Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant murdered a rival drug dealer. When he learned that a witness might cooperate with law enforcement, Defendant murdered him too. Federal charges followed. His lawyers negotiated a plea deal under which the government would drop many of the charges, and he would serve 480 to 520 months in prison. Defendant agreed to the plea deal, and the district court imposed a 504-month sentence. Defendant had second thoughts. He moved to vacate his sentence, claiming that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in advising him to accept the plea deal. The district court rejected this contention.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that his attorney performed deficiently and that he suffered prejudice from the inadequate representation. The court reasoned that given the lack of a single favorable decision at the time, the district court may not have accepted it. Even if the court had done so, “it is not clear how the successful exclusion of” one of 18 charges would have materially improved Defendant’s bargaining position. Yet despite this minimal leverage, Defendant’s counsel secured a plea with a 480-to520-month sentence—a lengthy term, granted, but one that (with good time credit) permits Defendant’s release in his mid-to-late 50s, a meaningful improvement over a guaranteed life sentence. Further, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show prejudice. Finally, the court held that by failing to raise the substantive challenge (or his newly asserted grounds for overcoming procedural default), Defendant doubly forfeited review. View "Terrance Kimbrough v. United States" on Justia Law

The district court previously found Defendant guilty of twelve supervised-release violations and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months imprisonment. He appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). On remand, the district court sentenced Defendant to the same sentence of 48 months imprisonment, even though that sentence now exceeds the high end of the advisory Guidelines range by 21 months. Defendant appealed again, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The court explained that district courts may consider the seriousness of the violation conduct when determining the sanction for the breach of trust associated with a supervised-release violation. Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to consider Defendant’s violation conduct. Further, the court found that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Also problematic is the court’s failure to explain its decision to increase Defendant’s sentence on Count One from “time served” to 24 months’ imprisonment post-remand. Although the district court was not constrained by its prior decision, the absence of any explanation leaves us to speculate as to the court’s reasoning. This is a reversible error. Moreover, the court concluded that the district court improperly weighed Section 3553(a) factors by placing considerable weight on a couple of factors and no weight on several other factors. This renders the sentence, in this case, substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Andrew Damarr Morris" on Justia Law

Following separate jury trials, Defendants George Oscar Messer (Oscar) and his son Jake Messer (Jake) were each convicted on two counts of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1201(a)(1). They were both sentenced to terms of life imprisonment because of various sentencing enhancements, including one for sexual exploitation. Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the federal kidnapping statute is (1) an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and (2) unconstitutionally vague. Jake also appealed his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, and precedent forecloses Defendants’ Commerce Clause and void-for-vagueness arguments. Further, the court held that Jake’s arguments regarding the alleged procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence are unavailing. Specifically, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in treating Jake’s federal drug-conspiracy conviction as part of his criminal history rather than as relevant conduct. Further, the court held that the district court properly applied the dangerous-weapon and sexual-exploitation enhancements. Moreover, the court wrote that if the district court erred in applying the ransom-demand enhancement, that error was harmless. Finally, the court explained that a life sentence is an extraordinary punishment. But the court is not permitted to engage in a de novo reweighing of the Section 3553(a) factors. And in the present case, despite the extremity of the sentence, it can find no abuse of discretion by the district court in imposing the sentence recommended by the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jake Messer" on Justia Law

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show. View "United States v. Richard Austin Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.
The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. View "Curt Russell Cannamela" on Justia Law

In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

While Smith was hiding in the woods, with an outstanding parole violation, police arrested him with a loaded gun in his possession. Smith was charged with illegally possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Despite advice from his attorney and the judge, Smith declined to stipulate his status as a felon and his knowledge of the same to preclude the government from introducing evidence of his prior felony convictions. At trial, the government introduced evidence of Smith’s 11 prior felony convictions: three convictions for grand larceny, one for forgery, two for robbery, four for escape, and one North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and infliction of serious injury. A jury convicted him. The district court sentenced him to 235 months in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s argument about the alleged unfairly prejudicial taint of evidence of his 11 prior felony convictions. Smith’s North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury qualified as a predicate violent felony under ACCA because it requires purposeful or knowing conduct and is categorically a violent felony. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Officer Layne pulled VanPelt over for driving a car with an illegal window tint and called for backup. When Officer Bennett responded, Layne informed him that “the plate doesn’t come back to the car” and the “car smells like weed.” While patting VanPelt down, Layne found several baggies of marijuana and one baggie of crack cocaine. With VanPelt in handcuffs, Layne led him toward the police car. VanPelt took off running. Four seconds later, Layne tackled VanPelt to the ground, then stood and attempted to pull VanPelt to his feet, briefly grabbing VanPelt’s hair. VanPelt replied that he could not stand because his hip was broken. Layne released his grip. VanPelt fell back to the ground.VanPelt sued Layne for using excessive force and Detroit for failing to adequately train and supervise Layne, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Layne’s tackle and subsequent attempt to lift VanPelt did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Layne’s use of force throughout the encounter was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, even assuming Layne could have stopped VanPelt using a less severe technique. When Layne attempted to lift VanPelt, a reasonable officer would not have known that VanPelt was injured. The record and video did not establish any indication of excessive force nor evidence that Layne had “evil intentions.” View "VanPelt v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After drunkenly beating his wife and threatening to shoot her with a handgun, Carter pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Carter had a prior conviction for felony robbery under Ohio law. The district court held that Ohio robbery is a crime of violence and calculated an enhanced Guidelines range of 37–46 months’ imprisonment, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A); 4B1.2. Considering the harm Carter caused his wife, the district court suggested the sentence would be the same even without the enhancement. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Carter’s 38-month sentence. The elements of Ohio robbery are “the same as, or narrower than,” the Guidelines’ elements of extortion. The court rejected Carter’s argument that because the crime he was convicted of is called robbery it could only be compared to Guidelines robbery. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

McReynolds and 17 co-defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846. The government, using circumstantial evidence, argued that McReynolds was part of the charged conspiracy, and should be held responsible for the drug quantities attributed to the conspiracy. The jury found McReynolds guilty and attributed “less than 100 grams” of heroin and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine to him. His PSR included the drug amounts attributable to the conspiracy–767.66 grams of heroin, 711.56 grams of cocaine, and 263.51 grams of cocaine base. The court adopted the PSR’s drug quantity determinations, calculated McReynolds’ guidelines range at 151-181 months, and imposed a 151-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded, stating that the district court should adequately explain its reasoning if it attributes any drug amounts to McReynolds beyond the jury’s verdict. On remand, the district court did not change its guideline range determination but imposed a 145-month sentence to account for McReynolds’ post-sentencing positive conduct. The court concluded that the PSR correctly calculated the drug quantity attributable to McReynolds because that quantity was within the scope of his conspiratorial agreement and foreseeable to him but opined that the jury was “confused” and cited three key witness testimonies.The Sixth Circuit again vacated the sentence. Because the higher drug quantities were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, McReynolds’ sentence is substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. McReynolds" on Justia Law