Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. View "L. C. v. United States" on Justia Law

Bauer worked as a physician for over 50 years, most recently in pain management at ANA. Bauer’s practice, which included regular prescribing controlled substances, became the subject of a DEA investigation. Bauer was indicted for knowingly or intentionally” distributing or dispensing controlled substances “except as authorized,” 21 U.S.C. 841(a), concerning 14 patients. The prosecution’s expert, Dr. King, opined that Bauer did not sufficiently establish a diagnosis and ignored “red flags.” Each patient had a history of at least two mental health conditions; several had histories of illegal drug use. Bauer drastically exceeded recommended thresholds and prescribed opioids together with other controlled substances. One patient died from an accidental overdose. None showed improvement. A drug task force officer alerted Bauer that a patient was selling his pills. Bauer did not terminate the patient but provided additional prescriptions. Several pharmacies would not fill his prescriptions. Dr. King opined that Bauer prescribed opioids “in most cases” to support “addiction and dependency,” “without a legitimate medical purpose.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bauer’s convictions and 60-month sentence (below the Guidelines range). A jury could reasonably find that Bauer knew his prescriptions were without authorization, satisfying the mens rea requirement clarified by the Supreme Court in 2022. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instruction on the good-faith defense. The court rejected Bauer’s challenges to the exclusion of his proffered expert witnesses and his argument that he had a constitutional right to testify as an expert in his own defense. View "United States v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Based on a tip from foreign law enforcement, Kentucky Detective Gatson and federal agents went to Lewis’s home. Lewis invited them inside and signed a form, consenting to “a complete search of the premises, property or vehicle” and electronic devices. A forensic examiner arrived and generated a preview of Lewis’s laptop, which revealed file names indicative of child pornography; on Lewis’s cell phone, he found thumbnail images of Lewis’s cousin’s children bathing naked. Lewis reportedly stated that he did not know that it was illegal to look at child pornography, then invoked his Miranda rights but did not say that he was revoking his consent to search. Gatson obtained a warrant. A forensic search of the seized devices revealed evidence of child pornography on Lewis’s laptop, cell phone, and USB thumb drive.The district court found that the search warrant failed to establish probable cause but that suppression was inappropriate because officers had relied on the warrant in good faith. Lewis conditionally pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The Sixth Circuit vacated. Lewis consented to the initial search of his laptop and cell phone and the officers’ account of that search and the preview generated were validly obtained and are admissible. All other evidence taken from Lewis’s electronic devices was obtained through searches and seizures that were not supported by a valid warrant. The warrant affidavit stated only Gatson’s conclusory belief that a suspect committed a crime and could not establish probable cause, which precludes the application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop of Moore and Saunders, the Ohio State Highway Patrol seized four vacuum-sealed packages, containing 431 grams of heroin. The couriers stated they had planned to deliver their load to Minter in West Virginia. The FBI Drug Task Force learned Minter had paid them in either cash or drugs, or both, to deliver money to Wright in Detroit and return with drugs for distribution by Minter. They had made similar journeys between Wright and Minter in the past. Moore explained that Wright was “in charge.” The FBI executed a search warrant for Minter’s residence and recovered traces of heroin, scales, and $18,000 in cash. A day later, the FBI executed a second warrant, based on information from a confidential informant, to search under the shared porch at Minter’s apartment building,.Officers recovered a charcoal bag containing 529 grams of heroin and 37 grams of crack cocaine. Underneath the steps, about eight feet away, officers recovered a stolen .357 Magnum.Minter pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin; after remands, the district court applied a two-level enhancement for his role as a manager or supervisor and a two-level firearm-possession enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the enhancements proper. View "United States v. Minter" on Justia Law

A 911 call, reported that “the people that live behind me” were “yelling and what sounds like him hitting something.” Officers Curtis and Gray responded to the address, wearing activated body cameras. Not seeing or hearing anything amiss outside, they knocked. Reed answered the door. Gray asked, “Do you mind stepping out here and talking to me for a second?” Reed asked, “you got a warrant?” Gray replied, “nope,” explaining that “somebody called and said that somebody was fighting.” Reed said, “Wasn’t here.” After additional discussion, Gray stated they needed to talk to other adults in the house; “if not, then we can come in … exigent circumstances.” Reed closed his door. The officers kicked the door down. Curtis stepped inside, drew his firearm, pointed it at Reed’s head. then put the gun away, and pulled Reed outside. Gray pushed Reed against the car and patted him down. Other officers arrived and spoke with Reed’s family. Satisfied that everyone in Reed’s house was safe, the officers documented the damage to Reed’s door and left.The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Campbell County and against the officers in their official capacities; dismissed a Terry claim as “duplicative” of a false arrest claim; dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and declined to award the officers qualified immunity on the individual capacity unlawful-entry, excessive-force, and false-arrest claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that the officers violated clearly established constitutional rights. View "Reed v. Campbell County, Kentucky" on Justia Law

Jones, who was on supervised release, was arrested after he fired shots outside his house and fled inside. He pled guilty to possessing a stolen firearm. The district court imposed the agreed-upon 10-year sentence, which was above the 77-96 month Guidelines range but below the 15-year mandatory minimum that would have applied if he had been classified as an armed career criminal. The court rejected arguments that he should not receive a sentence enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight and challenging the use of his prior controlled substance offense under Michigan state law to increase his base offense level–claiming Michigan’s controlled-substance statute is broader than the federal definition of the relevant substances. Separately, Jones faced resentencing on his supervised release; the firearm offense violated his supervised release conditions. A different district court imposed a 24-month sentence—half to run concurrently with his firearm conviction and half to run consecutively.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district courts properly calculated Jones’s Guidelines range for the firearm offense and imposed a reasonable sentence for the supervised-release violation. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

From 2009-2015, Hofstetter managed pain clinics in Florida and Tennessee. Hofstetter also co-owned and managed an additional clinic in Tennessee. Clemons, Newman, and Womack were employed as nurse practitioners at these clinics. All four defendants were convicted of maintaining drug-involved premises. Hofstetter was also convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, distributing controlled substances, and money laundering. Hofstetter was sentenced to 400 months in prison, Clemons to 42 months, Newman to 40 months, and Womack to 30 months. After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, the Supreme Court decided “Ruan” (2022), clarifying the applicable mens rea for an unlawful distribution charge, and remanded.The Sixth Circuit again affirmed. Under Ruan, it is insufficient for the government to prove that a prescription was “in fact” not authorized; the government must prove the defendant subjectively knew or intended that the prescription was unauthorized. The district court’s instructions were not plainly erroneous regarding the drug-involved-premises and conspiracy-to-distribute-and-dispense charges. Taken as a whole, the jury instructions made clear that the jury had to find that the defendants knowingly opened the clinics for the purpose of illegally distributing Schedule II controlled substances. View "United States v. Hofstetter" on Justia Law

Velasquez was convicted of conspiracy to use interstate commerce to commit murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a), and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841. The district court increased Velasquez’s offense level by four levels to 37 because “the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder” U.S.S.G. 2A1.5(b), determined Velasquez to be a career offender, varied downward on criminal history, reached sentencing range of 262–327 months, and ordered Velasquez to serve a 120-month sentence on the murder-for-hire conviction (the statutory maximum) concurrent with a 262-month sentence on the cocaine-distribution conviction. The Sixth Circuit rejected challenges to the convictions and upheld the four-level increase, but agreed that Velasquez should not have been considered a “career offender.”On remand, the district court denied a reduction under U.S.S.G 2X1.1(b)(2), which provides for a three-level decrease “unless the defendant or a co-conspirator completed [or was about to complete] all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense” and sentenced Velasquez to 120 months for Count 1 and 240 months for Count 2, to be served concurrently. The Third Circuit held that denial of the reduction was correct; a crossreference in U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(c) provides that when the “conspiracy is expressly covered by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline section.” The guideline that covers Velasquez’s case is U.S.S.G. 2A1.5, which expressly covers conspiracy to commit murder. View "United States v. Rios-Velasquez" on Justia Law

Thomas-Mathews pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and to two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Thomas-Mathews objected to the PSR’s “weight attribution to cocaine base versus cocaine as an unwarranted disparity” and requested the use of a 1:1 ratio. Thomas-Mathews also alleged he experienced a challenging childhood, including food insecurity and physical and sexual abuse by his uncle. His juvenile convictions include criminal sexual conduct, larceny, and drug possession. His adult convictions include drug offenses, domestic violence, and perjury in connection with a murder investigation. While serving his sentences for these crimes, Thomas-Mathews appeared to have turned his life around when he got out of prison in 2017, becoming involved with his children and “getting a barbershop.” The pandemic hurt Thomas-Mathews’ career as a barber and he “got back into [his] old style of living.”The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence of 60 months for the drug count, and two 60-month consecutive sentences for each of the gun counts as procedurally unreasonable. The court did not acknowledge the scope of its discretion concerning the crack-to-powder ratio and did not address specifically that failing to use the 1:1 ratio would result in an excessive sentence for Thomas-Mathews. The court’s discussion of section 3553(a)'s factors was limited to Thomas-Mathews’ criminal history without addressing Thomas-Mathews’ personal history and characteristics. View "United States v. Thomas-Mathews" on Justia Law