Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant One operated as a money broker for drug organizations that wanted to move money from the U.S. to Mexico. DEA agents infiltrated the operation. An undercover “coordinating agent” received from Defendant One a list of cities in which drug proceeds needed to be obtained and then coordinated with the DEA for a “receiving agent” to receive illicit funds. The coordinating agent provided a receiving agent’s phone number to Defendant One who shared it with his client. The money drop would be set up and executed, with the receiving agent obtaining illicit funds from a courier and depositing the funds in an undercover DEA bank account. The money was then transferred to Defendant One as cryptocurrency, then sent back to the client as cash.Guerrero was involved as a courier in three separate money drops in Chicago in 2020. Defendant One, Guerrero, and several other couriers were charged with conspiracy to launder money. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Guerrero’s convictions and sentence. Any errors involving venue or evidentiary rulings were not prejudicial. The court also rejected a claim of “variance,” that the evidence failed to demonstrate an overarching conspiracy between Guerrero and each individual named in the indictment, but rather demonstrated only a smaller conspiracy between himself and Defendant One. View "United States v. Rudy Guerrero" on Justia Law

In 2015, McBride was charged with first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. After two trials, a jury convicted McBride on all charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the court erred in failing to admit his full police interview, that the evidence could not support his convictions, and that his counsel was ineffective. While his appeal was pending, McBride filed unsuccessful motions requesting a “Ginther” hearing to present evidence of his counsel’s ineffectiveness.In a brief to the Michigan Supreme Court, McBride first alleged that his due process rights were violated during his pretrial detention. That court returned this brief because McBride was represented by counsel. In a federal habeas claim, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), McBride alleged his due process and Miranda rights were violated during his arrest and detention; his trial counsel was ineffective; and the Michigan courts erred in various evidentiary rulings. The district court dismissed claims without prejudice, citing the unexhausted first claim. A year later, McBride moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that his exhausted claims should be allowed to proceed under the Supreme Court’s “Rhines” decision which gives courts facing both exhausted and unexhausted claims two options besides dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, rejecting McBride’s argument that the district court should have sua sponte considered alternatives to dismissal. View "McBride v. Skipper" on Justia Law

Liggins was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1),846, and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute heroin, sections 841 and 2. At a pretrial hearing, the district judge remarked that Liggins, a Black man, “look[ed] like a criminal to me” and that Liggins was doing “what criminals do.” Liggins unsuccessfully moved for the judge’s recusal based on these remarks, among others, such as "I’m tired of this case. I’m tired of this defendant."The Sixth Circuit vacated Liggins's conviction and 127-month sentence and remanded to another district judge for a new trial. The judge's remarks could be understood to demonstrate clear prejudgment of Liggins’ guilt and could be understood to refer to Liggins's appearance rather than his behavior in insisting on a jury trial and changing attorneys. The judge also denied Liggins's requests to speak. "In this case, the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process is significant." View "United States v. Liggins" on Justia Law

Smith was stopped in a car that contained about 103 grams of crystal methamphetamine. Smith was charged with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The government indicated that it would seek an enhanced mandatory minimum of 180 months (21 U.S.C. 851) because of Smith’s prior drug trafficking conviction. Smith pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge; the government dropped the possession charge. The PSR calculated a guidelines range of 180-188 months—a combination of his uncontested guidelines range and his 180-month statutory mandatory minimum. The government requested a downward departure of one level under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 for Smith’s cooperation, indicating that Smith had lied but had supplied some helpful information. Smith argued that he “earned and deserve[d]” a four-level departure.The district court determined that Smith’s range was 151-188 months and that Smith had a mandatory minimum of 180 months, then decided on a two-level departure, and arrived at a range of 135-168 months. The court explained that the guidelines are advisory, evaluated the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and imposed a 158-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Michigan State Police (MSP) detectives, assigned to investigate the 2011 Bates killing, learned that on the night of her murder, Bates was in her home with Jones and both of their boyfriends. Reed, Jones’s boyfriend, was charged. Jones said she did not want to testify and that “they” would kill her if she did. An assistant prosecutor saw Brown (Reed’s mother) following Jones as Jones cried, yelling that she “couldn’t go testify and she better not go in there.” Brown was arrested for witness intimidation. Brown was in jail for approximately 96 hours and was not brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing. MSP never requested a warrant for her arrest or took any other action relating to her detention.Brown sued the MSP defendants for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity but, because of the “complicated factual scenario” did not determine at the summary judgment stage which defendants bore legal responsibility for violating her rights. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest Brown. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. It was clearly established at the time of Brown’s arrest that her arresting officers had a duty to take her before a magistrate for a probable cause hearing; they are not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Brown v. Knapp" on Justia Law

Around noon, officers responded to nine gunshots in a Cleveland neighborhood and located nine shell casings. A witness stated, and video surveillance confirmed, that he saw Wilson shooting out of a Ford truck as he chased a black Jeep. The victim (Wilson's relative) stated that Wilson got out of his truck and shot at his Jeep. The agents observed the victim’s wounds and images of the damaged Jeep. Wilson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of the ammunition used in the shooting. His PSR recommended a four-level enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), for shooting at an occupied vehicle, a felonious assault under Ohio law. Wilson was not charged in state court. Wilson asserted that he acted in self-defense. The witness apparently saw someone shoot out of the Jeep at Wilson. The judge stated: You do not have the right to shoot back at someone simply because they have shot at you. … you can’t even possess a bullet. If a bullet is here ,,, you are in violation of federal law, … 2K2.1 only requires that you were doing something in violation of some law.Wilson’s Guidelines range was 21-27 months; the court imposed a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court failed to make the requisite factual findings, rejecting Wilson’s self-defense claim based on its inaccurate belief that Wilson could not invoke self-defense because he did not lawfully possess the ammunition or firearm he used. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

D.B. left a Detroit and believed he was being followed by a silver sedan. At 1:41:01 a.m., a traffic camera captured D.B. driving through an intersection, followed by the silver sedan less than a minute later. Minutes later, about 2-½ miles away, an individual in a silver sedan shot D.B. Surveillance video captured muzzle flashes coming from a silver sedan described as “look[ing] like a Chevy Malibu.” The only silver sedan that could be placed in D.B.’s proximity around the time of the shooting was Smith’s Chevy Malibu. D.B. later picked Smith out of a photographic lineup as someone he had a “beef [with] in the past.”Smith’s car was tagged in Michigan’s Law Enforcement Information Network, with a warning that the car’s occupants were armed. Days later, an officer stopped Smith’s car and frisked Smith for weapons. Smith stated there was a gun in a case in the car. The trooper performed a “protective sweep” of the areas within a driver’s reach and found a handgun with a chambered bullet and a baggie containing fentanyl and heroin. Smith unsuccessfully moved to have the evidence suppressed as fruit of an unreasonable search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop Smith and perform a limited search. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Coopwood has bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. She was institutionalized several times from 2010-2017. On August 13, 2017, Coopwood (six months pregnant) stopped taking her antipsychotic medications because of concerns about potential effects on the fetus. Coopwood fatally stabbed her mother and was ultimately found “guilty but mentally ill.”In pretrial custody, Coopwood, not taking her antipsychotic medications, was repeatedly screened and denied any history of mental health treatment. Employees, aware of Coopwood’s history of inpatient psychiatric care, did not raise concerns. Coopwood alleges that, in August 2017, Jailer Watts dragged her to her cell and kicked Coopwood in the stomach, after which she suffered cramping with a bloody discharge from her vagina. She was hospitalized several times in August and September. On October 19, she was seen by a psychiatrist, Haddad, who determined that Coopwood had been psychotic for an unknown period and seemed unaware of her circumstances. On October 22, Coopwood, exhibiting bizarre behavior, was forcibly given antipsychotic medications. She was readmitted on November 8, reporting contractions. Labor was induced. Coopwood’s baby was stillborn. Coopwood contends that she attempted to file a grievance but that her verbal requests were ignored.Coopwood’s suit, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her medical needs, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants failed to establish the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Jail’s staff thwarted Coopwood’s attempts to exhaust her administrative remedies. View "Coopwood v. Wayne County, Michigan" on Justia Law

Kentucky State Police learned that a woman (Miller) had stolen a truck. State Trooper Couch located and stopped the truck, approached, and told Miller to exit the vehicle. According to Couch, Miller responded, “I’m not going back to fucking jail,” and refused to open the locked door. When Couch opened the door with a key code provided by the truck’s owner, Miller fired a single shot, hitting Couch in the shoulder at “point-blank” range. Couch and another trooper fired nearly 50 rounds at Miller, who was struck multiple times. Miller might have fired again during the exchange. More troopers arrived and forcibly removed Miller from the truck. In the truck, officers found a stolen revolver with three live rounds and two spent cartridges in the cylinder. Miller later claimed that she intended to scare Couch but hit him by mistake and that she had smoked methamphetamine that day. Couch and Miller survived.Miller pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of a stolen firearm, section 922(j). The PSR calculated Miller’s Guidelines range as 324-405 months. Under U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a), 5G1.2(d), however, her recommended sentence was reduced to 240 months to match the maximum sentence that she could receive for the firearms offenses. The district court applied the cross-reference to attempted murder and sentenced her to the statutory maximum sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 240-month sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

You, a U.S. citizen of Chinese origin, worked as a chemist, testing the chemical coatings used in Coca-Cola’s beverage cans. You was one of only a few Coca-Cola employees with access to secret BPA-free formulas. You secretly planned to start a company in China to manufacture the BPA-free chemical and received business grants from the Chinese government, claiming that she had developed the world’s “most advanced” BPA-free coating technology. On her last night as a Coca-Cola employee, You transferred the formula files to her Google Drive account and then to a USB drive. You certified that she had not kept any confidential information. You then joined Eastman, where she copied company files to the same account and USB drive. Eastman fired You and became aware of her actions. Eastman retrieved the USB drive and reported You to the FBI.You was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5), possessing stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit economic espionage, and economic espionage. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing after rejecting You’s claims that the district court admitted racist testimony and gave jury instructions that mischaracterized the government’s burden of proof as to You’s knowledge of the trade secrets and their value to China. In calculating the intended loss, the court clearly erred by relying on market estimates that it deemed speculative and by confusing anticipated sales of You’s planned business with its anticipated profits. View "United States v. You" on Justia Law