Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Calhoun, a Michigan state prisoner, filed a federal habeas petition in 2003. Although the petition included only exhausted claims, Calhoun also sought to litigate some unexhausted claims and moved to stay his petition while he exhausted the additional claims in state court. The district court granted the stay on conditions that Calhoun file his additional claims in state court within 90 days of the stay order and that he return to federal court within 30 days of exhausting them. Rather than file his unexhausted claims within 90 days, he waited more than six years, until 2010, to file them in Michigan state court. The Michigan trial and appellate courts denied relief. In 2012, Calhoun returned to the district court and filed an amended petition that included his old claims from the initial petition and his newly (but tardily) exhausted claims. The district court vacated its stay as of the date it had been entered and dismissed Calhoun’s original petition and amended petition as untimely. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Calhoun v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Fabian, a financial advisor, diverted millions of dollars to companies that he controlled. He pled guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and agreed to criminal forfeiture, 21 U.S.C. 853, of $4.8 million. He paid one million dollars. After U.S. Marshals inventoried his property, the district court entered an order that listed, as substitute property subject to forfeiture, real property and more than 800 items of personal property, including a collection of military trucks and equipment. Mais a victim of the fraud and member of a companies that Fabian controlled, contested the forfeiture, claiming that property in which Mais asserted a “legal interest” lacked any “nexus” to Fabian’s fraud. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under section 853(k), a third party “claiming an interest in property subject to forfeiture” cannot “intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving forfeiture of such property.” Nor can third parties file a separate lawsuit to assert their interest in forfeitable property. A district court “must enter” its preliminary order of forfeiture “without regard to any third party’s interest in the property.” The sole avenue for a third party to assert an interest in forfeitable property is an ancillary proceeding under section 853(n). Mais’s petition asserted only a conclusory legal interest in the properties, which Mais conceded does not meet the requirements of 853(n)(3). View "United States v. Fabian" on Justia Law

U.S. Marshals arrived at Krause’s Redford home on December 12, 2008 with a warrant for Krause’s arrest for felony possession of more than 50 grams of cocaine. When Krause saw the Marshals, he slammed the door shut and ran into a bedroom. The Marshals followed. One entered the bedroom but left when he found Krause standing in the corner pointing a handgun at him. As the others took up positions around the bedroom, they again announced themselves and explained they had a warrant for his arrest. Krause told them he had multiple guns and would kill anyone who tried to enter. A negotiator began talking to Krause from the hallway outside the open bedroom door. They talked for about eight hours. Sometimes Krause yelled and screamed; sometimes he “got very quiet.” Officers brought in Krause’s father and girlfriend to talk to Krause, without success. Eventually, the officers used a “flash bang” device in an effort to stun Krause. In the seconds that followed, Krause fired a shot at the officers; an officer fatally shot Krause in response. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The decisions to use a flash bang and to shoot Krause were reasonable, not “reckless,”View "Krause v. Jones" on Justia Law

Using the ARES Peer-to-Peer network, DHS agents downloaded child pornography images from Mabee's Internet address six times in 2012. Agents confronted Mabee at his home and Mabee admitted that he used the ARES software to download child pornography. Forensic examiners recovered at least 73 images and 14 videos, as well as evidence that Mabee had “searched extensively for child pornography using the ARES program.” All of the videos and one of the images had been stored so that they were available for other ARES users to download from Mabee’s computer. Mabee pleaded guilty to a distribution count; other counts were dismissed under Mabee’s Rule 11 plea agreement. Mabee admitted that he knew that the child pornography he had downloaded was available to other ARES users. There was no agreement as to Sentencing Guidelines factors or the appropriate guideline range. Mabee appealed his 121-month sentence arguing that the court misapplied a five-level offense level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(B)), for “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain.” Mabee argued that the record showed only that he used ARES to download and store child pornography, and there was no evidence that he engaged in trading of images with others. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court could have relied on circumstantial evidence in the record that Mabee made his own computer files available because he expected to receive additional pornography from others.View "United States v. Mabee" on Justia Law

In 1991 Loza shot and killed four members of his pregnant girlfriend’s family. An Ohio jury convicted him of four counts of aggravated murder and he was sentenced to death. Ohio state courts affirmed Loza’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal and denied him post-conviction relief. Loza filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning: refusal to suppress statements Loza made to a detective shortly after the detective encountered Loza on the day of his arrest; the voluntariness and admissibility of his confession; exclusion of the testimony of a clinical psychologist, at the guilt phase of trial; the court’s charge to the jury concerning inability to reach a decision; and failure to inform Loza, after his arrest, that he had a right to contact the Mexican consulate.View "Loza v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Prater was convicted as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Prater’s presentence report determined that U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 provided the base offense level; because Prater had at least two prior felony convictions for “crimes of violence,” his base offense level was 24 The report also determined that Prater qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), because he had at least three separated convictions for a “violent felony,” which subjected Prater to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years of imprisonment. It also raised Prater’s offense level to 33, under 4B1.4(b)(3)(B). The presentence report assigned Prater 20 criminal-history points, which corresponded to a criminal-history category of VI. An offense level of 33 and a criminal-history category of VI resulted in a guideline range of 235–293 months of imprisonment. The report identified four New York predicate convictions qualifying Prater as an armed career offender: a 1980 conviction for attempted third-degree burglary; a 1988 conviction for third-degree robbery; a separate 1988 conviction for third-degree burglary; and a 2000 conviction for attempted third-degree burglary. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence because the court did not apply the Supreme Court’s “modified categorical approach” to determine whether the version of the crimes for which Prater was convicted qualified as violent felonies.View "United States v. Prater" on Justia Law

After selling heroin to an undercover FBI agent, Johnson was charged with a drug offense by the State of Michigan. He declined the state’s plea offer. The state dismissed the charges, and a federal grand jury later indicted him. Johnson was convicted of: conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846; possession of heroin with the intent to distribute and distribution, section 841(a)(1); use of a communication facility to facilitate the drug conspiracy, section 843(b); and use of a residence for the purpose of distributing heroin, section 856(a)(1). Johnson claimed that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in the state plea negotiations that preceded his federal prosecution, and that, as a result, the federal indictment against him should have been dismissed. The Sixth Circuit rejected the claim and affirmed, noting that there was no indication that federal prosecutors were involved in his state-court case, nor any indication that Johnson’s representation in his state plea negotiations was ineffective. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1983 Esparza shot and killed Melanie Gerschults during the armed robbery of a Toledo restaurant, during which $110 was taken from the cash register. Another employee escaped and sought help. At trial, a fellow inmate and a sibling testified that Esparza had confessed. During the penalty phase, Esparza’s lawyers focused on his troubled youth. He was sentenced to death. After Ohio state courts refused to alter his sentence, Esparza unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court reversed in 2003. On remand, the district court reconsidered and rejected Esparza’s claims and granted him a certificate of appealability on ineffective-assistance and continuance claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; Ohio courts reasonably rejected his claims. Essentially, Esparza argued that his lawyers developed too much bad evidence at the penalty phase of his trial and not enough good. Esparza failed to show prejudice in his denial-of-continuance claim. The court stated that its “decision is not necessarily the end of the road for Esparza. Among other things, he has the right to file a clemency application with the governor to reduce his sentence from death to life in prison. In light of the many uninvited difficulties in his childhood, this application may be worth a serious look.”View "Esparza v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Foster was sentenced to 622 months’ imprisonment for two counts of drug possession, two counts of firearm possession, one count of drug distribution, and one count of conspiracy. Both parties subsequently agreed that Foster’s conviction and sentence for one of the drug possession counts and one of the firearm possession counts violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because those two counts duplicate other counts for which Foster was convicted and sentenced. The Sixth Circuit declined to vacate the sentences for the remaining four counts. The 120-month sentence for the duplicative drug possession count was set to run concurrently with three sentences of equal or greater length so that its vacatur could not logically be a basis for increasing the overall sentence for the remaining counts. The district court made clear at sentencing that the duplicative firearm possession count did not affect the length of other parts of the sentence. There is, therefore, no basis for the district court to increase the sentence on the four remaining counts. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Batey’s minor nephew Matthew was admitted to a mental health facility. Matthew’s older brother Jason told his parents that Batey had been sexually abusing Matthew and Jason for years. Matthew confirmed the abuse. At Batey’s trial on two counts of criminal sexual conduct, Matthew and Jason testified that Batey had abused them. Their mother testified that Matthew’s behavior had worsened leading up to his breakdown and confirmed that, Jason revealed Batey’s abuse. Batey’s defense was that the parents manufactured the accusations because he is gay and because he had encouraged the boys to explore their homosexual feelings; he argued that it was Jason who sexually abused Matthew. Jason had molested Matthew and told the police as much when he accused Batey. Fearing a confusing “fishing expedition” and unduly prejudicial information about Matthew’s sexual history, the trial court granted the state’s motion in limine prohibiting any exploration of Matthew and Jason’s sexual history with each other in accordance with Michigan’s rape-shield law. Batey was permitted to challenge the boys’ credibility on their mental health issues, inconsistencies in their testimony, Jason’s drug and alcohol abuse, and his tendency to lie. The jury convicted Batey and the judge sentenced him to 15 to 45 years. Batey’s direct appeals were unsuccessful. He is on parole. The district court denied his federal habeas petition based on an alleged Confrontation Clause violation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The probative value of evidence about Jason’s molestation of Matthew was marginal and any error was harmless.View "Batey v. Haas" on Justia Law