Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show. View "United States v. Richard Austin Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.
The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. View "Curt Russell Cannamela" on Justia Law

In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

While Smith was hiding in the woods, with an outstanding parole violation, police arrested him with a loaded gun in his possession. Smith was charged with illegally possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Despite advice from his attorney and the judge, Smith declined to stipulate his status as a felon and his knowledge of the same to preclude the government from introducing evidence of his prior felony convictions. At trial, the government introduced evidence of Smith’s 11 prior felony convictions: three convictions for grand larceny, one for forgery, two for robbery, four for escape, and one North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and infliction of serious injury. A jury convicted him. The district court sentenced him to 235 months in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s argument about the alleged unfairly prejudicial taint of evidence of his 11 prior felony convictions. Smith’s North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury qualified as a predicate violent felony under ACCA because it requires purposeful or knowing conduct and is categorically a violent felony. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After drunkenly beating his wife and threatening to shoot her with a handgun, Carter pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Carter had a prior conviction for felony robbery under Ohio law. The district court held that Ohio robbery is a crime of violence and calculated an enhanced Guidelines range of 37–46 months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); 4B1.2. Considering the harm Carter caused his wife, the district court suggested the sentence would be the same even without the enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Carter’s 38-month sentence. The elements of Ohio robbery are “the same as, or narrower than,” the Guidelines’ elements of extortion. The court rejected Carter’s argument that because the crime he was convicted of is called robbery it could only be compared to Guidelines robbery. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

McReynolds and 17 co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846. The government, using circumstantial evidence, argued that McReynolds was part of the charged conspiracy, and should be held responsible for the drug quantities attributed to the conspiracy. The jury found McReynolds guilty and attributed “less than 100 grams” of heroin and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine to him. His PSR included the drug amounts attributable to the conspiracy–767.66 grams of heroin, 711.56 grams of cocaine, and 263.51 grams of cocaine base. The court adopted the PSR’s drug quantity determinations, calculated McReynolds’ guidelines range at 151-181 months, and imposed a 151-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded, stating that the district court should adequately explain its reasoning if it attributes any drug amounts to McReynolds beyond the jury’s verdict. On remand, the district court did not change its guideline range determination but imposed a 145-month sentence to account for McReynolds’ post-sentencing positive conduct. The court concluded that the PSR correctly calculated the drug quantity attributable to McReynolds because that quantity was within the scope of his conspiratorial agreement and foreseeable to him but opined that the jury was “confused” and cited three key witness testimonies.The Sixth Circuit again vacated the sentence. Because the higher drug quantities were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, McReynolds’ sentence is substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. McReynolds" on Justia Law

Michigan’s 1994 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (amended in 2006 and 2011) imposed registration requirements, restrictions on living and working in a school zone, and reporting requirements. Michigan retroactively imposed these obligations, including those contained in the amendments, on offenders convicted before 2006 and 2011. In another suit, the Sixth Circuit held, in 2016, that the retroactive application of SORA amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. While an interim order was in effect, in another suit, Michigan passed a fourth version of SORA, effective on March 24, 2021, removing or modifying provisions that had been declared unconstitutional.In 2021, five Michigan sex offenders filed suit, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. They alleged that the Michigan State Police enforced unconstitutional provisions of SORA from 2006 onwards, including after the previous cases were decided. They alleged that state officials, whom they purported to sue “in their individual capacities,” knew that the invalidated provisions were unconstitutional, but failed to stop their subordinates from enforcing them, noting the governors’ duty under the Michigan Constitution to ensure the faithful execution of federal and state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on various grounds, including sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The plaintiffs fail to state a claim of supervisory liability. They do not plausibly allege that the defendants authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in any unconstitutional conduct. View "Does 1-5 v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gaona fired a gun with the intent to kill a certain individual but accidentally shot and injured a bystander. Gaona pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to assault with intent to murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Gaona was sentenced to two years for the firearm conviction, consecutive to a 17-to-50-year sentence for the assault conviction, based on a PSR which reported three prior misdemeanors, including one stemming from a 2009 incident, for which Gaona was (without the assistance of counsel) convicted of possession of marijuana via plea and sentenced to 30 days’ time served. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected his argument that state courts may not rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in enhancing a sentence if that conviction resulted in a sentence of actual imprisonment.The district court denied Gaona’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition on the same sentencing argument but stayed his petition so that he could exhaust his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court. The state courts rejected those claims. The federal court then rejected his ineffective assistance claims as he had not filed an amended habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that state courts may not, in enhancing a sentence, rely on an uncounseled misdemeanor that resulted in a sentence of time served. View "Gaona v. Brown" on Justia Law

Michigan State Police Officer Lay, stationed about 35 miles from the Indiana state line, noticed a vehicle driving northbound following closely behind another vehicle—a state law infraction. Lay began following the vehicle and ran its plate through a database, which noted that the car had been in Texas, one day before. Lay pulled the vehicle over and approached. Unprompted, the passenger handed over his driver’s license without making eye contact. The driver produced his driver’s license and a car rental agreement. Returning to her cruiser, Lay ran the information through databases and radioed for assistance. The driver’s name came up clean; the passenger was on probation for a prior crime. Meanwhile, Officer Bierema arrived with his drug-detection K-9. Approximately seven minutes into the stop, Lay exited her cruiser to speak with the passenger about his probation status; he was less than forthcoming. Lay requested consent to search the car, which the driver withheld. She then ordered him to stand back while Bierema’s K-9 conducted a sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs, prompting the officers to search the car. In the back seat, they found two gym bags containing cocaine and methamphetamine.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motions to suppress, rejecting arguments that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally overlong and that the driver’s arrest was unsupported by probable cause. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law