Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2003, at the age of 13 or 14, Hackett helped form the LSP street gang on the south side of Youngstown, Ohio. Eight years later, a federal grand jury indicted Hackett and 22 others for RICO conspiracy and many other crimes. Most of his codefendants pled guilty, but Hackett and four co-defendants proceeded to trial. A jury convicted Hackett of conspiracy under RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(5), retaliation against a government witness, 18 U.S.C. 1513(a)(1)(B), and various other weapons and narcotics charges. The district court sentenced him to 440 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting claims of Batson violations and insufficiency of the evidence, but remanded for resentencing, finding that Hackett’s mandatory-minimum sentence on a firearms count was imposed in violation of the 2013 Supreme Court decision, Alleyne v. United States. The indictment charged only that Hackett “use[d] and carr[ied]” a firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime of violence, not that he “discharged” the firearm as well; post-Alleyne, “use and carry” and “discharge” are two different offenses under 18 U.S.C. 924(c).View "United States v. Hackett" on Justia Law

McMullan and Smith, friends of 30 years, were related by marriage. They were addicts. During a drug-related fight, McMullan snatched a revolver from his wife and pointed the gun one foot from Smith’s chest. The gun fired. Smith later died from the gunshot wound to the chest. When witness McDowell testified at trial, he had a pending cocaine charge. Because McDowell had denied ever using crack cocaine at a preliminary hearing, McMullan’s counsel sought to cross-examine him about the charge to impeach McDowell’s credibility. The trial court denied the request. The court instructed the jury on the first-degree murder charge and on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. McMullan's requested involuntary-manslaughter instruction was denied. Convicted of second-degree murder, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and as a felon in possession of a firearm, McMullan was determined to be a fourth-felony habitual offender. The court in McDowell’s case granted the government’s motion to downgrade McDowell’s cocaine charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. McMullan’s counsel unsuccessfully sought a new trial because of McDowell’s plea deal. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected arguments relating to the involuntary-manslaughter instruction; counsel’s failure to cross-examine McDowell about the plea bargain; and failure to disclose the plea agreement. The Michigan Supreme Court granted affirmed on the sole issue of the jury instruction was warranted. McMullan unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments relating to the jury instruction and the plea agreement.View "McMullan v. Booker" on Justia Law

Following a string of armed robberies in the Lansing area, Ford, Perdue, Nathan, and Henry were each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1951; multiple counts of robbery affecting interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1951; and multiple counts of possessing and brandishing or discharging a firearm in furtherance of both the conspiracy and a robbery count, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Ford and Perdue were convicted of all charges. Ford was sentenced to 1,392 months of imprisonment; Perdue was sentenced to 1,464 months. Nathan pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce and was sentenced to 168 months of imprisonment; Henry pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce and was sentenced to 150 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences and convictions, rejecting challenges the admission of evidence regarding gang affiliation and the impact of the robbery on a witness to the crime; to the district court’s limitation on cross-examination of a government witness regarding his exculpatory out-of-court statements; and to the introduction of non-testifying codefendant Perdue’s out-of-court statement.View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Toviave immigrated to the U.S. in 2001, and, using false immigration documents, later brought four young relatives from Togo to live with him. He made the children cook, clean, and do laundry. He occasionally made the children babysit for his girlfriend and relatives. Toviave would beat the children if they misbehaved or failed to follow rules. Toviave provided for the children by working two jobs and did yard work. Toviave bought the children sports equipment and let them play soccer. The children exercised with him and went on family trips together. Toviave emphasized education; many of his punishments stemmed from problems related to schoolwork. He hired a tutor to teach the children English. He imposed mandatory study periods. The children always attended school. Teachers began to suspect abuse. Michigan authorities investigated. The children were removed from the house. The Department of Homeland Security obtained a warrant and discovered false immigration documents in Toviave’s home. Toviave pled guilty to visa and mail fraud charges, and the government dropped a human trafficking charge. Toviave was convicted of four counts of forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that Toviave’s treatment of the children was “reprehensible,” but was not forced labor.View "United States v. Toviave" on Justia Law

In 2008, Musgrave, a CPA, became involved in a tire recycling venture with Goldberg. Musgrave obtained a loan, guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), through Mutual Federal Savings Bank. The venture ultimately lost the $1.7 million loan and Musgrave lost his $300,000 investment. In 2011, the two were indicted. Goldberg pled guilty to one count of misprision of felony, and the recommended a sentence of three years of probation, restitution, and a special assessment. Musgrave was convicted of: conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud and to make false statements to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1349; wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment with credit for the day of processing, a variance from his Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months and below the government’s recommendation of 30 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity and are prime candidates for general deterrence. The district court relied on impermissible considerations and failed to address adequately how what amounted to a non-custodial sentence afforded adequate general deterrence in this context. . View "United States v. Musgrave" on Justia Law

After his conviction in Ohio state court for two 1999 murders and the aggravated robbery and kidnapping of one victims, Scott was sentenced to death. Scott unsuccessfully appealed and pursued state court post-conviction remedies, then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Ohio’s “course-of-conduct” capital specification was unconstitutional as applied; that the trial court erroneously failed to merge two other aggravating specifications, for robbery and kidnapping; that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, by giving erroneous advice about the risks of making an unsworn statement, and by failing to present certain mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial; and that Ohio’s method of execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional. Scott did not present his first argument in state court, so it was procedurally defaulted. AEDPA’s stringent standard of review applies to Scott’s second and third claims, and Scott cannot show that the Ohio courts reached a decision that contravened or unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. Scott is currently challenging Ohio’s execution procedures in federal district court, in a separate action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and consideration of this issue is properly confined to that forum. View "Scott v. Houk" on Justia Law

Webb pleaded guilty to drug offenses in two different cases. Based on his status as a career offender and a belief that the career offender guideline range was excessive and improper, the district court sentenced him to the pre-Fair Sentencing Act, 124 Stat. 2372, crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months imprisonment. Webb later moved, under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) for retroactive application of the new Sentencing guidelines in effect after passage of the FSA. The district court found that Webb was entitled to seek a reduction of his sentence and resentenced him to 188 months for each count in the first case and for the second case. The government appealed, claiming that the district court lacked the authority to reduce the sentence. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, reinstating the original sentence. The original sentence was not based on a sentencing range that was subsequently reduced and no amendment to the Guidelines had the effect of lowering Webbs’s “applicable guideline range,” sothe district court lacked authority to grant a motion for resentencing, View "United States v. Webb" on Justia Law

Akron police witnessed Nagy rummaging for change in a car that was not his. An officer placed him in handcuffs. Nagy immediately told the officer that he had a gun in his pocket, which Nagy had taken from a car by mistake. Nagy testified that he had intended to dispose of the gun safely by putting it in a U.S. Post Office Box, and was searching for a mailbox when he stopped to take change from a car as the officer drove by. Metzger searched Nagy and found a large amount of change, DVDs, Nintendo games, multiple cell phones, iPods, garments, costume jewelry, cigarettes, medications, and lighters—none of which belonged to Nagy. Convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), and knowingly possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j), he received a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. Nagy argued that his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment rights because his three prior convictions, which enhanced his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), were not submitted to the jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Alleyne v. U.S. Nagy also argued that his sentence was unconstitutional as contrary to the evolving national consensus and standards of decency. The Sixth Circuit rejected both claimsView "United States v. Nagy" on Justia Law

Snelling defrauded investors by soliciting funds for two fictitious financial companies, CityFund and Dunhill, which supposedly invested clients’ money in overseas mutual funds and overnight depository accounts, and promised investors an annual return of 10 to 15%. In reality, Snelling and his partner operated a Ponzi scheme in which “returns” on earlier investors’ capital were part of new investors’ deposits. The rest of the new deposits went to Snelling and his partner, who used the money to buy vacation houses and boats, pay private-school tuition, and live extravagantly. Among the tactics they employed were intentional targeting of victims’ IRA and 401(k) accounts, issuance of false quarterly statements by mail and, in confronting investors’ suspicions, production of false records that showed a balance of $8.5 million in the fund when it actually held $995.. Neither Snelling nor his partner paid taxes on the diverted funds. Snelling pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2; and tax evasion, 18 U.S.C. 7201. Snelling appealed his 131-month prison sentence, claiming that the Guidelines-range calculation employed a loss figure that did not take into account the sums paid back to investors in the course of the fraud. The Sixth Circuit agreed and vacated the sentence.View "United States v. Snelling" on Justia Law

Bell dealt crack cocaine for years and customarily cooked it in his kitchen; police stopped his car after receiving a tip and found 58 grams of crack cocaine and thousands of dollars in cash. In his home they found three police scanners, a digital scale, and drug-packaging materials. His ex-wife, who still lived in Bell’s house, had removed thousands of dollars in cash, packaged-to-sell crack cocaine, and guns from the house after he called her from jail. Based on those facts, the district court imposed a two-level enhancement to his sentence under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing and distributing drugs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; precedents under the guideline do not carve out residences as safe havens from being drug-production premises.View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law