Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ferguson, a 20-year-old black man, went online, describing his desire to create a militia group and “orchestrate raids for supplies such as weapons and armor.” An FBI informant, “Guiness,” contacted Ferguson on Discord and was added to the group. Guiness pressured Ferguson to meet for “training.” On April 28, Ferguson first described to the group an idea for ambushing a patrol car but stated, “It’s not happening right now.” The two met on May 2, joined by another informant, “Steve.” At Guiness’s request, Ferguson brought his AR-15 rifle. The group engaged in faux military exercises. Ferguson described having a girl fake a domestic violence call at “the end of the month or even June.” On May 5, without any request by Ferguson, Guiness sent a picture of an abandoned house in Cuyahoga Valley National Park, saying, “Perfect location.”On May 8, the three hiked to the abandoned house, unarmed, with Ferguson saying that if multiple cops responded, they’d have to start shooting. Guiness suggested a “dry run” to time police response and called 911. When rangers arrived, the men ran toward their car but were arrested. The FBI executed a search warrant for Ferguson’s residence, seizing an AR15 rifle, ammunition, magazines, tactical gear, and a guerilla warfare manual.Ferguson was convicted of two counts of attempted kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), (d). The Sixth Circuit reversed. No rational juror could have found Ferguson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Any possible plan was constantly changing. Ferguson had not decided what to do with the officers other than take their gear. Ferguson did not take a substantial step; his actions did not clearly corroborate an intent to commit a kidnapping. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Keller and others broke into a Shelby County house occupied by Morrow and Jones and two minor children. Keller threatened the occupants with a gun while demanding money. One assailant repeatedly struck Morrow in the head. All the assailants ransacked the house. One child hid and called 911. After his conviction Keller sought a new trial, raising several challenges to his convictions and sentence; he did not raise a double-jeopardy claim. For the first time, on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, Keller argued his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, in that his convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault of Morrow were for the same offense, and that all of his convictions should have merged into a single conviction for aggravated robbery of Morrow. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal found that Keller waived his double-jeopardy claim by not raising it in his motion for a new trial as required by Tennessee’s procedural rules. Keller had acknowledged the waiver. Considering Keller’s double-jeopardy claim under plain-error review, the court held that the double-jeopardy claim failed.After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Keller filed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition on the double jeopardy claim. Keller, by his own concession, procedurally defaulted his double-jeopardy claim. View "Keller v. Genovese" on Justia Law

Medlin pleaded guilty to kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1). Based on a guidelines range of 210-262 months and a maximum sentence of life, the district court took into account Medlin’s history of drug abuse, his parents’ incarceration during his childhood, his two children, his criminal history, the serious nature and circumstances of the offense, the respective roles of the co-conspirators, and balancing the factors in section 3553(a).The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 220 months’ imprisonment, upholding the application of a four-level enhancement to Medlin’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A4.1(b)(2)(A), which applies “[i]f the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury[.]” The court noted that one victim suffered multiple, serious, distinct injuries and was forced to ingest methamphetamine. He sustained permanent injuries through the loss of teeth that were extracted, permanent scarring on his face from the beating suffered, and permanent scarring on his arm/shoulder from being burned with a blow torch. The defendants threatened the victims with death if they reported the assault to the police; a co-conspirator brandished a firearm “in a threatening manner towards the [v]ictims” on multiple occasions. The court also rejected an argument that there was an unreasonable disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his co-defendants. View "United States v. Medlin" on Justia Law

The DEA received a tip from a local pharmacist that Dr. Anderson, an Ohio physician, was seeing patients who had been discharged by other physicians for non-compliance. The pharmacist was one of several who had grown concerned about Anderson’s prescribing practices relating to pain medications. The State Medical Board of Ohio expressed concern that Anderson was not prescribing in the usual course of practice or for a legitimate medical purpose. Separately, one of Anderson’s patients contacted the local sheriff’s office, voicing his concern that he sometimes would not get to see Anderson at his appointments and would occasionally retrieve his prescriptions from the receptionist rather than from Anderson himself. The DEA launched an investigation into Anderson, used a confidential informant, and then executed a search warrant to obtain evidence.Anderson was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, eight counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances, and one count of healthcare fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the district court’s refusal to give a good faith jury instruction, and the admission of the government’s expert testimony. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Responding to a “shots fired” call, officers arrived at an apartment, finding blood on the walls, bullet holes in the TV, broken glass, and items scattered everywhere. Crump, who was incoherent and wearing only a towel, was the only person inside. A protective sweep and subsequent search led the police to find two guns, ammunition, drugs (870 grams of marijuana packaged for resale and 27.3 grams of crack cocaine), drug paraphernalia, burner phones with messages about drugs and guns, and several documents bearing Crump’s name. After his arrest, Crump said on recorded phone calls that he had fired a gun and wanted to get back to drug trafficking.Crump was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924). His PSR calculated Crump’s guidelines range as 262-327, based on the conclusions that Crump qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and possessed a firearm in connection with a controlled substance offense. The court imposed a 210-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There were guns in the apartment, and a rational juror could have found that Crump possessed each of them. The district court properly gave instructions on both actual and constructive possession. The court upheld a finding that Crump possessed the guns and ammunition “in connection with” a controlled substance offense and upheld his sentence as reasonable. View "United States v. Crump" on Justia Law

Baugh coordinated a 2009 plan to use a gun to steal cocaine from a drug dealer and resell it. He was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). In accordance with the law at the time, the jury was instructed that either the cocaine conspiracy or the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy could furnish the predicate offense for the section 924(c) count. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the residual clause pursuant to which Baugh’s Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy conviction qualified as a crime of violence was unconstitutionally vague.The district court denied Baugh's motion to vacate his section 924(c) conviction, as resting on an invalid predicate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no reason to believe that the jury based Baugh’s section 924(c) conviction on only his Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy conviction and not also on his cocaine conspiracy conviction. Baugh does not explain how it would be possible to possess a firearm in furtherance of a conspiracy to “steal” cocaine without also possessing the firearm in furtherance of a conspiracy to “possess” it. View "Baugh v. United States" on Justia Law

Gilbert, on parole for a state conviction, was arrested for printing false identifications and credit cards and was returned to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Federal authorities charged Gilbert with identity theft crimes. Wolf was Gilbert's appointed counsel. Gilbert consented to federal detention pending trial. Gilbert pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4) and 1028A(a)(1). After reviewing Gilbert’s PSR, Wolf realized that he had mistakenly led Gilbert to believe that the time Gilbert had spent in federal detention would be credited against his federal sentence. Wolf acknowledged the error. The court offered Gilbert the opportunity to withdraw his plea but Gilbert decided to continue with sentencing. The court sentenced Gilbert to 15 months on Count 1, concurrent to the undischarged Michigan term, and 24 months on Count 2, “consecutive to Count 1 and all other terms of imprisonment.”Gilbert filed a habeas motion. Wolf admitted that he gave Gilbert erroneous advice and that because of his incorrect understanding of the law he did not expedite Gilbert’s guilty plea and sentence; did not seek a downward adjustment under USSG 5G1.3; and did not object when the court ruled that the aggravated identity theft sentence had to run consecutive to all other undischarged sentences. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if Gilbert could demonstrate that counsel’s performance—initial error followed by correction—was deficient, he failed to present evidence of prejudice. Sentences imposed under the aggravated identity theft statute must run consecutive to all other (including state) sentences and are not subject to USSG 5G1.3 adjustments. View "Gilbert v. United States" on Justia Law

Around midnight, Woolridge walked through an Akron neighborhood where police were searching for a fugitive. Officer Collins approached him and asked for his name. Woolridge turned and ran, tossing several items. Officers caught Woolridge, who immediately said, “I got a warrant” and “I got a parole violation.” Collins moved Woolridge to a containment van while, Woolridge tried to speak with Collins, who brushed him off. Eventually, Collins asked Woolridge about the items he threw during the chase. Woolridge ultimately explained that his brother had been murdered and “I had a firearm.” Officers found the gun only after asking Woolridge to specify where he threw the gun. As Collins began reading the Miranda warnings, Woolridge said “I know my rights.” Collins proceeded to give them. Woolridge again explained that he had carried the gun due to his brother’s murder.Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Woolridge moved to suppress the statements he made before receiving the Miranda warnings. The district court suppressed the unwarned statements and permitted the admission of the post-Miranda statements. Woolridge pleaded guilty. The court varied upward by 13 months, imposing a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Woolridge knew he had a choice and decided to speak anyway. The court explained its reasons for the sentence: Woolridge’s numerous offenses, his pattern of illegally possessing firearms, and many prison rule infractions. View "United States v. Woolridge" on Justia Law

In 1991, Jackson was wrongfully convicted of murder. In 2016, the Innocence Project requested from the Cleveland Police documents relating to the investigation, pursuant to the Ohio Public Records Act. Receiving no response, Innocence Project sent a request to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Marburger produced a heavily redacted file. The Act exempts “investigatory work product” and “[t]rial preparation record[s]” from production as public records. Months later, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the investigatory-work-product exception did not extend beyond the conclusion of a trial. Cleveland then produced the unredacted file, which included significant exculpatory evidence. The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office also produced an unredacted file. A state-court judge vacated Jackson’s conviction. In 2019, he was finally exonerated. Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Against Marburger, Jackson alleged denial of access to courts.The Sixth Circuit held that Marburger is not entitled to absolute immunity. Responding to a records request after the conclusion of a trial and appeal is not an action that is an inherent part of a prosecutor’s adversarial function. The court reversed the denial of qualified immunity. Jackson plausibly stated a claim that Marburger violated his right of access to the courts when she removed exculpatory information from the file and effectively prevented him from filing for postconviction relief but in 2016 it was not clearly established that redacting exculpatory information from a response to a public-records request effectively covered-up evidence. View "Jackson v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Two gangsters convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, challenged their convictions and sentences, raising an unprecedented legal theory—that district courts must apply the “categorical approach” to determine whether a state law crime qualifies as a predicate for “racketeering activity” under section 1961(1)(A). They argued that because Michigan’s robbery statute is categorically broader than generic robbery, the jury’s special verdict that found robbery as a predicate racketeering activity did not establish generic robbery.The Sixth Circuit rejected their argument and affirmed. Under RICO, “racketeering activity means any act or threat involving … robbery …, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” This encompasses more conduct than defined by Michigan’s statute, not less. The language refers unequivocally to the defendant’s conduct, not the state law or the elements of the state statute. Section 1961(1)(A) does not require a conviction or even require evidence sufficient for a conviction; it requires conduct that is chargeable under state law. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law