Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Smith was stopped in a car that contained about 103 grams of crystal methamphetamine. Smith was charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The government indicated that it would seek an enhanced mandatory minimum of 180 months (21 U.S.C. 851) because of Smith’s prior drug trafficking conviction. Smith pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge; the government dropped the possession charge. The PSR calculated a guidelines range of 180-188 months—a combination of his uncontested guidelines range and his 180-month statutory mandatory minimum. The government requested a downward departure of one level under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 for Smith’s cooperation, indicating that Smith had lied but had supplied some helpful information. Smith argued that he “earned and deserve[d]” a four-level departure.The district court determined that Smith’s range was 151-188 months and that Smith had a mandatory minimum of 180 months, then decided on a two-level departure, and arrived at a range of 135-168 months. The court explained that the guidelines are advisory, evaluated the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and imposed a 158-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Michigan State Police (MSP) detectives, assigned to investigate the 2011 Bates killing, learned that on the night of her murder, Bates was in her home with Jones and both of their boyfriends. Reed, Jones’s boyfriend, was charged. Jones said she did not want to testify and that “they” would kill her if she did. An assistant prosecutor saw Brown (Reed’s mother) following Jones as Jones cried, yelling that she “couldn’t go testify and she better not go in there.” Brown was arrested for witness intimidation. Brown was in jail for approximately 96 hours and was not brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing. MSP never requested a warrant for her arrest or took any other action relating to her detention.Brown sued the MSP defendants for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but, because of the “complicated factual scenario” did not determine at the summary judgment stage which defendants bore legal responsibility for violating her rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Brown. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. It was clearly established at the time of Brown’s arrest that her arresting officers had a duty to take her before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing; they are not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Brown v. Knapp" on Justia Law

Around noon, officers responded to nine gunshots in a Cleveland neighborhood and located nine shell casings. A witness stated, and video surveillance confirmed, that he saw Wilson shooting out of a Ford truck as he chased a black Jeep. The victim (Wilson's relative) stated that Wilson got out of his truck and shot at his Jeep. The agents observed the victim’s wounds and images of the damaged Jeep. Wilson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of the ammunition used in the shooting. His PSR recommended a four-level enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), for shooting at an occupied vehicle, a felonious assault under Ohio law. Wilson was not charged in state court. Wilson asserted that he acted in self-defense. The witness apparently saw someone shoot out of the Jeep at Wilson. The judge stated: You do not have the right to shoot back at someone simply because they have shot at you. … you can’t even possess a bullet. If a bullet is here ,,, you are in violation of federal law, … 2K2.1 only requires that you were doing something in violation of some law.Wilson’s Guidelines range was 21-27 months; the court imposed a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court failed to make the requisite factual findings, rejecting Wilson’s self-defense claim based on its inaccurate belief that Wilson could not invoke self-defense because he did not lawfully possess the ammunition or firearm he used. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

D.B. left a Detroit and believed he was being followed by a silver sedan. At 1:41:01 a.m., a traffic camera captured D.B. driving through an intersection, followed by the silver sedan less than a minute later. Minutes later, about 2-½ miles away, an individual in a silver sedan shot D.B. Surveillance video captured muzzle flashes coming from a silver sedan described as “look[ing] like a Chevy Malibu.” The only silver sedan that could be placed in D.B.’s proximity around the time of the shooting was Smith’s Chevy Malibu. D.B. later picked Smith out of a photographic lineup as someone he had a “beef [with] in the past.”Smith’s car was tagged in Michigan’s Law Enforcement Information Network, with a warning that the car’s occupants were armed. Days later, an officer stopped Smith’s car and frisked Smith for weapons. Smith stated there was a gun in a case in the car. The trooper performed a “protective sweep” of the areas within a driver’s reach and found a handgun with a chambered bullet and a baggie containing fentanyl and heroin. Smith unsuccessfully moved to have the evidence suppressed as fruit of an unreasonable search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Smith and perform a limited search. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Coopwood has bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. She was institutionalized several times from 2010-2017. On August 13, 2017, Coopwood (six months pregnant) stopped taking her antipsychotic medications because of concerns about potential effects on the fetus. Coopwood fatally stabbed her mother and was ultimately found “guilty but mentally ill.”In pretrial custody, Coopwood, not taking her antipsychotic medications, was repeatedly screened and denied any history of mental health treatment. Employees, aware of Coopwood’s history of inpatient psychiatric care, did not raise concerns. Coopwood alleges that, in August 2017, Jailer Watts dragged her to her cell and kicked Coopwood in the stomach, after which she suffered cramping with a bloody discharge from her vagina. She was hospitalized several times in August and September. On October 19, she was seen by a psychiatrist, Haddad, who determined that Coopwood had been psychotic for an unknown period and seemed unaware of her circumstances. On October 22, Coopwood, exhibiting bizarre behavior, was forcibly given antipsychotic medications. She was readmitted on November 8, reporting contractions. Labor was induced. Coopwood’s baby was stillborn. Coopwood contends that she attempted to file a grievance but that her verbal requests were ignored.Coopwood’s suit, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her medical needs, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants failed to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Jail’s staff thwarted Coopwood’s attempts to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Coopwood v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

Kentucky State Police learned that a woman (Miller) had stolen a truck. State Trooper Couch located and stopped the truck, approached, and told Miller to exit the vehicle. According to Couch, Miller responded, “I’m not going back to fucking jail,” and refused to open the locked door. When Couch opened the door with a key code provided by the truck’s owner, Miller fired a single shot, hitting Couch in the shoulder at “point-blank” range. Couch and another trooper fired nearly 50 rounds at Miller, who was struck multiple times. Miller might have fired again during the exchange. More troopers arrived and forcibly removed Miller from the truck. In the truck, officers found a stolen revolver with three live rounds and two spent cartridges in the cylinder. Miller later claimed that she intended to scare Couch but hit him by mistake and that she had smoked methamphetamine that day. Couch and Miller survived.Miller pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of a stolen firearm, section 922(j). The PSR calculated Miller’s Guidelines range as 324-405 months. Under U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a), 5G1.2(d), however, her recommended sentence was reduced to 240 months to match the maximum sentence that she could receive for the firearms offenses. The district court applied the cross-reference to attempted murder and sentenced her to the statutory maximum sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 240-month sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

You, a U.S. citizen of Chinese origin, worked as a chemist, testing the chemical coatings used in Coca-Cola’s beverage cans. You was one of only a few Coca-Cola employees with access to secret BPA-free formulas. You secretly planned to start a company in China to manufacture the BPA-free chemical and received business grants from the Chinese government, claiming that she had developed the world’s “most advanced” BPA-free coating technology. On her last night as a Coca-Cola employee, You transferred the formula files to her Google Drive account and then to a USB drive. You certified that she had not kept any confidential information. You then joined Eastman, where she copied company files to the same account and USB drive. Eastman fired You and became aware of her actions. Eastman retrieved the USB drive and reported You to the FBI.You was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5), possessing stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit economic espionage, and economic espionage. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing after rejecting You’s claims that the district court admitted racist testimony and gave jury instructions that mischaracterized the government’s burden of proof as to You’s knowledge of the trade secrets and their value to China. In calculating the intended loss, the court clearly erred by relying on market estimates that it deemed speculative and by confusing anticipated sales of You’s planned business with its anticipated profits. View "United States v. You" on Justia Law

Stewart obtained his private pilot airman’s certificate in 1978. In 2013, he flew at altitudes and in weather conditions for which he was not authorized. The FAA notified Stewart that it planned to suspend his airman’s certificate. He could: surrender his certificate and begin the 180-day suspension; submit evidence that he had not violated the regulations; discuss the matter informally with an FAA attorney; or request an appeal to the NTSB. Stewart instead sent a letter stating that the agency lacked jurisdiction over private pilots. The FAA suspended Stewart’s certificate and assessed a $5,000 civil penalty for failure to turn in his certificate. Stewart kept flying. When he failed to properly deploy his plane’s landing gear, the FAA flagged his plane for inspection. Stewart did not comply. The FAA suspended the airworthiness certificate for his plane. Stewart kept flying and again landed his plane with the landing gear up. The FAA revoked Stewart’s airman’s certificate and again assessed a civil penalty. Stewart continued flying. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stewart's convictions for knowingly and willfully serving as an airman without an airman’s certificate authorizing the individual to serve in that capacity, 49 U.S.C. 46306(b)(7), rejecting Stewart’s argument that he was not “without” a certificate because he still had physical possession of his. The statute required Stewart to have FAA permission to fly at the time of the flights in question. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Officers discovered Brewer’s naked body tied to his bed frame; he had been shot twice. The case went cold for several years before an inmate told officers that Miller and Hall and two women had set up a threesome with Brewer in order to rob him. DNA found at the scene did not implicate either woman. The women implicated Martin. Officers knew the story was false but nonetheless interviewed Martin; the interview was not recorded. Martin, who claimed to have been "very high" on the night of the murder, waffled between denying any involvement and other stories. Officers falsely told her that her DNA was found at the scene and implied her children could be taken away. Martin failed a polygraph examination. Martin was told that “she’[d] walk” if she revealed the killer but that if she did not implicate anybody else, she would “go down.” Eventually, with a plea agreement, she implicated Miller. Martin repeatedly attempted to recant. Kentucky indicted Miller but eventually dropped the charges.Miller filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, destruction of exculpatory evidence, due process violations, and conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Because the conduct at issue was in furtherance of genuine prosecutorial interests, the prosecutor has absolute immunity for his actions, including ordering the destruction of evidence and purported thwarting of a court order. The other defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Price v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Tennessee law enforcement was alerted to a drug distribution operation and executed a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of over 200 grams of pure meth. Agents executed additional warrants and intercepted phone calls. Twelve individuals, including Reed and Brown, were charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of meth. According to trial testimony by the law-enforcement agents, Brown and Reed both admitted to purchasing meth on numerous occasions and named several others. Four co-conspirators testified at trial. The parties agreed, and the judge confirmed, that Brown should not be mentioned during testimony to avoid the possibility of incriminating him. An officer read directly from his report, inadvertently mentioning Brown before stopping midsentence. Brown’s counsel made no objection. A joint stipulation was entered regarding the quantity and purity of the meth seized from various codefendants. No meth was seized from either Brown or Reed, who asked the district court to instruct the jury that “a conspiracy requires more than just a buyer-seller relationship.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Brown and Reed but vacated their 360-month sentences. The defendants’ request for a buyer-seller jury instruction was appropriately denied. The district court procedurally erred when calculating the defendants’ Guidelines ranges; it provided no basis to conclude that at least 4.5 kilograms of the meth distributed was actual meth. View "Reed v. United States" on Justia Law