Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McCormick pled guilty without a plea agreement to offenses involving drugs or guns. He received a below-Guidelines sentence and did not appeal. Ten months later, he moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his attorney performed ineffectively by failing to file a notice of appeal.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Review of an attorney's conduct is “highly deferential.” The district court’s finding that McCormick did not instruct counsel to file an appeal is “plausible on the record as a whole.” McCormick acknowledged telling his counsel that he wanted to appeal only if he lost at trial, or if he “didn’t feel like [he] was treated fairly” at sentencing. Neither condition was met. Counsel testified that McCormick expressed frustration with his sentence but never told him to file an appeal. The district court had to decide between two plausible stories, so its choice could not have been clearly erroneous. The court rejected McCormick’s claim that counsel was ineffective for consulting him before sentencing rather than after and was required to repeat his advice after sentencing. The Constitution does not impose any such obligation. The court’s colloquy ensured that the defendant understood his rights. McCormick may have expected an appeal, but the government did not promise that and did not breach its agreement. View "McCormick v. United States" on Justia Law

Officer Zolnai, responding to a call, passed a parked, running Chevy Malibu. The driver, Morgan, “appeared to be passed out.” After assisting the caller, Zolnai drove back and again noticed the seemingly passed-out occupant in the Malibu. Suspecting an overdose or intoxication, Zolnai parked and turned on his body camera. He did not turn on the squad’s flashing lights. Zolnai noticed a civilian, potentially in the path of the vehicle. In his experience, intoxicated individuals might “hit the gas” if startled. Without first trying to arouse Morgan, Zolnai opened the car door and asked if Morgan was okay. Morgan's response was “groggy.” Zolnai asked Morgan for “ID.” Morgan moved his hand between the seat and the console. Worried that Morgan might be reaching for a firearm, Zolnai asked him to step out. Morgan refused. A struggle followed. Morgan reached for a cardboard box in the passenger seat. Other officers arrived. They eventually handcuffed Morgan. In searching Morgan, they found plastic bags containing fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine, and a semi-automatic pistol in the cardboard box.The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress, citing the community-caretaking doctrine. Morgan conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Zolnai violated the Fourth Amendment when he seized and eventually searched Morgan by unreasonably opening his car door without warning in the absence of any exigency. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, 18 U.S.C. 1958; using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, sections 924(c), (j); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, and ordered Amaya to pay a statutorily required “special assessment” of $100 per count of conviction, section 3013(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Years later, Amaya filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence on count two, arguing that after the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” holding, his murder conspiracy charge was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for his 924(c) conviction. The district court invoked the “concurrent sentence doctrine” and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 2255 limits its reach to “prisoner[s] in custody ... claiming the right to be released.” Only prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody may challenge their sentences. Even if his motion were successful, Amaya would still be in custody on the two unchallenged life sentences and the $100 special assessment attached to Amaya’s challenged conviction did not warrant section 2255 review. View "Amaya v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, Corridore was convicted of sexually abusing his granddaughter. He was sentenced to 19 months to 15 years in prison and became subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) via a permanent ankle bracelet and sex offender registration under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). By the time he filed a habeas petition in federal district court, he had been released from prison and discharged from parole. The district court dismissed the petition, explaining that Corridore was no longer in custody and therefore could not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Corridore’s arguments that he is subject to lifetime sex-offender registration and electronic monitoring—requirements that he says satisfy the custody requirement. The collateral consequences of a conviction are not sufficient to render an individual “in custody” for the purposes of a habeas attack. The issue is whether a petitioner’s movement is limited because of direct government control and therefore amounts to a severe restraint on liberty. The LEM and SORA requirements, even combined, do not qualify. View "Corridore v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant murdered a rival drug dealer. When he learned that a witness might cooperate with law enforcement, Defendant murdered him too. Federal charges followed. His lawyers negotiated a plea deal under which the government would drop many of the charges, and he would serve 480 to 520 months in prison. Defendant agreed to the plea deal, and the district court imposed a 504-month sentence. Defendant had second thoughts. He moved to vacate his sentence, claiming that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in advising him to accept the plea deal. The district court rejected this contention.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must show that his attorney performed deficiently and that he suffered prejudice from the inadequate representation. The court reasoned that given the lack of a single favorable decision at the time, the district court may not have accepted it. Even if the court had done so, “it is not clear how the successful exclusion of” one of 18 charges would have materially improved Defendant’s bargaining position. Yet despite this minimal leverage, Defendant’s counsel secured a plea with a 480-to520-month sentence—a lengthy term, granted, but one that (with good time credit) permits Defendant’s release in his mid-to-late 50s, a meaningful improvement over a guaranteed life sentence. Further, the court wrote that Defendant failed to show prejudice. Finally, the court held that by failing to raise the substantive challenge (or his newly asserted grounds for overcoming procedural default), Defendant doubly forfeited review. View "Terrance Kimbrough v. United States" on Justia Law

The district court previously found Defendant guilty of twelve supervised-release violations and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months imprisonment. He appealed, and the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing in light of Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). On remand, the district court sentenced Defendant to the same sentence of 48 months imprisonment, even though that sentence now exceeds the high end of the advisory Guidelines range by 21 months. Defendant appealed again, arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing. The court explained that district courts may consider the seriousness of the violation conduct when determining the sanction for the breach of trust associated with a supervised-release violation. Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to consider Defendant’s violation conduct. Further, the court found that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Also problematic is the court’s failure to explain its decision to increase Defendant’s sentence on Count One from “time served” to 24 months’ imprisonment post-remand. Although the district court was not constrained by its prior decision, the absence of any explanation leaves us to speculate as to the court’s reasoning. This is a reversible error. Moreover, the court concluded that the district court improperly weighed Section 3553(a) factors by placing considerable weight on a couple of factors and no weight on several other factors. This renders the sentence, in this case, substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Andrew Damarr Morris" on Justia Law

Following separate jury trials, Defendants George Oscar Messer (Oscar) and his son Jake Messer (Jake) were each convicted on two counts of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1201(a)(1). They were both sentenced to terms of life imprisonment because of various sentencing enhancements, including one for sexual exploitation. Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the federal kidnapping statute is (1) an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and (2) unconstitutionally vague. Jake also appealed his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment, and precedent forecloses Defendants’ Commerce Clause and void-for-vagueness arguments. Further, the court held that Jake’s arguments regarding the alleged procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence are unavailing. Specifically, the court wrote that the district court did not clearly err in treating Jake’s federal drug-conspiracy conviction as part of his criminal history rather than as relevant conduct. Further, the court held that the district court properly applied the dangerous-weapon and sexual-exploitation enhancements. Moreover, the court wrote that if the district court erred in applying the ransom-demand enhancement, that error was harmless. Finally, the court explained that a life sentence is an extraordinary punishment. But the court is not permitted to engage in a de novo reweighing of the Section 3553(a) factors. And in the present case, despite the extremity of the sentence, it can find no abuse of discretion by the district court in imposing the sentence recommended by the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jake Messer" on Justia Law

Defendant violated the conditions of release that a district court imposed after it found him not guilty of an alleged crime by reason of insanity. Placing the burden on Defendant, the court found that Williams posed “a substantial risk” of harm to the public and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. At issue is whether Section 4243(g) places the burden of proof on Defendant to show that his continued release would not “create a substantial risk” to the public.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court explained just as the individual has the burden at every turn up to that point to show he is not a risk to the public (for the affirmative defense, for initial release, for release after a period of commitment, for modification of conditions of release, and for ultimate release), so the individual also has the burden when the same issue returns after a violation of the conditions of release. Moreover, the court permissibly found that Defendant presented a substantial risk to the community, as his behavior and mental condition show. View "United States v. Richard Austin Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioner, pro se federal prisoner, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He also moved for default judgment against the government for its alleged untimeliness in responding to his motion.
The Sixth Circuit denied both motions. The court explained that the district court did not run afoul of Castro when it construed Petitioner’s original filings as Section 2255 motions. The court’s order provided Petitioner notice of the recharacterization and gave him an opportunity to amend his filing. The court, it is true, did not expressly warn Petitioner of the consequences of recharacterization. The court instead appointed counsel. No longer pro se, Petitioner moved beyond Castro’s ambit. Further, the court found that even if the transcripts from Petitioner’s sentencing qualify as newly discovered evidence, they do not show his innocence or show that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty. View "Curt Russell Cannamela" on Justia Law

In 2005, FBI wire intercepts, part of an unrelated drug investigation, indicated that Day’s life was in danger from West and his associates. After Day was killed, West was charged with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in committing a murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958. The court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required findings that one or more conspirators had “traveled in interstate commerce”; “with the intent that a murder be committed”; and “intended that the murder be committed as consideration" for the promise to pay. The court defined “murder” under Michigan law, but did not require the jury to make a finding that Day’s death was the result of the conspiracy. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The court sentenced West to life in prison without the possibility of parole.In 2014, West unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He then unsuccessfully petitioned to file a second 2255 motion. In 2022, West moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(C)(1)(a), claiming that the jury instructions violated “Apprendi.” Conspiracy alone carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Life imprisonment requires a jury finding that “death result[ed]” from the conspiracy. He also argued that his medical conditions supported his early release. The district court granted compassionate release based on the Apprendi violation and West’s rehabilitation efforts. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive 2255 motions. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law