Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While serving a short sentence for domestic violence, Johnson caused a disturbance in a jail’s intake area. Officers were taking Johnson to his cell when he disobeyed orders to slow down. Another officer, Deputy Sootsman, stopped him. After a brief exchange, Johnson stepped in Sootsman’s general direction. Sootsman testified that he viewed this conduct as a threat. In response, he immediately grabbed Johnson’s neck, pushed him against the wall, and took him to the ground to be handcuffed. This force lasted about seven seconds. Investigators found that Sootsman’s actions violated jail policies. Sootsman pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery.Johnson sued Sootsman, citing the Eighth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claim. Johnson failed to meet the demanding standard of proving that Sootsman used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of” inflicting pain. Johnson’s claim fails if Sootsman used force out of a belief—even an unreasonable belief—that the force was necessary to control Johnson. The states may impose stricter limits on officers than the Constitution demands, so Johnson may try to seek relief under state tort law. View "Johnson v. Sootsman" on Justia Law

Based on a 1983 murder, a three-judge panel convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, Davis’s sentence was vacated, but on remand, the same three-judge panel again sentenced him to death. The Sixth Circuit subsequently vacated Davis’s death sentence on appeal of his first federal habeas petition. A different three-judge panel again sentenced Davis to death. Davis again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and granted conditional relief on claims that the state violated Davis’s constitutional rights by enforcing his 1984 jury waiver against him at his third sentencing hearing in 2009 and that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at Davis’s 2009 sentencing hearing by failing to move to recuse a judge for bias and in failing to reasonably prepare and present mitigation evidence. The court rejected claims that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to advise him of the collateral consequences of a jury waiver and that Davis’s trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence about the circumstances of Davis’s prior conviction, which provided the aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for the death penalty View "Davis v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 1994, Keith and his uncle were charged with cocaine trafficking based on information provided by Chatman, a confidential informant. Weeks later, someone shot six of Chatman’s relatives, killing three of them. A survivor identified Keith as his attacker. An Ohio jury convicted Keith of triple homicide and sentenced him to death.Keith has filed four federal habeas petitions; three have claimed “Brady” violations. This petition was filed after Keith received the personnel file for Yezzo, a forensic expert who testified at Keith’s trial that she could confirm that the perpetrator’s car had left a partial license plate imprint of the numbers “043” in the snow, matching the license plate on an Oldsmobile driven by Keith’s girlfriend (Davison) and that the tire tracks matched the tires Davison’s grandfather had purchased for the Oldsmobile—though they did not match the tires actually installed on it when the car was found. Yezzo’s file showed that Yezzo’s supervisors, colleagues, and union representatives had expressed concerns about the reliability of her work, even stating that Yezzo would “stretch the truth.” Keith submitted a new forensic analysis that concluded that the snow impressions were not consistent with the Oldsmobile. Ohio state courts again denied relief.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Keith cannot show that no reasonable juror today would convict him in light of the “evidence as a whole.” The full record contains significant additional evidence of Keith’s guilt. View "Keith v. Hill" on Justia Law

In 1997-2009, Chappelle managed Terra and withheld federal income, Social Security, and Medicare taxes (trust fund taxes) from Terra’s employees’ wages, 26 U.S.C. 3102, 3402, 7501, but failed to remit them to the IRS in 2007-2009. The IRS imposed “trust fund recovery penalties” on Chappelle. To avoid paying, Chappelle misstated his income and assets. He used business funds to pay personal expenses. He purchased real estate in others’ names rather than his own. Chappelle repeated this cycle in 2009-2016 after he closed Terra and sequentially opened three more companies. Chappelle repeatedly moved assets.In a 2016 IRS interview, Chappelle made false statements about his real estate purchases. Chappelle subsequently falsely claimed that the latest company did not have any employees and was entitled to a tax refund. Chappelle pleaded guilty to willfully attempting to evade the payment of the Trust Fund Recovery Penalties in 2008-2009. Chappelle’s PSR calculated a total tax loss of $1,636,228.28 and recommended increasing Chappelle’s offense level by two levels for his use of sophisticated means, U.S.S.G. 2T1.1(b). The district court overruled Chappelle’s objections, calculated his guideline range as 37-46 months, considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and sentenced Chappelle to 38 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court miscalculated the tax loss and erroneously found that his offense involved sophisticated means. View "United States v. Chappelle" on Justia Law

Jaffal was convicted of two counts of possessing controlled substances with the intent to distribute the drugs, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Count 1 involved 35.69 grams of a mixture containing heroin and carfentanil that was found in Jaffal’s pocket when police responded to a 911 call and found him unresponsive. Count 2 involved 27 pills containing fentanyl and 4-ANPP (a schedule II controlled substance) that were found in Jaffal’s pocket following a traffic stop weeks later. Jaffal was also convicted of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and as a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g)(1).The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and remanded. The district court did not err in admitting recordings of his phone calls from jail to show Jaffal’s intent. Statements by the other speaker that referenced hiding evidence, financial struggles, and what the police found on Jaffal when he overdosed were properly admitted to provide context to Jaffal’s own statements. A detective did not improperly provide expert testimony about Jaffal’s state of mind; the detective never mentioned Jaffal’s intent but noted only that the evidence was consistent with distribution. However, because the element of intent is sufficiently in dispute, the district court abused its discretion in denying Jaffal’s request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included-offense instruction of simple drug possession. View "United States v. Jaffal" on Justia Law

Wilkes pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 921(a), 924(a). His prior convictions included four Michigan convictions for the delivery/manufacture of cocaine from 1995, 2006, and 2007. The district court accepted Wilkes’s plea and applied the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e).Wilkes challenged the ACCA sentence, arguing that Michigan’s law includes ioflupane and federal law does not and that Michigan includes all the stereoisomers of cocaine, while federal law does not, so his prior convictions are not serious drug offenses. Wilkes also argued that the district court improperly overruled his objection to the inclusion of proffer-protected information in the PSR.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a finding that federal law covers the same isomers of cocaine as Michigan law and the rejection of Wilkes’s objection to the inclusion of proffer-protected information as harmless error. The court retained jurisdiction over Wilkes’s challenge to his ACCA enhancement based on ioflupane, noting the Supreme Court’s 2023 grant of certiorari in “Jackson.” on the issue of “[w]hether the classification of a prior state conviction as a ‘serious drug offense’ under the [ACCA] depends on the federal controlled-substance schedules in effect at the time of the defendant’s prior state crime, the time of the federal offense for which he is being sentenced, or the time of his federal sentencing.” View "United States v. Wilkes" on Justia Law

In 2011, Whitson participated in two Hobbs Act robberies. Both had victims who were threatened and physically injured; one was shot. Whitson was convicted of eight crimes at trial and sentenced to 1,252 months of incarceration. After several appeals, through which four of his convictions were vacated, he was resentenced in 2022 to 360 months of incarceration. Whitson argued that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court speculated that Whitson’s difficult upbringing made him more likely to re-offend, in spite of evidence to the contrary; failed to make an “individualized assessment” of Whitson’s background; impermissibly required Whitson to admit his guilt in order to consider fully evidence of his rehabilitation while incarcerated; and did not properly weigh the evidence of his rehabilitation.The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court committed plain error by requiring Whitson to admit his guilt in order to consider fully the evidence of his rehabilitation. “There is a fine line between consideration of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility as relevant to [section] 3553 and penalizing a defendant for maintaining their right to avoid self-incrimination, and in this case, the district court fell on the wrong side of that line.” View "United States v. Whitson" on Justia Law

Burroughs went to the Niles Municipal Court to pay a traffic fine. The electronic docketing system alerted court officials that there was an active warrant for Burroughs’s arrest, relating to a recent domestic violence incident. Zickefoose, a probation officer, followed Burroughs outside, commanded him to stop, and told him to put his hands behind his back. When Zickefoose tried to grab Burroughs’s forearm, he pulled away and ran toward the parking lot. Zickefoose, injured as Burroughs drove away, reported the incident to the police. Four officers responded separately to Burroughs’s apartment complex, where they boxed in Burroughs’s car and yelled for Burroughs to “[s]hut the car off” and “[g]et out of the vehicle.” Officer Mannella fired three rounds into the windshield, which hit Burroughs in the chest, killing him. Officer Reppy fired an additional five shots that penetrated the car but did not hit Burroughs.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court determined that a reasonable jury could find that when Mannella opened fire, Burroughs was moving slowly or was stationary; Burroughs was complying with Mannella’s commands and was standing to the side of the car, not in the vehicle’s path. The court noted testimony and unrebutted forensic analysis. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Mannella. View "Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio" on Justia Law

Campbell approached construction workers, performing road repairs, and asked who had voted for Trump in the recent presidential election. Following their responses, Campbell brandished a firearm and stated that he “had a bullet for each one.” Campbell then drove away, parking his truck near the construction site. When officers found the vehicle, Campbell was sitting inside with a semi-automatic pistol in his lap.Campbell pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which typically carried a maximum penalty of ten years’ imprisonment. The Armed Career Criminal Act, however, mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant with “three previous convictions” for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense,” each committed on “occasions different from another” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Campbell had Tennessee convictions for a 1985 robbery, a 1987 aggravated assault, a 1992 drug trafficking offense, plus Virginia drug trafficking offenses from 1992 and 1993. Campbell argued that the drug offenses were not committed on different “occasions,” and that the different-occasion issue must be decided by a jury. Campbell also challenged a standard supervised release condition: if Campbell’s probation officer determined Campbell posed a “risk” to another, the officer could require Campbell to notify the person about the risk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 180-month sentence, finding that the robbery and drug offenses qualify as ACCA predicates. Campbell admitted that he committed those predicates on four different dates, separated by months or years. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 2012, Kares was convicted of raping a 16-year-old girl. The judge found five “Offense Variables” that increased Kares’ sentencing range. While Kares’ case was on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Alleyne) that the Constitution requires any fact that increases the mandatory minimum penalty for a crime to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Kares’ counsel failed to raise an Alleyne claim on appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Kares’ conviction and sentence. Kares then began collateral review proceedings in Michigan state court. Seeking leave to appeal the denial of his motion for relief from judgment, Kares first cited Alleyne. Michigan courts rejected his arguments. In 2018, Kares unsuccessfully sought additional DNA testing under MCL 770.16.Kares filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in December 2018. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Kares’ application for leave to appeal the denial of his motion for biological testing in April 2019. The district court permitted Kares to amend his petition to include claims related to that request; he filed his amended petition in May 2019.The Sixth Circuit reversed an order denying as untimely Kares’s motion to vacate his sentence. Kares’ petition for DNA testing under MCL 770.16 tolls the limitations period; it was properly filed and calls for “postconviction or other collateral review” under 2244(d)(2). The court denied Kares’ motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include his merits “Alleyne” claim, which was procedurally defaulted. View "Kares v. Morrison" on Justia Law