Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man walked into Walgreens wearing clothes with white stains, placed a pack of gum on the counter, asked for cigarettes, then pulled out an apparent handgun. The man fled with the money and the cigarettes, leaving the gum. Police found Jacobs’s fingerprint on the gum and got an arrest warrant. Jacobs learned of the warrant and voluntarily went to the police station. Jacobs met with Detective Agee, who read him his Miranda rights. Showing Jacobs pictures from the Walgreens robbery and other robberies, Agee noted that the stains on the robber’s clothes resembled stains on Jacobs’s jacket. Jacobs denied involvement in the robberies. Agee highlighted the strength of the fingerprint evidence and said that he would get a warrant to search Jacobs’s dad’s house, where Jacobs was living, and Jacobs’s car. Agee said that Jacobs would likely face a severe sentence but things might be different if Jacobs changed his story. Jacobs then said: “The weapons—them is gone.” Agee gave Jacobs a phone to make calls and offered food and drink. After a break, Jacobs said he “f—ed up bad” because he was “broke” and needed to pay child support. He made statements about the gun and helped police retrieve the clothes from his girlfriend’s house. The interview lasted less than two hours.The district court granted Jacobs’s suppression motion, concluding that Agee used impermissibly coercive tactics. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Jacobs’s statements were voluntary. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

Kennedy was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, fentanyl, heroin, and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841, and distribution of methamphetamine, section 841. He pled guilty to Count 1 and stipulated that he “was involved in a drug trafficking conspiracy that distributed 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, as well as heroin, fentanyl, and crack cocaine.” He “frequently used cellular telephones and various social media accounts, including Facebook, to coordinate with his co-conspirators and to set up various drug deals.” He acknowledged sales of “approximately 99 grams of actual methamphetamine” on November 26, 2019, and of “approximately 270 grams of actual methamphetamine” on December 10.Kennedy’s PSR calculated a base offense level of 32 based on 150-500 grams of at least 80% pure methamphetamine, added two levels under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) for firearm possession, and deducted three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The court rejected a four-level leadership enhancement because the operation was “decentralized in nature.” With a Guideline range of 168-210 months, the court imposed a 210-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the firearm enhancement was improperly applied; the district court failed to honor the read-and-discuss requirement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i); and the Guidelines’ harsher treatment of pure methamphetamine was unfair. View "United States v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Robinson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing drugs with the intent to distribute them. During his supervised release term, Robinson was stopped, purportedly for a tinted-window infraction. The officer gave Robinson a warning for that violation, then asked for consent to search the car, allegedly stating that refusal to consent might violate the conditions of Robinson's supervised release. Robinson acknowledged having a gun. The officer searched the car and found a loaded handgun, marijuana, and cocaine. Robinson was not indicted.In proceedings to revoke Robinson’s supervised release, Robinson moved to suppress the evidence. The government conceded a Fourth Amendment violation. The court denied the motion. Robinson separately unsuccessfully moved for a jury trial on the supervised release violation. The court revoked Robinson’s supervised release and sentenced him to another 28 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exclusionary rule does not bar illegally obtained evidence from a supervised release hearing. Defendants do not have a right to a jury at supervised-release hearings. While the Supreme Court recently found that the jury-trial guarantee applies to a unique provision—18 U.S.C. 3583(k)—that imposed a minimum 5-year prison term on a defendant who committed specified federal crimes while on supervised release, that decision did not render unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. 3583(g), which requires a court to impose a prison term of unspecified length if a defendant has engaged in certain conduct (such as possessing a gun) while on supervised release. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Harris went to the store, argued with a clerk, left the store, and entered the laundromat next door where his friend, Henderson, worked. Harris asserts that while he was between the buildings, the clerk came out, pointed a gun, and taunted him with racial slurs. Following Harris’s 911 call, four officers arrived. As shown on bodycams, they expressed disbelief in Harris’s report. The store clerk denied having a gun. The store had at least three surveillance cameras but the officers watched footage from only the front door, although Harris had reported that the incident occurred near the back door. Harris wanted to move forward with his report, believing the footage would corroborate his account. The officers indicated that the video revealed Harris had lied and arrested Harris. No officer took Henderson’s statement. Detective Busch reviewed the police report and passed it to the prosecutor for charging.Harris spent 18 days in jail before being released on bond. Weeks later, the state dropped Harris’s false felony report charge; the store clerks failed to appear. Harris sued the City of Saginaw, the officers, and Busch. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity summary judgment to the officers, the grant of qualified immunity to Busch, and the dismissal of Harris’s failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city. There is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officers arrested Harris without probable cause. View "Harris v. City of Saginaw, Michigan" on Justia Law

Moss purchased cocaine from a DEA informant and was charged with possession with intent to deliver 1,000 or more grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Moss’s first attorney moved for an entrapment hearing. Steingold then began representing Moss. At the entrapment hearing, 10 days later, Steingold attested to minimal pre-trial preparation. Moss was the only witness he presented. Steingold requested a continuance to contact witnesses he learned about during Moss’s direct and cross-examination. The court permitted Steingold to contact one witness but denied a continuance. The prosecution presented five witnesses and multiple exhibits. The court denied Moss’s motion to dismiss based on entrapment.At trial, Steingold waived his opening argument, presented no witnesses, and stipulated to the admission of the transcript from the entrapment hearing as substantive evidence. For one of the government’s two witnesses, Steingold did not object during his testimony or conduct any cross-examination. Steingold waived his closing argument. On appeal, Moss unsuccessfully argued that Steingold provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by waiving Moss’s right to a jury trial and stipulating to the admission of the evidence from the entrapment hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order of habeas relief. The state court’s denial of Moss’s ineffective assistance claims under Strickland was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Moss v. Miniard" on Justia Law

Simmonds ran a drug-trafficking conspiracy. During traffic stops, officers seized large quantities of fentanyl from co-conspirators acting under Simmonds’s instructions. Investigators also searched an apartment and four storage units associated with Simmonds, where they seized cash, cell phones, fentanyl, methamphetamine, cocaine, xylazine, and suspected marijuana, plus shipping and packaging supplies. At one unit, investigators seized a firearm, ammunition, and Simmonds’s passport and birth certificate.Simmonds pled guilty to conspiring to distribute drugs, possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and using a cell phone to facilitate a felony drug offense. In the plea agreement, Simmonds agreed that “sentencing rests within the discretion of the Court,” that the guideline range would be determined by the court after a PSR was prepared, and to a base offense level 32. The government would seek two-level enhancements for possession of a firearm, and for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity but “no other specific offense characteristics, Guideline adjustments or Guideline departures.” The PSR departed from that recommendation. The district court followed the PSR, set the base offense level at 36, and accepted four recommended enhancements, bringing the offense level to 43. Simmonds’ Guideline range was life imprisonment. The court sentenced Simmonds to 250 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Simmonds cannot show that the prosecution breached the plea agreement nor can he show that the court committed reversible error by failing to notice and rectify a breach of the agreement. View "United States v. Simmonds" on Justia Law

In 2001, Akridge was convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine; possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine; possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime; and possessing a firearm as a felon. Akridge had prior convictions for aggravated assault and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 based on a then-mandatory Guidelines range of 30 years’ to life imprisonment for his drug-trafficking offenses. Akridge also was subject to a mandatory consecutive 25-year sentence for using a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, since he had a prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court sentenced Akridge to 55 years’ imprisonment: 30 years for his drug and a consecutive 25-year term.The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the sentencing disparity between crack- and powder-cocaine penalties; the 2018 First Step Act made this change retroactive. Akridge sought a sentence reduction, acknowledging that his career-offender designation and corresponding offense level remained unchanged. Proceeding to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court noted that while Akridge had taken vocational and self-improvement classes, he had also received 11 disciplinary sanctions. Citing Akridge’s post-sentencing misconduct and criminal history, the court declined to reduce his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court miscalculated his Guidelines’ range and that its “3553(a) analysis was procedurally incomplete … because it was anchored” to the wrong career-offender range. View "United States v. Akridge" on Justia Law

A government informant arranged to buy meth at Kilbourne’s home. When the informant arrived, Kilbourne was not there. The informant purchased meth from Reinberg and asked Reinberg about purchasing a gun. Reinberg stated she would “have [Kilbourne] hit you up on that.” Later, Kilbourne sold the gun to the informant. Kilbourne was arrested. Reinberg pled guilty, without an agreement, to drug offenses. Reinberg’s attorney stopped her from answering questions about the gun because she was not charged with any gun offenses. The government opposed Reinberg’s for safety-valve relief at sentencing. Reinberg later claimed “she was aware of the gun” but was not involved in its sale. The government opposed her safety-valve request again, claiming that a video of the meth sale showed Reinberg knew more.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of safety-valve relief and a 60-month sentence. The safety-valve provision allows a court to impose a sentence shorter than the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that she meets "every criterion,” including telling the government all information she has concerning the offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme. The district court found the conversation with the informant indicated that the gun was present. Reinberg withheld information. That finding was not clearly erroneous. Reinberg identified the gun by name, twice remarked “it’s pretty,” and facilitated its later sale. View "United States v. Reinberg" on Justia Law

Brothers Marshane and Terry were convicted in 2005 of conspiring to distribute crack and powder cocaine. Each brother had at least two prior convictions for a “felony drug offense.” Their latest convictions required life sentences. The Guidelines ranges for both brothers was 360 months to life, regardless of whether they were deemed career offenders. Both were sentenced to life in prison. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger the statutory penalties. The Sentencing Guidelines changed how multiple prior sentences are counted in calculating an offender’s criminal history and changed the drug-equivalency tables to reflect the Act. Marshane's Guidelines range dropped to 292-365 months. Terry's range fell to 324-405 months. If treated as career offenders, the brothers would still have a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. The 2018 First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive.In 2020, the brothers sought sentence reductions. Conceding that they are career offenders, they asked for a downward variance, emphasizing their rehabilitation and a recent report recommending that offenders convicted only of drug-trafficking crimes should not be deemed career offenders. The government argued that the Act had not modified the penalties for their offense that involved five kilograms or more of powder cocaine and that they remained career offenders. President Obama had already commuted their sentences to the bottom of their Guidelines ranges. The district court granted reduced sentences of 306 months for Marshane and 324 months for Terry. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by failing to recognize that, under current law, they were not career offenders. While an error occurred, it was invited by the defendants and was not so plain as to warrant remand. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Waide encountered the Lexington police after a shed fire occurred on the property next to his. Although no one suspected Waide of being involved with the fire and there was no evidence of arson, the fire investigator noticed surveillance cameras attached to Waide’s duplex residence and asked Waide to turn over his DVR. When Waide declined, the investigator obtained a warrant to enter Waide’s apartment and retrieve the DVR. When six officers arrived at Waide’s duplex to execute that warrant, their threatened entry and questions about whether Waide had drugs on the premises caused Waide to admit that his apartment contained a small amount of marijuana. This confession led to the issuance of two subsequent warrants to search both units of Waide’s duplex for narcotics–the other unit was occupied by Waide’s mother. The searches yielded a firearm plus large quantities of drugs and money.After the district court denied Waide’s motions to suppress evidence, he entered into a conditional guilty plea to the offense of possessing cocaine and heroin with the intent to distribute the drugs and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The affidavit in support of the DVR warrant lacked reliable evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the shed fire was due to arson or any other criminal activity. The incriminating evidence should be suppressed because it stemmed from the exploitation of the unlawful DVR warrant. View "United States v. Waide" on Justia Law