Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carson was convicted of bank robbery and witness tampering. He was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment and ordered to “immediately” begin paying $5,590 in restitution in installments of 25% of his gross monthly income through the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Carson receives prison wages and cash deposits from his family in his inmate trust account, maintained by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). After discovering that BOP had control of $4,037.89 belonging to Carson, the government asked the court to order BOP to turn over all but $300 and apply the funds to Carson’s restitution obligation. The government cited 18 U.S.C. 3664(n), which requires a defendant who “receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment" to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still owed. The next day, without giving Carson an opportunity to be heard, the district court granted the motion. The order contained no findings and cited no authorities.The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the government had moved to recover federal stimulus payments issued during the COVID-19 pandemic to thousands of inmates. The district court failed to make the minimal findings necessary under statutes cited by the government–18 U.S.C. 3664(n), 3664(k), 3613. . It did not determine the source of the funds, whether they are sufficiently “substantial” to warrant garnishment, or whether circumstances justified adjustment to the restitution order View "United States v. Carson" on Justia Law

Warren, Ohio, police officers responded to a call about an unknown disturbance at a gas station in the early morning hours. They found Jones playing loud music from his SUV in the parking lot. Jones turned off the music. While the officers drove around the building to investigate, Jones drove away. Officers followed Jones, pulled him over, and told him that they had stopped him for a noise ordinance violation. The officers then smelled marijuana and searched the car, finding hidden compartments containing two firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Jones was convicted on four gun-and-drug-related counts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stop of Jones’s car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits officers to warrantlessly arrest—to seize—a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. The search of Jones’s SUV revealed loaded firearms in close proximity to drugs, plastic baggies, and a digital scale; sufficient evidence supports the conviction for possessing the firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The court rejected an argument that nine comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Bergman crossed the center line, drove into an oncoming truck, and killed its two occupants. Scientists testified that she had prescription drugs (oxycodone, a muscle relaxer, and Adderal) in her system, along with alcohol, at the time of this crash (and at the time of several prior accidents). The state’s expert opined that these drugs impaired her driving. The state relied on her prior incidents to prove that she knew the risks of getting behind the wheel after taking prescription drugs. Bergman claimed that she should have been provided an expert toxicologist at her trial for driving on a suspended license, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and second-degree murder. In its 1985 “Ake” decision, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide psychiatric experts to indigent defendants who have a credible insanity defense.A Michigan court held that Ake did not require the state to provide Bergman with a defense toxicologist because she failed to show a sufficient need for one notwithstanding the state’s expert evidence. The Sixth Circuit rejected Bergman’s federal habeas petition as not meeting the stringent standards for relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), given the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity over Ake’s scope. View "Bergman v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2007, Jones was convicted of possessing a methamphetamine mixture with intent to distribute it. Because Jones had twice served time, in California and Nevada, for similar narcotics offenses the court sentenced Jones to 360 months in prison, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). In 2016, Jones filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. In 2021, Jones obtained dismissal of his prior California conviction and filed another section 2255 motion, arguing that dismissal of the California conviction triggered resentencing under the Supreme Court’s 2005 “Johnson” decision.Believing the motion second or successive, the district court transferred it to the Sixth Circuit. That court returned the case to the district court, concluding that the motion is neither second nor successive. When “the events giving rise” to a section 2255 claim have not yet occurred at the time of a prisoner’s first 2255 motion, a later motion predicated on those events is not “second or successive.” The events giving rise” to Jones’s Johnson claim occurred in 2021 when California dismissed and vacated Jones’s prior California conviction. View "In re: Ronald Jones" on Justia Law

In August, 1993, Fields, having spent the day drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, got into a fight with Burton. Burton lived in a duplex owned by Horton. That night, Burton found that she was locked outside. Fields appeared, with a knife, and broke a window in the duplex. Both Fields and Burton fled before police arrived, having been called by a neighbor. Officers found Fields in Horton’s residence, a block away, in possession of Horton’s jewelry, saying that he had killed Horton, who was dead in her bedroom. At his second trial, the prosecution argued that Fields broke into Horton’s residence through a storm window, murdered her in the bedroom, and started burglarizing the residence shortly before police arrived. To test the plausibility of that theory, the jury conducted an experiment using a flat-tipped knife submitted into evidence to remove a cabinet door in the jury room (in place of the storm window). Satisfied with the outcome, the jurors convicted Fields of intentional murder and sentenced him to death.The Sixth Circuit granted Fields conditional habeas corpus relief. The jury improperly considered extrinsic evidence in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Given the centrality of the issue, the inherently prejudicial nature of the experiment, and the lack of overwhelming evidence of guilt, the jury experiment had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "Fields v. Jordan" on Justia Law

On three occasions, Harrison sold methamphetamine to B.B., a confidential informant who recorded the transactions on video. Police arrested Harrison. B.B. died before trial and was unable to testify about the controlled buys. As a substitute, the government played B.B.’s videos of the transactions for the jury, over Harrison’s objection. Recordings of statements from B.B. to law-enforcement personnel were excluded on Sixth Amendment grounds.The jury convicted Harrison on multiple drug counts and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court found that Harrison’s prior conviction for complicity to commit murder was a serious violent felony and that Harrison was subject to a sentencing enhancement, raising his mandatory minimum on the possession-with-intent-to-sell count from 10 years to 15. 21 U.S.C. 841. Harrison was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the introduction of B.B.’s videos violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers and the district court improperly characterized his prior conviction as a violent felony at sentencing. B.B.’s statements in the videos were not offered for their truth and were not hearsay. Complicity to commit murder always requires the use of physical force, because murder always requires the use of physical force. View "United States v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The PROTECT Act of 2003, 117 Stat. 650, required the Sentencing Commission to vary penalties for child-pornography offenses depending on the number of images involved. Addressing a perceived ambiguity in Congress’s command, the Commission added a Sentencing Guidelines commentary application note instructing courts to equate one video to 75 images when calculating the applicable sentencing range, the “75:1 Rule,” U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(7) n.6(B). Recent Supreme Court precedent has clarified when courts can defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations (“Auer deference”).Phillips, convicted of possessing child pornography, argued that this recent clarification meant that courts can no longer rely on the 75:1 Rule and that the court erred in relying on it when imposing his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 151-month sentence. Applying traditional statutory construction, determining the number of images in a video is the kind of genuinely ambiguous exercise that the Commission was entitled to address in its commentary. The 75:1 Rule fits within the zone of ambiguity because it considers that videos contain multiple images; the purpose of tying offense levels to the number of images; and Congress’s choice to create four tiers of punishment, based on a scale of 10-600 images. The Rule has the character and context of an interpretation entitled to controlling weight. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Windham was charged with kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Windham’s attorney told the court that he had gone over the indictment “word by word” with Windham. The court advised Windham that he was “charged with kidnapping and with aiding and abetting kidnapping” in violation of the federal kidnapping statute. In a pro se motion, Windham later wrote that he had “been indicted [on] one count of ‘kidnapping[,]’” confirming that he understood that he had been charged with a single count. Windham’s negotiated plea agreement provided that he pleaded guilty to a single count of kidnapping and listed the elements of 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. 2. The agreement also included Windham's admission that he and his accomplices held M.S. at gunpoint for an extended period of time and confirmed that he used a cell phone and a motor vehicle in furtherance of that offense. At his plea hearing, Windham confirmed that he: signed the plea agreement; initialed each page; and read and reviewed each paragraph with his attorney.The court sentenced Windham to 120 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Windham’s arguments that no factual basis supported his guilty plea and that he was unaware of the nature of the charges against him. View "United States v. Windham" on Justia Law

Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies investigated Bravo for drug trafficking. Those investigatory efforts revealed that Bravo sat at the head of an interstate drug trafficking organization: a contact in Mexico connected Bravo to drug suppliers, one of whom was Mercado-Lozano. When Bravo received drugs from those suppliers, he would route them to associates for distribution. Those associates included Bush, Gibson, and Mosley. Bush maintained one of Bravo’s stash houses, tended to marijuana growing on the property, and occasionally distributed drugs on Bravo’s behalf. Gibson was a street-level drug dealer who bought distribution quantities of cocaine from Bravo on five or six occasions. Mercado-Lozano, a 14-year veteran of the Sinaloa Cartel, was one of Bravo’s methamphetamine suppliers. Mosley bought distribution quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, and marijuana from Bravo and sold them. After a two-year investigation, a federal grand jury indicted Bravo, Bush, Gibson, Mercado-Lozano, and Mosley for violating federal drug laws.In consolidated appeals, the Sixth Circuit affirmed their convictions and sentences. The court agreed with Gibson that his post-conviction letter to the district court asserting a perfunctory denial of guilt was an improper basis to impose a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, but otherwise rejected arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing enhancements, and the denial of a motion to suppress. View "United States v. Mercado-Lozano" on Justia Law

Hewittel was convicted of armed robbery and related offenses based solely on the testimony of the victim. Three witnesses—one of them having little relationship with anyone in the case—were prepared to testify in support of Hewittel’s alibi that he was at home, almost a half-hour from the crime scene when the crime occurred. Hewittel’s attorney failed to call any of those witnesses at trial, not because of any strategic judgment but because Hewittel’s counsel thought the crime occurred between noon and 12:30 p.m. when Hewittel was at home alone. The victim twice testified (in counsel’s presence) that the crime occurred at 1:00 or 1:30 p.m.—by which time all three witnesses were present at Hewittel’s home. Counsel also believed that evidence of Hewittel’s prior convictions would have unavoidably come in at trial. In reality, that evidence almost certainly would have been excluded, if Hewittel’s counsel asked. Throughout the trial, Hewittel’s counsel repeatedly reminded the jury that his client had been convicted of armed robbery five times before.The trial judge twice ordered a new trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, based in part on the same mistake regarding the time of the offense. The federal district court granted a Hewittel writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, calling the trial “an extreme malfunction in the criminal justice system.” View "Hewitt-El v. Burgess" on Justia Law