Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elsass and his companies, FRG, and STS, were charged with violations of the Tax Code, including claiming theft-loss deductions for losses that did not involve criminal conduct, claiming those deductions before it was clear that there was no reasonable prospect of recovery, falsely characterizing theft losses as losses incurred in a trade or business to artificially inflate refunds, claiming theft-loss deductions to which taxpayers were not entitled because the losses were incurred by deceased relatives, negotiating customers’ tax-refund checks and depositing them into defendants’ bank accounts, falsely indicating that Elsass was an attorney in good standing, making deceptive statements to customers that substantially interfered with the administration of the tax laws, promoting an abusive tax shelter through false or fraudulent statements about the tax benefits of participation, and aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability. The district court held that there was no genuine issue as to whether Elsass and FRG had engaged in each of these prohibited practices and enjoined them from serving as tax-return preparers. While it granted summary judgment to STS with respect to all claims except on, because STS is wholly owned by Elsass, it enjoined STS to the same extent as Elsass and FRG. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "United State v. Elsass" on Justia Law

Young helped a neighbor sort and sell her late husband’s possessions, including a box of seven shotgun shells, which he stored in a drawer where they would be safe from his children. Young had been convicted of several burglary-related offenses, 1990-1992, so it was a crime for him to possess ammunition. He was unaware of this legal disability. Police later visited Young’s home, investigating recent burglaries at an auto repair shop and a storage building. During the consent search, officers found items reported stolen and the shotgun shells. The government charged Young as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The statute carries a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for anyone who has at least three prior felony convictions. Young argued that the ACCA mandatory minimum sentence, as applied to him, would violate the Eighth Amendment because it is grossly disproportionate to his offense. His advisory Guidelines range, absent the ACCA would have been 10-16 months. He also argued that he did not have fair notice of the prohibition against felons possessing ammunition. The district court expressed concerns about fairness, but determined that it had no discretion and imposed a 15-year sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. That the magnitude of Young’s crime culpability, and motive were low is offset by his recidivism. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

Farah was a member of the Somali Outlaws gang, but renounced his affiliation with the gang. In 2010, while in immigration custody Farah agreed to assist in a government investigation. Farah believed that he would receive immunity from prosecution, reversal of the revocation of his work permit, help obtaining citizenship and release from custody. Farah was granted transactional immunity, testified before the grand jury, and assisted with the identification and location of gang members. Gang members apparently suspected his involvement and threatened Farah, who then refused to testify at trials concerning conspiracies including sex trafficking of minors, interstate transportation of stolen goods. and other offenses. Farah was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 401(3), for willfully disobeying an order requiring his testimony by deposition and for violating 18 U.S.C. 1591(d), which prohibits obstruction, or attempt to obstruct enforcement of section 1591(a), a child sex trafficking statute. The Sixth Circuit vacated the section 401(3) conviction as violating the Double Jeopardy Clause and the rule of Yates v. United States. Farah’s Double Jeopardy rights were only partly violated because he was also convicted of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the child sex trafficking laws; that conviction passes the “same elements” test of Blockburger v. United States. View "United States v. Farah" on Justia Law

Henness was indicted for murder with prior calculation and design; aggravated robbery-murder; and kidnap-murder. He also was charged with aggravated robbery, kidnapping, four counts of forgery, and having a weapon while under disability. Henness pled guilty to the forgery counts and was convicted of the remaining counts. The trial court adopted the jury’s recommendation that he be sentenced to death. The Ohio Court of Appeals and Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. In 1996, Henness filed a state post-conviction petition, which the trial court denied. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court denied Henness permission to further appeal this decision. In 2001, Henness moved to reopen his direct appeal. The court denied the motions because Henness had not established good cause for his failure to timely file the motions. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected his appeal as untimely. In 2001, Henness filed his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which the district court dismissed as meritless. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2013, Henness filed the current Rule 60(b)(6) motion, seeking to revisit the previous dismissal of several ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion as meritless. View "Henness v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Clark was charged with making a false statement to a federally licensed firearm dealer, 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(A), and with possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). She entered a nolo contendere plea to the false-statement charge and a guilty plea to the possession charge. In 2008, the district court sentenced Clark to 60 months for the false-statement charge and 108 months for the possession charge, to be served concurrently. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Clark’s convictions and sentences and allowed counsel to withdraw. In 2010, Clark filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence, claiming ineffective assistance and that her plea was not knowing or voluntary. A magistrate recommended denial. Clark did not object to the recommendation, but moved to amend, claiming that “severe depression” made her unable to file a comprehensive motion in the first instance. She sought to add claims that the four-level enhancement for transferring a firearm to be used in a felony and the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice were incorrectly applied and alleging selective prosecution and judicial misconduct. The district court denied the motion and dismissed her petition. Clark did not timely appeal, but filed a second, identical, motion to amend, which was also denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Clark v. United States" on Justia Law

Aaron Hayward was driving home from his parents’ store around 4:00 a.m. when a Cleveland Clinic Police Department SUV followed him into his driveway without using a siren or lights. An officer yelled, “Hey you, come over here, boy,” as Aaron entered his home. It was not communicated to Aaron that he was under arrest. About 10-15 minutes later, five additional officers arrived and began pounding on the Haywards’ front door. Essex Hayward opened the main door and the officers tried to force their way through the outer security door. Essex shut the main door and used his body to prevent the officers from breaking down the door. The officers used the butt of a shotgun to shatter the main door’s window. Annie called 911. An officer stuck a taser through the window and blindly fired into the home, striking Aaron twice. The officers broke through the door, tased Aaron again, as he continued struggling, then dragged Aaron to the driveway, where they allegedly beat him with batons, kicked him in the head and other parts of his body, stunned him with a taser, and called him a “black nigger” before they handcuffed and arrested him. Aaron pleaded guilty to willfully fleeing a police officer and resisting arrest, admitting that he injured an officer. The Haywards brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. At the court’s request, they removed their claims based on pre-arrest conduct. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of the parents’ section 1983 claim for illegal home entry and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, but affirmed dismissal of other claims, including Aaron’s section 1983 claims. View "Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found." on Justia Law

Williams, who was convicted in Michigan state court for the fatal shooting of the owner of a video store during an attempted robbery, filed a direct appeal, arguing that the introduction of the testimony of an eyewitness who died before trial at the preliminary hearings violated Williams’s rights under the Confrontation Clause, that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of the testimony, and that the lineup in which Williams participated was unduly suggestive and violated the due process clause. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that Williams’s constitutional rights were not violated and that, if they were, the errors were harmless. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The federal district court denied a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Bauman" on Justia Law

Cordell was an inmate at the Greene County Jail in Xenia, Ohio until he pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. As Deputy McKinney performed his initial rounds on the floor on which Cordell was housed, several inmates, including Cordell, requested haircuts. A verbal conflict ensued. McKinney commanded Cordell to step into the vestibule area to be placed in handcuffs. The conflict continued as McKinney placed Cordell in "escort position” to take him to a third-floor holding cell. Cordell claimed that during this trip McKinney ran him “head first into the wall” with force sufficient to lacerate Cordell’s forehead, cause severe neck and back pain, and leave him “very, very groggy.” The jail’s nurse (Jordan) found “a little cut above his eye,” and bandaged it. Later, at a hospital, Cordell was diagnosed with whiplash. Based on a witness statement, McKinney received a written warning for use of excessive force. The district court rejected Cordell’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. A genuine dispute as to several material facts exists. If Cordell’s version of events is credited, a reasonable jury could conclude that McKinney inflicted serious pain upon Cordell with malicious and sadistic intent. Any reasonable jail official would know that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the conduct that Cordell described.View "Cordell v. McKinney" on Justia Law

Garrett entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). The district court sentenced Garrett to 151 months of imprisonment, which was the bottom end of the guideline range as calculated in his presentence report. Garrett argued that he was eligible for resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) because his original sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission” and because reduction would be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court rejected the argument. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. When a defendant’s sentence follows from a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the district court is bound by that agreement if it accepts it, and the sentence is, therefore, “based on” an agreement “that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply.” Garrett’s agreement employed a range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. View "United States v. Garrett" on Justia Law

In 1991 Charlene filed a paternity suit naming McCarley as the father of her younger son. McCarley stated that he would kill Charlene before paying support. In January 1992 a neighbor went to Charlene’s apartment and found her dead, with a leather strap wrapped around her neck. Both of Charlene’s children were at home. Three-year-old D.P. repeatedly looked at uniformed officers and stated: “It was him. He hurt mommy.” Four days later, he made related statements in the presence of Charlene’s mother, including “Policeman hit my mommy. Put tape on her.” A child psychologist was able to elicit similar statements. In 1995, police officers made a surprise visit to McCarley’s home on an unrelated matter. In his garage, officer Balogh saw a deputy sheriff’s jacket and cap strewn across a moving dolly. Balogh remembered D.P.’s statements from years before and confiscated the jacket and cap. After a second trial in 2007, McCarley was convicted for aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in 20 years. The district court denied habeas relief, rejecting an argument that the Ohio Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established Sixth Amendment law by allowing a child psychologist to read into evidence the testimonial hearsay statements of a three-and-a-half year-old declarant, where the declarant was not subject to any prior cross-examination. The court concluded that the error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "McCarley v. Hall" on Justia Law