Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gumm is mentally retarded, with an IQ of approximately 70. He was convicted of the kidnapping, attempted rape, and murder of a 10-year-old and was sentenced to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, and his post-conviction petition was found to lack merit by the Ohio state courts. After he sought federal habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) that persons who are mentally retarded cannot be executed. In a post-Atkins petition, Ohio courts adjudicated Gumm mentally retarded and reduced his sentence to 30 years to life in prison, but rejected non-Atkins claims. On federal habeas review, the court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus on claims that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland; that Gumm received an unfair trial due to improper admission of incendiary prior bad acts evidence; that admission of a psychiatric report violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause; and that the prosecutor’s elicitation of inflammatory testimony and admission of psychiatric reports constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of the conditional writ of habeas corpus based on Gumm’s Brady and prosecutorial misconduct claims. View "Gumm v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Despite the complete absence of physical evidence and Bies’ repeated proclamations of innocence, Bies was convicted and sentenced to death in Ohio state court in 1992 for the kidnapping, assault, and urder of a 10-year-old boy. The case against Bies rested almost entirely upon an unrecorded statement that Bies allegedly made to the police following a prolonged and highly suggestive custodial interrogation. The Ohio courts upheld Bies’ convictions on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, but vacated Bies’ death sentence after determining that he is intellectually disabled, and that his execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, Bies challenged his convictions and sought a new trial. He claims that the government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady; that the trial court improperly allowed Bies’ custodial statements to be admitted at trial; and that Bies’ attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus based on the Brady violation, and denied relief on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the Brady claim, and declined to consider the remaining claims. View "Bies v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

In 2009, Krul, a convicted felon, took a 9mm Glock handgun out of his friend’s basement to use as collateral for a drug deal, but the dealer refused to return it to Krul after the deal was completed. A chain of transfers took the weapon to Dantzler, who used the weapon on a murderous spree. The one to whom Krul initially transferred the gun cooperated with authorities, and eventually Krul and the one that transferred the weapon to Dantzler were indicted. Krul pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Sentencing Guidelines range was 51 to 63 months. The court sentenced Krul to 63 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release with various strict conditions. On appeal, Krul argued that some of the court’s statements during sentencing imply that the court impermissibly factored rehabilitation into the length of his prison sentence. The Sixth Circuit rejected the claim: the district court carefully considered rehabilitation for other, permissible purposes and Krul invited the discussion of rehabilitation by emphasizing rehabilitation during his own statement. The court had emphasized Krul’s extensive criminal history since age 14 and the need to protect the public. View "United States v. Krul" on Justia Law

Miner marketed two schemes that promised to avoid taxes. Miner’s first scheme, IRx Solutions, offered to assist clients in requesting alterations to their Individual Master Files (IMFs), which are internal IRS records pertaining to each taxpayer. Miner claimed that the IRS was engaged in widespread fraud by improperly coding individuals as businesses on their IMFs so that tax could be assessed against them. The second scheme, Blue Ridge Group, helped clients create common-law business trusts, into which he claimed that they could place any or all of their assets in order to avoid paying income tax. Affirming his conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7212(a) for corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the “due administration” of federal income tax laws, the Sixth Circuit rejected arguments that the district court reversibly erred in failing to instruct the jury that section 7212(a) required proof that he was aware of a pending IRS proceeding; that his conduct was constitutionally and statutorily protected; and that certain witness testimony was improperly introduced at trial because the witness opined about his state of mind. View "United States v. Miner" on Justia Law

Someone murdered Chappelear in February 1992. Sergeant Calhoun of the Hamburg Township police led the investigation. Newman became the primary suspect based. Ballistics showed that Newman’s gun was the murder weapon, which police found in a duffle bag that contained hairs similar to Newman’s. Masters said that he saw two young men with light brown hair drive by Chappelear’s home in a car much like Kulpa’s not long before the murder. Both Newman and his friend Kulpa had light brown hair. In Calhoun’s affidavit supporting his request for a warrant to arrest Newman, he presented this and other evidence. The judge found probable cause, and the police arrested Newman. A jury convicted Newman of murder. In 2008, the Sixth Circuit held that the evidence presented at trial did not suffice to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a free man, Newman filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution action against Calhoun, claiming that Calhoun’s affidavit purposefully distorted Masters’ statement. . The court rejected Calhoun’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that there was ample evidence of probable cause for Newman’s arrest and no evidence of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation by Calhoun. View "Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg" on Justia Law

Welch entered a plea agreement to charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The government withdrew the plea agreement upon receipt of the presentence report, which recommended that Welch be sentenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) because he had three convictions for a “violent felony.” The district court found that Welch’s conviction in Ohio state court for attempted failure to comply with order or signal of police officer constituted a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, and that Welch therefore had three convictions for a violent felony. The other two qualifying convictions were uncontested. Welch entered a plea of guilty but preserved his right to appeal his ACCA mandatory minimum of 180 months imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. An attempt to commit third-degree felony failure to comply, as a categorical matter, presents a serious potential risk of physical injury that is comparable to that involved in arson and burglary. View "United States v. Welch" on Justia Law

In 1999, 76-year-old Dorothy Brown was found murdered in her Cleveland apartment, having suffered blunt-trauma injuries to the head. She was partially clothed, and foreign human pubic hairs were collected from her mouth. Ayers spent 12 years in prison based on a state-court murder conviction for Brown’s murder that was later overturned. He was freed in 2011 after the Sixth Circuit granted his habeas corpus petition, finding that the detectives leading the investigation (Cipo and Kovach) had violated Ayers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by using a fellow inmate to induce Ayers to make allegedly incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. Ayers filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Cipo, Kovach, and others, alleging a Brady violation and malicious prosecution. The district court denied Cipo and Kovach’s motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds, and a jury found in favor of Ayers and awarded $13 million in damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to address the denial of summary judgment, denial of a preverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law, the sufficiency of the evidence, and denial of a motion in limine to exclude certain expert testimony because those arguments were procedurally forfeited. View "Ayers v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Ball pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court enhanced his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act based on three Kentucky state convictions: 1st degree trafficking in a controlled substance; 1st degree fleeing or evading police in Boyle County; and 1st degree fleeing or evading police in Mercer County. His sentencing range under the Guidelines was 188-235 months; the court sentenced him to 211 months. Ball argued that his Mercer County conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Violation of Kentucky’s vehicle flight statute qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA, regardless of whether the violation entailed the additional element of causing or creating a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death. Even vehicle flight “simpliciter” presents a risk similar in degree and kind to both burglary and arson. Even were this not the case, Ball’s indictment makes clear that he pleaded guilty to a crime that not only carried a potential risk similar in magnitude to the ACCA’s enumerated crimes, he actually created a “substantial”—or ample, considerable, and true—risk of serious injury or death to others. View "United States v. Ball" on Justia Law

Pierce Township Officer Homer responded to a call from S.L.’s mother and “smelled smoke.” S.L.’s mother stated that her teenage son had set fires in the house and that she had found smoldering Popsicle sticks in his bedroom. Homer entered S.L.’s bedroom. Popsicle sticks were not visible, but S.L. allegedly admitted that he had the fire. Homer asked whether he was afraid that the house might catch fire. S.L. responded, “I really don’t care.” Homer arrested S.L. for aggravated arson, transported him to the Juvenile Detention Center, and prepared a complaint charging S.L. as delinquent. Bartley, a deputy clerk, signed the complaint, attesting that Homer had taken an oath in his presence, but never administered the oath. S.L. appeared 12 hours later before Judge Wyler, who scheduled the pre-trial hearing and ordered continued detention pending psychological evaluation. S.L. was released a week later; the charge was dismissed. S.L. sued. Concerning claims against Homer under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that a genuine dispute of material fact existed on probable cause for arrest. Concerning Bartley, the court held that there is no duty for a detention clerk to make an independent assessment of probable cause and that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether Bartley had legal authority to administer oaths. The court denied summary judgment for the township because the judge did not make a probable-cause determination. There was insufficient evidence that police training was inadequate. The court denied summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "S.L. v. Pierce Twp. Bd. of Trustees" on Justia Law

In 1988, a man abducted a woman at gunpoint and sexually assaulted her. Two women were abducted and raped 15 days later. In 1991 Gillispie was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 22 to 56 years. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed; the Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In 2008, Gillispie sought a new trial, arguing that the prosecution had failed to produce police reports that eliminated Gillispie as a suspect. The state court rejected that claim; the court of appeals affirmed, but remanded a claim that new evidence showed that another man committed the rapes. Before the state trial court acted, Gillispie filed a federal habeas petition, asserting only his Brady claim. The state court then rejected his new-evidence claim. In 2011, the federal court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, ordered a new trial, and ordered Gillispie released pending appeal. In 2012, the state court of appeals reversed on the new-evidence claim, and remanded for a new trial. Vacatur of Gillispie’s conviction eliminated federal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit granted the state’s motion to dismiss its appeal. The district court subsequently denied the state’s motion to vacate the conditional-writ order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Gillispie v. Warden, London Corr. Inst." on Justia Law