Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1988, a man abducted a woman at gunpoint and sexually assaulted her. Two women were abducted and raped 15 days later. In 1991 Gillispie was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 22 to 56 years. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed; the Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In 2008, Gillispie sought a new trial, arguing that the prosecution had failed to produce police reports that eliminated Gillispie as a suspect. The state court rejected that claim; the court of appeals affirmed, but remanded a claim that new evidence showed that another man committed the rapes. Before the state trial court acted, Gillispie filed a federal habeas petition, asserting only his Brady claim. The state court then rejected his new-evidence claim. In 2011, the federal court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, ordered a new trial, and ordered Gillispie released pending appeal. In 2012, the state court of appeals reversed on the new-evidence claim, and remanded for a new trial. Vacatur of Gillispie’s conviction eliminated federal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit granted the state’s motion to dismiss its appeal. The district court subsequently denied the state’s motion to vacate the conditional-writ order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Gillispie v. Warden, London Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Williams was arrested on non-felony charges of driving with a license suspended for failure to pay a traffic ticket. After Williams paid her ticket and fines, she was instructed to undress and shower in the presence of a corrections officer and two other female detainees, where she was also subjected to a visual body cavity search, and was instructed to bend at the waist and spread her buttocks. While she was bent over, an officer sprayed her with delousing solution all over her naked body, including into her anus. There was no indication that Williams had lice. Williams was released the same day. While her putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether pretrial detainees could be strip searched as a matter of course upon entry into a correctional facility absent individualized suspicion. The district court stayed Williams’s action. In 2012 the Court upheld a blanket strip-search policy. The district court denied a motion to file an amended complaint clarifying that plaintiffs “not only complain about the use of delousing on all detainees, but also about the manner,” particularly spraying delousing agent all over their naked bodies, “specifically aim[ing]” at their genitals,” instead of using less invasive methods, such as permitting detainees to apply the solution. According to the district court, the question was resolved by Florence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations plausibly allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "Williams v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Waters, a former Michigan state legislator, became involved in a corruption probe involving her then-live-in companion, political consultant Riddle. With a negotiated plea agreement, Waters pleaded guilty to filing a fraudulent tax return (26 U.S.C. 7207). The district court sentenced her to a year’s probation on the misdemeanor charge. Eight days later, Waters moved pro se to withdraw her guilty plea. The district court denied that motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and later affirmed Waters’s conviction and sentence. More than three years later, Waters petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that her attorney was constitutionally ineffective in promising that her misdemeanor conviction could “easily” be expunged and in failing to represent her vigorously at sentencing because he had a conflict of interest arising from his simultaneous representation of Riddle. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Waters did not establish an ongoing civil disability. At most she has alleged an injury to reputation, but this is not enough to warrant coram nobis. Although Waters claimed that her ability to travel outside the United States has been impaired, she did not show how this is the case. View "United States v. Waters" on Justia Law

In 2001, Kentucky State Police officers executed a search warrant at the home of Grubbs’s mother, relating to an investigation into stolen automobiles and operation of a “chop shop” by Grubbs and his brother, Paul. At the time Grubbs was living in South Carolina but made periodic visits to his mother’s house. Paul was living at their mother’s house full time. The officers recovered the handgun. Grubbs pleaded guilty to counts related to the stolen vehicle allegations and went to trial on two firearms charges and one count of possessing ammunition as a felon. He was convicted only of possessing the handgun. The conviction was overturned by the Sixth Circuit in 2007 for lack of sufficient evidence. Grubbs sought a certificate of innocence (28 U.S.C. 2513), which was denied by the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although the failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not preclude the court from finding that the Grubbs failed to establish that he did not commit the offense charged in the indictment. View "United States v. Grubbs" on Justia Law

Following the 2004 murder of Mary Stevenson, an Ohio state-court jury convicted Frazier, of aggravated murder (with two death-penalty specifications), aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, and recommended the death penalty. The judge sentenced him to die by lethal injection. After exhausting his state appeals, Frazier unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he was ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia (2002), due to his intellectual disability; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and that Ohio’s lethal-injection regime is unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state courts’ decisions were not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as defined by the United States Supreme Court. Frazier’s substantive Atkins claim remains procedurally defaulted because he did not show by clear and convincing evidence that he is mentally retarded. Under applicable law, the Ohio courts were not objectively unreasonable in rejecting his ineffective-assistance claims, and Frazier’s constitutional challenge to Ohio’s lethal-injection protocol requires the accumulation of evidence in another court. View "Frazier v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Jenkins pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence on anyone previously convicted of three or more violent felonies that occurred “on occasions different from one another,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e). In 1990 Kentucky had convicted him of robbing nine different homes during an alcohol-and-drug-induced crime spree that lasted one day or four days. The district court determined that Jenkins’ nine robberies, involving homes separated by one to two miles apiece, amounted to distinct violent felonies even if they occurred on a single day. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 15-year sentence. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2009, two masked men entered the credit union waving guns. The taller was a light-skinned African American wearing a black hooded sweatshirt. The shorter man, fully masked, wore a gray sweatshirt. A teller included with the money a “dye pack” that exploded as the robbers sped away in their Pontiac, spewing red smoke into the air. Kortas witnessed the robbery through a drive-through window. After dialing 911, he pursued the Pontiac, noting its plate number. He saw the robbers pitch a bag out the window, red dye “coming out like smoke.” Kortas chased them to Toledo, where they ditched the car, eluding Kortas and the police. In 2011, they were indicted for bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). There was evidence that the Pontiac was stolen the night before the robbery. The FBI recovered Tucker’s DNA from its steering wheel. Investigators discovered clothing near the abandoned Pontiac. DNA on items matched both men. Tucker stands 5'7'' and is a light-skinned African American, Sherer stands 5'3'' and is left-handedness, like the man in gray. Sherer and Tucker lived blocks from each other and from the home of the Pontiac’s owner. During 10 days before the robbery, they called each other 27 times. Convicted, Tucker received a 147-month sentence; Sherer, a 540-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges under the Speedy Trial Act, to the sufficiency of the evidence, and to the sentences. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Roberson was incarcerated at a Michigan correctional facility. Corrections officer Torres went to Roberson’s cell and ordered Roberson to back up to the cell door to be placed in restraints. When Roberson did not comply, Torres sprayed a chemical agent into the cell. Torres issued Roberson a major-misconduct ticket for his failure to comply with the order. At a subsequent hearing, Roberson claimed that he did not understand Torres’s order because he was asleep when it was given and did not awaken until after Torres deployed gas into his cell. Roberson claimed that, although he had been awake and had refused to come out of his cell earlier, he had subsequently fallen asleep. Roberson ceased to reasonably cooperate with the review process and the hearing officer stated that he was “unconvinced” that the sergeant gave the order to a sleeping prisoner. In Roberson’s civil rights suit, the district court denied Torres qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that a genuine issue exists as to whether Roberson was sleeping at the time he was sprayed and, if so, whether Torres’s actions constituted excessive force, given Roberson’s admission that he was covered from head to toe in his blanket. View "Roberson v. Torres" on Justia Law

After a “buy-bust” operation orchestrated by Dayton police, based on information from a confidential informant, Detective House shot and killed Jordan. Jordan, not the intended target of the bullet, sat in the front passenger seat of a vehicle that, moments before the shot was fired, had been driven into two officers in an attempt to escape. Jordan’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that House used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the city failed to train and supervise its employees adequately. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding House’s actions objectively reasonable. The “calculus of reasonableness” allows for the fact that police officers must often “make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” An officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment where, although ultimately wrong in his or her assessment of the circumstances, “a dangerous situation evolved quickly to a safe one before the police officer had a chance to realize the change.” View "Cass v. City of Dayton" on Justia Law

Miller disappeared in 1988. In 1999 interviews of Miller’s associates, Lamp admitted involvement in the disappearance and led police to Miller’s remains, buried in woods near Lamp’s property. Lamp stated that he and Blackston had killed Miller with the help of Simpson. The state charged Blackston with first-degree murder. In exchange for his testimony, the state granted Simpson immunity from prosecution and permitted Lamp to plead guilty to manslaughter. No physical evidence connected Blackston to Miller’s death. The state’s case depended on testimony by Lamp and Simpson and three women friends. Lamp and Simpson described the crime. The defense noted their favorable deals and inconsistencies in their stories. The jury convicted Blackston but the judge reversed because he had misinformed the jury regarding the extent of Simpson’s immunity. Before the second trial, Zantello and Simpson prepared written statements, recanting their testimony. At trial, the judge tired of their erratic behavior, deemed Simpson and Zantello to be “unavailable” and ordered their testimony from the first trial read to the jury. The judge did not allow the recantations to be read to the jury. The testimony of all remaining witnesses was consistent with testimony at the first trial. The second jury convicted Blackston. The Michigan Supreme Court twice reversed the appeals court, finding that it was not error to exclude the recantations or that other evidence rendered any error harmless. A federal district court granted a conditional habeas writ, finding that Blackston’s rights of confrontation and due process were violated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state unreasonably abridged Blackston’s clearly established federal constitutional right. View "Blackston v. Rapelje" on Justia Law