Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

James picked up Herald and Hickerson in a silver car. Driving around, the men got high and plotted to rob the Contreras home. At a gas station, Hickerson picked up black ski masks. Herald went home. Hours later, two armed, masked men invaded the Contreras home and shot Adrian five times, killing him. Adrian’s brothers returned fire, hitting Hickerson. The other intruder escaped in a silver car. Around 4 a.m. that day, James arrived at his friends’ house in a silver car, telling them he had attempted a robbery with Hickerson and that Hickerson had been shot. James later told Herald that he “left Johnny” and had thrown his gun in a lake. Police found a black ski mask two blocks from the Contreras house, with James’s DNA on it.James was convicted of felony murder, home invasion, assault, and firearm offenses. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, finding that Herald’s testimony was supported by “the location of the weapon” and that a “weapon” found near the crime scene had James’s DNA on it. No evidence supported those findings. Police never found the second intruder’s gun and did not find James's DNA on any weapons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of James’s federal habeas petition. Even serious errors do not warrant habeas relief by themselves. Petitioners need to show a violation of the Constitution or federal law. James has not. View "James v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

Taylor pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and 400 or more grams of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, section 841(a). The PSR recommended sentencing enhancements for maintaining premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12); being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants, 3B1.1(a); and using fear, impulse, friendship, affection, or some combination thereof to involve another individual in the illegal purchase, sale, transport, or storage of a controlled substance, 2D1.1(b)(16)(A).Over Taylor’s objections and following testimony from several witnesses, the district court applied those enhancements, calculated his Guidelines range to be 324-405 months, and sentenced him to a prison term of 385 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Taylor stipulated to facts concerning his connection to his co-conspirators’ residences that provided a foundation for the application of the drug house enhancement. The court noted testimony about Taylor’s role atop his distribution network and that he “essentially blackmailed” at least one participant. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Zakhari, in a program to become a cardiothoracic surgeon, engaged in online sexually explicit conversations with a profile (boredcrbgirl) created by a detective, claiming to be a 15-year-old girl. He received an image of an officer. Zakhari sent an Uber to take boredcrbgirl to his apartment for sex. The officer arrived at Zakhari’s residence in the Uber. Zakhari was arrested. The detective interrogated him after giving the Miranda warnings. Zakhari said, “I can answer some questions and then maybe call.” After responding to basic questions, he said: My sister’s an attorney. Asked if he wanted to call her, Zakhari said “yeah,” then paused. The detective interjected that such a call would end the questioning. Zakhari continued to answer questions and made incriminating statements.Zakhari was convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), attempting to transmit an obscene image to a minor, section 1470, and attempting to produce child pornography sections 2251(a)(e). Zakhari unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements. The court declined to strike the third charge on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness.The Sixth Circuit vacated the convictions. The suppression motion should have been granted. The factual context shows Zakhari had “lawyerly assistance” in mind in wanting to call his sister and the invocation was not ambiguous. The court abused its discretion in failing to require the government to substantiate its explanations concerning Count 3. Zakhari showed enough to presume vindictiveness. View "United States v. Zakhari" on Justia Law

Castro-White died from a drug overdose. Detective Sivert noticed that Castro-White’s phone had many missed calls from Karaplis, who implicated others but lied to Sivert by denying any involvement. Later, after admitting his involvement, Karaplis described the drug dealer, “Red,” Red’s car, Red’s phone number, and, using Google Maps, the specific home where he bought drugs from Red. Sivert traveled to this home and spotted a nearby car p that fit Karaplis’s description and was registered to “Russell Davis,” called “Big Red.” Karaplis identified Davis’s picture with “100 percent” confidence. Sivert had Karaplis set up a phone call with Davis to discuss Castro-White’s death. Sivert then obtained a warrant to search Davis’s Garden Avenue home. During the search, police found the phone and illegal drugs. Davis unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence and was given a mandatory life sentence.The Sixth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing about what Sivert told the magistrate in person. Although the magistrate described his general practice, he lacked a “specific recollection” of Davis’s case. Sivert was “sure” that he had conveyed the many facts connecting Davis to the home. The court again denied Davis’s motion, despite finding that the affidavit failed to establish a probable-cause nexus between Davis and the home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sivert uncovered overwhelming evidence tying Davis to the home and the magistrate (not Sivert) bore any blame for failing to transcribe the additional oral testimony. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Roberts was convicted for federal crimes relating to the death of Caldwell, who was in a child-custody dispute with his ex-wife (Roberts’ girlfriend). Roberts tried to kill, or at least seriously harm, Caldwell by luring him through false guise to a remote location. Caldwell escaped but was later murdered after a family counseling session.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Roberts’ arguments under the Confrontation Clause, federal evidentiary rules, and the attorney-client privilege, that the district court improperly admitted evidence related to the earlier attack and other incriminating proof and his two constitutional challenges to the interstate stalking statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. 2261A, claiming that it exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that the counts of his conviction are multiplicitous. Testimonial statements are allowed into evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), for “[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused . . . the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” Caldwell was the declarant of the written-witness statement and an affidavit, which were to be used against Roberts, who intentionally caused Caldwell’s unavailability as a witness. The court also upheld the admission of “excited utterances’ made by Roberts to Caldwell’s attorney. View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Terry pleaded guilty to four counts of distributing a mixture containing fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and was sentenced to 57 months of imprisonment, at the high end of his U.S.S.G. range. He challenged the imposition of the Guidelines’ two-point enhancement for maintaining premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). Without the two-level enhancement, the Guidelines range would have been 37-46 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Terry sold fentanyl from the address and permitted the head of the conspiracy to use his property for drug distribution. The district court adopted the facts in the PSR, stating “the government’s argument as related to the facts which justify the enhancement, are spot on correct.” The PSR listed multiple activities involving Terry’s residence. The conclusion does not change even if no drugs were ever recovered from the house, there is no evidence that Terry cooked, manufactured, or packaged drugs there, no tools of the trade were found at his house, no money was seized from his house, and Terry had other legitimate employment. Distributing drugs “need not be the sole purpose” for the premises; it need only be one of the primary uses for the premises. View "United States v. Terry" on Justia Law

In 2016, Schumaker pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. Schumaker had 14 prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary, involving separate structures, occurring on 13 different dates. In 2017, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee aggravated burglary was not a violent felony and did not qualify as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) predicate offense. The district court sentenced Schumaker to 54 months’ imprisonment in 2020. While the government’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that Tennessee aggravated burglary qualified as an ACCA predicate offense. Schumaker then argued that his prior offenses “did not occur on separate occasions” under ACCA. The Sixth Circuit rejected his argument after considering the charging documents.On remand, Schumaker cited the Supreme Court’s 2022 grant of certiorari in “Wooden” and unsuccessfully argued that, in conducting the occasions-different inquiry, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prohibited the court from relying on the dates and locations of the aggravated-burglary offenses found in the judgments associated with those convictions because the dates and locations are non-elemental facts that the government had to prove to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The limited remand required the district court to sentence Schumaker under the ACCA. Circuit precedent bars Schumaker’s argument that the non-elemental facts in Shepard documents must be charged in an indictment and found by a jury before a court may rely on those facts in the occasions-different inquiry. View "United States v. Schumaker" on Justia Law

Officers Simpson and Patrick drove to Perez’s house to execute seven felony arrest warrants. Simpson approached Perez behind the house. After a brief exchange, Perez bolted. Perez wove her way through the neighborhood—including across a two-way street—in a chase the length of two football fields. Patrick ordered her to stop. Perez did not comply. Patrick fired his taser but missed. Perez kept fleeing, heading toward another two-lane street, intending to cross. A row of moving cars stood in her way, so she stopped. Perez alleges she raised her hands and stood still, expecting to be handcuffed. Patrick claims she did not raise her hands and instead took off running. Patrick made the split-second decision to fire his taser again. It connected. Perez fell forward and hit her chin on the ground, fracturing her jaw. She later pled guilty to evading police and resisting arrest.Perez filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Patrick’s request for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review the denial of summary judgment, 28 U.S.C. 1291, where the decision depended on issues of fact. View "Perez v. Simpson" on Justia Law

Alyssa was visiting her friend when Lundy, intoxicated forced his way into the house. A neighbor called 911 after hearing “a woman crying” and someone “being thrown around.” Lundy left before officers arrived. The women stated that Lundy left in a red Pontiac. Officers, looking for Lundy, received another call. Lundy had returned with a gun. Officer Martin returned to the house in about two minutes, activated his bodycam, and recorded the women saying that Lundy pointed the gun at them, loaded it, and threatened to kill them in front of Alyssa and Lundy’s young children. Officer Brown found Lundy near the house and looked through the window of the red Pontiac. A loaded pistol sat on the passenger’s seat. During booking, Lundy stated that he’d take the gun charge because “it’s mine.”Lundy was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The prosecution introduced Martin’s bodycam footage and Martin’s testimony about that conversation. Lundy argued that because Alyssa did not testify, her out-of-court statement was barred. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of that evidence. The excited-utterance exception applied because there was an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, the statement was made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and the statement was made while Alyssa was under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. The statement was nontestimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply. View "United States v. Lundy" on Justia Law

While L.C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee, Lee. L.C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women and failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. L.C. filed a negligence claim against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The district court dismissed the assault-and-battery claim, holding that the FTCA’s exception to sovereign immunity does not apply to torts committed by federal employees who act beyond the scope of their employment. It dismissed her negligence claim under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on other grounds. The claims fall outside the discretionary-function exception; BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official and deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations. The negligence claim, however, should be dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s attacks. View "L. C. v. United States" on Justia Law