Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Simmonds ran a drug-trafficking conspiracy. During traffic stops, officers seized large quantities of fentanyl from co-conspirators acting under Simmonds’s instructions. Investigators also searched an apartment and four storage units associated with Simmonds, where they seized cash, cell phones, fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, xylazine, and suspected marijuana, plus shipping and packaging supplies. At one unit, investigators seized a firearm, ammunition, and Simmonds’s passport and birth certificate.Simmonds pled guilty to conspiring to distribute drugs, possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and using a cell phone to facilitate a felony drug offense. In the plea agreement, Simmonds agreed that “sentencing rests within the discretion of the Court,” that the guideline range would be determined by the court after a PSR was prepared, and to a base offense level 32. The government would seek two-level enhancements for possession of a firearm, and for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity but “no other specific offense characteristics, Guideline adjustments or Guideline departures.” The PSR departed from that recommendation. The district court followed the PSR, set the base offense level at 36, and accepted four recommended enhancements, bringing the offense level to 43. Simmonds’ Guideline range was life imprisonment. The court sentenced Simmonds to 250 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simmonds cannot show that the prosecution breached the plea agreement nor can he show that the court committed reversible error by failing to notice and rectify a breach of the agreement. View "United States v. Simmonds" on Justia Law

In 2001, Akridge was convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine; possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime; and possessing a firearm as a felon. Akridge had prior convictions for aggravated assault and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 based on a then-mandatory Guidelines range of 30 years’ to life imprisonment for his drug-trafficking offenses. Akridge also was subject to a mandatory consecutive 25-year sentence for using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, since he had a prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court sentenced Akridge to 55 years’ imprisonment: 30 years for his drug and a consecutive 25-year term.The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the sentencing disparity between crack- and powder-cocaine penalties; the 2018 First Step Act made this change retroactive. Akridge sought a sentence reduction, acknowledging that his career-offender designation and corresponding offense level remained unchanged. Proceeding to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court noted that while Akridge had taken vocational and self-improvement classes, he had also received 11 disciplinary sanctions. Citing Akridge’s post-sentencing misconduct and criminal history, the court declined to reduce his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court miscalculated his Guidelines’ range and that its “3553(a) analysis was procedurally incomplete … because it was anchored” to the wrong career-offender range. View "United States v. Akridge" on Justia Law

A government informant arranged to buy meth at Kilbourne’s home. When the informant arrived, Kilbourne was not there. The informant purchased meth from Reinberg and asked Reinberg about purchasing a gun. Reinberg stated she would “have [Kilbourne] hit you up on that.” Later, Kilbourne sold the gun to the informant. Kilbourne was arrested. Reinberg pled guilty, without an agreement, to drug offenses. Reinberg’s attorney stopped her from answering questions about the gun because she was not charged with any gun offenses. The government opposed Reinberg’s for safety-valve relief at sentencing. Reinberg later claimed “she was aware of the gun” but was not involved in its sale. The government opposed her safety-valve request again, claiming that a video of the meth sale showed Reinberg knew more.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of safety-valve relief and a 60-month sentence. The safety-valve provision allows a court to impose a sentence shorter than the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that she meets "every criterion,” including telling the government all information she has concerning the offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme. The district court found the conversation with the informant indicated that the gun was present. Reinberg withheld information. That finding was not clearly erroneous. Reinberg identified the gun by name, twice remarked “it’s pretty,” and facilitated its later sale. View "United States v. Reinberg" on Justia Law

Brothers Marshane and Terry were convicted in 2005 of conspiring to distribute crack and powder cocaine. Each brother had at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense.” Their latest convictions required life sentences. The Guidelines ranges for both brothers was 360 months to life, regardless of whether they were deemed career offenders. Both were sentenced to life in prison. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger the statutory penalties. The Sentencing Guidelines changed how multiple prior sentences are counted in calculating an offender’s criminal history and changed the drug-equivalency tables to reflect the Act. Marshane's Guidelines range dropped to 292-365 months. Terry's range fell to 324-405 months. If treated as career offenders, the brothers would still have a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive.In 2020, the brothers sought sentence reductions. Conceding that they are career offenders, they asked for a downward variance, emphasizing their rehabilitation and a recent report recommending that offenders convicted only of drug-trafficking crimes should not be deemed career offenders. The government argued that the Act had not modified the penalties for their offense that involved five kilograms or more of powder cocaine and that they remained career offenders. President Obama had already commuted their sentences to the bottom of their Guidelines ranges. The district court granted reduced sentences of 306 months for Marshane and 324 months for Terry. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by failing to recognize that, under current law, they were not career offenders. While an error occurred, it was invited by the defendants and was not so plain as to warrant remand. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Waide encountered the Lexington police after a shed fire occurred on the property next to his. Although no one suspected Waide of being involved with the fire and there was no evidence of arson, the fire investigator noticed surveillance cameras attached to Waide’s duplex residence and asked Waide to turn over his DVR. When Waide declined, the investigator obtained a warrant to enter Waide’s apartment and retrieve the DVR. When six officers arrived at Waide’s duplex to execute that warrant, their threatened entry and questions about whether Waide had drugs on the premises caused Waide to admit that his apartment contained a small amount of marijuana. This confession led to the issuance of two subsequent warrants to search both units of Waide’s duplex for narcotics–the other unit was occupied by Waide’s mother. The searches yielded a firearm plus large quantities of drugs and money.After the district court denied Waide’s motions to suppress evidence, he entered into a conditional guilty plea to the offense of possessing cocaine and heroin with the intent to distribute the drugs and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The affidavit in support of the DVR warrant lacked reliable evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the shed fire was due to arson or any other criminal activity. The incriminating evidence should be suppressed because it stemmed from the exploitation of the unlawful DVR warrant. View "United States v. Waide" on Justia Law

In 1985, two people were shot to death in rural Garrard County. Haight, who had escaped from jail days earlier, was captured in a nearby cornfield. During a chase, police discovered the victims’ possessions and both handguns used to commit the murders in a stolen truck abandoned by Haight. Haight pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s recommendation of a life sentence without parole for 25 years. The court accepted Haight’s plea but sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court vacated. Haight unsuccessfully sought specific enforcement of the plea agreement, was allowed to withdraw his plea, and went to trial. Haight admitted to the murders from the witness stand, claiming that he was suffering from “extreme emotional disturbance” and intoxication. The jury found him guilty of two counts each of intentional murder and first-degree robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Haight’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed. Haight was denied postconviction relief without discovery or an evidentiary hearing.In 2002, Haight sought habeas relief. The district court stayed the federal action. The Kentucky Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court refused to consider his unexhausted issues. Haight successfully moved to have the now-exhausted issues included in his amended 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which raised 45 grounds. Haight’s motion and application for the appointment of experts and his motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing were denied.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance; upholding the refusals to permit the defense to have Haight examined by a neuropsychologist before sentencing and to appoint medical experts; rejecting challenges to jury instructions and to the exclusion of certain potential jurors; and rejecting arguments concerning the refusal to enforce the plea agreement. Kentucky’s death penalty statute is not facially unconstitutional. View "Haight v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Helphenstine was arrested for drug offenses on April 14 and taken to jail. Around 8:30 p.m. on Sunday, April 16, Helphenstine vomited and was moved to a “detox” cell. A local doctor was contractually obligated to visit the jail once a week. He came on Tuesday nights. Helphenstine’s condition deteriorated. Knowing that the office was closed, deputies faxed the doctor a non-emergency medical request, stating Helphenstine was vomiting and soiling himself, refusing to eat or drink, and had not gotten out of bed for 24 hours. The doctor testified he called the jail and directed that Helphenstine be taken to a hospital but was told that Helphenstine refused. There is no record of these calls. The doctor faxed prescriptions for antiemetics; although it was a Tuesday and although he knew of Helphenstine’s condition, he did not visit the jail. Around midnight, Helphenstine laid on his mat, where he remained. Around 3:30 a.m., Helphenstine was unresponsive; jailers began CPR and called 911. Helphenstine was pronounced dead en route to the hospital.Plaintiff’s experts testified that Helphenstine died either from withdrawal or from severe dehydration caused by withdrawal. Helphenstine’s death certificate lists his cause of death as “acute (fentanyl) and chronic drug abuse,” with the interval between onset and death listed as 6 minutes; fentanyl was present in Helphenstine’s blood. The district court rejected a deliberate indifference claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A jury could conclude that Helphenstine’s death was the result of deliberate indifference by the county and the doctor; the individual defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Helphenstine v. Lewis County" on Justia Law

Officer Hazlewood applied to a Kentucky state judge for a warrant. In his supporting affidavit, Hazlewood stated that a confidential informant (CI) advised Hazlewood that Sanders was selling heroin/fentanyl from a specific apartment. Hazlewood set up two controlled purchases; officers observed Sanders leaving and returning to that apartment. The affidavit contained no information pertaining to the reliability of the CI. With a warrant, officers recovered controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and firearms from the apartment. Sanders was charged with drug and firearm offenses but was not charged with distributing the drugs sold during the controlled purchases.The court denied Sanders's motion for supplemental discovery relating to the controlled buys because disclosure would reveal the CI’s identity and the evidence was not material to the defense. Sanders also moved to suppress all evidence and statements that were obtained when executing the warrant and for a “Franks” hearing to challenge the accuracy of surveillance referenced in the affidavit. The court denied the motions determining that probable cause supported the search warrant or, in the alternative, that the “good faith” exception applied.The Sixth Circuit vacated Sanders’s conviction and 72-month sentence. Few facts supported a nexus between the drug evidence being sought and the apartment that was searched; entering and exiting an apartment, alone, provides no indication of criminal activity at the apartment. The affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that Sander resided at the apartment. No reasonable officer would believe that the affidavit established probable cause to search the apartment. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

A North Carolina social services department received a tip that Michael had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with his four-year-old stepdaughter. Michael and his family subsequently moved to Kentucky, where Family Services told detectives that Michael was possibly sexually abusing the children. All three children were placed into foster care.Before each interview, Michael received and waived his Miranda rights. He admitted to touching “between [Dorothy’s] legs and in her vagina area.” The detectives later said: “You’re going to continue to not have any contact with your children just until you admit to everything.” Michael said that he’d “like to talk to a therapist or something other than social services.” The detectives continued, saying: “You’re going to continue the rest your [sic] life without seeing your children because you want to bottle this up.” During a second interview, Michael admitted to multiple acts of sexual abuse that he had previously denied.Michael unsuccessfully moved to suppress the incriminating statements as coerced under “Miranda.” The Kentucky Supreme Court found that four of the officers’ statements “were delivered in a threatening manner” but noted that Michael had already admitted to three instances of sexual abuse. That court, the federal district court, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Michael v. Butts" on Justia Law

Cincinnati police responded to a “shots fired” call..A witness provided a video recording of the incident. The person in the video said that White had pointed a gun at his face and demanded his property. Police observed White enter a vehicle being driven by someone else, performed a traffic stop, found the driver in possession of a firearm, and found a loaded firearm under White's seat. White pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and agreed that he had “at least two convictions for crimes of violence” under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1. The parties did not agree on the applicability of ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)’s 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence for armed career criminals. In 2005, White had been adjudicated guilty of aggravated robbery with specifications for firearm possession and firearm facilitation, in Juvenile Court; in 2009, White pleaded guilty to six counts of aggravated robbery (occurring on two different dates), with specifications for having a firearm on or about his person while committing the offenses, and for possessing, displaying, brandishing, or using a firearm to facilitate the offenses.The Sixth Circuit vacated White’s 180-month sentence. The district court plainly erred in finding that White’s aggravated-robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies. The underlying theft offenses were not identified nor shown to have as an element the knowing or purposeful “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” View "United States v. White" on Justia Law