Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A confidential informant notified the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Department of Public Safety (KDPS) that methamphetamine was being sold from 913 Cooper Avenue and that two firearms were in the home. KDPS linked the Gates brothers, Trevon and Deonte, to the residence. In total, the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services concluded that the brothers were accountable for distributing 1.41 kilograms of methamphetamine during the relevant time. Trevon received a 72-month sentence for pleading guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Deonte received a 110-month sentence for pleading guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).The Sixth Circuit affirmed Deonte’s sentence, rejecting an argument that the district court improperly considered juvenile conduct when calculating his Guidelines range. The court vacated Trevon’s sentence as procedurally unreasonable. The district court did not openly address the Guidelines as they related to Trevon’s section 924(c) conviction. After the district court imposed a 12-month above-Guideline sentence, Trevon objected. The district court responded, incorrectly: “The crime itself is without a guideline,” and later stated, “all right. If that’s correct, then I have varied upward for the reasons that I stated.” View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

Several members of the Romania-based “Alexandria Online Auction Fraud Network,” including Nedelcu, were charged with conspiracy to violate RICO, 18 U.S.C 1962(d); conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). Romania extradited Nedelcu to the U.S. He pleaded guilty to RICO conspiracy in exchange for the dismissal of his other charges and admitted that the government could prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt including that a Confidential Source would, in accordance with Nedelcu’s instructions, launder the proceeds of fraud by exchanging fraud proceeds into bitcoin to conceal the source, nature, ownership, and control of those proceeds. Nedelcu and the CS laundered approximately $5,600. The PSR concluded that two money-laundering provisions applied: U.S.S.G. 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) increases a defendant’s offense level by two “[i]f the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1956” and section 2S1.1(b)(3), provides that, if 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) applies and the offense involved “sophisticated laundering” a further two-level increase is necessary.With a Guidelines Range of 78-97 months’ imprisonment, the court imposed a sentence of 82 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the factual basis for Nedelcu’s plea agreement specifically established that he committed money laundering as a predicate for his RICO conviction, the Guidelines compelled the district court to sentence him “as if” he had been convicted of money laundering. View "United States v. Nedelcu" on Justia Law

On November 17, 1997, an Ashtabula Police dispatcher advised officers that Jones, who had outstanding felony warrants, had been spotted. Days earlier, Jones had told his cousin that he “was facing a lot of time” and “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest him.” Officer Glover found Jones, who pulled a revolver from his pocket and fired several shots at Glover. Jones kicked Glover in the chest, then fled the scene. Officers apprehended Jones and recovered the weapon, which used hollow-point bullets. Officer Glover died the following morning.Jones was convicted of murder. During the penalty phase, Jones’s counsel presented testimony from a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Jones with Antisocial Personality Disorder and testified that Black men with this disorder (including Jones) would commit more murders—he claimed that about one in four “African-American urban males” suffered from the disorder, and the only treatment was to “throw them away, lock them up.” The jury recommended and the court imposed the death penalty. The district court denied Jones’s petition for habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The issue of whether Jones received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because his attorneys failed to prepare expert witnesses properly, as shown by the psychologist’s racialized testimony, was not procedurally defaulted. On de novo review of the merits, the court held trial counsel performed ineffectively and Jones is entitled to a new sentencing. View "Jones v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Walker Officer Dumond began pursuing Meadows after he passed Dumond on the highway while traveling nearly 90 miles per hour. During the subsequent traffic stop, which was captured on dash-camera footage, Dumond instructed Meadows to keep his hands out of his vehicle and to open the door to his vehicle. Dumond and Meadows shouted back and forth as Meadows attempted to open his door. Once Meadows exited the vehicle, Dumond grabbed Meadows and slammed him to the ground. On the ground, Dumond kneed Meadows to try and roll him over, and Officer Wietfeldt punched Meadows multiple times. Wietfeldt fractured Meadows’s wrist while handcuffing him.Meadows sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers appealed the denial of their summary judgment motions based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court stated that on interlocutory appeal, it is bound by the district court’s determination that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dumond and Wietfeldt did not perceive Meadows as refusing to comply or resisting arrest. The dash-camera footage does not “blatantly contradict” the factual issues identified by the district court. View "Meadows v. City of Walker, Michigan" on Justia Law

Clark was arrested for obtaining and distributing controlled substances, including cocaine and heroin, and for selling heroin to undercover agents on three occasions, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. Clark had committed various felonies in the past, including two Tennessee convictions for possessing marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentencing enhancement if a defendant has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a).Clark pled guilty to the possession count. The PSR calculated Clark’s total offense level at 29, taking into account his career offender status. The Guidelines range was 151–188 months. Clark objected to his career offender designation, arguing that before Clark’s 2019 arrest, the Agriculture Improvement Act narrowed the federal definition of marijuana to exclude hemp, 21 U.S.C. 802(16). Tennessee narrowed its definition a few months later. The district court overruled Clark’s objections and sentenced Clark to 151 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines’ use of the term “controlled substance” in the career offender enhancement should be defined with reference to the drug schedules in place at the time of the prior convictions at issue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Paulk pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 921(a), and 924(e). The PSR concluded that three of Paulk’s prior convictions were “violent felon[ies]” as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (ACCA). He did not object to that finding. The district court sentenced him as a career offender and imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years for a section 922(g) conviction if the defendant has three or more previous convictions for “violent felon[ies],” “serious drug offense[s],” or both.Paulk challenged the conclusion that his 2011 conviction for Michigan third-degree home invasion constituted a “violent felony” under ACCA. Reviewing his challenge for plain error, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court applied the categorical approach and rejected Paulk’s argument that it is possible to imagine scenarios in which there is no intent to commit a crime, yet a defendant could be convicted of third-degree home invasion. “This creative legal imagination is insufficient.” Paulk demonstrated at best “a theoretical possibility[] that [Michigan] would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of [burglary].” View "United States v. Paulk" on Justia Law

A DEA task force investigated Jacobs, a Kentucky drug dealer. Jacobs sold drugs to a couple who allegedly were “good friends” with the local Commonwealth Attorney (CA). After Jacobs' arrest on state drug-trafficking charges, the couple had extensive conversations with the CA. After one conversation, an assistant state prosecutor requested Jacobs’s cell phone records from the task force, alerting the DEA to the CA’s relationship with Jacobs’s customers. The CA became involved in the case in other ways, impeding Jacobs’ use as a cooperating witness in other federal investigations by opposing a bond reduction and refusing to seek a state search warrant for an unrelated case if the DEA agent from the Jacobs investigation was involved. The DEA began investigating the CA’s conduct, “Operation Speakeasy.” Evidence was presented to the U.S. Attorney, who refused to bring obstruction charges against the CA.A Cincinnati Enquirer reporter filed a Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 request with the DEA, seeking any document related to the Jacobs investigation or Operation Speakeasy. The DEA denied that request, citing an exception for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Enquirer’s suit. The documents “only minimally advance[d] a public interest in shedding light on the decision” to not prosecute the CA and “significant privacy interests outweigh[ed] the proffered public interest.” View "Cincinnati Enquirer v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

A Romanian organization, the Alexandria Online Auction Fraud Network (AOAF), used fraudulent online advertisements on websites like eBay, Craigslist, and Amazon to convince unknowing U.S. purchasers to send payments for high-value items that did not actually exist. After receiving the payments through vehicles like gift cards and prepaid debit cards, AOAF money launderers in the U.S., including Brown, converted the payments into Bitcoin currency, which was then transferred back to Romania. Foreign Bitcoin exchange businesses including RG, Iossifov’s Bulgaria-based business, then transferred the Bitcoin balances to cash on behalf of AOAF fraudsters. About 900 victims never received the items for which they paid. The government learned about the scheme in 2014 when it discovered that an American citizen living in Kentucky was laundering funds on behalf of an online fraud organization; the individual became a confidential source.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Iossifov and Brown’s convictions and sentences under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and Iossifov’s additional conviction for conspiring to launder money 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The court rejected venue, jurisdiction, and Due Process claims, a contention that Bitcoin does not fall under the money laundering statute, and challenges to sentencing enhancements and evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Iossifov" on Justia Law

Ozomaro was indicted for possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. After competency proceedings and the withdrawal of appointed counsel, the court allowed Ozomaro to proceed pro se, with standby counsel. Ozomaro repeatedly asserted that he would not attend his trial and submitted incoherent jurisdictional arguments. On the day set for trial, Ozomaro refused to leave his holding cell. The court adjourned until October 20. On October 20, Ozomaro appeared. The court empaneled 12 jurors and two alternates. After a day of deliberations, a juror informed a court staff member that she observed a juror drinking alcohol during lunch and that “the same individual hates the Government and doesn’t believe anything they say.” Another juror called to ask if “it was legal to drink on lunch break,” stating that “a juror openly admitted bias to the Government.” The court separately questioned each juror. Most of the jurors verified the allegations about Juror 109, who was excused and replaced with an alternate juror. The jury was told, “start completely brand new.” Following a guilty verdict, Ozomaro was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was a sufficient factual inquiry from which to find good cause and conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that the discharge stemmed from Juror 109’s views of the case. The court upheld the application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice based on Ozomaro’s refusal to appear. View "United States v. Ozomaro" on Justia Law

Fields was charged with possession of 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The indictment alleged that Fields had two prior Kentucky “final conviction[s] for . . . serious drug felon[ies]” for which he served over a year in prison and was released within 15 years of the instant offense: “Trafficking in a Controlled Substance in the First Degree,” and “Unlawful Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor and Persistent Felony Offender,” The trial was bifurcated into two phases to prove the substantive drug offense and to prove that Fields had previously been convicted of two serious drug felonies.The Sixth Circuit vacated Fields’ 25-year mandatory-minimum enhanced sentence, rejecting one of the “serious drug offense” predicates. Kentucky’s meth-precursor statute applies when a defendant was not yet capable of manufacturing methamphetamine and does not “necessarily entail” manufacturing under section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The court rejected challenges to the procedure used to impose the enhancement, including arguments that 21 U.S.C. 851(b), which governs procedures for imposing the enhancement, facially violated the Fifth Amendment by compelling defendants to testify regarding previous convictions and that section 851(c) facially violates the Sixth Amendment by requiring judges to determine facts—the length and recency of incarceration—that the Constitution requires to be decided by a jury. View "United States v. Fields" on Justia Law