Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Around midnight, Woolridge walked through an Akron neighborhood where police were searching for a fugitive. Officer Collins approached him and asked for his name. Woolridge turned and ran, tossing several items. Officers caught Woolridge, who immediately said, “I got a warrant” and “I got a parole violation.” Collins moved Woolridge to a containment van while, Woolridge tried to speak with Collins, who brushed him off. Eventually, Collins asked Woolridge about the items he threw during the chase. Woolridge ultimately explained that his brother had been murdered and “I had a firearm.” Officers found the gun only after asking Woolridge to specify where he threw the gun. As Collins began reading the Miranda warnings, Woolridge said “I know my rights.” Collins proceeded to give them. Woolridge again explained that he had carried the gun due to his brother’s murder.Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Woolridge moved to suppress the statements he made before receiving the Miranda warnings. The district court suppressed the unwarned statements and permitted the admission of the post-Miranda statements. Woolridge pleaded guilty. The court varied upward by 13 months, imposing a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Woolridge knew he had a choice and decided to speak anyway. The court explained its reasons for the sentence: Woolridge’s numerous offenses, his pattern of illegally possessing firearms, and many prison rule infractions. View "United States v. Woolridge" on Justia Law

In 1991, Jackson was wrongfully convicted of murder. In 2016, the Innocence Project requested from the Cleveland Police documents relating to the investigation, pursuant to the Ohio Public Records Act. Receiving no response, Innocence Project sent a request to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office. Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Marburger produced a heavily redacted file. The Act exempts “investigatory work product” and “[t]rial preparation record[s]” from production as public records. Months later, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the investigatory-work-product exception did not extend beyond the conclusion of a trial. Cleveland then produced the unredacted file, which included significant exculpatory evidence. The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office also produced an unredacted file. A state-court judge vacated Jackson’s conviction. In 2019, he was finally exonerated. Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Against Marburger, Jackson alleged denial of access to courts.The Sixth Circuit held that Marburger is not entitled to absolute immunity. Responding to a records request after the conclusion of a trial and appeal is not an action that is an inherent part of a prosecutor’s adversarial function. The court reversed the denial of qualified immunity. Jackson plausibly stated a claim that Marburger violated his right of access to the courts when she removed exculpatory information from the file and effectively prevented him from filing for postconviction relief but in 2016 it was not clearly established that redacting exculpatory information from a response to a public-records request effectively covered-up evidence. View "Jackson v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Two gangsters convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, challenged their convictions and sentences, raising an unprecedented legal theory—that district courts must apply the “categorical approach” to determine whether a state law crime qualifies as a predicate for “racketeering activity” under section 1961(1)(A). They argued that because Michigan’s robbery statute is categorically broader than generic robbery, the jury’s special verdict that found robbery as a predicate racketeering activity did not establish generic robbery.The Sixth Circuit rejected their argument and affirmed. Under RICO, “racketeering activity means any act or threat involving … robbery …, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” This encompasses more conduct than defined by Michigan’s statute, not less. The language refers unequivocally to the defendant’s conduct, not the state law or the elements of the state statute. Section 1961(1)(A) does not require a conviction or even require evidence sufficient for a conviction; it requires conduct that is chargeable under state law. View "United States v. Jefferson" on Justia Law

In 1987, a Michigan jury convicted Burton of first-degree murder and a firearm charge. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. In 2019, Burton was released from prison and his conviction was vacated on the prosecutor’s motion after key witnesses recanted and details of witness manipulation and intimidation were revealed. Detective Sanders’s investigative tactics allegedly included threats and physical violence against witnesses, including minors. In 2020,Burton filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 against Sanders and Detroit for Brady violations, malicious prosecution, and fabrication of evidence. The district court dismissed Burton’s claims as barred by Detroit’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy which occurred after Burton’s claims arose. Burton’s claims against Sanders remain pending. Burton’s sons then filed suit against Sanders and the city, alleging that the wrongful conviction and incarceration of their father throughout their childhood and into adulthood violated their constitutional right to family integrity. The district court dismissed, finding no cognizable due process right for “interference with family integrity” when a party is indirectly harmed by a constitutional tort against a family member. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the plaintiffs have not alleged that the defendants acted with a culpable state of mind, directed toward them or their family unit. View "Chambers v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Two brothers were indicted in 2006 and were convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute; possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and felon in possession of a firearm. Additionally, Alejandro was convicted of possession of counterfeit federal reserve notes. William's sentence was 234 months—the high end of his Guidelines range. Based on prior state convictions for armed robbery and attempted drug trafficking, Alejandro, classified as a career offender, with a Guidelines range of 360 months to life plus a mandatory 60-month consecutive term, was sentenced to 420 months.The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act alleviated sentencing disparities between cocaine offenses and crack cocaine offenses; the 2018 First Step Act made its provisions retroactive. Both brothers sought resentencing. The court calculated an amended Guidelines range of 120-150 months for William and of 262-327 months for Alejandro but denied relief. The Sixth Circuit vacated. On remand, Alejandro argued that, if he were sentenced today, he would no longer be designated a career offender and would have a Guidelines range of 140-175 months. William argued that if an amendment eliminating “recency” points applied to him, his Guidelines range would be 110-137 months. The district court again denied relief.In 2022, the Supreme Court held, in “Concepcion,” that courts can consider all relevant information, subject only to constraints by Congress or the Constitution when discharging “their responsibility to sentence the whole person before them.” The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded for reassignment and consideration in light of Concepcion. View "United States v. Domenech" on Justia Law

A man walked into Walgreens wearing clothes with white stains, placed a pack of gum on the counter, asked for cigarettes, then pulled out an apparent handgun. The man fled with the money and the cigarettes, leaving the gum. Police found Jacobs’s fingerprint on the gum and got an arrest warrant. Jacobs learned of the warrant and voluntarily went to the police station. Jacobs met with Detective Agee, who read him his Miranda rights. Showing Jacobs pictures from the Walgreens robbery and other robberies, Agee noted that the stains on the robber’s clothes resembled stains on Jacobs’s jacket. Jacobs denied involvement in the robberies. Agee highlighted the strength of the fingerprint evidence and said that he would get a warrant to search Jacobs’s dad’s house, where Jacobs was living, and Jacobs’s car. Agee said that Jacobs would likely face a severe sentence but things might be different if Jacobs changed his story. Jacobs then said: “The weapons—them is gone.” Agee gave Jacobs a phone to make calls and offered food and drink. After a break, Jacobs said he “f—ed up bad” because he was “broke” and needed to pay child support. He made statements about the gun and helped police retrieve the clothes from his girlfriend’s house. The interview lasted less than two hours.The district court granted Jacobs’s suppression motion, concluding that Agee used impermissibly coercive tactics. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Jacobs’s statements were voluntary. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Kennedy was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, fentanyl, heroin, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841, and distribution of methamphetamine, section 841. He pled guilty to Count 1 and stipulated that he “was involved in a drug trafficking conspiracy that distributed 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, as well as heroin, fentanyl, and crack cocaine.” He “frequently used cellular telephones and various social media accounts, including Facebook, to coordinate with his co-conspirators and to set up various drug deals.” He acknowledged sales of “approximately 99 grams of actual methamphetamine” on November 26, 2019, and of “approximately 270 grams of actual methamphetamine” on December 10.Kennedy’s PSR calculated a base offense level of 32 based on 150-500 grams of at least 80% pure methamphetamine, added two levels under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) for firearm possession, and deducted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The court rejected a four-level leadership enhancement because the operation was “decentralized in nature.” With a Guideline range of 168-210 months, the court imposed a 210-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the firearm enhancement was improperly applied; the district court failed to honor the read-and-discuss requirement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i); and the Guidelines’ harsher treatment of pure methamphetamine was unfair. View "United States v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Robinson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing drugs with the intent to distribute them. During his supervised release term, Robinson was stopped, purportedly for a tinted-window infraction. The officer gave Robinson a warning for that violation, then asked for consent to search the car, allegedly stating that refusal to consent might violate the conditions of Robinson's supervised release. Robinson acknowledged having a gun. The officer searched the car and found a loaded handgun, marijuana, and cocaine. Robinson was not indicted.In proceedings to revoke Robinson’s supervised release, Robinson moved to suppress the evidence. The government conceded a Fourth Amendment violation. The court denied the motion. Robinson separately unsuccessfully moved for a jury trial on the supervised release violation. The court revoked Robinson’s supervised release and sentenced him to another 28 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exclusionary rule does not bar illegally obtained evidence from a supervised release hearing. Defendants do not have a right to a jury at supervised-release hearings. While the Supreme Court recently found that the jury-trial guarantee applies to a unique provision—18 U.S.C. 3583(k)—that imposed a minimum 5-year prison term on a defendant who committed specified federal crimes while on supervised release, that decision did not render unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. 3583(g), which requires a court to impose a prison term of unspecified length if a defendant has engaged in certain conduct (such as possessing a gun) while on supervised release. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Harris went to the store, argued with a clerk, left the store, and entered the laundromat next door where his friend, Henderson, worked. Harris asserts that while he was between the buildings, the clerk came out, pointed a gun, and taunted him with racial slurs. Following Harris’s 911 call, four officers arrived. As shown on bodycams, they expressed disbelief in Harris’s report. The store clerk denied having a gun. The store had at least three surveillance cameras but the officers watched footage from only the front door, although Harris had reported that the incident occurred near the back door. Harris wanted to move forward with his report, believing the footage would corroborate his account. The officers indicated that the video revealed Harris had lied and arrested Harris. No officer took Henderson’s statement. Detective Busch reviewed the police report and passed it to the prosecutor for charging.Harris spent 18 days in jail before being released on bond. Weeks later, the state dropped Harris’s false felony report charge; the store clerks failed to appear. Harris sued the City of Saginaw, the officers, and Busch. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity summary judgment to the officers, the grant of qualified immunity to Busch, and the dismissal of Harris’s failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city. There is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers arrested Harris without probable cause. View "Harris v. City of Saginaw, Michigan" on Justia Law

Moss purchased cocaine from a DEA informant and was charged with possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moss’s first attorney moved for an entrapment hearing. Steingold then began representing Moss. At the entrapment hearing, 10 days later, Steingold attested to minimal pre-trial preparation. Moss was the only witness he presented. Steingold requested a continuance to contact witnesses he learned about during Moss’s direct and cross-examination. The court permitted Steingold to contact one witness but denied a continuance. The prosecution presented five witnesses and multiple exhibits. The court denied Moss’s motion to dismiss based on entrapment.At trial, Steingold waived his opening argument, presented no witnesses, and stipulated to the admission of the transcript from the entrapment hearing as substantive evidence. For one of the government’s two witnesses, Steingold did not object during his testimony or conduct any cross-examination. Steingold waived his closing argument. On appeal, Moss unsuccessfully argued that Steingold provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by waiving Moss’s right to a jury trial and stipulating to the admission of the evidence from the entrapment hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order of habeas relief. The state court’s denial of Moss’s ineffective assistance claims under Strickland was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Moss v. Miniard" on Justia Law