Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wellpath contracted with the jail to provide on-site medical staff and services. Wellpath assigned Dr. Cogswell, to work at the jail. While there, he sexually assaulted three inmates during their visits to the medical clinic. None of the women called out for help or otherwise indicated to the jail staff that anything untoward was occurring. One inmate, Bills recounted seeing an unidentified officer “glance through the little crack of the white curtain [and give] kind of like a head nod,” which Bills interpreted as the officer saying to Cogswell “I got your back.” Wellpath had a policy that if there was a sensitive exam going on, there would be a chaperone. During Cogswell’s tenure, Macomb Officer Horan reported to Wellpath’s nursing director and a Wellpath paramedic that Cogswell was potentially violating this policy by seeing patients unchaperoned, using a privacy screen. At Horan’s request, the nursing director “pop[ped] [her] head in” and saw “nothing out of the ordinary[ or] suspicious.”Days after their assaults, inmates reported the incidents to the jail. Wellpath learned of the reports the same day and immediately informed Cogswell not to report to work. Following an investigation, his employment was terminated. Cogswell was later convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. In the inmates’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing the lack of evidence that the defendants knew of Cogswell’s assaults before they were reported. View "Buetenmiller v. Macomb County Jail" on Justia Law

Police stopped Jones for a traffic violation. Ignoring demands that he step out of the car, Jones sped off, crashed the car, and ran until he was arrested. Police seized an AR-15 and a handgun from the car. Without a plea agreement, Jones pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court informed Jones of the maximum statutory penalties. Jones claimed he “thought [his] guideline was something different.” The government claimed the Guidelines called for 21-27 months’ imprisonment. Jones’s lawyer argued the range was 12-18 months. Jones was unaware that the court was not bound by those calculations. The court stated that it would use the PSR at sentencing. The PSR recommended 46-57 months’ imprisonment, Jones claimed that if he had known the court could sentence him to more time than the government originally requested, he would have fought the charge or taken a plea deal. The court informed Jones that he could move to withdraw his guilty plea but warned that if it denied the motion, Jones would lose credit for accepting responsibility. The prosecution then asked for a 57-month sentence. Jones went through with his guilty plea. The court sentenced him to 57 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated; the district court did not ensure that the plea was knowing and voluntary. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Ruiz-Lopez was a frequent customer at a Memphis gas station and was friendly with the employees, including Hamid. One day, Ruiz-Lopez stopped at the gas station, carrying his new pistol in his pocket, and made a playful grab for Hamid’s hip-holstered firearm. According to Hamid, Ruiz-Lopez pulled his pistol out of his pocket and pointed it at Hamid’s face. As Ruiz-Lopez lowered the gun, he hit the trigger, discharging the weapon. The bullet ricocheted off the floor and struck Hamid’s leg. A surveillance camera captured this encounter; the district court found Hamid’s testimony credible.Ruiz-Lopez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as an undocumented alien, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The court imposed a four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), reckless endangerment with a firearm, and ordered Ruiz-Lopez to pay $4,689.64 restitution to Hamid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court did not clearly err when it found that Ruiz-Lopez pointed a loaded firearm at Hamid’s face and committed no error by applying the enhancement. The restitution award was consistent with the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663. View "United States v. Leonel Ruiz-Lopez" on Justia Law

Reho, proceeding pro se, moved for an extension of time to apply for a certificate of appealability and to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, 83 days after the district court entered judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was three weeks late, 28 U.S.C. 2107(b)(1); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i).The Sixth Circuit remanded. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was time-barred. However, the motion, which repeatedly asks for an extension of time and offered an explanation for his delay, is better construed as a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(c); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(A); the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal based on “excusable neglect or good cause” if the petitioner moves for an extension within 30 days of the expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal. On remand, the district court must determine whether Reho has shown excusable neglect or good cause so as to merit an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. View "Reho v. United States" on Justia Law

Officials switched Flint’s municipal water supply from the Detroit Water Department to the Flint River, reviving a dormant treatment plant. Flint residents immediately complained of water that looked, tasted, and smelled foul. There was evidence of E. coli contamination in the water, a localized outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease, and a dangerously high lead poisoning rate in children. Without proper corrosion-control treatment, lead leached from aging pipes into the water. The plaintiffs, children who suffered lead poisoning, brain damage, and other injuries, sued “governmental defendants” and “engineering defendants.” Criminal charges were prosecuted at the same time.The appellants, Flint Emergency Managers, and the former Flint Director of Public Works sought a protective order in the civil litigation after their initial criminal charges were dismissed, asking the court to delay discovery pertaining to them until the criminal statute of limitations expired or to seal the discovery. The district court denied the motion. Each sat for a deposition; none invoked the Fifth Amendment. All were later indicted.The governmental defendants settled the civil case. The remaining civil defendants served subpoenas on appellants, who moved to quash, contending that they would invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. The court denied the motions, concluding that they had waived the privilege by testifying at their depositions. At trial, after each appellant invoked the Fifth Amendment, the court played videos of the depositions. After a mistrial, the court scheduled a retrial.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Appellants’ deposition waivers did not waive the privilege at trial because the waiver extended only through cross-examination at their depositions. View "Walters v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Lamb was involved in an altercation with a WCI correctional office. Lamb alleges that other correctional officers retaliated by beating him and deploying pepper spray against him while he was handcuffed outside the presence of surveillance cameras. That night, Lamb was transferred to the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LeCI), where he was placed in restrictive housing. Lamb filed an internal informal complaint. WCI responded with a computer entry on the prison’s internal system, stating “[y]ou will be able to give your statement during the use of force investigation.” Lamb asserts that he did not receive this response for two years because he did not have access to the System while in restrictive housing. Lamb also alleges that he filed second and third informal complaints and unsuccessfully asked LeCl officers for forms to escalate his grievance. Lamb was transferred to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. Lamb allegedly sent an appeal letter to the Chief Inspector of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. There is no record of this letter.Lamb filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Sixth Circuit reversed. While Lamb did not exhaust his administrative remedies properly, there remain material disputes of fact about whether prison officials rendered those administrative remedies unavailable. View "Lamb v. Kendrick" on Justia Law

Memphis attorney Skouteris practiced plaintiff-side, personal injury law. He routinely settled cases without permission, forged client signatures on settlement checks, and deposited those checks into his own account. Skouteris was arrested on state charges, was disbarred, and was indicted in federal court for bank fraud. At Skouteris’s federal trial, lay testimony suggested that Skouteris was not acting under any sort of diminished cognitive capacity. Two psychologists examined Skouteris. The defense expert maintained that Skouteris suffered from a “major depressive disorder,” “alcohol use disorder,” and “seizure disorder,” which began during Skouteris’s college football career, which, taken together, would have “significantly limited” Skouteris’s “ability to organize his mental efforts.” The government’s expert agreed that Skouteris suffered from depression and alcohol use disorder but concluded that Skouteris was “capable of having the mental ability to form and carry out complex thoughts, schemes, and plans.” Skouteris’s attorney unsuccessfully sought a jury instruction that evidence of “diminished mental capacity” could provide “reasonable doubt that” Skouteris had the “requisite culpable state of mind.”Convicted, Skouteris had a sentencing range of 46-57 months, with enhancements for “losses,” abusing a position of trust or using a special skill, and committing an offense that resulted in “substantial financial hardship” to at least one victim. The district court varied downward for a sentence of 30 months plus restitution of $147,406. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the jury instructions, and the sentence. View "United States v. Skouteris" on Justia Law

Wallace, a Kentucky constable, planted evidence in order to enhance the charges against suspects. Officers who had observed him doing so told a supervisor who contacted the FBI. During an undercover sting operation, Wallace engaged in false arrests and “set up” an incident of drunk driving and “stuck his hand up [the driver’s] skirt and felt [her] butt.” In 2020, FBI agents conducted a consensual search at Wallace’s home and found 5.9 grams of methamphetamine in the safe and nearly 30 firearms around the property.Wallace was convicted of conspiracy to violate civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 241, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for Wallace’s possession of a dangerous weapon during a drug trafficking crime. The enhancement led to an advisory Guidelines range of 188-235 months. The court emphasized that Wallace refused to take responsibility for his crimes, targeted victims on the “low[est] rung” of society, and engaged in “stomach-turning” abuse of his office but imposed a sentence of 140 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Wallace’s drug conviction and the dangerous weapon enhancement supporting his sentence. View "United States v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Sittenfeld, a former Cincinnati City Council member, was charged with honest-services wire fraud, bribery, and attempted extortion under color of official right. The jury trial comprised nine days. The court did not sequester the jurors but admonished them repeatedly against discussing the case or considering extraneous information. On the third day of jury deliberations, a court employee informed the judge that “Juror X” had been posting to her private Facebook page, which was visible only to Juror X’s Facebook friends, of whom the court employee was one. The court obtained printouts of Juror X’s private posts and comments and called the parties to chambers to discuss the situation. In the meantime, the jury reached a verdict. The parties and court accepted the verdict with the possibility of a post-verdict “Remmer” hearing on possible extraneous influences on the jury. The jury convicted Sittenfeld on two counts. The court discharged the jury, questioned Jurors X and Y in chambers, denied Sittenfeld’s motion for a forensic examination of Juror X’s electronic devices, and concluded that Sittenfeld was not prejudiced by the Facebook postings.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A court’s inherent or statutory authority in conducting a Remmer hearing does not include an unlimited, inquisitorial power to order jurors to surrender their personal possessions, such as their electronic devices, or to divulge their passwords; the district court had no power to order a forensic examination of the juror’s devices. View "In re: Sittenfeld" on Justia Law

In 2010, a jury convicted Mammone of the aggravated murder of his two children and his former mother-in-law, aggravated burglary, violation of a protective order, and attempted arson. Mammone’s mother, his father, and a psychologist testified on his behalf at sentencing, and Mammone gave a five-hour unsworn statement. The jury recommended and the court imposed three death sentences plus 27 years of consecutive imprisonment for his noncapital offenses. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court rejected Mammone’s arguments that pretrial publicity was so prejudicial that he did not receive a fair trial; that the jurors unconstitutionally prayed before penalty-phase deliberations; and that trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. The Ohio Supreme Court held that it could not conclude that pretrial publicity rendered Mammone’s trial a “hollow formality.” That decision was not an objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Mammone cites no Supreme Court precedent holding that prayer by jurors amounts to the influence of extraneous information. Mammone’s underlying claim that trial counsel should have pursued a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity is not substantial because he cannot overcome the presumption that the decision was strategic. View "Mammone v. Jenkins" on Justia Law