Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hill and Combs kidnapped 12-year-old Fife, beat Fife, raped him in multiple ways, strangled him, bit his genitals, sodomized him, and burned him. Fife’s father found him in a field. Fife died days later. Several witnesses testified that Hill was around the crime scene. The state introduced Hill’s confession that he had watched Combs beat and rape Fife. There was physical evidence. One witness testified that Hill had raped her in the same wooded area and another testified that Hill had raped her multiple times. Hill was sentenced to death in 1986. Ohio courts rejected Hill’s appeal and state habeas petition.Hill’s 1996 federal habeas petition challenged the denial of expert assistance on bitemark evidence. While an appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided “Atkins.” On remand, the state court determined that Hill was not intellectually disabled; his death sentence stood. Following a remand by the Supreme Court and various Sixth Circuit decisions, Hill sought a new trial based on “newly discovered evidence,” a report from the American Board of Forensic Odontology that suggested using bitemarks to identify a specific individual might not be reliable. Ohio courts held that there was “no probability” that a new trial would lead to a “different outcome” because the state had proffered so much other evidence of guilt.Hill’s second federal habeas petition argued that the state trial court violated his due process rights by not properly conducting a materiality review of the bitemark evidence. The Sixth Circuit characterized Hill’s petition as “second or successive,” so Hill was required to meet the gatekeeping provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2). Under Hill's interpretation, "Hmost convictions involving forensic evidence would never be final." View "In re: Hill" on Justia Law

In 2019-2020, Cedrid, Smith, and Hoskins defrauded 20 different banks and their customers by purchasing identification information that hackers stole from financial institutions, then accessing the victim’s bank online. A conspirator would call the victim, “spoofing” the bank's phone number, and pretend to be concerned about suspicious activity, then tell the victim they would send an identification code to verify the victim’s identity. The co-conspirator would then trigger the “forgot my password” function to send a code to the victim. When the victim provided that code to the conspirator, the conspirator could change the password and gain full access to the victim’s account.to withdraw funds. The three were charged with bank fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1349 and 18 U.S.C. 1028A.The PSRs determined an actual loss of $1,171,673.97 and an Intended loss of $2,158,297.80. The district court overruled Smith’s objection to some of the conduct included in her offense level because she was not directly involved with several of the banks. The court sentenced Smith to 36 months for the conspiracy charge and to a consecutive 24 months for aggravated identity theft. Hoskins was sentenced to 48 months for the conspiracy charge. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred by attributing to each defendant the conduct of others involved in the conspiracy, by including intended-loss amounts in Hoskins’s offense level, and in ordering Smith to pay all the restitution in full. View "United States v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

In 2006, Soto’s wife reported the death of their two-year-old son. Soto admitted that the child’s death was his fault but described it as an accident: he said he had been driving an ATV around his property and had run over the toddler by mistake. Soto agreed to plead guilty to child endangerment in exchange for the dismissal of a manslaughter charge. Soto served his five-year sentence and left prison in 2011. In 2016, Soto went to the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office and confessed that he had actually beaten his son to death and had staged the ATV accident to cover up his crime. Soto was charged with aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence.Soto claimed double jeopardy in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Jeopardy attaches to an “offence” under the Double Jeopardy Clause, only when a court or jury has the power to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to that “offence.” During Soto’s 2006 plea hearing, jeopardy attached to the child-endangerment charge once the court accepted Soto’s guilty plea for that charge; the court lacked power to determine Soto’s guilt or innocence of the manslaughter charge. Jeopardy never attached to that charge. View "Soto v. Siefker" on Justia Law

Pembrook, Johnson, and two others robbed two stores at gunpoint. Each was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), possession of a firearm by a felon, 922(g), and two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 924(c). The 924(c) counts carried a combined 32-year additional mandatory-minimum sentence: seven years for the first count and an additional 25 years for the second.The court granted a downward variance and sentenced each defendant to 33 years: one year each for the first three counts, to run concurrently, plus the mandatory 32 years. The Supreme Court remanded in light of “Davis” (2019), which found 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague. The parties stipulated that new PSRs would exclude the 25-year additional sentence for the second 924(c) count, and revise the defendants’ personal information, including their conduct during incarceration. The court added a five-level enhancement for brandishing a firearm, which applied only after the second 924(c) charge was excluded, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), and a two-level enhancement for physical restraint of the victims, 2B3.1(b)(4)(b), then resentenced Pembrook to 156 months in prison and Johnson to 168 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. This case involved a general remand for a de novo resentencing; the parties were entitled to raise new issues at resentencing, even issues previously waived or forfeited. The district court properly determined that the facts of the robbery satisfy that enhancement. View "United States v. Pembrook" on Justia Law

While facing charges for conspiracy to engage in human trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c), Pennington improperly communicated with witnesses in the case and was charged with witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The 1594(c) conspiracy charge was dismissed when Pennington pleaded guilty to the witness-tampering charge. The district court applied the U.S. Sentencing Guideline that corresponds with his witness-tampering conviction, which prompted cross-references to other guidelines, including U.S.S.G. 2G1.1, which applies to certain human-trafficking offenses and supplies two possible base-offense levels. Subsection (a)(1) provides a base-offense level of “34, if the offense of conviction is 18 U.S.C. 1591(b)(1)”; subsection (a)(2) provides a base-offense level of “14, otherwise.” Although Pennington had not been convicted under 1591(b)(1), the district court used subsection (a)(1)’s base-offense level of 34 as its starting point and imposed a 29-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence. Pennington is currently serving his term of supervised release. The district court plainly erred by misinterpreting and miscalculating the Guidelines. Pennington has not been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 1591(b)(1) and no guideline permits us to treat him as if he had been; U.S.S.G. 2G1.1(a)(2) provides his base-offense level, 14. View "United States v. Pennington" on Justia Law

Johnson was the councilman in Cleveland’s Buckeye-Shaker neighborhood for 41 years. Jamison was his executive assistant. For years, Johnson used his position to fraudulently claim federal reimbursements for payments he never made. He also secured employment for his children in federally funded programs, although they were not legally eligible to work in such positions. Johnson deposited their earnings into his own account. In addition, Johnson fraudulently claimed a series of tax deductions. He encouraged and assisted his son Elijah in submitting falsified records for Elijah’s grand-jury testimony. Jamison assisted Johnson in these crimes. Johnson and Jamison were convicted on 15 charges, including federal program theft under 18 U.S.C. 371, 666(a)(1)(A) and (2); tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2); and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b) and 1519. Johnson was sentenced to 72 months in prison. Jamison was sentenced to 60 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s loss calculations and to sentencing enhancements for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, for using a minor, and for obstructing justice. The district court properly admitted “other acts” evidence of prior misuse of campaign funds. Any other errors in evidentiary rulings were harmless. View "United States v. Jamison" on Justia Law

Motorcycle gang members Nicholson and Sorrell were charged with conspiracy and aiding and abetting assault under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute. The district court instructed the jury that either of those two offenses could serve as a predicate offense for another count involving the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The jury convicted both men on those three counts and the convictions were affirmed. The jury did not explicitly answer which predicate offense met 924(c)’s crime-of-violence requirementThe Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of their 28 U.S.C. 2255, motions to vacate their section 924(c) convictions. The 924(c) convictions rested on a valid predicate offense. While a VICAR conspiracy is not a crime of violence, a VICAR aiding-and-abetting assault with a dangerous weapon is because an element of the offense requires a finding of the use or threatened use of physical force. The jury was improperly instructed that it could base convictions for the 924(c) count solely on a conviction for VICAR] conspiracy but the error was harmless. View "Sorrell v. United States" on Justia Law

While serving a short sentence for domestic violence, Johnson caused a disturbance in a jail’s intake area. Officers were taking Johnson to his cell when he disobeyed orders to slow down. Another officer, Deputy Sootsman, stopped him. After a brief exchange, Johnson stepped in Sootsman’s general direction. Sootsman testified that he viewed this conduct as a threat. In response, he immediately grabbed Johnson’s neck, pushed him against the wall, and took him to the ground to be handcuffed. This force lasted about seven seconds. Investigators found that Sootsman’s actions violated jail policies. Sootsman pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery.Johnson sued Sootsman, citing the Eighth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claim. Johnson failed to meet the demanding standard of proving that Sootsman used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of” inflicting pain. Johnson’s claim fails if Sootsman used force out of a belief—even an unreasonable belief—that the force was necessary to control Johnson. The states may impose stricter limits on officers than the Constitution demands, so Johnson may try to seek relief under state tort law. View "Johnson v. Sootsman" on Justia Law

Based on a 1983 murder, a three-judge panel convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, Davis’s sentence was vacated, but on remand, the same three-judge panel again sentenced him to death. The Sixth Circuit subsequently vacated Davis’s death sentence on appeal of his first federal habeas petition. A different three-judge panel again sentenced Davis to death. Davis again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and granted conditional relief on claims that the state violated Davis’s constitutional rights by enforcing his 1984 jury waiver against him at his third sentencing hearing in 2009 and that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at Davis’s 2009 sentencing hearing by failing to move to recuse a judge for bias and in failing to reasonably prepare and present mitigation evidence. The court rejected claims that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to advise him of the collateral consequences of a jury waiver and that Davis’s trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence about the circumstances of Davis’s prior conviction, which provided the aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for the death penalty View "Davis v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 1994, Keith and his uncle were charged with cocaine trafficking based on information provided by Chatman, a confidential informant. Weeks later, someone shot six of Chatman’s relatives, killing three of them. A survivor identified Keith as his attacker. An Ohio jury convicted Keith of triple homicide and sentenced him to death.Keith has filed four federal habeas petitions; three have claimed “Brady” violations. This petition was filed after Keith received the personnel file for Yezzo, a forensic expert who testified at Keith’s trial that she could confirm that the perpetrator’s car had left a partial license plate imprint of the numbers “043” in the snow, matching the license plate on an Oldsmobile driven by Keith’s girlfriend (Davison) and that the tire tracks matched the tires Davison’s grandfather had purchased for the Oldsmobile—though they did not match the tires actually installed on it when the car was found. Yezzo’s file showed that Yezzo’s supervisors, colleagues, and union representatives had expressed concerns about the reliability of her work, even stating that Yezzo would “stretch the truth.” Keith submitted a new forensic analysis that concluded that the snow impressions were not consistent with the Oldsmobile. Ohio state courts again denied relief.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Keith cannot show that no reasonable juror today would convict him in light of the “evidence as a whole.” The full record contains significant additional evidence of Keith’s guilt. View "Keith v. Hill" on Justia Law