Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stewart obtained his private pilot airman’s certificate in 1978. In 2013, he flew at altitudes and in weather conditions for which he was not authorized. The FAA notified Stewart that it planned to suspend his airman’s certificate. He could: surrender his certificate and begin the 180-day suspension; submit evidence that he had not violated the regulations; discuss the matter informally with an FAA attorney; or request an appeal to the NTSB. Stewart instead sent a letter stating that the agency lacked jurisdiction over private pilots. The FAA suspended Stewart’s certificate and assessed a $5,000 civil penalty for failure to turn in his certificate. Stewart kept flying. When he failed to properly deploy his plane’s landing gear, the FAA flagged his plane for inspection. Stewart did not comply. The FAA suspended the airworthiness certificate for his plane. Stewart kept flying and again landed his plane with the landing gear up. The FAA revoked Stewart’s airman’s certificate and again assessed a civil penalty. Stewart continued flying. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stewart's convictions for knowingly and willfully serving as an airman without an airman’s certificate authorizing the individual to serve in that capacity, 49 U.S.C. 46306(b)(7), rejecting Stewart’s argument that he was not “without” a certificate because he still had physical possession of his. The statute required Stewart to have FAA permission to fly at the time of the flights in question. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Officers discovered Brewer’s naked body tied to his bed frame; he had been shot twice. The case went cold for several years before an inmate told officers that Miller and Hall and two women had set up a threesome with Brewer in order to rob him. DNA found at the scene did not implicate either woman. The women implicated Martin. Officers knew the story was false but nonetheless interviewed Martin; the interview was not recorded. Martin, who claimed to have been "very high" on the night of the murder, waffled between denying any involvement and other stories. Officers falsely told her that her DNA was found at the scene and implied her children could be taken away. Martin failed a polygraph examination. Martin was told that “she’[d] walk” if she revealed the killer but that if she did not implicate anybody else, she would “go down.” Eventually, with a plea agreement, she implicated Miller. Martin repeatedly attempted to recant. Kentucky indicted Miller but eventually dropped the charges.Miller filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, destruction of exculpatory evidence, due process violations, and conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Because the conduct at issue was in furtherance of genuine prosecutorial interests, the prosecutor has absolute immunity for his actions, including ordering the destruction of evidence and purported thwarting of a court order. The other defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Price v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Tennessee law enforcement was alerted to a drug distribution operation and executed a search warrant that resulted in the seizure of over 200 grams of pure meth. Agents executed additional warrants and intercepted phone calls. Twelve individuals, including Reed and Brown, were charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of meth. According to trial testimony by the law-enforcement agents, Brown and Reed both admitted to purchasing meth on numerous occasions and named several others. Four co-conspirators testified at trial. The parties agreed, and the judge confirmed, that Brown should not be mentioned during testimony to avoid the possibility of incriminating him. An officer read directly from his report, inadvertently mentioning Brown before stopping midsentence. Brown’s counsel made no objection. A joint stipulation was entered regarding the quantity and purity of the meth seized from various codefendants. No meth was seized from either Brown or Reed, who asked the district court to instruct the jury that “a conspiracy requires more than just a buyer-seller relationship.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Brown and Reed but vacated their 360-month sentences. The defendants’ request for a buyer-seller jury instruction was appropriately denied. The district court procedurally erred when calculating the defendants’ Guidelines ranges; it provided no basis to conclude that at least 4.5 kilograms of the meth distributed was actual meth. View "Reed v. United States" on Justia Law

Ohlinger, booked into the jail (SEORJ) as a pretrial detainee for burglary, reported a history of bipolar disorder and depression and that she used intravenous heroin daily. She indicated no history of seizures and reported no signs of physical trauma or illness. In the following days, Ohlinger did not report any medical problems. On June 25, at 6:57 a.m., Ohlinger, walking in the common area, appeared to become disoriented and fell off a bench. Officers Lowery and Jarvis responded. Nurse Gray found no evidence to support inmates’ statements that Ohlinger had a seizure and hit her head. She was returned to her cell. At 7:07 a.m., Lowery and Jarvis responded to a call and, seeing Ohlinger had urinated on herself, escorted Ohlinger to the medical unit. Gray again examined Ohlinger. Lowery and Jarvis returned Ohlinger to her cell to await a blood test. At 9:12 a.m., an inmate discovered Ohlinger, unresponsive. Gray used a portable defibrillator and began CPR. At 9:28 a.m., paramedics transported Ohlinger to the hospital, where she died. An autopsy identified the cause of death as seizure activity due to a subarachnoid hemorrhage and subdural hematoma of undetermined etiology. There was no evidence of skull fracture or contusions.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Gray, Lowery, and Jarvis. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to Gray and otherwise affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that Gray acted recklessly, not negligently, in the face of unjustifiably high risk to Ohlinger’s health. Gray’s observations of Ohlinger, information provided by other jail officials and inmates, and SEORJ’s policies should have led Gray to seek care from a doctor or hospital. View "Mercer v. Athens County, Ohio" on Justia Law

Spectrum contracts with Michigan to house children who are ordered to be detained in facilities “similar to a prison setting.” The children are completely restricted in their movements. The state requires Spectrum to monitor them on a 24/7 basis. A court ordered the detention of 15-year-old Quintana at Spectrum’s facility on August 24, 2018. Quintana struggled with depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, among other things. On September 11, 2018, Quintana took his life while alone in his bedroom. No one checked his room in the 45 minutes between the last time he was seen alive and when his body was found, violating a contractual requirement that Spectrum conduct “eye-on checks” every 15 minutes when the children are “outside of the direct supervision of staff.” Spectrum had a policy or custom of skipping many eye-on checks and falsifying supervision logs to reflect that the checks had been performed.Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissed the dismissal of the suit. The complaint contains adequate facts to establish that Spectrum is a state actor. Spectrum was allegedly engaged in a public function similar to a correctional institution, a traditionally exclusive state function. View "Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services" on Justia Law

Petlechkov was convicted of 20 counts of mail fraud. 18 U.S.C. 1341. The Sixth Circuit vacated 17 counts, affirmed three, and remanded in 2019. The district court resentenced Petlechkov to 37 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release, referred him for deportation proceedings upon completion of his prison sentence, entered a money judgment against him, and awarded restitution. To satisfy the money judgment, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order that allowed the government—if needed—to seize and sell three substitute properties. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petlechkov was not making restitution payments. The government asked the court to add a provision to the final forfeiture order allowing it to sell the third property to pay the restitution award.The district court entered the final forfeiture order with the requested provision, denied Petlechkov’s subsequent motions, and imposed a filing restriction. The Sixth Circuit vacated the filing restriction and the new forfeiture provision but otherwise affirmed. The district court did not offer any reason for imposing the new provision, cite any authority for adding the provision, or comply with any apparently available authority. The court erroneously held that Petlechkov lacked standing; he had standing to challenge the new provision. View "United States v. Petlechkov" on Justia Law

McCormick pled guilty without a plea agreement to offenses involving drugs or guns. He received a below-Guidelines sentence and did not appeal. Ten months later, he moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his attorney performed ineffectively by failing to file a notice of appeal.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Review of an attorney's conduct is “highly deferential.” The district court’s finding that McCormick did not instruct counsel to file an appeal is “plausible on the record as a whole.” McCormick acknowledged telling his counsel that he wanted to appeal only if he lost at trial, or if he “didn’t feel like [he] was treated fairly” at sentencing. Neither condition was met. Counsel testified that McCormick expressed frustration with his sentence but never told him to file an appeal. The district court had to decide between two plausible stories, so its choice could not have been clearly erroneous. The court rejected McCormick’s claim that counsel was ineffective for consulting him before sentencing rather than after and was required to repeat his advice after sentencing. The Constitution does not impose any such obligation. The court’s colloquy ensured that the defendant understood his rights. McCormick may have expected an appeal, but the government did not promise that and did not breach its agreement. View "McCormick v. United States" on Justia Law

Officer Zolnai, responding to a call, passed a parked, running Chevy Malibu. The driver, Morgan, “appeared to be passed out.” After assisting the caller, Zolnai drove back and again noticed the seemingly passed-out occupant in the Malibu. Suspecting an overdose or intoxication, Zolnai parked and turned on his body camera. He did not turn on the squad’s flashing lights. Zolnai noticed a civilian, potentially in the path of the vehicle. In his experience, intoxicated individuals might “hit the gas” if startled. Without first trying to arouse Morgan, Zolnai opened the car door and asked if Morgan was okay. Morgan's response was “groggy.” Zolnai asked Morgan for “ID.” Morgan moved his hand between the seat and the console. Worried that Morgan might be reaching for a firearm, Zolnai asked him to step out. Morgan refused. A struggle followed. Morgan reached for a cardboard box in the passenger seat. Other officers arrived. They eventually handcuffed Morgan. In searching Morgan, they found plastic bags containing fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine, and a semi-automatic pistol in the cardboard box.The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress, citing the community-caretaking doctrine. Morgan conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Zolnai violated the Fourth Amendment when he seized and eventually searched Morgan by unreasonably opening his car door without warning in the absence of any exigency. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. 1958; using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, sections 924(c), (j); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Amaya to pay a statutorily required “special assessment” of $100 per count of conviction, section 3013(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Years later, Amaya filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on count two, arguing that after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding, his murder conspiracy charge was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for his 924(c) conviction. The district court invoked the “concurrent sentence doctrine” and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 2255 limits its reach to “prisoner[s] in custody ... claiming the right to be released.” Only prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody may challenge their sentences. Even if his motion were successful, Amaya would still be in custody on the two unchallenged life sentences and the $100 special assessment attached to Amaya’s challenged conviction did not warrant section 2255 review. View "Amaya v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, Corridore was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. He was sentenced to 19 months to 15 years in prison and became subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) via a permanent ankle bracelet and sex offender registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). By the time he filed a habeas petition in federal district court, he had been released from prison and discharged from parole. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that Corridore was no longer in custody and therefore could not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Corridore’s arguments that he is subject to lifetime sex-offender registration and electronic monitoring—requirements that he says satisfy the custody requirement. The collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack. The issue is whether a petitioner’s movement is limited because of direct government control and therefore amounts to a severe restraint on liberty. The LEM and SORA requirements, even combined, do not qualify. View "Corridore v. Washington" on Justia Law