Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Adolphe was found murdered in front of his apartment building. Adolphe and Carr had been dating. Carr, age 16, was arrested and entered an Alford plea in 2008 to second-degree manslaughter, conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to commit burglary, and tampering with physical evidence. She was paroled in 2009 and discharged in 2018. In 2019, Kentucky Governor Bevin granted Carr “the full and unconditional pardon she has requested.”A year later, Carr sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants fabricated evidence, coerced false statements, and withheld exculpatory evidence. The district court dismissed Carr’s complaint, finding that her section 1983 claims were not cognizable under the Supreme Court’s “Heck” decision. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While a full pardon does not always indicate that the individual is innocent, Heck did not impose a prerequisite of innocence to seek relief under section 1983; a full pardon in Kentucky removes all legal consequences so that a plaintiff can proceed with her section 1983 claims. View "Carr v. Louisville-Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Bell asked why Officer Korkis pulled him over. Korkis responded that Bell first needed to provide his driver’s license, registration, and car insurance and that more officers were on their way. Bell claims the officers forcefully removed him from his vehicle, despite Bell volunteering again to exit on his own. Dash-cam videos show Korkis and Bell arguing for three minutes. Korkis asked for Bell’s information about 20 times, then reached into the window to unlock the door. A physical struggle ensued, not fully visible in the videos. Officers eventually pried open the door and told Bell to get on the ground; he repeatedly refused. Officers wrestled him to the pavement, where he refused to comply. An officer warned Bell about the taser. Bell still did not put his hands behind his back. An officer tased him.Bell sued the officers (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming they violated the Fourth Amendment’s bar against excessive force. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part after holding that the video footage could be considered at the motion-to-dismiss stage to determine whether allegations in the complaint were implausible. The court dismissed the appeal with respect to claims concerning the officers removing Bell from his car, noting that factual issues remain. With respect to claims concerning the tasing, Bell had not shown that the officers violated his clearly established rights. View "Bell v. City of Southfield" on Justia Law

After going to Helton’s home to execute a warrant for his arrest, Knox County Deputy Mullins sought a search warrant. His affidavit stated that Mullins had received complaints about Helton selling methamphetamine; that a reliable source advised that a person he was with purchased methamphetamine at the residence; and that when the officers arrived Helton had a clear baggie that appeared to hold residue. Executing the search warrant, deputies found illegal drugs, currency, and multiple firearms. Deputies then obtained a warrant and searched the home of Helton’s mother, recovering money, firearms, and drugs. Helton was charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of firearms. The court rejected motions to suppress, upholding both warrants. At trial, Moore testified about a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Helton. Juror 191 told the judge that she recognized Moore as someone that she would watch during her employment at a shopping center “in case she was going to steal,” but that she was not aware of Moore actually shoplifting. Over Helton’s opposition, the district court struck Juror 191 on the basis that she personally knew Moore and had twice responded “I think so” when asked if she could set aside her knowledge of Moore. The Sixth Circuit upheld Helton’s convictions and 264-month sentence. While the search warrant did not satisfy constitutional requirements, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "United States v. Helton" on Justia Law

Rangers, responding to an incident at Mammoth Cave, encountered a female technician who was monitoring a cave restoration project. She explained that Zabel, a contractor, had pinned her against a wall and attempted to kiss her, grabbed her buttocks and breasts, and exposed his penis. The rangers used an elevator to enter the cave and walked 25 minutes through dark, narrow passages until they found Zabel. They recorded the ensuing encounter. The rangers introduced themselves and explained that he was “not under arrest,” was “free to go,” and that he did not have to talk to them. Zabel made several incriminating statements, including that he had grabbed the woman’s butt and showed her his penis, which “may have been a little” erect.Zabel, indicted under 18 U.S.C. 2244(b), unsuccessfully moved to suppress those statements, arguing that the rangers improperly solicited those statements during a custodial interrogation without reciting his Miranda rights. Zabel then pled guilty, The PSR sought an upward variance and an upward departure (U.S.S.G. 5K2.8) for Extreme Conduct because Zabel’s behavior was more egregious than typical abusive sexual contact. The district court recessed so that Zabel and his counsel could review recorded statements by the victim and provided Zabel an opportunity to testify. Zabel declined. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment plus a life term of supervised release. The court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress and the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his custodial sentence and term of supervised release. View "United States v. Zabel" on Justia Law

Whitley was the subject of a traffic stop for failing to come to a standstill before exiting a driveway onto a street. Before the stop, officers had been surveilling Whitley for suspected drug trafficking. During the stop, officers noticed a digital scale sitting on Whitley’s lap. They asked Whitley to exit the vehicle Whitley initially refused but complied after his mother arrived. A drug-detection dog arrived and alerted to the presence of narcotics in Whitley’s vehicle. The officers then conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle. They found a Glock handgun with an extended magazine, ammunition, $7,600 in cash, a digital scale, and a pound and a half of marijuana.Whitley unsuccessfully moved to suppress that evidence, and several post-Miranda statements, as fruits of an unlawful stop and search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers abandoned the permissible traffic stop after seeing the scale but had reasonable suspicion to continue detaining Whitley such that the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In addition to the scale and apparent marijuana residue on the dashboard., the officers observed Whitley entering and leaving a suspected drug house, counting a wad of cash, making short stops, and moving a bag from the seat to the trunk. The drug-detection dog was certified, so its positive alert was sufficient to establish probable cause. View "United States v. Whitley" on Justia Law

Burnett was charged with failure to appear for a work-detail program. At Burnett’s arraignment hearing, his behavior was so erratic that the court held Burnett in contempt and sentenced him to jail. A mental health representative advised Sergeant Griffith that Burnett should be placed on suicide watch. While being escorted to a cell, Burnett attempted to break away. Griffith pulled Burnett backward. Burnett continued his efforts. Griffith took him down to the floor with significant force, then knelt over Burnett in an effort to control him. Burnett continued moving. Officer Tessar joined Griffith. Burnett claims that he temporarily lost consciousness. Griffith called for assistance when he noticed that Burnett had a laceration on his head and was bleeding. Other officers and a nurse arrived. Burnett was taken to a hospital, where he received three stitches, then was discharged in good condition. Burnett claims that he suffers from PTSD, migraines, back pain, and personality changes.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The law at the time that Griffith acted did not provide him with fair warning that his actions would violate Burnett’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force; his actions were not so egregious as to obviate the requirement of identifying precedent that places the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. View "Burnett v. Griffith" on Justia Law

In 2019, Miller was arrested at his home for failure to appear. Police woke Miller up in his bedroom and searched his room and his person. They found methamphetamine, marijuana, and a shotgun at the end of his bed. Miller pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government objected to the PSR’s recommended offense level, arguing Miller’s prior convictions for Tennessee drug delivery were “controlled substance offenses” under the U.S.S.G. The district court rejected the government’s argument, citing Sixth Circuit precedent (Havis), which held that “the least culpable conduct” proscribed by Tennessee’s drug delivery statute was “the attempted delivery of a controlled substance” and attempt crimes were not “controlled substance offenses” because they were omitted from the Guidelines’ text.The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that it has repeatedly acknowledged that “the parties’ assumption in Havis was wrong.” The parties in Havis were mistaken about the scope of Tennessee’s drug delivery statute. Evaluating the statute anew, the court concluded it is a controlled substance offense and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

Groom tried to refill a prescription for a drug that treats opioid addiction. A technician informed Groom that he could not use a coupon. Groom grabbed the prescription and left without paying. The pharmacist followed him out, offering a lower-cost drug. Groom kept walking. The dispatcher alerted police officers that a man carrying a large knife had robbed the pharmacy and that the suspect, Groom, ran toward another store. Captain Russ and Officer Lee responded. Russ was familiar with Groom, having heard that Groom suffered from mental illness and had attempted suicide. They spotted Groom in a parking lot and exited their vehicles. Russ announced himself. Groompulled a large knife out of a sheath, saying: “Not today David.” Both officers drew their firearms. Groom ignored several commands to drop the knife and walked toward Russ, waving his knife, stopping 30 feet from Russ. He repeatedly told Russ to shoot him. Lee testified that, although Groom at first was “being very belligerent,” he stopped walking and eventually stopped waving the knife. After 20 seconds, Groom took another step. Russ shot Groom. He died from the wound.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court granted Russ summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing “[p]recedent involving similar facts” putting this case “beyond the otherwise hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" to "provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.” View "Lee v. Russ" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rife moved from Kentucky to Cambodia, took a position as an elementary school teacher, began a relationship with a Cambodian woman, and adopted a young Cambodian girl. For six years, Rife lived and worked exclusively in Cambodia, obtaining annual “Extension of Stay” temporary visas through his U.S. passport. Rife did not visit the U.S. during that period but maintained a bank account and property in Kentucky. In 2018, Cambodian authorities investigated allegations that Rife had sexually assaulted his young female students. Rife’s school terminated his employment. He returned to Kentucky, where federal agents interviewed him. Rife eventually confessed to abusing two female students.Rife was charged with two counts of illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place, 18 U.S.C. 2423(c). The government did not allege that Rife offered anything of value in connection with his abuse of the girls; his “illicit sexual conduct” was non-commercial in nature. Rife argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to punish him for non-commercial acts of sexual abuse that occurred in a foreign country years after he had traveled there. The district court denied Rife’s motion to dismiss, passing over the foreign commerce issue but upholding section 2423(c) as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to implement the Optional Protocol. The court sentenced Rife to 252 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent; section 2423(c) as applied here was within Congress’s power to enact legislation implementing treaties. View "United States v. Rife" on Justia Law

In 2011, Portis and Thompson committed several robberies. Each pleading guilty to conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); they “expressly and voluntarily waive[d]” their rights to appeal their convictions or to challenge their convictions through a postconviction proceeding, “including a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255.” Seven years later, the Supreme Court determined, in Davis, that section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague concerning “crimes of violence,” ultimately requiring the government to prove that a defendant met the requirements of the statute’s elements clause. Davis applies retroactively. After Davis, the Sixth Circuit held that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not count as a predicate “crime of violence” under section 924(c);s residual clause or the elements clause.Portis and Thompson sought habeas relief. The government responded that the men waived their rights to file section 2255 motions and that the robberies (rather than the conspiracy) served as the predicate offenses. The district court denied the motions on the merits. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal. The plea agreement, in no uncertain terms, waives each defendant’s right to challenge his convictions in “a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law