that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland; that Gumm received an unfair trial due to improper admission of incendiary prior bad acts evidence; that admission of a psychiatric report violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause; and that the prosecutor’s elicitation of inflammatory testimony and admission of psychiatric reports constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of the conditional writ of habeas corpus based on Gumm’s Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims. View "Gumm v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Despite the complete absence of physical evidence and Bies’ repeated proclamations of innocence, Bies was convicted and sentenced to death in Ohio state court in 1992 for the kidnapping, assault, and urder of a 10-year-old boy. The case against Bies rested almost entirely upon an unrecorded statement that Bies allegedly made to the police following a prolonged and highly suggestive custodial interrogation. The Ohio courts upheld Bies’ convictions on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, but vacated Bies’ death sentence after determining that he is intellectually disabled, and that his execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Bies challenged his convictions and sought a new trial. He claims that the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady; that the trial court improperly allowed Bies’ custodial statements to be admitted at trial; and that Bies’ attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus based on the Brady violation, and denied relief on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Brady claim, and declined to consider the remaining claims. View "Bies v. Sheldon" on Justia Law