Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Mullet bought Jefferson County, Ohio land that became the Bergholz Amish community. As bishop, Samuel controlled life in the Bergholz compound and could order the “shunning” (excommunication) of community members. In 2006, Samuel excommunicated members who questioned his leadership. Given the number of excommunications, 300 Amish bishops convened and voted unanimously to reverse the shunnings. The excommunications caused family disputes, including a custody battle that resulted in a SWAT team taking children under an emergency temporary custody order. Believing that the loss of the children resulted from their lack of faith, several Bergholz residents cut their hair and trimmed their beards to atone, but did not confine this ritual to their community, but used it to punish or harm others who were not Bergholz members. In 2011, Bergholz members attacked nine individuals, slicing off the men’s beards and cutting the women’s hair. Religious and personal ties connected the victims to the Bergholz community. Members of the Bergholz community were indicted for violating, and conspiring to violate, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, on a theory that that they assaulted the victims “because of” their religious beliefs, 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(2)(A); for concealing evidence; and for making false statements to the FBI. No defendant disputed that the assaults happened; few disputed that they participated. A jury found that four attacks amounted to hate crimes and convicted 16 defendants. The court rejected the defendants’ proposed jury instruction (that the faith of the victims must be a “but for” cause of the assaults) and adopted the government’s proposed instruction (that the faith of the victims must be a “significant factor”). The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on a Supreme Court holding (Burrage (2014)) that the court should have given a but-for instruction.View "United States v. Mullet" on Justia Law

Mateen pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) after police discovered more than 600 images of child pornography on his computer. In 2006, Mateen had pleaded guilty to Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of Ohio Revised Code 2907.05. The state-court plea colloquy indicated that his victim was an eight-year-old girl. The district court imposed a 10-year statutory maximum term of imprisonment, concluding that a statutory enhancement (18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2)) for recidivist sexual offenders did not apply to because Mateen’s prior conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition did not necessarily involve a minor or ward. The Sixth Circuit initially affirmed, but subsequently vacated and remanded, concluding that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies only its direct antecedent, “abusive sexual conduct,” and not all three listed categories of conduct: “aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” and “abusive sexual conduct.” Only state crimes relating to abusive sexual conduct need involve a minor or ward in order to trigger enhancement under section 2252(b)(2).View "United States v. Mateen" on Justia Law

Van Tran was born in 1966 in Vietnam, the son of an American serviceman who died two years later. He lived in poverty, and as a child, suffered severe social deprivation. He attended one year of school in the U.S., and dropped out in 1984. In 1987, Van Tran and three others robbed a Memphis restaurant, from which he had been fired. Three people were killed and a 75-year-old woman was beaten unconscious. Van Tran twice shot a 74-year-old woman and shot another victim in the face. He confessed participation in the robbery, was convicted of three counts of felony murder, and was sentenced to death for each on the basis of aggravating circumstances, that the murder was “especially cruel in that it involved depravity of mind.” The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, but reversed his death sentence for two murders, finding that there was sufficient evidence that killing the older woman evinced “depravity of mind.” Van Tran sought state post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance and that he should not be executed because he is mentally retarded and incompetent. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed denial of relief, noting that Van Tran’s I.Q. was above 70. Van Tran moved to reopen his petition in 2000, alleging that new evidence established that he was mentally retarded. The Tennessee Supreme Court announced that execution of mentally retarded persons was prohibited by the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions. On remand, the court denied relief, finding that Van Tran had not demonstrated the existence of deficits in adaptive behavior nor the manifestation of deficits before the age of 18. The appellate court agreed. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit remanded to allow the state court to apply the proper standard in assessing whether Van Tran is intellectually disabled such that his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment under Atkins v. Virginia. The court affirmed on the issues of whether, as applied, the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance of the jury instruction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and whether Van Tran’s penalty phase counsel was ineffective. View "Van Tran v. Colson" on Justia Law

In 1996, Robinson pleaded guilty to mail fraud and aiding and abetting. The district court sentenced Robinson to 97.5 months of imprisonment and ordered him to pay criminal restitution of $286,875. A year later, Robinson pleaded guilty to a second set of criminal violations, resulting in convictions of wire fraud and aiding and abetting. The district court imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment and again ordered Robinson to pay restitution, this time $100,000. Robinson paid only $7,779.44 of the first judgment and $200 of the second before filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. The government, under the criminal restitution judgments, is a lien creditor. Filing for bankruptcy triggered the automatic stay, which suspends all activities related to the collection and enforcement of prepetition debts, 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The bankruptcy court denied the government’s motion to bypass the stay under 18 U.S.C. 3613(a), which provides that the government may enforce a judgment imposing restitution “notwithstanding any other Federal law.” The district court reversed, reasoning that it did not matter whether the debtor or the bankruptcy estate holds nominal title to the property because section 3613(a) allows the government to enforce a restitution order against all property of the person ordered to pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; section 3613 supersedes the automatic stay and allows the government to enforce restitution orders against property included in the bankruptcy estate. View "Robinson. v. United States" on Justia Law

Charged with unlawful possession of a rifle, Tomlinson was represented by an Assistant Federal Public Defender. The venire included 36 prospective jurors. The court awarded Tomlinson 10 peremptory challenges and the government six. The court and counsel questioned the jurors. After each of three rounds consisting of “for cause” review, followed by peremptory challenges, both counsel stated that they had no objections to the strikes of the other party. In the fourth round, each party exercised its last peremptory strike. Tomlinson objected to the government’s strike against Jackson, an African American woman, stating: “I think we are going to bring a Batson challenge. I think all of the strikes by the government were African-Americans.” The court ruled that Tomlinson had waived any objection to the government’s first five strikes by failing to object earlier. After the prosecutor stated race-neutral reasons for striking Jackson, defense counsel renewed her objection and reiterated that all six of the government’s peremptory strikes were used against African Americans. The court analyzed Tomlinson’s objection only with respect to Jackson and explained why it was persuaded that the strike was not based on race. The trial continued and the jury convicted Tomlinson. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Tomlinson’s Batson objection was timely because he raised it before the jury was sworn and the trial commenced.View "United States v. Tomlinson" on Justia Law

Five death-row inmates, housed in a maximum-security prison in Kentucky, filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), which prohibits state and local governments from placing “a substantial burden” on the “religious exercise” of any inmate unless they establish that the burden furthers a “compelling governmental interest” and does so in the “least restrictive” way. They made various claims, some related to requests to practice their Native American faith, some related to a request for clergy visits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that there was a triable issue of fact over whether RLUIPA gives the inmates a right to have access to a sweat lodge for faith-based ceremonies and a triable issue of fact over whether RLUIPA gives the inmates a right to buffalo meat and other traditional foods for a faith-based once-a-year powwow? RLUIPA, however, does not permit inmates to collect money damages from prison officials sued in their individual capacities.View "Haight v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Wershe was 17 years and 10 months old when he was arrested in Detroit and charged with various drug crimes. He was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine, and, in 1988, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At sentencing, Wershe was 18 years and 7 months old. In 1992, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the life-without-parole penalty for simple possession unconstitutional. Wershe’s first opportunity for parole was denied in 2003. In 2012, the Parole Board determined that it had no interest in taking action on his case and scheduled Wershe’s next interview for 2017. Wershe brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Michigan Parole Board members, alleging that the parole consideration process did not afford him a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court sua sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Wershe’s due-process claim, but vacated with respect to the Eight Amendment because the district court failed to consider the impact of Wershe’s youth at the time of the crime and his arrest.View "Wershe v. Combs" on Justia Law

Fields entered a guilty plea to racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. After a 28-day trial, Clinton and Lewis were convicted of multiple counts of racketeering conspiracy, drug conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, and conspiracy to commit murder for hire, and sentenced to life in prison. The Sixth Circuit upheld the convictions and sentences, finding that the government did not breach its plea agreement with Fields. Fields did not allege any unconstitutional motive by the prosecution in declining to move for a downward departure and the plea agreement made clear that not only was it within the government’s sole discretion to determine whether Fields provided substantial assistance, but also within its judgment to assess the “value, truthfulness and completeness of any assistance [] Fields offer[ed],” as well as whether Fields “committed or attempted to commit any additional crimes.” The seven-week trial was not marred by reversible error with respect to denial of a motion to sever or an alleged Brady violation.View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

On the basis of a cooperating defendant's tip, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task force set up surveillance along an interstate in eastern Kentucky, hoping to intercept members of a methamphetamine-trafficking operation. Detective Robert Hart, a task force member, found a car suspected of involvement with the operation. The detective trailed the automobile in an unmarked car, radioed a local officer (Adam Ray) and asked Officer Ray to initiate a traffic stop on the basis of a traffic violation. Detective Hart told Officer Ray only that the car was suspected of being linked to a DEA drug investigation. Officer Ray initiated the stop and discovered the Tahoe's driver, Defendant-Appellant, Marcus Adkins, and one passenger, Defendant-Appellant, Courtney Junior Noble. Adkins gave Officer Ray permission to search the car. The officer found several baggies of methamphetamine, a pipe used for smoking drugs, and a handgun on Noble's person. He arrested Noble and Adkins. In addition, the task force used this evidence to obtain a search warrant for a motel room suspected of being a way station for the traffickers. In the room, the task force found Defendant-Appellant Dena Brooks, pills, and a scale for weighing drugs. A grand jury indicted all three on charges of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine and conspiracy to sell methamphetamine; it also indicted Noble on a gun charge. Noble moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of Officer Ray's frisk. Adkins and Brooks joined this motion, which the district court denied in full after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Officer Ray lacked sufficient particularized and objective indicia to believe that Noble was armed and dangerous. As a result, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Noble's motion to suppress, vacated his conviction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Because the government never objected to, and explicitly waived an argument related to, Adkins's and Brooks' lack of standing to challenge Officer Ray's frisk of Noble, the Court also reversed the district court's denial of their motions to suppress, vacated their convictions, and remanded for further proceedings.View "United States v. Noble" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Marquis Heard of numerous drug and money-laundering offenses after a three-day trial in which Heard represented himself. He argued on appeal to the Sixth Circuit was that the district court was obligated to proceed with a hearing to determine his competency to stand trial. Heard also argued that his decision to represent himself was not voluntary. After review of the district court record, the Sixth Circuit rejected his arguments and affired. View "United States v. Heard" on Justia Law