Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under the Gun Control Act “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun,” 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The Act incorporates the definition from the National Firearms Act: “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b).The ATF, which administers both statutes, previously maintained that a bump stock, which drastically increases a gun’s rate of fire, is not a machinegun part. In 2018, after a Las Vegas gunman used bump stocks attached to semiautomatic rifles to kill 58 people and injure roughly 500 in approximately 10 minutes, the ATF reversed its position by promulgating the Rule, giving possessors of bump stocks 90 days to destroy or abandon their bump stocks.Hardin challenged the Rule as exceeding the ATF’s statutory authority. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment upholding the Rule, noting the rule of lenity in criminal cases and that Congress could resolve the ambiguity. View "Hardin v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law

More than 20 years ago, Johns kidnapped her ex-girlfriend at gunpoint and sexually assaulted her. Following her arrest, Johns absconded. After about 16 years, the law caught up to Johns. She was convicted of three federal offenses, resulting in a 168-month sentence. In 2021, the district court vacated Johns’s 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in light of the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. Johns remained convicted of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), and failing to appear following her pretrial release, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1), giving her a Guidelines range of 121-151 months. Johns argued that her deteriorating health counseled for a reduced sentence. The court viewed any mitigating circumstances as “more than offset by the aggravating circumstances” and imposed a 151-month sentence.The Sixth Circuit upheld the sentence as reasonable after conducting “plain error” review. Within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable. The district court’s decision to discuss Johns’s mitigation arguments generally was not an obvious error; Johns raised multiple mitigation arguments all within the general rubric of “history and characteristics,” against a serious federal offense. Johns’s recently-developed health issues would never have been a subject at the resentencing hearing had Johns not absconded from justice. To find otherwise would be contrary to “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The district court discussed Johns’s “well-written” sentencing memorandum and referenced the many mitigating circumstances that she raised. View "United States v. Johns" on Justia Law

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) forwarded to the Knoxville Police a CyberTip from Facebook reporting that a 43-year-old male appeared to be using Facebook private messages to entice a 15-year-old female (M.D.) to produce and send child-exploitation images and engage in sexual activity. The CyberTip suggested that they had already engaged in sexual activity and included information matching Tywan Sykes.Charged with enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, section 2251; committing felony offenses involving a minor while required by Tennessee law to register as a sex offender, section 2260A; and knowingly possessing child pornography section 2252A, Sykes filed unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence retrieved from his Facebook account and cell phone. He argued that NCMEC is a government entity and that Facebook had become NCMEC's agent by searching his account and forwarding messages to NCMEC and that the month-and-a-half delay between the seizure of his phone and the execution of the search warrant was unreasonable. The court also partially denied a motion to exclude evidence of his prior sex offenses.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sykes’s convictions and 45-year sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and erroneously admitted evidence of a past sex-offense conviction; that there was insufficient evidence to convict on all charges; and that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Ferguson, a 20-year-old black man, went online, describing his desire to create a militia group and “orchestrate raids for supplies such as weapons and armor.” An FBI informant, “Guiness,” contacted Ferguson on Discord and was added to the group. Guiness pressured Ferguson to meet for “training.” On April 28, Ferguson first described to the group an idea for ambushing a patrol car but stated, “It’s not happening right now.” The two met on May 2, joined by another informant, “Steve.” At Guiness’s request, Ferguson brought his AR-15 rifle. The group engaged in faux military exercises. Ferguson described having a girl fake a domestic violence call at “the end of the month or even June.” On May 5, without any request by Ferguson, Guiness sent a picture of an abandoned house in Cuyahoga Valley National Park, saying, “Perfect location.”On May 8, the three hiked to the abandoned house, unarmed, with Ferguson saying that if multiple cops responded, they’d have to start shooting. Guiness suggested a “dry run” to time police response and called 911. When rangers arrived, the men ran toward their car but were arrested. The FBI executed a search warrant for Ferguson’s residence, seizing an AR15 rifle, ammunition, magazines, tactical gear, and a guerilla warfare manual.Ferguson was convicted of two counts of attempted kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), (d). The Sixth Circuit reversed. No rational juror could have found Ferguson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Any possible plan was constantly changing. Ferguson had not decided what to do with the officers other than take their gear. Ferguson did not take a substantial step; his actions did not clearly corroborate an intent to commit a kidnapping. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In 2010, Keller and others broke into a Shelby County house occupied by Morrow and Jones and two minor children. Keller threatened the occupants with a gun while demanding money. One assailant repeatedly struck Morrow in the head. All the assailants ransacked the house. One child hid and called 911. After his conviction Keller sought a new trial, raising several challenges to his convictions and sentence; he did not raise a double-jeopardy claim. For the first time, on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, Keller argued his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, in that his convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault of Morrow were for the same offense, and that all of his convictions should have merged into a single conviction for aggravated robbery of Morrow. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal found that Keller waived his double-jeopardy claim by not raising it in his motion for a new trial as required by Tennessee’s procedural rules. Keller had acknowledged the waiver. Considering Keller’s double-jeopardy claim under plain-error review, the court held that the double-jeopardy claim failed.After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Keller filed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition on the double jeopardy claim. Keller, by his own concession, procedurally defaulted his double-jeopardy claim. View "Keller v. Genovese" on Justia Law

Medlin pleaded guilty to kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1). Based on a guidelines range of 210-262 months and a maximum sentence of life, the district court took into account Medlin’s history of drug abuse, his parents’ incarceration during his childhood, his two children, his criminal history, the serious nature and circumstances of the offense, the respective roles of the co-conspirators, and balancing the factors in section 3553(a).The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 220 months’ imprisonment, upholding the application of a four-level enhancement to Medlin’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A4.1(b)(2)(A), which applies “[i]f the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury[.]” The court noted that one victim suffered multiple, serious, distinct injuries and was forced to ingest methamphetamine. He sustained permanent injuries through the loss of teeth that were extracted, permanent scarring on his face from the beating suffered, and permanent scarring on his arm/shoulder from being burned with a blow torch. The defendants threatened the victims with death if they reported the assault to the police; a co-conspirator brandished a firearm “in a threatening manner towards the [v]ictims” on multiple occasions. The court also rejected an argument that there was an unreasonable disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his co-defendants. View "United States v. Medlin" on Justia Law

The DEA received a tip from a local pharmacist that Dr. Anderson, an Ohio physician, was seeing patients who had been discharged by other physicians for non-compliance. The pharmacist was one of several who had grown concerned about Anderson’s prescribing practices relating to pain medications. The State Medical Board of Ohio expressed concern that Anderson was not prescribing in the usual course of practice or for a legitimate medical purpose. Separately, one of Anderson’s patients contacted the local sheriff’s office, voicing his concern that he sometimes would not get to see Anderson at his appointments and would occasionally retrieve his prescriptions from the receptionist rather than from Anderson himself. The DEA launched an investigation into Anderson, used a confidential informant, and then executed a search warrant to obtain evidence.Anderson was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, eight counts of unlawful distribution of controlled substances, and one count of healthcare fraud. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the district court’s refusal to give a good faith jury instruction, and the admission of the government’s expert testimony. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Responding to a “shots fired” call, officers arrived at an apartment, finding blood on the walls, bullet holes in the TV, broken glass, and items scattered everywhere. Crump, who was incoherent and wearing only a towel, was the only person inside. A protective sweep and subsequent search led the police to find two guns, ammunition, drugs (870 grams of marijuana packaged for resale and 27.3 grams of crack cocaine), drug paraphernalia, burner phones with messages about drugs and guns, and several documents bearing Crump’s name. After his arrest, Crump said on recorded phone calls that he had fired a gun and wanted to get back to drug trafficking.Crump was convicted of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924). His PSR calculated Crump’s guidelines range as 262-327, based on the conclusions that Crump qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and possessed a firearm in connection with a controlled substance offense. The court imposed a 210-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There were guns in the apartment, and a rational juror could have found that Crump possessed each of them. The district court properly gave instructions on both actual and constructive possession. The court upheld a finding that Crump possessed the guns and ammunition “in connection with” a controlled substance offense and upheld his sentence as reasonable. View "United States v. Crump" on Justia Law

Baugh coordinated a 2009 plan to use a gun to steal cocaine from a drug dealer and resell it. He was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). In accordance with the law at the time, the jury was instructed that either the cocaine conspiracy or the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy could furnish the predicate offense for the section 924(c) count. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the residual clause pursuant to which Baugh’s Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy conviction qualified as a crime of violence was unconstitutionally vague.The district court denied Baugh's motion to vacate his section 924(c) conviction, as resting on an invalid predicate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no reason to believe that the jury based Baugh’s section 924(c) conviction on only his Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy conviction and not also on his cocaine conspiracy conviction. Baugh does not explain how it would be possible to possess a firearm in furtherance of a conspiracy to “steal” cocaine without also possessing the firearm in furtherance of a conspiracy to “possess” it. View "Baugh v. United States" on Justia Law

Gilbert, on parole for a state conviction, was arrested for printing false identifications and credit cards and was returned to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Federal authorities charged Gilbert with identity theft crimes. Wolf was Gilbert's appointed counsel. Gilbert consented to federal detention pending trial. Gilbert pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4) and 1028A(a)(1). After reviewing Gilbert’s PSR, Wolf realized that he had mistakenly led Gilbert to believe that the time Gilbert had spent in federal detention would be credited against his federal sentence. Wolf acknowledged the error. The court offered Gilbert the opportunity to withdraw his plea but Gilbert decided to continue with sentencing. The court sentenced Gilbert to 15 months on Count 1, concurrent to the undischarged Michigan term, and 24 months on Count 2, “consecutive to Count 1 and all other terms of imprisonment.”Gilbert filed a habeas motion. Wolf admitted that he gave Gilbert erroneous advice and that because of his incorrect understanding of the law he did not expedite Gilbert’s guilty plea and sentence; did not seek a downward adjustment under USSG 5G1.3; and did not object when the court ruled that the aggravated identity theft sentence had to run consecutive to all other undischarged sentences. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if Gilbert could demonstrate that counsel’s performance—initial error followed by correction—was deficient, he failed to present evidence of prejudice. Sentences imposed under the aggravated identity theft statute must run consecutive to all other (including state) sentences and are not subject to USSG 5G1.3 adjustments. View "Gilbert v. United States" on Justia Law