Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In its 2014 “Mitchell” decision, the Sixth Circuit held that robbery, as defined under Tennessee law, is a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). Based on that holding, the district court sentenced Belcher to a 15-year mandatory-minimum sentence under ACCA after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The Sixth Circuit rejected Belcher’s arguments that the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Elonis” and 2021 “Borden” decisions undermine Mitchell. Those decisions clarified that ACCA’s definition of violent felony excludes offenses where the defendant’s use or threatened use of force can be reckless or negligent (as opposed to intentional). Tennessee defines robbery as “the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” The court rejected Belcher’s argument that Tennessee precedent leaves room for cases where the defendant did not intend to cause fear, but where the victim actually did experience (or reasonably could have experienced) fear nonetheless; no Tennessee court has construed the fear element that way. The court also rejected Belcher’s argument that a jury, rather than the court, must determine whether a defendant’s prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of ACCA. Three of his prior offenses each came at least six years apart. View "United States v. Belcher" on Justia Law

Inman was part of the majority of the Michigan House of Representatives who, along with a majority of the Senate, voted to repeal the prevailing-wage law. Inman was charged with soliciting bribes for his prevailing-wage vote: attempted extortion under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. 1951; soliciting a bribe, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B); and making a false statement to the FBI, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) (Count III). A jury acquitted Inman on Count III but hung on Counts I and II. The district court dismissed those counts, concluding that the acquittal precluded a retrial on the other counts.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The acquittal on the false-statement charge did not decide any fact that necessarily precludes a verdict against Inman on the extortion and bribery-solicitation charges, so issue preclusion does not apply. To show the underlying corrupt agreement, the prosecution did not need to produce evidence that Inman lied to the FBI. It needed to produce evidence that Inman extorted or attempted to solicit an agreement where Inman would vote on the prevailing-wage law in exchange for payment. At retrial, a jury must decide whether Inman actually extorted or attempted to solicit such an agreement—a question not answered by the acquittal on Count III. View "United States v. Larry Inman" on Justia Law

Akron Police received an anonymous call that men were smoking marijuana in Whitney Park, "a high-crime area." Several officers, including Detective Elam, went to investigate. They arrived at the park in the early evening and saw a group of 10-15 men, including McCallister; they detected the odor of marijuana and began stopping people. Four men, including McCallister, tried to walk away. An officer instructed them to stop moving and place their hands on their heads. McCallister did so. Elam saw a “little bump out on his shirt,” which the detective concluded was a gun, and saw McCallister “turn[] his body in towards the huddle so no one would see.” Elam asked McCallister if he was carrying any weapons; McCallister did not respond. As McCallister raised his hands, his shirt lifted, and Elam saw a firearm magazine tucked into McCallister’s waistband. Elam retrieved the weapon.McCallister was indicted for illegal possession of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), and possessing an unregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officers had reasonable suspicion that all of the men were smoking marijuana, justifying the detention, and reasonable suspicion that McCallister was armed and dangerous, justifying the search. View "United States v. McCallister" on Justia Law

Williams pled guilty to possession of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on four previous Kentucky robbery convictions, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). When Williams was 16, he pled guilty to robbery in the first degree, Ky. Rev. Stat. 515.020, and three counts of robbery in the second degree, section 515.030. The four robberies, committed on separate days by the same individuals, were charged in the same indictment. Williams argued that the second-degree robbery convictions were not ACCA predicate offenses because they were not violent and not separate offenses. The district court overruled the objection, calculated a guidelines range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment, considered 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s factors, and sentenced Williams to 200 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Looking at Kentucky law as a whole, robbery occurs when the defendant steals using force sufficient to overcome the victim’s will and does not encompass taking without the victim’s awareness or without physical force; second-degree robbery in Kentucky requires a sufficient level of force to satisfy ACCA’s elements clause. It is not a crime that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

VanDemark owns the Used Car Supermarket, which sells cars from two lots in Amelia, Ohio. In 2013-2014, VanDemark funneled away his customers’ down payments and left them off his tax returns. He used this stashed-away cash to finance the mortgage on his mansion.The Sixth Circuit affirmed VanDemark’s convictions for helping prepare false tax returns, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2), structuring payments, 31 U.S.C. 5324(a)(3), and making false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. The down payments were taxable upon receipt, not, as VanDemark argued, when customers purchased the cars after leasing them. With respect to his missing 2013 personal return, the court stated that a defendant is guilty even if he helps prepare, without presenting, the fraudulent return. View "United States v. VanDemark" on Justia Law

Ziesel entered a bank wearing a mask and a hooded sweatshirt, approached the tellers, and said “give me all the money.” At some point, Ziesel told the tellers that “no one was going to get hurt.” Before leaving with the money, Ziesel told the tellers to get on the floor. Ziesel did not have a weapon, nor did he imply he had a weapon. Ziesel pleaded guilty to bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement for “physical restraint” under USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), resulting in an imprisonment range of 46-57 months. Without that enhancement, the range would have been 37-46 months.The judge noted that application of the enhancement was “a close question” but overruled Ziesel’s objection, stating: the simple communication “This is a bank robbery” connotes a certain degree of potential harm, whether a weapon is shown or not, and certainly, control is exercised by the robber ... when you are standing upright, and then to be told to go into prone position by somebody who appears able to exercise substantial force over you …. They believed that you posed a clear and present danger. The Sixth Circuit reversed Ziesel’s 46-month sentence. Neither the plain language of the Guidelines nor precedent supports application of the enhancement under thesed facts. View "United States v. Ziesel" on Justia Law

Bell was charged with distribution of a controlled substance that resulted in death, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, section 841(a)(1). Bell pled guilty to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense--distribution of a controlled substance. The district court accepted the guilty plea but ultimately rejected the plea agreement. The court then sentenced Bell to 30 months’ imprisonment—a sentence approximately 82 percent lower than that contemplated under the plea agreement. The government appealed, alleging a right to withdraw its consent to a plea to a lesser included, but not indicted, offense when a district court rejects a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the government’s arguments. Rule 11 contemplates that the rejection of a plea agreement allows the defendant, not the prosecutor, to withdraw or persist in the plea. Where, as here, the defendant pleads to all charges against him and chooses not to withdraw his pleas, there are no remaining charges for which the government may proceed to trial, and a subsequent re-indictment for the greater included offense implicates double jeopardy concerns under the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Alcoa Officers arrested an obviously inebriated Colson following a report that, while driving her SUV, she chased her 10-year-old son in a field and then crashed in a ditch, and transported her to a hospital. Colson then withdrew her consent. to a blood draw. Colson defied repeated orders to get back into the cruiser. During the struggle, an officer's knee touched Colson’s knee, followed by an audible “pop.” Colson started screaming “my fucking knee” but continued to resist. Once Colson was in the cruiser, officers called a supervisor, then took Colson to the jail where a nurse would perform the blood draw. Colson never asked for medical care. At the jail, Colson exited the vehicle and walked inside, with no indication that she was injured. As she was frisked, Colson fell to the ground and said “my fucking knee.” Jail nurse Russell asked Colson to perform various motions with the injured leg and compared Colson’s knees, commented “I don’t see no swelling,” and then left. A week later, Colson was diagnosed with a torn ACL, a strained LCL, and a small avulsion fracture of the fibular head. Colson pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, reckless endangerment, and DUI.Colson sued; only a claim for failure to provide medical care for her knee injury survived. The Sixth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. View "Colson v. City of Alcoa" on Justia Law

Maddux and his wife, Carman trafficked cigarettes in a way that bypassed governmental taxing authorities. They were indicted; Maddux pleaded guilty and Carman was convicted in 2016. Before their sentencing hearings, the government sought two multi-million-dollar money judgments against each of them—forfeiture orders representing the gross proceeds of their scheme. At sentencing, however, the district court failed to enter preliminary forfeiture orders, nor did it include the money judgments as “part of the sentence[s]” announced, 28 U.S.C. 2461(c); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B), (b)(4)(A)–(B). Years after their sentences were affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, the district court imposed the money judgments sought, justifying its late-issued money judgments by calling Rule 32.2(b)’s procedural requirements time-related directives—deadlines that may be violated so long as the defendant receives adequate notice and a hearing.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rule 32.2(b) is not a time-related directive. Its text, context, and purpose indicated that it is a mandatory claims-processing rule—one that ensures forfeiture is resolved fairly and fully before becoming final, which preserves judicial resources by avoiding wasteful appeals over avoidable errors. Once a criminal sentence is imposed, the judgment is final, both as to what it includes and what it lacks. If the government wishes to “enlarge [the] sentence” with forfeiture omitted from the sentence, it must timely appeal. View "United States v. Maddux" on Justia Law

Detroit police officers apprehended a fleeing suspect who had run across several yards, including White’s yard. Believing that the suspect had disposed of a weapon nearby, officers called in a canine unit to search. Bodycam and security camera footage captured the events that followed. Officer Cherry arrived with her trained canine, Roky. The White family had two dogs outside, White’s daughter, Mi-Chol, grabbed Chino, a pit bull, to put him inside but he escaped and ran to the front yard. Mi-Chol went inside to grab a leash. As Officer Cherry and Roky reached the corner of the adjoining yard, Chino lurched through the fence’s vertical spires and bit down on Roky’s snout. Roky yelped. Cherry turned and saw Roky trapped up against the fence with his nose in Chino’s mouth. Cherry tugged at Roky’s leash and yelled at Chino to “let go.” Chino began “thrashing.” Unable to free Roky and afraid for the dog’s life, Cherry shot Chino. Six seconds passed between Chino’s attack and Cherry’s shot. Chino died from the shot. The Whites sued. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, citing qualified immunity. Officer Cherry acted reasonably. View "White v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law